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Twice each year, the editor reports to the APSA Council on *Review* operations, and the editor's Annual Report is printed in *PS* each December. In these reports, editors discuss various issues related to the *Review* and provide statistics on number of manuscripts received, their distribution by field, the length of time articles spend in the review process, acceptance rates, etc. These annual reports are the most systematic sources of information about *Review* procedures. Nevertheless, it may be useful to use this space on occasion as an additional outlet for information about what happens to manuscripts after they arrive at the *Review* office and to provide news about our operations.

After they are logged in, manuscripts are distributed among our interns for summary and analysis, and a list of potential reviewers is constructed. These materials and the author's abstract are sent to appropriate members of the editorial board for advice about the suitability of reviewers on our list, additional reviewer suggestions, and guidance about any special issues we should consider in the review of the paper. Based on all this information, the editor selects a panel of three reviewers. We ask for reviews to be sent within a month, but this does not always occur. In many cases, we have to select new reviewers to get the three reviews *APSR* editors have generally thought desirable for each manuscript. Scientific publishing as we know it today is heavily dependent upon the peer review process. While peer review is justly celebrated in the abstract, it obviously depends entirely on the largely unsung contributions of individual reviewers, and all who participate deserve the gratitude of the profession.

On this first round, a substantial proportion of manuscripts receive conflicting reviews. Reviewers may focus on different aspects of a paper and make different (and occasionally conflicting) suggestions for revision. Not infrequently, reviewer summary evaluations differ significantly. Authors of manuscripts with generally positive reviews may be invited to revise and resubmit their papers, and revised papers are reviewed again. Almost all papers published in the *APSR* have been through this "*R* and *R*" process. Once in a while, a paper is more or less accepted on its initial submission, but even then authors usually make some revisions in response to reviewer comments.

We have space to publish only about 10% of the papers received. We try to return the others to authors as quickly as possible. Many among the 90% of submissions that we cannot publish will later be published in other journals. For the 10% that are successful at the *APSR*, our review procedures can occasionally be lengthy. One paper was recently accepted 23 months to the day after its initial submission and will finally appear in the next issue of the *Review*, two and a half years after the original version was submitted. Much of the intervening time was used by the author to revise the paper, but our careful review process also contributed its share. Toward the other end of the spectrum, one paper in this issue was submitted to my office last September as a revision that had been invited by the last editor. Thanks largely to very speedy reviewers, the resubmission process went quickly and the author made the final revisions in time for the paper to be included in this issue, which will appear slightly less than nine months after the revised paper was received. The remainder of the papers in this issue were all resubmissions that were sent out for their second review from Rochester; several went through an additional revision initiated by me. Almost all the papers in this issue were accepted since I became editor, but two or three were accepted during the editorial transition on the recommendation of the former editor.

Accepted papers are professionally copy edited, and the *Review* goes through four print stages—galleys, page proofs, revised pages, and "blue lines"—before it is mailed to its 16,000 subscribers. While the process may seem leisurely to authors and readers, the editor and staff are constantly scrambling to keep up with the manuscript flow. More than 100 papers at various stages in the review process were sent to us when the Michigan State office opened last September, and 320 new papers were received in the first seven months of my editorship. We solicited more than 1,500 reviews for these papers. We hope the end result of this process is a journal whose articles will be consulted by scholars long into the future.

Faster forms of scholarly communication have arrived. Via the Internet, authors can make papers available almost instantaneously to readers all over the world. Some potential *APSR* authors are already doing this independently or via forums organized by groups of scholars. Several papers currently under review at the *APSR* are already available on line. How such electronic distribution should relate to traditional print publication is now being actively discussed in the scholarly publishing community. In addition to independent distribution by authors, a few traditional print journals have electronic counterparts and many new "on-line" journals have been established, some using peer review processes. Some on-line journals specifically preclude submission of papers published or distributed elsewhere, whether in print or electronically. Similarly, some print journals will not consider for publication articles that have been posted on the Internet, defining that as publication (unlike an author's limited distribution of requested materials to colleagues, which is not considered publication). Obviously, the *APSR* does not review papers published elsewhere in print form, but until the legal and scholarly communities reach consensus about whether electronic distribution is "publication," it is too early to say how electronic distribution will affect the *Review*.

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Ada W. Finifter

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The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985

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We present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables. We hypothesize that strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type, among other variables, will play key roles in determining the duration of war. We test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments. We find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration. We also find that historically, on average, mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent.

The decision by leaders to initiate or join a war is fundamentally a political decision. The impact of political decision making on international conflict does not end when a war begins, however. The decision to *continue* fighting a war is also a fundamentally political decision. Because the processes by which wars are fought are powerfully influenced by politically driven choices, we believe this to be an important area for research. In this paper we seek to understand why wars last as long as they do. We test several hypotheses about the causes of war duration using a statistical hazard model. We investigate four specific questions. (1) What factors cause some wars to last longer than others, and do domestic political factors significantly affect expected war durations when added to a realpolitik model? (2) Is war duration-dependent, that is, does the length of time a war has lasted influence the time it is likely to continue as conflict becomes institutionalized? (3) Can we accurately predict the duration of interstate wars, and in doing so use only ex ante data? (4) Does mobilization, often discussed as a key strategic factor in wartime, make a difference in determining war duration?

Answering these questions and understanding the duration of interstate war is important for several reasons. War duration is a key factor influencing the costs of war. A simple regression of war duration on battle deaths using the Small and Singer (1982) list of interstate wars since 1816 reveals that 24,000 soldiers die (on average) every month a war continues. In a more political vein, wars and their duration have important effects on leaders' popularity (Russett 1990) and on the stability of national regimes (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). Anticipating the outcome, duration, and costs of possible wars, leaders choose what wars to fight, leading to possible selection bias in the analysis of international conflict (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). An improved model of war duration will help us better understand the nature of state behavior and interstate conflict.

This question is also important in helping analyze the role of military mobilization in war. An important body of literature suggests that military mobilization is a significant component in the process by which wars are fought in general (e.g., Trachtenberg 1991; Van Evera 1984). Others argue that states rarely jump through windows of opportunity such as those created by different mobilization rates (Lebow 1984; Reiter 1995; Sagan 1986). While we do not have data which allow us to test claims about mobilization effects (or their anticipated effects) at the very outset of a war, we do test whether mobilization across the course of a multiyear war affects war duration.

Little empirical work on war duration exists. That which does exist relies on questionable methodology or is limited in the independent variables examined. To explore how system polarization affects the duration of war, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) used an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Given that the dependent variable of war duration is positive by construction, this technique was inappropriate for statistical reasons. More recently, Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) used an underspecified hazard model to compare the duration of wars to the duration of strikes, riots, and family arguments, predicting (and finding) that wars will become institutionalized over time. Without a general theoretical model to guide the inclusion and exclusion of independent variables, however, little weight can be given to the finding of duration dependence as an important factor in war duration because such variables could alter estimates of the hazard curve's shape. Other studies have included no independent variables (e.g., Horvath 1968; Morrison and Schmittlein 1980), simply fitting curves to war duration data. We believe that these data-driven models are seriously misspecified and offer little theoretical insight into war.

We draw from two bodies of work that point to theoretical models of war duration. First, some quantitative studies have tried to predict battle duration using a basically realpolitik approach. Epstein (1987) builds upon Lanchester differential equations approaches and develops a model of battles which includes military exchange rates, relative capabilities, strategy, and skill and technology levels. Second, studies of war termination (starting with Iklé 1971) have focused on the political nature of the decision to surrender in wartime.

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Although the theoretical treatment of war termination has gradually become more formalized (e.g., Mitchell and Nicholson 1983; Wittman 1979), the testing of both realpolitik and political hypotheses about war termination has remained informal, and war-termination studies have examined only a few cases. We believe that it is important not only to consider both realpolitik factors and regime behavior and type in analyzing war duration but also to test our predictions empirically using a population of wars.

THEORETICAL APPROACH

The General Model

We assume that states are headed by rational leaders. By rational we mean that leaders act to maximize the net gains resulting from a deliberate process of decision making. Once a war has begun, the two or more leaders involved periodically choose either to continue fighting or to seek to end their participation in that war by accepting some negotiated settlement or surrendering. A war ends when all the involved leaders have chosen to end their participation in the war rather than continue fighting. The decision to try to end a state's participation in a war will be made when the costs of continuing to fight become greater than the benefits. This quite general conception matches that of Wittman (1979), Morrow (1985), Stam (1996), and Vuchinich and Teachman (1993).

We assume that wars occur over some issue, with some fundamental benefit at stake, such as a piece of territory, economic influence over an area, or some government policy. We also assume these issues to be fixed and exogenous, despite the possible manipulation of the apparent stakes by political leaders. Unlike benefits, the costs of continuing a war rise over time. Different types of states may have different abilities to absorb these accumulating costs. Whether a war continues at some point is then determined by the benefits at stake, the costs of fighting, and states' ability to deal with costs. The causes of longer war durations are factors that increase the stakes, decrease the expense, and increase countries' ability to deal with the costs of war.

Time and the Costs of War

A crucial element in our approach is the relationship between time and the costs to key parts of the state during a war. Militarily, the passage of time may allow states to reduce the costs of fighting by adapting to their opponents' technology or strategy and as such may be viewed by some states' militaries as an asset. Although time can be the best friend of a state trying to adapt to its opponent's war fighting apparatus, it can be a politician's worst nightmare when attempting to maintain public and elite support for the war effort. Russett argues: "Governments lose popularity in proportion to the war's cost in blood and money" (1990, 46). He finds that wars produce a brief spurt of increased popular support followed by increasing levels of social dislocation, dispute, and violent political protest. This suggests that withdrawal may ultimately be forced on leaders if the war drags on past the stage of initial enthusiastic public support, a strong argument against negative duration dependence, which we will test below (negative duration dependence suggests that the probability of a war ending will decrease as the war continues and becomes entrenched).

The problems of military adaptation over time and leaders' inability to maintain indefinite popular support for war create incentives for leaders to limit the amount of time that their states will be involved in a war. Leaders accomplish this in large part by choosing particular military strategies. We believe that it is not necessarily organizational biases which lead militaries to prefer massive and complex offensive strategies (Posen 1984; Snyder 1984b; Van Evera 1984). Rather, we argue that such strategies lead to quicker outcomes and are a rational response to the possible effects of strategic adaptation and rising domestic unrest.

Realpolitik Approach

Strategy and Doctrine. Military strategy has frequently been ignored in political scientists' quantitative studies of international conflict. Previous analyses suggest that strategy plays a key role in determining war outcomes (Dupuy 1979; Epstein 1987; Stam 1993). Strategy is also a main way in which leaders can affect the duration of a war, which is a key concern of decision makers. Since strategy is determined by a choice which can be made in the relatively short term, strategy is a main way states have of directing their power to influence other states.[1] We define military *strategy* as the general way in which a state uses its military forces in a war, and classify three basic types of strategy: *maneuver, attrition*, and *punishment*. Strategy differs in our terminology from *doctrine*, which refers to states' foreign policy *goals* and plans for attaining them. Doctrine can be fundamentally *offensive* or *defensive* depending upon whether state objectives are to maintain or to alter the status quo. Regardless of doctrine, states can use any of the three strategy types.

Maneuver Strategy. Maneuver strategies are those whereby states focus on the use of speed and mobility to disarm the opponent through disrupting the opponent's ability to organize forces effectively. These are often referred to as "blitzkrieg" strategies. When used under an offensive doctrine, the attacker seeks to occupy as much of the defender's territory as possible through a series of sequential actions in which physically occupying enemy territory may be more important than destroying enemy forces. Germany defeated France in World War II with this strategy. When used under a defensive doctrine, the defending state will use mobile forces to seek out, destroy, or disarm attacking forces wherever they are, rather than set up a relatively static defensive line.

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[1] Several other variables in the realpolitik approach, such as terrain or available forces (see below), represent *constraints* on leaders' choices of how to use power. While conceptually distinct, realists discuss both choices and constraints or resources as part of the same model. The results of the analysis do not depend upon both types of factors being included or excluded from the analysis.

Attrition Strategy. Attrition strategies seek to destroy or capture opposing forces, making them incapable of continuing to fight, without necessarily using mobility to achieve this. Typically, an attrition strategy seeks large confrontations with the enemy (Mearsheimer 1983, 34). On offense, Hitler adopted an attrition strategy in the Soviet Union, ordering his forces to take as many prisoners and to destroy as many forces as possible rather than bypass large battles, as they had in France. On defense, an attrition strategy typically employs a forward defense, as exemplified by the French Maginot line in World War II.

Punishment Strategy. Punishment strategies attempt to inflict such high costs on an opponent that the attack ceases or the opponent surrenders even though its military forces may not actually be defeated in battle. Unlike maneuver and attrition strategies, punishment is not necessarily a counter-force strategy. The punisher simply counts on being able to break the resolve of the enemy. In the West, punishment strategies developed from the theoretical work of Douhet and Mitchell (e.g., Mitchell 1921) and are exemplified by the logic behind the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) nuclear strategy. Another type of offensive punishment strategy is guerrilla warfare. Mao Tse-tung maintained that guerrilla forces should seek to avoid large military confrontations with the enemy and instead inflict damage only when they could avoid suffering serious costs themselves.

Military strategy has an important effect on the length of a war. Maneuver strategies offer the potential for, and anticipation of, the quickest outcomes. They concentrate on a narrow point of attack. Once a narrow salient has been opened, mobile forces move quickly toward rear areas, where they have the potential to cause enormous disruption to the opponent. Mobile strategies entail critical risks, however, because the advancing columns and their following logistical trains are themselves quite vulnerable (Luttwak 1987, 100–101). A maneuver strategy will tend to end relatively quickly, as its rapid success or failure becomes clear.

Attrition strategies rely upon wearing down the opponent and are not predicated on speed in the same way as maneuver strategies. There is less need to move quickly as long as damage is being inflicted on the opponent. Attrition strategies do not depend on the success or failure of any individual battle to as great an extent as a sequential movement strategy, and as a result they are less risky than maneuver strategies.

States using punishment strategies count on their opponents having difficulty adapting to the long-term imposition of costs during a war. The aim is for the target state ultimately to suffer political defeat through the erosion of political resolve among elites and/or mass publics. As the strategy counts on erosion of support rather than destruction or defeat of forces, wars in which one side or both use punishment strategies will last longest of all.

H_{Maneuver}: *Wars in which one or both sides use a maneuver strategy will be the shortest.*

$H_{\text{Punishment}}$: *Wars in which one or both sides use a punishment strategy will be the longest.*

Terrain. Dense terrain (heavy woods, jungles, swamps, or mountains) hinders the movement of both invading and defending forces. In dense terrain, military forces can hide quite easily. While this makes ambushes possible, if fighting begins to inflict high costs on a military force, it can move out of the battle and hide, lowering the costs of fighting. We argue that since costs can be reduced in dense terrain, wars fought in such terrain will last longer. In contrast, flat terrain will lead to shorter wars, as forces can move quickly and fight decisively with little time lost in finding the opponent. Terrain (as well as the capability factors discussed next) can be viewed as a constraint on leaders, influencing such choices as what strategy to employ.

H_{Terrain}: *Wars fought on flat, open terrain will be shorter than those fought on inhospitable terrain.*

Strategy and Terrain Interaction. Terrain and strategy choice also interact. Decision makers and military leaders typically anticipate that terrain and strategy will affect their ability to inflict costs on the opponent, and they will pick a strategy to match the terrain in which they are fighting. For example, states with rough terrain, such as jungles or mountains, will be more likely to fight with punishment rather than maneuver strategies, since the rugged terrain hinders rapid movement but allows forces to inflict costs upon their opponent with relative impunity.

It is possible, however, for leaders to choose an "inappropriate" strategy for given terrain. If a state tries to use a punishment strategy in open terrain, for example, then typically it will find it difficult to sustain the secrecy necessary to fight with a Maoist-style strategy. Without the cover and concealment of rough terrain, more time will have to elapse between operations as military units struggle to maintain the necessary level of secrecy in the open. Given the mismatch of strategy and terrain, paradoxically the war will be longer than when punishment can be applied almost continuously. Similarly, if a state uses a maneuver strategy in terrain that cannot support the quick transportation of soldiers and supplies, then it will have difficulty implementing its strategy, leading to a longer duration. In all cases, wars fought with punishment strategies should last longer than wars fought using movement strategies, but within the context of a single strategy choice, a mismatch of strategy with terrain will slow the war.

$H_{\text{Interaction}}$: *Wars fought with a strategy appropriate to the terrain will be shorter.*

Balance of Capabilities. When one side is stronger than its adversary, it will be able to inflict more damage on the adversary in a given period than the adversary is able to inflict on it, and the opponent may be quickly overwhelmed. This will lead to the weaker side surrendering sooner than it otherwise would, as it recognizes the probability of winning the ongoing conflict is small. When two armies are relatively equal in size, however, neither side is likely to collapse quickly, leading to a longer war.

$H_{\text{Balance of Capabilities}}$: *The greater the imbalance of the two sides, the quicker is the war.*

Total Military Capabilities. The absolute size of military forces also affects war duration. When countries have larger militaries, they can absorb more damage before they are forced to give up or otherwise seek to end the war. In addition, it simply takes more time for any military to fight through a large opposing army than through a small opposing army.

$H_{\text{Total Capabilities}}$: *The greater the total military forces involved in a war, the longer is the war.*

Population. When countries are involved in a war, they draw upon both material and human resources to fight the war. Larger countries have more human resources on which they can draw than do smaller countries. They can thus absorb more casualties and mobilize more people than can smaller countries before reaching their limit of fighting.

$H_{\text{Total Population}}$: *The greater the total population involved in a war, the longer is the war.*

As with military forces, it may be the case that an imbalance of population will lead to a quicker end to a war, as one side can draw upon more human resources than its adversary.

$H_{\text{Population Ratio}}$: *The greater the disparity in the size of the opposing countries' populations, the quicker is the war.*

Military Quality. When one state's military has better-trained troops and equipment of higher technology than that of the other, it can inflict relatively more damage on the adversary in a given amount of time than the adversary can inflict on it. A better-equipped military can also absorb more damage than a lower-quality military before collapsing. As a result, when the disparity between the adversaries' military quality is high, the war will end more quickly.

H_{Quality}: *The greater the difference in the two sides' military quality, the shorter is the war.*

Surprise. Military strategists often discuss the importance of surprise (Axelrod 1979; Clausewitz 1976; Dupuy 1979; Sun Tzu 1991). Strategic surprise occurs when a state is forced to change how it has planned to fight the overall war based on a sudden military move by its opponent. For example, the enemy could suddenly increase its military commitment or change strategy. Note that both sides can achieve strategic surprise at different times in a single war. In the Korean War, the North Koreans surprised the United States and South Korea with their initial attack, the United States achieved surprise with the Inchon landing, and the Chinese surprised the United States with their sudden entry into the war.

H_{Surprise}: *If a state achieves strategic surprise, then the war will be shorter.*

Mobilization. States' ability to mobilize their resources for war is perceived to be a key factor in their ability to prevail in a conflict (Trachtenberg 1991). Differences in mobilization rates have also been blamed as a cause of war, particularly in World War I (Snyder 1984a; Van Evera 1984). Yet, the argument that mobilization has a substantial influence on war outcomes or duration has, to our knowledge, not been broadly tested. While we cannot test propositions about preemptive motives resulting from anticipated short-term advantages at the outset of a war or preventive motives prior to a power transition, we can test the effect of longer term mobilization over the course of a war.

We argue that the mobilization of resources which varies during a war should not affect war duration for two reasons. First, most interstate wars are quite short. The mean war duration in our data set is approximately 15 months, the median less than that. Since most wars are won or lost in a short time, the year-to-year mobilization of capabilities during a war should be expected to have relatively little aggregate effect. Second, when a war does continue for more than a short period, states can adapt to their situation and to any mobilization problems that they have.

$H_{\text{Mobilization}}$: *Military mobilization during a war will have little effect on war duration.*

Issue Salience. Different wars are fought over different issues reflecting different potential benefits. The greater the benefits at stake in a conflict, the more costs rational leaders will be willing to accept in that conflict (Zimmerman 1973), and the longer state leaders will be able to convince domestic audiences to continue fighting. Realists in particular distinguish salient security and territorial issues from issues of trade or extended possessions.

H_{Salience}: *The more salient the issues at stake, the longer is the war.*

Domestic Political Approach: Regime Behavior and Type

Somewhat paradoxically, we believe that both highly repressive and highly democratic regimes will be associated with shorter wars. States at neither extreme will be involved in longer wars.

Repression. Leaders in highly repressive regimes may choose to fight in wars with objectively low chances for victory but potentially large gains to the repressive elite if the state pulls off an improbable victory. These leaders also know that they can remain in power by repressing the opposition, even if they lose a war. Leaders who cannot suppress the opposition as efficiently will be acutely aware of the postwar domestic costs of losing (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). As a result, they will be less likely to become involved in highly risky wars. In most cases risky wars are mismatches. Consequently, they are likely to end more rapidly than wars in which the opponents are closely matched in capabilities, and so repressive states will be more likely to get involved in mismatched wars which end quickly.

$H_{Repression}$: *Highly repressive states will select risky wars which are likely to end quickly.*

Democracy. Two plausible arguments support the hypothesis that democratic states are more likely to be involved in shorter wars than are nondemocratic states. First, because citizens are freer to voice their opposition to government policy in democracies than in nondemocracies, opposition to a war will surface more quickly in democracies. Democratic leaders may be less able to repress this dissent than are leaders in autocratic regimes. Therefore, democratic countries should be involved in shorter wars than are nondemocracies as leaders respond to actual or anticipated opposition by ending their war involvement sooner than they might otherwise. Second, wars involving democracies will be shorter because of choices made prior to the outbreak of war. Because they face more certain sanctions following a flawed choice, leaders in highly democratic states are likely to avoid, whenever possible, wars in which they anticipate long duration and the associated high political costs. This aversion to risky wars may account for the observed difference in duration.

$H_{Democracy}$: *The more democratic the states involved, the shorter is the war.*

Empirically, then, we expect to see the same type of effect for both the political behavior of repression and the institutional constraint posed by democracy. The democracy variable measures state type, while the repression variable measures a form of state behavior. By choosing this particular internal political behavior, we believe that state leaders indirectly manipulate the observed duration of wars. Democratic states may be constrained in their ability to repress opposition to leaders' choices, but in theory there is no reason that both authoritarian and participatory regimes could not choose or threaten to violently repress political dissent during war.

Other Approaches

Several other explanations germane to war duration are discussed in various areas of the international conflict literature, but they do not clearly fit under the labels "realpolitik" or "regime behavior and type." Without capturing the entire scope of other approaches, we present three important arguments here.

Duration Dependence. Duration dependence refers to whether the future endurance of an event is related directly to its past length. Nearly all the previous work on war duration (e.g., Vuchinich and Teachman 1993) has found that the relative likelihood of a war ending at any particular time decreases the longer the war lasts, and it is argued that such negative duration dependence is a basic characteristic of wars. Three theoretical arguments support this position. First, large organizations (such as militaries) stockpile resources in anticipation of conflict, which reduces the costs of war to states. Second, large organizations have the ability (through propaganda) to affect the *perceived* benefits of victory so that mass publics continue to support the organization's actions. Finally, states adapt over time to one another's strategy. The longer a war lasts, the more time states have to adapt their strategies to allow them to continue fighting. All these factors help stretch out wars by reducing the acceleration in the costs of fighting.

In contrast to the existing literature, we do not believe there is a theoretical reason for wars to be duration dependent. Rather, such apparent dependence is a result of underspecification. We believe the independent variables in our model capture the arguments underlying war's apparent duration dependence. Our strategy variables directly capture the impact of strategic choice and adaptation. The effect of organizational stockpiling and propaganda is captured by our inclusion of variables measuring the size of the participants' population and military forces. With these controls, we expect no duration dependence.

$H_{Duration\ Dependence}$: *The length of war is not duration dependent.*

Previous Disputes. Literature on enduring rivalries has recently begun to emphasize that interstate conflicts are likely to be connected over time (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1993). For example, it has been shown that past disputes between states have significant effects on conflict initiation (Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992). Previous disputes also may have important effects on conflict duration. Repeated disputes between states are likely to raise the salience or stakes for the two sides. In addition, as they recur domestic constituencies are likely to form in opposition to the opponent (as was the case over time during the Cold War in the United States). The longer the history of conflict between states, the easier it will be for leaders to justify continued fighting to domestic audiences. Previous disputes thus may institutionalize conflict.

$H_{Disputes}$: *The more numerous the previous disputes between states, the longer is the war.*

Number of Actors. One emphasis of institutional approaches to international politics is that international coalitions (most commonly alliances, but also groups of states fighting together) must deal with collective action problems, which have implications for large war-fighting coalitions. As the number of participants in a war increases and the benefits of potential victory become distributed among more actors, the potential gains from victory for any individual state shrink. When many states are involved in fighting, some of them may receive no tangible benefits at all from victory. Because of smaller and possibly more abstract benefits, the leader of an individual state in a coalition thus will be less able to convince domestic audiences to continue fighting than if the state were fighting alone. We expect that the more states who fight in a war, the more quickly a coalition will fall apart due to collective action problems, leading to a shorter war. Note that our argument is the opposite of that made by Blainey (1988, 197) and Vasquez (1994, 258–60). Blainey argues that balanced capabilities, multiple fronts, and no danger of outside intervention make multistate wars last longer. Because we control for these variables, and because Blainey fails to consider the collective action problem of coordinating continued military action, we believe the opposite.

$H_{\text{Number of Actors}}$: *The more states involved in a war, the shorter is its duration.*

METHODOLOGY

To test our general theory and hypotheses of war duration, we apply a hazard model to the population of interstate wars which began between 1816 and 1985.

Hazard Analysis

The appropriate way to analyze the duration of events (such as wars) is to use a hazard model.[2] The use of OLS regression on data which take the form of some finite length of time is inappropriate. Since duration data are strictly positive, the assumption of normally distributed errors made by OLS regression is violated. Applying a linear model to duration data would introduce specification error, biased coefficients, and the possible prediction of negative values for expected war duration (Hanushek and Jackson 1977; King 1989).

Hazard models focus on the *hazard rate*, which is roughly the instantaneous rate at which events terminate at duration t, given that they have survived until time t. Technically, given observed duration times t, which are drawn from a random variable T, the hazard rate is the probability that an event will end in an interval of time $t + \Delta t$, as the interval goes to 0, given that the event has survived up to time t. The hazard rate is defined as

$$h(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{P(t \leq T \leq t + \Delta t \mid T \geq t)}{\Delta t}.$$

When applied to our data, a hazard model estimates the instantaneous rate at which transitions occur from a state of war to a state of peace as a function of a set of variables, including time. It is often intuitive to think of the hazard rate as the conditional probability of event termination at some time t. There are two important differences, however, between a hazard rate and a probability of event termination. First, since the hazard rate is instantaneous, the probability of event termination at any particular instant is infinitesimal (although it is possible to integrate the hazard rate over an interval, and so to estimate the probability that an event will end before a particular duration is reached). Second, the hazard rate is not bounded between 0 and 1, technically having no upper limit (Allison 1984, 23).

Hazard rates need not be constant over time, and one important use of hazard models is in identifying the duration dependence of a process. If the hazard rate in a distribution is increasing over time, and so an event is expected to end more quickly the longer it continues, the distribution is said to show positive duration dependence. If the hazard rate is decreasing over time, the distribution shows negative duration dependence. Negative duration dependence would occur if an event or situation tended to become institutionalized over time. Finally, if the hazard rate is independent of the time a situation has continued, there is no duration dependence.[3]

Several different parametric functional forms can be specified as the basis for a hazard model, with the exponential, Weibull, normal, log-normal, and gamma distributions representing only a few of many possibilities. There are few firm guidelines for selection of model form; as Kiefer (1988, 661) states, the family of duration distributions may be chosen "on the basis of a particular economic theory, convenience, and perhaps some preliminary plotting of data." For various reasons, we use a Weibull specification in our hazard analysis. The Weibull form allows for positive, negative, or no duration dependence; an exponential model assumes no duration dependence and would not allow us to test for it. The Weibull model permits the inclusion of independent variables and easy statistical estimation even when time-varying covariates (discussed below) are included, which the normal or log-normal model would not. It is also possible to add a specification for heterogeneity between cases; we test for this and find a Weibull model with gamma heterogeneity statistically indistinguishable in overall fit from the simpler Weibull. The distribution of survival times in our final data set is displayed in Figure 1.

Without any covariates, the basic functional form of the hazard rate $h(t)$, using a Weibull specification,[4] is

$$h(t) = \lambda p(\lambda t)^{p-1}.$$

The function $h(t)$ is the hazard rate at some time t. The parameter λ, on the right-hand side of the model, is a constant. The parameter p determines the shape of the hazard function and so accounts for duration dependence. When $p = 1$, there is no duration dependence, and the hazard rate $h(t)$ equals the constant rate λ. When $0 < p < 1$, the hazard rate decreases monotonically over time. When $p > 1$, the hazard rate increases monotonically.

Covariates (independent variables) can be added into the model as influences on the hazard rate by specifying

$$\lambda = e^{-\beta X_i}.$$

Direct interpretation of the final estimated β coefficients is difficult due to the presence of e and nonlinearity. The effect on duration of unit changes in the

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[2] Hazard models are also referred to as survival models, duration models, or event history models. A basic introduction to such analysis is provided by Allison (1984). Comprehensive sources for duration analysis include Greene (1993), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), Kiefer (1988), and Lancaster (1990). Recent applications of hazard analysis to political science include Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995), Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) and Warwick (1992).

[3] Another useful feature of duration models is that they can be applied to data with censoring, that is, data for which the actual ends of some events are not observed. We do not take advantage of this, however, as all the wars in our population have ended; we would have done so if any wars included in our data set were still ongoing.

[4] It is important to note that hazard model notation varies significantly among sources, resulting in some confusion, as the same model may appear with different signs and parameter normalizations (Greene 1992, 725). Our presentation here primarily uses the notation of Greene (1993).

FIGURE 1. Number of Wars Ending and Percentage Surviving over Time, 1816–1985.



independent variables is not constant over the range of the independent variables, as they would be in an OLS model; the effect changes depending both upon the value of the independent variable in question and the value of the other independent variables. The expected survival time for any given case (set of values x_i), however, given a Weibull distribution, is $E[t|x_i] = \exp(\beta' x_i)*\Gamma(1/p+1)$.[5] The best way to interpret the magnitude of the coefficients is to use this formula to calculate and compare the values of hypothetical cases. For example, if we calculated the expected duration of a war to be 16 months given an attrition strategy, but only 12 months given a maneuver strategy, while holding other variables constant at their means, we would estimate the effect of the strategy change on duration as −4 months, holding the other variables at their mean values. At the simplest level, positive coefficients in β predict longer duration, and negative coefficients predict shorter durations.

Analyses to be Performed

Hazard models are typically estimated on data consisting of one observation per event, using variables measured at the beginning of each event. Variable values are then constant within each event. In our case, this approach would use a data set with one observation per war, with variables measured at the beginning of the war. We use this type of model as a means of making ex ante predictions about war duration. The results of this analysis will help us investigate how accurately decision makers could have estimated war duration, since we use only information that could have been observed by leaders when the war began. Because the values of the independent variables (covariates) do not change over time under this method, it is often referred to as a "time-invariant covariate" model.

While reasonable in many situations, a model using time-invariant covariates may ignore important information if variables change over time within cases. For example, if the balance of forces in a war changes dramatically at some point, affecting expected war duration from that point forward, that information is lost. This problem is sometimes handled by creating variables which measure average values across an event (e.g., the mean of the balance of forces across several years of war). Using average values might make better predictions (albeit ex post) than would the use of initial values, since the effects of changes are indirectly included. A better approach is available, however. Relatively recent work has extended the estimation of hazard models to allow inclusion of *time-varying covariates*, that is, variables which vary independently over the course of an event (Greene 1993; Lancaster 1990; Petersen 1986). Each event can be broken into discrete intervals that have different values on the independent variables; each interval contributes to the log-likelihood function computed for an observation. Since it uses all available information without losing any to averaging, this type of model should provide a better fit to the data than a one-observation-per-event model using either ex ante or average variable values.

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[5] Greene (1993, 722) states that $E[t|x_i] = \exp(p\beta' x_i)$. This has been verified by Greene to be incorrect (via personal communication). The correct equation involves the Gamma function. The correct formulas for expected duration in Greene (1993) should be (p. 720) $E[t] = (1/\lambda)*\Gamma(1/p+1)$, and by substituting for λ (p. 722), $E[t|x_i] = \exp(\beta' x_i)*\Gamma(1/p+1)$.

Current data sets in international relations contain variables with annually measured values. As a result, we can fit a statistical model incorporating time-varying covariates to our data. We subdivide wars which cross a year boundary into multiple observations and refer to the resulting data as the time-varying covariate (TVC) data set. This includes the same wars as the time-invariant (hereafter non-TVC) data but has additional information. For example, for World War I, we have one observation in the non-TVC data set, but in the TVC data set we have data for 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1918. The model with time-varying covariates is substantively important, because significant variables may well change during a war as alliances are formed and broken, additional capabilities are mobilized, opposition to the war is voiced or repressed, and individual countries opt to continue fighting or stop their participation in the war. We compare the results of the TVC model to those from the non-TVC model to evaluate our ability to perform ex ante versus ongoing prediction of war duration. We use the statistical routines found in LIMDEP (Greene 1992) to perform our estimations.

OPERATIONALIZATION

We created two data sets. For the TVC analysis, the data were coded for each year of each war. For the non-TVC analysis, only the values for the first year of each war were used. Below, we discuss the operational details of the variables in the data sets.

Population of Cases

Our population of cases for analysis is all interstate wars begun between 1816 and 1985. To identify these, we use the Correlates of War (COW) project's database of interstate wars (Small and Singer 1982, and updates) and the Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) *Encyclopedia of Military History*. We made two changes to the COW data set for theoretical reasons. We disaggregated World War II and the Vietnam War into multiple wars because we believe that each consisted of more than one distinct military conflict. We believe that decision makers rarely anticipate or think in terms of large systems of wars, but instead think in terms of sequences of opponents. We split single wars apart when Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) identified separate and distinct negotiated settlements between various participants or identified fundamentally independent war-fighting efforts between or among the participants.[6]

Consider the two modified cases. The COW data set treats World War II as one multilateral six-year war which included the United States, Germany, France, Poland, and others. Following Dupuy, we break the war down into a series of sequential smaller wars, treating Germany versus Poland in 1939 as one war, Germany versus France in 1940 as a separate war, and so forth. These wars were quite distinct militarily and in time, with each war being violent and brief as far as the military organizations were concerned. In 1940 France formally surrendered to Germany in World War II, thereby ending the war between France and Germany. To include France as a continuing participant in World War II until 1945 is a misstatement. Similarly, in Vietnam the United States and North Vietnam reached a negotiated settlement in 1973. Following that, the North Vietnamese routed the South in what we consider to be a separate war two years later.

The wars included in our analysis and their participants, dates, and durations are listed in Appendix A. For inclusion in the population, 87 wars initially met our criteria. Because of missing military expenditure data, however, our analysis (and Appendix A) includes 78 wars when we use annual data, and 77 when we measure variables only in the first year of war. The non-TVC analysis involves 77 data points for the 77 wars, while the TVC analysis involves 78 wars, which include 169 separate (annual) data points.

War Duration

The duration data come from the COW interstate war data set, updated with information found in Clodfelter (1992), Dupuy and Dupuy (1986), and Langer (1980).

Independent Variables

Strategy. We coded strategy as a set of dummy variables following Stam's (1996) procedures. We first coded which side sought to alter or preserve the status quo (determining offensive or defensive doctrine), based on Dupuy and Dupuy (1986) and Holsti (1991). We then coded each state's military strategy using Dupuy and Dupuy (1986), Dupuy (1983), and Clodfelter (1992). If the historical consensus was that a state used a blitzkrieg strategy or the actor encircled and divided its opponent's forces, then we coded those instances as maneuver.[7] An attrition strategy was coded when states fought meeting engagements against their opponents. Instances in which a state followed a Maoist guerrilla strategy or in which civilians were the principal military target were coded as punishment. If states used multiple strategies, then we coded the strategy which absorbed the majority of the state's military assets. If more than one country fought on a side in a war, then we coded the strategy of the largest state (in terms of capabilities).[8] In making the codings, our interpretation was as broad as possible. For example, a counterforce attrition strategy of searching out enemy submarines and a countervalue attrition strategy of searching out enemy shipping are both coded as attrition strategies.[9]

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[6] While we believe that this coding change is theoretically appropriate, we did check the sensitivity of our results to this change. Our results were quite similar even if we dropped the changed wars (dropped because we believe they are currently miscoded). Two differences emerged. First, since the Vietnam War is the only war in the population with the strategy OPDA (offensive punishment, defensive attrition), we are forced to drop that variable. Second, because this procedure involves dropping 14 wars (12 in World War II), *all* the standard errors increase slightly. The coefficient estimates were stable, however.

[7] Note that the coding of strategy as described in the historical record leads to a possible problem for our ex ante argument in that the coding is based on an ex post evaluation of the strategies used. In a few cases states initially tried to execute maneuver strategies but were forced to switch to attrition. An example is Germany's World War II strategy on the Eastern front, namely, a switch from maneuver to attrition as the blitzkrieg ran out of steam in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, purely ex ante coding is impossible without access to military strategic plans. In the empirical record, however, there are relatively few instances of strategy shift among our categories, and so the problem affects only a few cases. When states did change strategy, they tended to do so soon after the beginning of a war, and so we believe that the magnitude of this problem is not severe. It does mean that our future predictions will have to be contingent on revealed strategy.

Attrition is the most common strategy, accounting for about two-thirds of all cases. Punishment strategies are the least common. With an offensive and defensive side each having three strategy choices, nine combinations are possible. The variables marking the possible strategies are:

0. OMDM: offensive maneuver, defensive maneuver;
1. OMDA: offensive maneuver, defensive attrition;
2. OADM: offensive attrition, defensive maneuver;
3. OADA: offensive attrition, defensive attrition;
4. OMDP: offensive maneuver, defensive punishment;
5. OPDM: offensive punishment, defensive maneuver;
6. OADP: offensive attrition, defensive punishment;
7. OPDA: offensive punishment, defensive attrition;
8. OPDP: offensive punishment, defensive punishment.

The 0 to 8 labels reflect the strategies' ordinal value in order of increasing expected duration, although we include a set of dummy variables in the analysis. Compared to attrition or maneuver, punishment strategies are always expected to make war longer. For the other orderings, wars in which the offensive state uses a faster strategy are expected to be shorter than wars in which the defending state uses a faster strategy because the distances the two sides must cover are not symmetrical. The offensive force typically must venture farther than the defender since the war is being fought into the defender's forces. When the offense is using a faster strategy, we expect the war to be shorter than if the attacker were using a slower strategy, which would take additional time to cover the necessary distances.

Historically, we observe the strategies 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7. Since these are dummy variables, we include four of them in the final analysis: OADM, OADA, OADP, and OPDA. OMDA was omitted, as we expect it to lead to the quickest wars.

Terrain. Terrain codes, which come from *The New York Times World Atlas* (1983), correspond to the location of the majority of the battles fought during the war. Terrain types were scaled to predicted movement times, using data from Dupuy (1979), which estimated movement speeds on various types of terrain.[10] The variable was coded between 0 (open or rolling terrain) and 1 (impassable terrain).[11]

Interaction of Terrain and Strategy. To measure the interaction of terrain and strategy, normally we would simply multiply our included strategy and terrain variables. With dummy variables marking strategy, however, the inclusion of each dummy interacted with terrain creates multicollinearity problems. As a result, we multiply a single ordinal-scaled strategy variable by terrain. This strategy variable is coded 0 through 8 in rank-order of increasing expected duration for the strategies OMDM through OPDP, as listed above. We expect a negative coefficient on the interaction.[12]

Balance of Capabilities. We use the COW composite capabilities index (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) as an indicator of states' capabilities.[13] We define the balance of capabilities as the ratio of the larger side's total capabilities to the total capabilities of all participants. We discount states' capability scores according to the distance from a country to the point at which fighting with the adversary took place, using Bueno de Mesquita's procedures (1981, 105).[14]

Total Military Capabilities. We measure military capabilities as the sides' total military personnel, using the COW project's national capabilities database, coded as millions of soldiers.[15]

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[8] In three cases there was a lack of consensus among military historians about the strategy choice (Germany in World War I, Germany versus the United States and Britain in World War II, and Israel in the Yom Kippur War). In these cases we coded the modal strategy of attrition.

[9] Gartner's *Strategic Assessment and War* (1992) contains an extended discussion of tactical and strategic change during wartime. The types of strategy change he addresses do not affect the broad codings we employ here.

[10] Because Dupuy coded the ease of tactical movement in different types of terrain based on a different data set of *battles*, it is not circular to use the variables as a predictor of the duration of *wars*. For detailed discussions about data codings on a battle by battle basis see Dupuy (1983).

[11] The highest observed value for the terrain variable was 0.75, marking very rough terrain, such as jungles or extremely mountainous regions. In cases with more than two actors on one side, and where the terrain on which different states fought might have been quite different, the coded value was an average of terrain scores weighted by the size of the forces fighting in particular terrain.

[12] Including the scale or individually multiplied dummy variables makes little difference in the overall results, as the model fit remains nearly identical.

[13] This index ranges potentially from 0 to 1 and indicates a country's share of total international military personnel, military expenditures, energy consumption, iron/steel production, total population, and urban population. When wars continued past 1985, we updated the capability data (the published data end in 1985) and supplemented it with interpolation of data and additional research using International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data.

[14] When multiple countries fought together, we summed their discounted capabilities to obtain the total capabilities on each side of a war. When countries were involved for only part of a year, we adjusted their contribution to capabilities based on the portion of the year in which they were involved. For example, since Russia ended its involvement in World War I in early December 1917, we included 11/12 of Russia's capabilities in the 1917 Entente capabilities. When a country was involved in a two-front war, which we coded as separate wars, we discounted its total capabilities by the amount of forces allocated to each conflict. We coded a 50-50 allocation of resources between fronts with one exception: For U.S. participation in World War II, there is clear evidence that the United States fought primarily a holding action in the Pacific until the war in Europe was over (Dupuy and Dupuy 1986). We allocated U.S. capabilities in the proportions 75 and 25 to the European and Pacific wars, respectively.

[15] When countries were involved for only part of a year, we adjusted

Population. We measure the total population of the combatants using data from the COW National Capabilities data set, coded as billions of people.[16] We also code the ratio of the total population on the larger side to that of the smaller side to create the variable POPULATION RATIO.

Military Quality. We estimate the quality of military forces for a country as military expenditures (in constant U.S. dollars) divided by number of military personnel. Following Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi (1992) and Stam (1996), we argue that additional spending per soldier reflects additional troop training, equipment, and relative technology endowment.[17] We then create a ratio of the superior side's quality to the inferior side's quality.

Surprise. The surprise codings sought to capture strategic surprise at any time during the war. The coding is based on secondary historical sources as presented in Stam (1996). Since both sides can achieve surprise, we create a variable which attempts to capture not only the difference in surprise over the entire course of the war but also the seriousness of that surprise, given capabilities and how much of each side's forces were surprised. The variable ranges from 0 (no or symmetrical surprise) to 1 (large and asymmetrical surprise). Given states 1 through i on sides A and B, we code the variable as

$$\text{Net Surprise} = Abs\left(\frac{\sum_i Capability(A_i) * Surprise(A_i)}{\sum_i Capability(A_i)} - \frac{\sum_i Capability(B_i) * Surprise(B_i)}{\sum_i Capability(B_i)} \right).$$

Mobilization. We do not need to include a separate variable to test the argument regarding mobilization. Support for or against the hypothesis will be given by a comparison of the results of the analyses of the two different data sets. The non-TVC data use the values for capabilities measured in the first year of each war. Therefore, results using this data set will reflect no information about mobilization over the course of the war, only the forces available for the initial battles. The TVC model measures capability values annually throughout the war, and results using this data set will reflect the results of mobilization. On the one hand, if longer term mobilization is the key to determining war duration, we should observe a substantively and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the balance of forces variable in the second (TVC) analysis but not in the first. On the other hand, if initial forces are important, with later mobilization being a less important factor, similar coefficient estimates should be found for both models.

Issue Salience. We code the issues at stake in each war using Holsti's (1991) categorization. We follow arguments in Stam (1996) and use Zimmerman's (1973) conception of the pole of power and pole of indifference to code these issues as salient or nonsalient. Given an inability to make a more sophisticated differentiation, we set up a dummy variable for each side marking conflicts involving survival, territory, unification, reputation, and autonomy as salient. Conflicts involving policy, empire, and trade are coded as nonsalient.[18] We then create a final interval variable indicating that the issues were salient to neither side (0), salient to one side (1), or salient to both sides (2).

Repression. We use the Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989) "competitiveness of participation" variable as our measure of the repressiveness of a state government (repression). For each state, Gurr's variable ranges from 1 (no significant opposition activity permitted) to 5 (significant and regular political competition in opposition to ruling leaders).[19] Given only five categories, this is a somewhat crude measure of state behavior. In its favor, however, are its availability and comparability both historically and cross-nationally, unlike other possible measures of repression, such as those based on deaths in political violence. We multiply the variable by -1, so that higher values represent more repressive regimes, and summed the repressiveness of each side to obtain the final variable.

Democracy. We use the Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989) "institutionalized democracy" variable as our measure of democracy in a state government. For a single country, the variable is a scale ranging from 0 (few constraints on the chief executive, closed executive recruitment procedures, and noncompetitive political participation) to 10 (many constraints, open recruitment, active opposition).[20] We then summed the democracy value of each side to obtain the final variable. Democracy is negatively correlated (Pearson's $R = -0.64$) with repression, but not perfectly so. This level of correlation raises some concern that the results observed may be

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their contribution to total personnel accordingly and then summed the personnel of the two sides to obtain total military personnel of all combatants.

[16] When countries were involved for only part of a year, we adjusted their contribution to total population accordingly.

[17] Data on military expenditures and personnel were obtained from the COW National Capabilities data set. Exchange rates and an inflation deflator were obtained from Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989). When there were multiple countries on a side, we created a weighted average of quality on each side whereby a state's contribution to its side's overall quality was proportional to its capabilities.

[18] When there was more than one country on a side, we coded a side's salience as the salience of the war to the largest state (in terms of capabilities).

[19] When there were multiple countries on a side, we again weighted each state's contribution to the overall value by its capabilities. There were significant problems of missing data; when data were lacking for a country, we substituted the mean of the variable across the rest of the data set, or 2.36.

[20] We weighted each state's contribution to the overall value by its capabilities when there were multiple countries on a side. There was significant missing data on the variable; to allow estimation, when data were missing for a country we substituted the mean of the variable across the rest of the data set, or 2.61.

TABLE 1. Hazard Model Coefficient Estimates, Effects on War Duration

Variable	Model 1 VT model, TVC	Model 2 Realpolitik, TVC	Model 3 Regime, TVC	Model 4 Complete, TVC	Model 5 Complete, non-TVC
Constant	2.480 (0.678)	2.470 (1.470)	1.750 (0.598)	2.260 (1.540)	1.260 (1.500)
Realpolitik					
Strategy: OADM	—	2.480 (0.978)***	—	2.750 (0.940)***	2.870 (0.947)***
Strategy: OADA	—	3.250 (0.938)***	—	3.200 (0.875)***	3.330 (0.801)***
Strategy: OADP	—	7.010 (2.000)***	—	6.270 (1.870)***	6.280 (2.050)***
Strategy: OPDA	—	11.600 (3.850)***	—	10.970 (3.580)***	7.990 (1.706)
Terrain	—	6.600 (4.120)*	—	5.020 (3.750)*	2.990 (3.650)
Terrain × Strategy	—	−2.020 (1.050)**	—	−1.690 (0.976)**	−1.240 (0.995)*
Balance of Forces	—	−5.030 (1.360)***	—	−4.760 (1.300)***	−3.980 (1.280)***
Total Military Personnel	—	0.061 (0.041)*	—	0.124 (0.047)***	0.273 (0.088)***
Total Population	—	0.753 (0.567)*	—	0.707 (0.586)	0.162 (0.716)
Population Ratio	−0.024 (0.021)	0.001 (0.019)	—	0.007 (0.017)	0.007 (0.022)
Quality Ratio	—	0.013 (0.013)	—	0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)
Surprise	—	−0.012 (0.746)	—	−0.204 (0.807)	−0.219 (0.636)
Salience	—	0.336 (0.327)	—	0.420 (0.380)	0.427 (0.399)
Regime					
Repression	—	—	−0.281 (0.160)**	−0.200 (0.144)*	−0.246 (0.168)*
Democracy	—	—	−0.130 (0.070)**	−0.100 (0.063)*	−0.118 (0.066)**
Other Approaches					
Previous Disputes	—	—	—	−0.008 (0.070)	0.016 (0.069)
Number of States	0.064 (0.111)	—	—	−0.189 (0.095)**	−0.135 (0.098)*
Year	−0.001 (0.005)	—	—	—	—
p (duration param.)	0.629 (0.060)	0.907 (0.088)	0.629 (0.061)	0.965 (0.108)	0.942 (0.122)
Log-likelihood	−273.6	−244.7	−273.1	−242.1	−126.1
Mean error (months)	17.0	15.8	17.5	13.0	12.2
SD of mean error	18.2	23.7	18.0	20.5	16.2
Median error	12.8	6.2	11.1	5.1	5.0
Mean error (as % of war length)	22.8%	5.6%	17.4%	4.9%	4.4%
Number of wars	78.0	78.0	78.0	78.0	77.0
No. of data points (war-years)	169.0	169.0	169.0	169.0	77.0

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance tests are one-tailed. The constant-only model on the one-observation-per-year data set estimates $p = 0.629$, log-likelihood −274.8, mean error 17.3 months (25.9%), and median error 13 months. The constant-only model on the one-observation-per-war data set estimates $p = 0.618$, log-likelihood −176.7, mean error 18.3 months (27.7%), and median error 15.1 months. Year is included in model 1 because of its inclusion in Vuchinich and Teachman (1993).

$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

due purely to multicolinearity or correlation of measurement error. Tests below show that this is not the case.

Previous Disputes. We count the average number of reciprocated disputes in the ten years before each war between all pairs of states on the opposing sides of each war as given by the COW project's data set of militarized interstate disputes. We count only disputes that lasted a minimum of 30 days to avoid including minor conflicts (such as "fishing boat incidents") which would inflate the count. We then normalize by dividing this count by the number of states in each war (so that large wars would not automatically have more disputes).

Number of Actors. We count how many states were involved in the war in each year as given by the COW project's data set of interstate wars.

Duration Dependence. The presence of duration dependence is given by the p parameter, estimated as part of the hazard analysis.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the results of five hazard analyses. Models 1 through 4 are estimated on the time-varying covariates data set, while model 5 is estimated on the non-TVC data set. Model 1 includes only the Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) variables estimated on our data set. It is important to estimate this model because our population of wars is somewhat different from that of Vuchinich and Teachman.[21] Without a comparison of the data sets, any differences in our results could be attributed solely to differences in the population. In fact, the results obtain with our population are very similar to those of Vuchinich and Teachman. In particular, the p

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[21] Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) analyze 118 interstate and extrasystemic wars. We limit our analysis to interstate wars because we believe that including both types may lead to two problems. First, data for extrasystemic wars are much more uncertain than for interstate wars. Second, the process by which each type is fought may be quite different.

parameter is significantly less than one, indicating negative duration dependence when other variables are omitted. We believe that this suggests the comparability of the results we obtain in other models.

Models 2 and 3 use the realpolitik and regime variable subsets, respectively.[22] These allow us to compare the relative explanatory power of the realpolitik approach to the regime behavior and type approach as well as build up to our complete theory. Models 4 and 5 estimate our full theory on the TVC and non-TVC data sets, respectively.

Overall Fit and Model Predictions

An examination of log-likelihood values shows that the more completely specified model presented here is better than either the Vuchinich and Teachman (1993) model (model 1)[23] or a "naive" constant-only model ($p = 0.01$). The results of a series of specification checks are contained in Appendix B. In particular, the realpolitik model adds substantial explanatory power when predicting war duration, even after taking into account the number of variables it contains ($p = 0.01$). Although the individual variables in the regime behavior and type model, as well as number of states from the "other approaches" subset, are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (or, as in the case of democracy, just miss the standard level of statistical significance, $p = 0.06$), the improvement in overall model fit in moving from model 2 to model 4 does not meet standard conventions of statistical significance ($p = 0.20$). The same holds true for adding just the two regime variables to the realpolitik model (log-likelihood for the realpolitik plus regime model is −243.7). Thus, using likelihood ratio tests, we cannot distinguish between the simpler realpolitik model and the more complex and completely specified models 4 and 5.[24] While the realpolitik model is a substantial improvement over simpler approaches, adding variables for regime behavior, regime type, and the number of actors does not significantly improve the overall fit. We believe this suggests that, while the regime and other factors may have some effect on war duration, the influence is likely to be small and remains somewhat uncertain, relative to realpolitik factors. This finding supports the position of realists who argue that, once war begins, regime type and willingness to repress mass publics are less important in determining state behavior than are military considerations.

While log-likelihood values provide a relative measure of fit between nested models, maximum likelihood models generally do not have an overall measure of fit analogous to the R^2 statistic in an OLS model. As a result, we give three auxiliary indicators of prediction error in an attempt to provide a feel about model fit in a "real-world" sense.[25] We take the absolute value of the difference between the actual duration of each war and the models' prediction of duration. We then calculate the mean absolute error, median absolute error, and mean of the absolute error as a percentage of each war's length (the reason for this last indicator is discussed below). We present multiple measures because any single indicator of overall fit is likely to be imperfect (if there were a good indicator, then it would be in widespread use), especially given that the distribution of war durations is skewed. Since mean war duration is longer than median war duration, a model which predicts durations close to the median will perform well on measures of the median error but poorly on measures of mean error, while the opposite is true of models whose predictions are close to the mean.

The complete TVC model (model 4) predicts with a mean absolute error of 13 months. Our errors are quite skewed, however, as are the duration data. The median error produced by the TVC model is only 5.1 months. For comparison, a naive "constant-only" model has a four-month greater mean prediction error than model 4, and an eight-month greater median prediction error. It is important to place neither too little nor too much emphasis on this prediction comparison. A naive prediction could perform quite well given a skewed data set. In this case, since most wars are short, a prediction of the median length (five months) would predict within five months of the true duration for all wars shorter than ten months. Despite this "accuracy," such a prediction is theoretically uninteresting, as it provides no way to make differentiated predictions. Such a naive model will *always* miss predicting long wars, which are the most interesting since they are typically the least expected.

Our model *can* (and does) predict long wars. This is reflected by the third error measure, the mean of the absolute error as a percentage of each war's length. A model which accurately predicts only short wars while making large errors in predicting long ones will have a higher value on this measure than a model which can more accurately predict both types. Our theoretical models do much better on this measure (4.9% and 4.4%, respectively) than do the less complete model 1 and a naive constant-only model (22.8% and 25.9%, respectively). Finally, while the log-likelihood values of model 4 versus model 2 did not suggest a statistically significant improvement in model fit, it is also useful to note that the prediction errors of model 4 are smaller (4.9%) than those from the realpolitik model 2 (5.6%).

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[22] We do not present estimates for a separate "other approaches" model. It offers no overall statistical improvement over the constant-only model, and neither previous disputes nor number of states are statistically significant in the separate analysis.

[23] The log-likelihood value for model 4 is not directly comparable to model 1 as we present it because the models are not nested. We omit the variable "year" in our models because we know of no theoretical reason for its inclusion. When a truly nested model is estimated, model 4 is still significantly better than model 1. The same is true if the Vuchinich and Teachman model is estimated on the non-TVC data set and compared to model 5.

[24] Beck and Katz (1992) argue that too much reliance on likelihood ratio tests may be misleading. They maintain that, in addition to the standard tests, prediction errors also should be used for model assessment and choice. Because of this, we do not reject the hypothesis that domestic variables are an important factor in war duration, even though the likelihood ratio test supports the inclusion of the variables only at the 0.20 level. Below, we discuss the changes in prediction accuracy as Beck and Katz suggest and find that democracy and political repression do improve our estimates of expected duration.

[25] One problem of maximum likelihood models generally is the absence of a measure of fit analogous to R^2. If one were to estimate a technically inappropriate OLS using the model 5 variables and data set with duration as the dependent variable, then the R^2 would be 0.56, and the mean error would be 15.7 months.

Perhaps even more important than the overall predictions are the inferences possible by comparing the more completely specified models to the less theoretical models, especially regarding duration dependence. Once realpolitik variables are included in models 2, 4, and 5, the apparent duration dependence of war disappears. The simplest Vuchinich and Teachman model (as well as the constant-only model) suggests with high confidence that negative duration dependence exists, as did prior work on war duration. The controls introduced in the regime model (model 3) do not change this conclusion. Model 2, however, and especially models 4 and 5 suggest that the *p* parameter is not clearly distinguishable from one. Better model specification leads to a conclusion regarding duration dependence that is quite different from previous work, namely, that wars are not duration dependent.

The prediction errors of models 4 and 5 can be compared to assess our ability to make ex ante predictions. The ex ante model 5 predicts just as well as model 4. This suggests that accurate prediction of war duration is quite possible even with primarily ex ante data. One caveat is in order here. Our strategy codings are the result of historical observation of how states actually fought and are not based on information known before the wars occurred. As previously noted, this is because states tend to be quite secretive about their strategies and tactics before war. The effect of strategy is thus inferred from ex post information gathered after the wars had occurred. Forecasts based on our results must be contingent in that they must rely upon assumptions about what strategy a side will use during some hypothesized war.

Prediction error is important to testing our hypothesis about mobilization. If the results of the non-TVC model 5 and the TVC model 4 were quite different in their ability to make predictions, and if the balance of forces variable was much weaker in model 5, then it would suggest that annual changes in mobilization during a war play a key role in determining war duration. That variable is statistically significant and of a similar substantive magnitude in the two analyses, however, and the models' predictions are similar. In addition, although total military personnel has a large and significant effect, total population (representing mobilizable resources) does not. We believe this suggests that while mobilization at the outset of a war may affect its duration, mobilization and the potential for it after the initial battles do not play the overwhelming role that some might attribute to it. This provides support for Lebow's (1984) argument that windows of opportunity are not as tempting to states as many fear and for Reiter's (1995) argument that preemptive attacks to gain short-run advantages before the opponent can mobilize reservists or the general population are unnecessary.

We performed one additional test to evaluate our predictive ability. We predicted the duration of the Persian Gulf War, which is not in our population of wars. By our criteria, there were two separate wars in the Persian Gulf, the first when Iraq occupied Kuwait, the second when the United States attacked Iraq in January 1991. The duration of the first was one day (0.03 months); the strategy was OADA. The duration of the second can be coded in two ways. The eventual ground war, in which the U.S. mobile strategy was of the OMDA type, lasted four days (0.13 months). If the war is also coded to include the bombing of Iraqi military targets starting on January 16, an OADA strategy, the duration was 43 days (1.39 months). Using the expected duration formula given earlier, and using the model 4 coefficients, our model predicts a duration of 6.9 months for the Iraq/Kuwait war, 0.70 months for the U.S./Iraq war with a U.S. OMDA strategy, and 17 months for the U.S./Iraq war with an OADA strategy. We believe this compares favorably with regard to what actually happened and to other models, many of which predicted a longer duration for the U.S.-Iraqi conflict (Record 1993, 58–59).[26]

Individual Effects

Important individual elements of both models had substantive and statistically significant effects as anticipated. A simple observation of the coefficients, however, is not adequate to compare the influence of different variables. Because the estimated models are nonlinear, the coefficients have no direct linear interpretation, and the marginal effects of variables differ depending on the values of other variables. The only way to gauge the relative effect of different variables is to estimate and compare expected durations given different variable values. This is done by estimating the expected duration of a hypothetical case (a war with a given set of parameters) as $E[t|x_i] = \exp(\beta' x_i)*\Gamma(1/p+1)$, as discussed earlier. We have done this in Table 2, which presents the effects of changes in the variables with other variables held constant at typical observed values. Table 2 uses the coefficient estimates from the ex ante model 5.

Balance of forces appears to be a key variable in determining the duration of wars. The more out of balance the opponents' capabilities, the faster the war progresses. Note in Table 2 that the most dramatic changes in war duration occur when the force ratio moves just away from parity. This finding supports those, such as Organski and Kugler (1980), who argue that small shifts in the balance of power when the states are closely matched can have a major impact on international politics. Once capabilities have moved from parity, additional increments bring declining marginal returns in terms of shortening a war's duration.

Strategy appears to have a major and consistent influence on the duration of war, and all our expectations regarding the effect of different strategies are met.

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[26] For those interested in replicating this exercise, the values of the variables are (represented as Iraq-Kuwait value/Iraq-U.S. air-plus-ground value/Iraq-U.S. ground-only value): strategy = OADA/OADA/OMDA; terrain = 0/0/0; terrain × strategy = 0/0/0; balance of forces = .945/.823/.823; total military personnel = 1.02/3.12/3.12; total population = .021/.268/.268; population ratio = 9.37/13.04/13.04; quality ratio = 5.70/10.33/10.33; surprise = 1/1/1; salience = 2/2/2; repression = 3/−7/−7; democracy = 1/11/11; previous disputes = 2/2/2, number of states = 2/2/2.

TABLE 2. Marginal Effect of Variables from One-Observation-per-War Model on War Duration

	Change in Independent Variable		Change in War Duration (months)
Variable	From	To	
(Base Case)			(11.2 months)
Balance of Forces	1:1	2:1	−18.4
	2:1	3:1	−5.5
	3:1	4:1	−2.5
Strategy	OMDA	OADM	+12.4
	OADM	OADA	+0.4
	OADA	OADP	+155.9
	OADP	OPDA	+439.1*
Terrain, given strategy OMDA	0.1	0.5	+1.5
given strategy OADM	0.1	0.5	+9.9
given strategy OADA	0.1	0.5	+2.9
given strategy OADP	0.1	0.5	−54.7
given strategy OPDA	0.1	0.5	−548.7*
Total Military Personnel	1.0 million	2.4 million (mean)	+10.4
	2.4 million	5.0 million	+34.0
Democracy	0.0 (least democratic)	6.1 (mean)	−28.9
	6.1	17.0 (max. observed)	−19.9
Repression	−9.0 (least repressive obsvd.)	−5.0 (mean)	−45.4
	−5.0	−1.0 (max. observed)	−17.0
Number of States	2.0	3.0	−3.8
	3.0	4.0	−3.3
	4.0	8.0	−9.6

Note: The changes in expected war duration are calculated from the estimated coefficients in model 5 by setting all other variables to values of a base case consisting of typical (mean or median) values on other variables. In particular, the base case has strategy = OADA, balance of forces = 0.75, terrain = 0.34, number of states = 3, total population = 165 million, total military personnel = 2.4 million, population ratio = 2:1, quality ratio = 2:1, salience = 0, democracy = 6.3, repression = 5.1, and surprise = 0.5, with expected duration 13.5 months. Expected duration is then estimated as $E[t|x_i] = \exp(\beta' x_i)^{*}\Gamma(1/p+1)$ (corrected version of Greene 1993).

*Problematic estimate. See the text for discussion.

The increasing magnitudes of the strategy coefficients are reflected in the increasing expected length of war shown in Table 2. The most dramatic change occurs when attacking states move from maneuver to attrition strategies, or when either state shifts to a punishment strategy. These findings cast some doubt on the assertion of the "Cult of the Offensive" scholars, who argue that militaries choose mobile strategies for organizational reasons. Our results imply that a mobile strategy choice is rational and understandable for either military organizations or civilian leaders as a way of shortening a war. Despite the advantages of such a choice, however, states may not choose a mobile strategy because of constrained internal politics, and so we observe the suboptimal attrition and punishment strategies (many other nonrealpolitik factors affect strategic choice as well; see, for example, Kier [1995], Rosen [1995], and Stam [1995, 1996]).

An important caveat is in order regarding our results on punishment strategies. We observe only one war in our data set (the Vietnam War) in which the strategy combination is OPDA, and only a few cases of OADP. This results in difficulty with obtaining precise point estimates for these strategy variables. In model 5's non-TVC analysis, OPDA has so little variation and is therefore so colinear with other variables that a huge standard error is obtained. With the additional observations (and variation within the Vietnam War) included in model 4, a more reliable point estimate is obtained, but we do not feel confident in making a strong claim about the degree to which the OPDA coefficient is greater than the OADP coefficient. Given the uncertain estimates, prediction of the marginal effects of OADP and OPDA strategies is also difficult. The predicted jumps from OADA to OADP and OPDA may well be too high.[27] Unfortunately, given the historically observed distribution of strategies, we do not know of a better way to obtain more precise estimates of punishment strategies' effect on war duration.

The terrain on which a war is fought and its interaction with strategy also affect duration. Fighting on rougher terrain results in longer wars when the observed strategy combination is OMDA, OADM, or OADA, and there is a "turnaround" with slow punishment strategies, as expected. As with strategy, colinearity appears to be leading to a statistically "insignificant" coefficient estimate for terrain in model 5. Yet, if terrain is dropped from the analysis, the overall fit as measured by log-likelihood decreases quite a bit, and so we believe this variable indeed has an effect on war duration.[28]

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[27] The overall predicted length of the Vietnam War is not off by very much because other variables work in the direction of shortening the anticipated length of that war.

[28] If other apparently nonsignificant variables are dropped from the analysis, then terrain as well as some of the variables significant at the 0.1 level become significant at the 0.05 level. In the absence of other research, however, dropping other variables raises the possibility of introducing misspecification by choosing our model to fit the data. As a result, we have chosen to report all our included variables, even though this weakens the apparent significance of some of them.

The effects of democracy and repression are quite interesting, as anticipated. We find that both are associated with shorter wars.[29] Holding all other variables at their respective means, we expect war between highly repressive regimes to be 15 months shorter on average than a war involving moderately repressive regimes, while we expect a 21-month difference between wars involving moderately democratic states and wars between states without democratic institutions. Yet, two possible theoretical explanations remain as to why democracy and repression are both associated with shorter wars, as advanced in our selection and public-constraint arguments above.[30] Some additional evidence that helps sort out this argument can be obtained by examining the average duration of the wars initiated by highly democratic or repressive states (selected) versus the wars they did not initiate (the hazard model does not differentiate between who starts the war).

For wars in which highly democratic states participated, the average length of those they initiated was 9.2 months, while the average of those they did not initiate was 16.7 months. The comparable figures for highly repressive (risk acceptant) states were 11.8 months and 18 months, respectively. Grouping the two extreme types of states together, the average duration of wars started by either type was 11.2 months. Wars initiated by states neither highly democratic nor repressive lasted an average of 22.4 months, which suggests that the selection argument has strong merit ($p = 0.02$ level).[31] We can examine the auxiliary question of whether risk aversion and risk acceptance are driving these initiation decisions by looking at the wars' outcomes. If the risk argument holds, then we would expect risk-averse, highly democratic states to select easy, short wars, which frequently they should win. Highly risk-acceptant, repressive states would be expected to initiate short wars, but they would be less likely to win them. These expectations are strongly supported by the data. Ten of the 12 wars (83%) initiated by highly democratic states were won by them. Highly repressive states won only 20 of the 40 wars (50%) they initiated (the chi-squared test of independence statistic is 6.9, $p < 0.001$). While these results are not conclusive, they point strongly in the direction of the selection bias arguments of Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995).

The empirical effects of several other variables also matched our expectations. Total military personnel appears to have a major positive effect on war duration. The salience variable does not meet standard levels of statistical significance in both models 4 and 5 ($p = 0.13$, but it was consistently positive through a variety of specification tests). Once controls for other factors are introduced, the number of states involved appears to have a negative effect on war duration; note, however, that the substantive effect is small relative to other factors (Table 2). Finally, as previously stated, we find no evidence of duration dependence in the wars we analyzed once we include the variables in the realpolitik model. In combination with our strong findings on other variables, we believe that the apparent duration dependence of war can be accounted for by measuring underlying factors.

There are a few surprising results in the analysis. The estimated effects of total population, the ratio of states' populations, and the ratio of force quality were near zero. Previous disputes also show a coefficient near zero. When these variables are dropped from the analysis, the log-likelihood function changes very little, suggesting that they are not adding much information to the model. We hypothesize (post hoc) that the dispute finding is due to our controlling for issue salience (salience is one key element of the dispute argument; the two variables are positively correlated at the $p < 0.05$ level). Similarly, we hypothesize post hoc that the effect of total population is captured by the total military personnel variable, and the effects of population ratio and quality ratio are captured by the balance of forces ratio, which incorporates these components. Finally, in retrospect, we also can make a strong theoretical argument based upon our mobilization finding that total population is not a key variable. The population must be mobilized somehow (whether by induction into the military or by relocation to areas where they produce war materials) in order to have an effect on war duration. Given that mobilization does not appear to have a dramatic effect on war duration, we should expect that only the actual military variables, and not the raw component of population size, will affect a war's length.

Finally, in contrast to our expectations derived from consideration of military strategy, we find that surprise plays little role in determining the duration of war. While the sign on the estimate was negative (as predicted), the standard deviation was relatively large, and the true effect of the variable is quite uncertain.

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[29] We cannot be quite as confident of these results as we are of several others. The probability that democracy does not lead to shorter wars is 0.055 in the TVC model, and the probability that repression does not lead to shorter wars is 0.08 and 0.07 in the TVC and non-TVC models, respectively. These estimates miss the 0.05 cutoff that many analysts use as a benchmark of significance, and the regime behavior and type model does not substantially improve the overall log-likelihood ($p = 0.20$). The 0.05 cutoff represents an elementary rule of thumb. While recognizing that we have exceeded it, we believe that repression and democracy are likely to have some effect on duration, both because the magnitude of the variables remained relatively unchanged through a variety of other specification tests, and because the mean expected effect of the variables on war duration appears substantial (Table 2). It is important to note, however, that because of the wider confidence interval around democracy (and number of states, discussed below), the effect on duration could be somewhat farther off for these variables—either larger or smaller—than for others.

[30] Additional analysis showed that our results were not simply the result of colinearity; if either repression or democracy is dropped, then the magnitude of the remaining regime variable remains similar. Because the institution of democracy and behavior of repression are negatively correlated, an alternative explanation could be that there is a curvilinear relationship between a more general "regime type" variable and war duration, with extremely liberal states (strong institutional constraints on elite behavior) and extremely authoritarian states both fighting short wars, while "moderate" states fight longer wars. We checked for this possibility by estimating a model without repression (behavior) and substituting a democracy-squared term. While the democracy term remains approximately the same as in the other models, the squared term has no substantive or statistical effect.

[31] We define as "highly democratic" those states coded by Gurr as scoring 8 or more on the democracy scale. We define as "highly repressive" those states scoring 1 on Gurr's PARCOMP index of repression.

CONCLUSIONS

From our detailed analysis of the duration of interstate war, we conclude that a number of variables not usually considered in empirical work by political scientists, especially various strategies and terrain, have important effects. Since the anticipated duration of war affects leaders' decisions to initiate wars, we believe that models of war initiation and termination should consider incorporating these factors. While the realpolitik model clearly has the most explanatory power, it appears that a number of other variables—particularly democracy, repression, and the number of actors involved—may affect war duration.

We also found that some of the variables often assumed to influence the length of war played a minor role. Neither long-term mobilization nor surprise had a major effect. War also does not appear to be duration dependent. This finding differs from previous studies and is attributable to our inclusion of several independent variables key to the duration dependence argument. As a result, we can suggest that ongoing wars are not subject to continuation forever, as each additional increment of time spent at war does *not* further perpetuate conflict. Rather, identifiable factors suggest which wars are likely to continue.

Finally, we conclude that an accurate model of the duration of interstate war is possible, even using ex ante data and a small number of contingent variables specified at the outset. We predicted war duration with a mean error of thirteen months and a median error of five months. Our ex ante model made predictions that were within one month of our alternative model, which incorporates ex post information. Clearly, additions and refinements need to be made, in particular, those relating to the precise effect of punishment strategies and terrain interactions, but we have taken a major first step toward understanding how long and why wars will last.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A-1. Interstate Wars, 1816–1985

War Name	Actors	Start Year	End Year	Length (Months)
Franco-Spanish	France vs. Spain	1823	1823	4
Mexican-American	United States vs. Mexico	1846	1847	22
Austro-Sardinian	Austria-Hungary vs. Italy/Sardinia, Modena, Tuscany	1848	1849	16
1st Schleswig-Holstein	Germany/Prussia vs. Denmark	1848	1848	6
Roman Republic	France, Austria-Hungary vs. Papal States, Two Sicilies	1849	1849	2
La Plata	Brazil vs. Argentina	1851	1852	12
Crimean	United Kingdom, France, Italy/Sardinia, Russia vs. Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1854	1856	28
Anglo-Persian	United Kingdom vs. Iran/Persia	1856	1857	6
Italian Unification	France, Italy/Sardinia vs. Austria Hungary	1859	1859	5
Italo-Roman	Italy vs. Papal States	1860	1860	10
Italo-Sicilian	Italy vs. Two Sicilies	1860	1860	2
Franco-Mexican	Mexico vs. France	1862	1867	58
2nd Schleswig-Holstein	Germany/Prussia, Austria-Hungary vs. Denmark	1864	1864	6
Lopez	Brazil, Paraguay vs. Argentina	1864	1869	63
Spanish-Chilean	Peru, Chile vs. Spain	1866	1866	6
Seven Weeks	Germany/Prussia, Mecklenburg, Italy vs. Austria-Hungary, Hanover, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Wurtemburg, Hesse-Electoral, Hesse-Ducal	1866	1866	1
Franco-Prussian	France vs. Bavaria, Germany/Prussia, Baden, Wurtemburg	1870	1871	10
Russo-Turkish	Russia vs. Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1877	1877	9
Pacific	Peru, Bolivia vs. Chile	1879	1883	58
Central American	Guatemala vs. El Salvador	1885	1885	4
Serbo Bulgarian	Serbia vs. Bulgaria	1885	1885	3
Sino-Japanese	China vs. Japan	1894	1895	9
Greco-Turkish	Greece vs. Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1897	1897	5
Spanish-American	United States vs. Spain	1898	1898	4
Boxer Rebellion	United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Japan vs. China	1900	1901	15
Russo-Japanese	Russia vs. Japan	1904	1905	16
Central American	Guatemala vs. Honduras, El Salvador	1906	1906	3
Central American	Honduras vs. El Salvador, Nicaragua	1907	1907	11
Italo-Turkish	Italy vs. Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1911	1912	12
First Balkan	Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece vs. Turkey/Ottoman Empire	1912	1913	7
Second Balkan	Serbia, Greece, Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Rumania vs. Bulgaria	1913	1913	2
World War I	Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Portugal, Rumania, United States, Greece vs. Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey/Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria	1914	1918	52

TABLE A-1. Continued

War Name	Actors	Start Year	End Year	Length (Months)
Russo-Polish	Poland vs. USSR	1920	1920	6
Hungarian-Allies	Hungary vs. Czechoslovakia, Rumania	1919	1919	5
Greco-Turkish	Greece vs. Turkey	1919	1922	41
Sino-Soviet	USSR vs. China	1929	1929	4
Manchurian	China vs. Japan	1931	1933	19
Chaco	Bolivia vs. Paraguay	1932	1935	36
Sino-Japanese	China vs. Japan	1937	1945	96
Changkufeng	USSR vs. Japan	1938	1938	1
German-Czech	Germany vs. Czechoslovakia	1938	1938	0.033
German-Austrian	Germany vs. Austria	1938	1938	0.1
Nomohan	USSR, Mongolia vs. Japan	1939	1939	4
Russo-Finnish	USSR vs. Finland	1939	1939	4
World War II				
German-Polish	Germany vs. Poland	1939	1939	1
German-Belgian	Germany vs. Belgium	1940	1940	0.11
German-Netherlands	Germany vs. Netherlands	1940	1940	0.1
German-Danish	Germany vs. Denmark	1940	1940	0.033
German-Norwegian	Germany vs. Norway	1940	1940	2
German-French	Germany vs. France	1940	1940	1.5
Italo-Greek	Italy vs. Greece	1940	1940	2
Pacific	United States vs. Japan	1941	1945	45
Western	United States, United Kingdom vs. Germany, Italy	1942	1945	60
Eastern	Germany vs. USSR	1941	1945	46
German-Yugoslav	Germany vs. Yugoslavia	1941	1941	0.33
German-Greek	Germany vs. Greece	1941	1941	0.67
Franco-Thai	France vs. Thailand	1940	1940	3
1st Kashmir	India vs. Pakistan	1947	1948	24
Palestine	Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan vs. Israel	1948	1948	8
Korean	United States, S. Korea vs. China, N. Korea	1950	1953	36
Russo-Hungarian	Hungary vs. USSR	1956	1956	1
Sinai	United Kingdom, France, Israel vs. Egypt	1956	1956	1
Sino-Indian	China vs. India	1962	1962	1
Vietnamese I	United States, S. Vietnam vs. N. Vietnam	1964	1973	121
Second Kashmir	India vs. Pakistan	1965	1965	5
Six Day	Egypt, Syria, Jordan vs. Israel	1967	1967	0.2
Israeli-Egyptian	Egypt vs. Israel	1970	1970	0.25
Football	Honduras vs. El Salvador	1969	1969	0.15
Bangladesh	India vs. Pakistan	1971	1971	2
Yom Kippur	Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Libya vs. Israel	1973	1973	3
Turko-Cypriot	Turkey vs. Cyprus	1974	1974	1
Vietnamese II	North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam	1975	1975	3
Ethiopian-Somalian	Cuba, Ethiopia vs. Somalia	1977	1978	8
Ugandan-Tanzanian	Uganda, Libya vs. Tanzania	1978	1978	6
Iran-Iraq	Iran vs. Iraq	1980	1988	96
Falklands	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	1982	1982	3
Israeli-Syria (Lebanon)	Syria vs. Israel	1982	1982	2
Sino-Vietnamese	China vs. Vietnam	1985	1990	60

APPENDIX B: SPECIFICATION CHECKS

We did auxiliary analyses to check the specification of the model in several ways, none of which change the major substantive conclusions. An analysis using an exponential specification produces nearly identical coefficient estimates, as expected, given our Weibull model's estimate of p close to 1.0. To check for the effect of the few longest (outlying) wars, we estimated a Cox proportional hazard model on the non-TVC data set and obtained very similar estimates on all variables except for terrain × strategy, for which the statistical significance level dropped from 0.09 to 0.19. We also performed a Weibull analysis on that data set after simply dropping the three extremely long wars. In that analysis, the magnitude of the coefficients remained approximately the same, but some standard errors increased, and statistical significance dropped from 0.07 to 0.12 for repression, from 0.05 to 0.07 for democracy, and from 0.10 to 0.35 for number of actors.

Finally, we performed a check of the Weibull specification assumption using procedures described in Greene (1993, 723) and Jaggia (1991b), which attempt to reject the hypothesis that another (unspecified) model is correct. Duration models do not produce residuals directly comparable to regression residuals. It is necessary to generate a "generalized residual" = $\varepsilon_i = [\exp(-\hat{\beta}x_i)t_i]^{\hat{p}}$ to test multiple moment restrictions. The test estimators are created by generating an $n \times J$ matrix M, consisting of J moment restrictions for the n cases, and an $n \times k$ matrix D, which is made up of all $\partial L/\partial\theta_i$, where L is the model likelihood function and $\theta_i (i = l \,..\, k)$ are the k parameters of the model. The second moment restriction (for example) is $\varepsilon^2 = 2$. Two test statistics can be generated, both of which are known to be distributed $\chi^2(J)$. The first statistic equals nR^2, where R^2 is obtained by regressing unity on the matrix (DM). The second statistic equals $\mathrm{i'M(M'M\text{-}M'D(D'D)^{-1}D'M)^{-1}M'i}$. On the second moment test, our test statistics were 5.37 and 4.74, which slightly exceed the chi-square critical value of 3.81. The results fall into a gray area: While they do not indicate rejection of the Weibull, they do suggest that a more general specification could be appropriate.

We therefore estimated a gamma heterogeneity model, which allows heterogeneity among cases. Along with neglected duration dependence, the major source of misspecification in duration models is heterogeneity (Pagan and Vella 1989, S55). The final source of misspecification, exclusion of other relevant variables, can only be addressed by further theory. If heterogeneity is important, the new analysis would result in large coefficient changes, as it does in Jaggia's (1991a, 179) example. In our case, however, the gamma heterogeneity model did not yield an improved log-likelihood, did not estimate a heterogeneity parameter significantly different from 1, and most important did not affect our coefficient estimates and hence our inferences. In conjunction with the specification tests, this suggests that the Weibull is superior to the likely alternative distributions.

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The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation

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India has been the one major deviant case for consociational (power-sharing) theory, and its sheer size makes the exception especially damaging. A deeply divided society with, supposedly, a mainly majoritarian type of democracy, India nevertheless has been able to maintain its democratic system. Careful examination reveals, however, that Indian democracy has displayed all four crucial elements of power-sharing theory. In fact, it was a perfectly and thoroughly consociational system during its first two decades. From the late 1960s on, although India has remained basically consociational, some of its power-sharing elements have weakened under the pressure of greater mass mobilization. Concomitantly, in accordance with consociational theory, intergroup hostility and violence have increased. Therefore, India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but, instead, an impressive confirming case.

India has long been a puzzle for students of comparative democratic politics. Its success in maintaining democratic rule since independence in 1947 (excluding the brief authoritarian interlude of the 1975–77 Emergency) in the world's largest and most heterogeneous democracy runs counter to John Stuart Mill's (1958, 230) proposition that democracy is "next to impossible" in multiethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically divided countries.[1] And it confounds Selig S. Harrison's prediction (1960, 338), in line with Mill's argument, of India's democratic failure and/or territorial disintegration: "The odds are almost wholly against the survival of freedom and . . . the issue is, in fact, whether any Indian state can survive at all." The Indian puzzle is even more troublesome for consociational (power-sharing) theory. In contrast with Mill's and Harrison's thinking, power-sharing theory holds that democracy is possible in deeply divided societies but only if their type of democracy is consociational, that is, characterized by (1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy. In contrast, under majoritarian winner-take-all democracy—characterized by the concentration of power in bare-majority one-party governments, centralized power, a disproportional electoral system, and absolute majority rule—consociational theory regards stable democracy in deeply divided societies as highly unlikely. In other words, consociational theory maintains that power sharing is a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition for democracy in deeply divided countries.

Consociational theory has had a strong influence on comparative politics, and it has spawned a vast literature. Soon after it was formulated, Daalder (1974, 609) spoke of "an incipient school" of consociationalism, and, a few years later, Powell (1979, 295) proclaimed the theory "among the most influential contributions to comparative politics." It has become a widely accepted paradigm for the analysis of democracies that can be regarded as the prototypes of power sharing, such as the Netherlands (Daalder and Irwin 1989; Mair 1994), Belgium (Huyse 1987; Zolberg 1977), Austria (Powell 1970; Luther and Müller 1992), Switzerland (Lehmbruch 1993; Linder 1994; Steiner 1990), Lebanon (Dekmejian 1978; Messarra 1994), Malaysia (Von Vorys 1975; Zakaria 1989), and Colombia (Dix 1980; Hartlyn 1988). And it has been used for the interpretation of many other political systems, from tiny Liechtenstein (Batliner 1981) to the European Union (Chryssochoou 1994; Gabel 1994; Hix 1994; Lindberg 1974); in all parts of the world, for instance, Canada (Cannon 1982), Venezuela (Levine 1973), Suriname (Dew 1994), Italy (Graziano 1980), Nigeria (Chinwuba 1980), Gambia (Hughes 1982), Kenya (Berg-Schlosser 1985), and Sri Lanka (Chehabi 1980); and not only democracies but also such nondemocratic states as the former Yugoslavia (Goldman 1985; Vasovic 1992) and the former Soviet Union (Van den Berghe 1981, 190–91). Furthermore, consociational democracy has been proposed as a normative model for many ethnically divided countries, and it had a decisive influence in the shaping of South Africa's 1994 power-sharing constitution (Huntington 1988; Lijphart 1994; Worrall 1981). Given its prominent status, conso-

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[1] Two other puzzles are posed by Indian democracy. The first is its survival despite widespread poverty and illiteracy (Dahl 1989, 253), which casts grave doubts on the hypothesized link between the level of socioeconomic development and stable democracy, further weakened by the fact that several other Third World democracies have by now established stable democratic rule (e.g., Barbados, Botswana, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Malta, Mauritius, and Papua New Guinea). The second, which I shall discuss later, is Myron Weiner's (1989, 9) "Indian paradox," that is, "the far more puzzling contradiction between India's high level of political violence and its success at sustaining a democratic political system."

ciational theory has received a commensurate amount of criticism (e.g., Barry 1975; Halpern 1986; Horowitz 1985; Taylor 1992), but it has successfully held its own, partly by rebutting its critics and partly by incorporating many of the critics' concerns (Lehmbruch 1993; Lijphart 1985, 83–117; Steiner and Dorff 1980).

Nevertheless, consociational theory has remained vulnerable on one major count: the glaring exception of India to its otherwise unblemished empirical validity. Indian democracy has worked despite the fact that, according to the usual interpretation (Pathak 1993, 36; Weiner 1989, 78), the Indian political system devised by the founding fathers was patterned after the majoritarian and adversarial Westminster model. B. K. Nehru (1986, 74) writes that the Indian mind was "completely conditioned to believing that whatever was British was best" and calls it no wonder that the Indian Constitution is but an "amended version" of the 1935 Government of India Act. And Paul R. Brass (1991, 342) states that "the consociationalists . . . consistently ignore the experience of India, the largest, most culturally diverse society in the world that has . . . functioned with a highly competitive and distinctly adversarial system of politics." A theory with only one disconfirming case comes close to perfect validity, of course,[2] but one cannot simply shrug off a deviant case that looms as large as India's huge democracy, with its 900 million inhabitants.

In the admittedly rare attempts to come to terms with the Indian exception, consociational scholars have conceded that India's democracy is, in line with the usual interpretation, mainly majoritarian because of the frequency of one-party majority cabinets, the highly centralized federal system that K. C. Wheare (1964, 28) considers only "quasi-federal," and a highly disproportional electoral system that has regularly enabled the Congress Party to win parliamentary majorities without ever winning a majority of the popular vote. Yet, they have claimed that India is not completely majoritarian, citing Rajni Kothari's (1970, 421) description of the Indian political system as a "coalitional arena," akin to a grand coalition, and the autonomy for the major linguistic groups provided by the coinciding linguistic and state boundaries of India's federal design, and they have equivocated between calling India nonconsociational (Lijphart 1977, 181, 225) and semiconsociational (Lijphart 1979, 513; Powell 1982, 215). In other words, the argument was that, while India remained a deviant case, its negative significance for consociational theory was relatively mild.

This argument can be taken much farther, however, on the basis of a more thorough examination of the Indian case. The evidence clearly shows that India has always had a power-sharing system of democracy, especially strongly and unmistakably during its first two decades of independence, from 1947 to 1967, but continuing, albeit in somewhat attenuated form, after about 1967. As Indian democracy has become less firmly consociational, intergroup tensions and violence have increased. If this reinterpretation is correct, as I shall try to demonstrate, then India is no longer a deviant case for consociational theory and, in fact, becomes an impressive confirming case.[3]

THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF POWER-SHARING IN INDIA

Indian democracy has clearly exhibited all four of the defining characteristics of power sharing also found in the other prominent examples of consociational systems: Canada from 1840 to 1867 (strictly speaking, a consociational *pre*democracy), the Netherlands from 1917 to 1967, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975 and again after the 1989 Taif Accord, Switzerland since 1943, Austria from 1945 to 1966, Malaysia since 1955 with a temporary breakdown from 1969 to 1971, Colombia from 1958 to 1974, Cyprus from 1960 to 1963, Belgium since 1970, Czecho-Slovakia from 1989 until the 1993 partition of the country, and South Africa according to its 1994 interim constitution (Lijphart 1977, 1992, 1994; Olson 1994).

Grand Coalition

Government by grand coalition can take many different forms. The modal form is an inclusive cabinet coalition of ethnic, linguistic, or religious parties, as in the Austrian, Malaysian, and South African power-sharing systems, but there are many other possibilities. One entails the formation of grand governing coalitions in sites other than the cabinet, such as the Dutch pattern of permanent or ad hoc "grand" councils or committees with much greater influence than their formal advisory role. Another entails grand coalitions in cabinets, defined not in partisan terms but more broadly in terms of the representation of linguistic or other groups in a predetermined ratio; for instance, Belgian cabinets have rarely been coalitions of all significant parties, but they have been ethnically "grand" because of the constitutional rule that cabinets must consist of equal numbers of Dutch-speakers and French-speakers. Yet another option entails neither cabinets nor parties: the allocation of top governmental offices—such as the presidency, prime ministership, and assembly speakership in Lebanon, and the presidency and vice-presidency in Cyprus—to specified ethnic or religious groups.

The Indian case adds even greater variety. Its main vehicle for grand coalition is the cabinet, which is not an exceptional form, but the unique aspect in India is that cabinets are produced by the broadly representative and inclusive nature of a single, dominant party, the Congress Party. In a seminal article, originally published in 1964, Kothari (1989, 21–35) tried to analyze the Indian party system from the comparative perspective of the distinction between one-, two-, and multiparty systems. He found that the intermediate category of one-party dominance provides a reasonably good fit but that Indian one-party dominance is still quite different from the authoritarian type in a country like Ghana. The Congress Party's location in the center means that minor parties surround it on all sides. These, in turn, which Kothari (1989, 22–23) calls "parties of pressure," perform the role of preventing the ruling "party of consensus" from straying too far from "the balance of effective public opinion." Hence, he assigns a separate conceptual category to India's party system, uniquely occupied by the Indian case: the "Congress system."[4] One important conclusion that emerges from this classificatory exercise is to highlight the vast differences between the Congress system, with virtually permanent rule by a centrist party, and the Westminster-style two-party system, with alternation in office by right-wing and left-wing parties.

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[2] Three other counterexamples mentioned by Powell (1979, 296) are Sri Lanka, Trinidad, and the Philippines, but the first two are cases of majority "control" instead of genuinely democratic majority rule with alternating majorities, in Ian Lustick's (1979) sense of the term. Lustick argues that power sharing is not the only method that can maintain stability in divided societies; the alternative is a system of control in which a dominant group uses its superior power to keep the other group or groups subordinate. In control democracies, power is almost permanently in the hands of the majority group (Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Africans in Trinidad, and, until 1972, Protestants in Northern Ireland), and the minorities are excluded from power and often discriminated against. In the case of the Philippines, it is doubtful that we can speak of a true deeply divided society, and, in any case, democracy broke down in 1972 and was not restored for many years (see Lijphart 1985, 103).

[3] India obviously remains deviant in terms of Mill's and Harrison's nonconsociational thinking, mentioned earlier.

The second major conclusion is that the Congress system has served as the foundation for a consociational grand coalition. Despite never winning a majority of the popular vote in parliamentary elections, the Congress Party has been balanced in the political center and has encompassed "all the major sections and interests of society" (Kothari 1989, 27). Prior to independence the Congress was already an internally federal organization with a high degree of intraparty democracy and a strong penchant for consensus. This "historical consensus" Kothari (1989, 23, 51) writes, was successfully transformed into a "consensus of the present," and he comes close to using consociational terminology in describing Indian democracy as a "consensus system which operates through the institution of a party of consensus," namely, the Congress Party. Crawford Young (1976, 314) makes the same point in explicitly consociational language: "Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy has application to the Indian pattern of integration. . . . At the summit is a national political elite who are committed to reconciling differences through bargaining amongst themselves." The combination of the Congress Party's inclusive nature and political dominance has generated grand coalition cabinets with ministers belonging to all the main religious, linguistic, and regional groups.

Cultural Autonomy

Cultural autonomy for religious and linguistic groups has taken three main forms in power-sharing democracies: (1) federal arrangements in which state and linguistic boundaries largely coincide, thus providing a high degree of linguistic autonomy, as in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czecho-Slovakia; (2) the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own autonomous schools, fully supported by public funds, as in Belgium and the Netherlands; and (3) separate "personal laws"—concerning marriage, divorce, custody and adoption of children, and inheritance—for religious minorities, as in Lebanon and Cyprus. Indian democracy has had all these three forms, the last two from the very beginning and linguistic federalism since the 1950s.

The British colonial rulers of India drew the administrative divisions of the country without much regard for linguistic or cultural cohesion. The Congress movement was opposed to this policy and committed itself to a thorough redrawing of the boundaries along linguistic lines; from 1921 on, it also based its own organization on linguistically homogeneous units, the so-called Pradesh Committees. Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress leaders had second thoughts, however, and the Constituent Assembly, following the advice of its Linguistic Provinces Commission, decided not to incorporate the linguistic principle into the new Constitution. Pressures from below forced a complete change of policy in the 1950s. After the State of Madras was divided into the separate Tamil-speaking and Telugu-speaking states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh in 1953, the States Reorganization Commission embraced the linguistic principle and recommended drastic revisions in state boundaries along linguistic lines in 1955. These were quickly implemented in 1956, followed by the creation of several additional states in later years.

Linguistic federalism has not fully satisfied the minorities' desire for autonomy and security. The balance of power in the Indian federal system was asymmetrical in favor of the central government from the beginning, and further centralization has occurred from the late 1960s on, a subject to which I shall return below. As a result, many states have been demanding greater autonomy. The special autonomous status constitutionally granted to Kashmir, the one Muslim-majority state, was in practice also soon undermined, and smaller linguistic minorities without statehood have agitated for the creation of new states. But the leadership's initial fears that linguistic federalism would strengthen fissiparous tendencies have not been realized, and, in retrospect, the policy is regarded as a success by most observers. As consociational theory would have predicted, the "rationalizing [of] the political map of India" has made language "a cementing and integrating influence" instead of a "force for division" (Kothari 1970, 115; see also Banerjee 1992).

The crucial feature of educational autonomy is not just the minorities' right to set up and run their own schools but the ability to make this right effective through full government financial support of these schools. Dutch and Belgian religious minorities had to fight hard to obtain this right, and, while full educational autonomy was granted in the Netherlands in 1917, it was not instituted in Belgium until 1958. In India, however, the constitution provided this right from the outset. Article 30 states that "all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice" and, more important, that "the State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language."

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[4] A further comparison with Japan, not yet so obvious in the early 1960s, reveals the additional contrast between India's centrist Congress Party and Japan's right-of-center Liberal Democrats. Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is probably the closest parallel to the centrist Congress Party, except that it does not operate in a fully competitive democratic setting.

Separate personal laws for Hindus, Muslims, and smaller religious minorities already existed under British rule, and they were carried forward and sometimes amended or replaced by similar new laws in independent India. Examples are the 1955 Hindu Marriages Act, the 1956 Hindu Succession (that is, inheritance) Act, the 1937 Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, the 1939 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, and the 1872 Indian Christian Marriage Act (Fyzee 1964; Engineer 1987). These statutes were enacted by parliamentary majorities but, when intended for one of the minorities, were drafted in conformity with the minority's wishes. For instance, after the controversial 1985 Shah Bano decision by the Supreme Court (involving the right of a divorced Muslim woman to financial support from her former husband), a new Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act was adopted in 1986, largely in line with the wishes of the Muslim Personal Law Board. And the new 1993 Christian Marriage Act was proposed by the government after extensive consultations with and the final approval of all Christian churches, albeit only reluctant endorsement by the Roman Catholic Church.

The Constituent Assembly explicitly considered the question of whether separate personal laws ought to be continued in independent, democratic India. An amendment to the draft constitution was proposed that would have ended this form of religious autonomy: "The Union or the State shall not undertake any legislation or pass any law . . . applicable to some particular community or communities and no other" (cited in Luthera 1964, 83). Significantly, such a clause was *not* included in the constitution. A year later, Law Minister B. R. Ambedkar, replying to accusations of discrimination on the ground of religion during a parliamentary debate, again emphatically endorsed the principle of minority personal laws: "The Constitution permits us to treat different communities differently and if we treat them differently, nobody can charge the Government with practising discrimination" (cited in Luthera 1964, 86).

Proportionality

In accordance with the principle of proportionality, the normal electoral system in power-sharing democracies is proportional representation (PR). The plurality (first-past-the-post) and other majoritarian methods have the tendency to overrepresent majorities and large parties and to discriminate against smaller minority parties, as well as the corollary tendency to create artificial parliamentary majorities for parties that fall considerably short of winning popular vote majorities, what Rae (1967, 74–77) has called "manufactured majorities." It is not impossible, however, for power-sharing systems to circumvent these disproportional effects. For instance, despite Malaysia's plurality elections, the interethnic coalition has succeeded in guaranteeing a nearly proportional share of parliamentary seats to the minority Chinese and Indian parties by giving them the coalition's exclusive nomination in a number of districts.

In India, too, power sharing has managed to coexist with the plurality electoral system inherited from the British. One reason is that plurality does not disfavor geographically concentrated minorities, and India's linguistic minorities are regionally based. Another is that the Congress Party's repeated manufactured majorities have not come at the expense of India's many minorities due to its special status as the "party of consensus," which has been deliberately protective of the various religious and linguistic minorities. Indian cabinets, which have been mainly Congress cabinets, also have accorded shares of ministerships remarkably close to proportional, especially given the constraint of only about twenty positions usually available, to the Muslim minority of about 12% and even the much smaller Sikh minority (roughly 2%), as well as to the different linguistic groups, states, and regions of the country (Pai Panandiker and Mehra 1996). In addition, a special feature of the electoral law guarantees the so-called Scheduled Castes (untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes (aboriginals) proportional shares of parliamentary representation by means of "reserved seats," that is, seats for which only members of these groups are allowed to be candidates. Finally, these scheduled groups and the so-called Other Backward Classes have benefited from other quotas—so-called reservations—with regard to public service employment and university admissions (Mehta 1991; Prasad 1991; Srinivasavaradan 1992, 105–33).[5]

Minority Veto

The minority veto in power-sharing democracies usually consists of merely an informal understanding that minorities can effectively protect their autonomy by blocking any attempts to eliminate or reduce it. The major exception is countries in which one or a few minorities face a solid majority (such as Belgium, Cyprus, and the former Czecho-Slovakia), and the minority veto is formally entrenched in the constitution. India has a numerical Hindu majority of about 83 percent, but the Hindus are so thoroughly divided by language, caste, and sect that they do not form a political majority. A good example of the informal veto in Indian politics is the 1965 agreement by the central government that Hindi would not be made the exclusive official language without the concurrent approval of the major non-Hindi speaking regions, in effect giving a veto to the southern states, which had opposed dropping English as a language of administration. The provision works best if the minority veto does not have to be used very often in order to protect minority rights and autonomy, and this has been the case in India. No attempts have been made to reverse linguistic federalism, and, while opposition to educational autonomy has been increasing, no governmental actions to weaken or abolish it have been undertaken. The one clear instance of the actual use of the minority veto occurred in the mid-1980s in connection with the separate personal laws: The Muslim minority saw the Supreme Court decision in the Shah Bano case as an attack on Muslim personal law, and it succeeded in vetoing this decision by persuading the government to propose, and parliament to enact, a law reversing the court's judgment.

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[5] Clearly, the consociational interpretation does not fit India's caste conflict as well as it fits the linguistic and religious divisions. In the early years, an accommodation with the Scheduled Castes was reached, but further accommodation with the backward castes came about only later and mainly in parts of southern India. Especially in northern India, where there has been little intercaste accommodation, caste conflict is the most serious (see Frankel 1988).

The one respect in which India does seem to differ from the other consociational democracies is that power sharing was not instituted by a deliberate and comprehensive agreement, such as the 1917 Pacification in the Netherlands, the 1943 National Pact in Lebanon, the 1945 Grand Coalition accord in Austria, and the Malayan Alliance of the early 1950s. But not all consociational democracies have been established by a compact of this kind of comprehensiveness and intentionality; in Belgium and Switzerland, for instance, power sharing developed in a slow step-by-step fashion over more than a century, and Daalder (1974) has argued that even the Dutch Pacification should be seen as merely one step in a long incremental process. This means that India's incremental and sometimes haphazard development of power sharing is somewhat unusual among consociational democracies but not at all unique.

In the face of overwhelming evidence concerning the consociational character of India's democratic system, how can we explain the explicit and complete rejection by Brass (1991, 342–43) of the applicability of consociational theory to India? Brass claims that India is not at all a consociational democracy and, on the contrary, has "functioned with a highly competitive and distinctly adversarial system of politics." One explanation is that he defines power sharing in much too narrow terms. His main point is that India has had a variety of interethnic and intercommunal as well as monoethnic parties and sometimes coalitions among these. The implication is that only cabinet coalitions of monoreligious and monoethnic political parties deserve to be regarded as grand coalitions, which is obviously incorrect in view of the great variety of forms that grand coalitions can assume. Moreover, by focusing exclusively on parties and coalitions, Brass completely ignores the evidence with regard to autonomy, proportionality, and the minority veto.

Brass (1991, 343) concedes that India "has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some temporarily," but he fails to see that *together* these devices add up to a fully consociational system. Compared to India, the other consociational democracies do not have any additional or stronger methods of power sharing. The final explanation of Brass's disagreement with my interpretation may be that he focuses on India's more recent democratic experience, when its consociational character has not been as strong as in the first two decades, a subject that I shall treat at greater length later. But even in more recent decades India has remained basically consociational rather than "not consociational at all."

INDIA'S POWER-SHARING SYSTEM: HOW MUCH OF A SURPRISE?

Categorizing India as one of the consociational democracies, completely on a par with the other well-known cases, is a novel interpretation, although several scholars have identified particular instances of power sharing in India (even Brass 1991; Kothari 1989; Young 1976; see also Hardgrave 1993; Weiner 1969). What needs to be emphasized, however, is that, from the perspective of consociational theory, the adoption of power sharing by India and its maintenance for nearly half a century is not at all unexpected or surprising. For one thing, consociational theory places great emphasis on the contribution of prudent and constructive leadership in the development of successful power-sharing systems. Jawaharlal Nehru is an almost perfect example of such leadership. He was prime minister from 1947 until his death in 1964, during the heyday of Indian power sharing. Kothari (1976, 15–16) comments that in India "it is essential that the institutional system provides for widespread diffusion of power. That this happened to a significant degree under Nehru, and that this trend even appeared to grow stronger in the later part of his career, is a tribute [mainly] to the democratic values, vision, and self-confidence of one man." That Nehru was not a fully convinced consociational thinker is shown by his initial opposition to the principle of linguistic federalism. But his leadership combined firmness and self-confidence with flexibility and tolerance, and he unfailingly respected and promoted the internally democratic and federal nature of the Congress Party. Even on the issue of linguistic federalism, he turned out in the end to be a consociational practitioner. In Kothari's (1970, 157) words once again, "Nehru's understanding of the consensus framework represented by the Congress was better than that of most of his contemporaries," although he operated "more on the intuition of a pragmatic politician than on any intellectual grasp of the logic of the system."

Furthermore, consociational theory tries to explain the probability that power sharing will be instituted and maintained in divided societies in terms of nine background factors that may favor or hinder it. Since most of these conditions are favorable in India, it is again not very surprising that consociational democracy was established and has worked quite well. The following brief review of the nine factors rates India on each; the two most important factors are listed first.

(1) The most serious obstacle to power sharing in divided societies is the presence of a solid majority that, understandably, prefers pure majority rule to consociationalism; this factor was mainly responsible for the 1963 failure of the Cypriot consociational system, for instance. As indicated earlier, India's numerical Hindu majority is internally divided to such an extent that the country consists of minorities only.

(2) The second major factor is the absence or presence of large socioeconomic differences among the

groups of a divided society. In India, there are disparities of this kind among regions and, hence, among linguistic groups, as well as and more important between Hindus and Muslims. But even the latter difference is not as great as is often assumed. In a country such as India, where illiteracy is still quite high, literacy rates are good indicators of different levels of socioeconomic development. In rural areas—and India is still mainly rural—there is very little difference in the literacy rates of Hindus and Muslims; in urban areas, about two-thirds of Hindus are literate compared with one-half of Muslims (Sharif 1993). Linguistic-regional variations in socioeconomic development are mitigated by the fact that the poorer Hindi-speaking areas have historically exercised more power in the central government than the rest of the country, similar to the trade-off between the economically dominant Chinese and the politically dominant Malays in consociational Malaysia (Esman 1972, 25). Finally, socioeconomic differences within religious and linguistic groups are so much larger that they overshadow intergroup disparities.

(3) If there are too many groups, then negotiations among them will be too difficult and complex. India, with its extremely large number of groups, including fourteen major languages, receives an unfavorable rating on this factor.

(4) If the groups are of roughly the same size, then there is a balance of power among them. India's division into very many minorities, without any clearly predominant groups, achieves such a rough balance.

(5) If the total population is relatively small, then the decision-making process is less complex (Dahl and Tufte 1973, 40). Since India is the world's second most populous country, there appears to be no doubt that its score on this factor should be negative. Weiner (1989, 35–36) suggests, however, that India's success in sustaining democracy despite growing tensions and violence can be explained, first, in terms of its federal system (essentially a consociational explanation, because India's linguistic federalism is a key element of its power-sharing system) and, second, in terms of the size of the country, which means that much of the conflict remains localized and does not directly endanger the central authority. Weiner's second argument is also highly plausible and suggests that the relationship between size and the chances for power sharing is curvilinear instead of linear; as size increases, conditions for power sharing worsen initially, but beyond a certain critical point the tendency is reversed.

(6) External dangers promote internal unity. The long struggle against British colonial rule was such a unifying factor in India, as was the 1962 war with China. The wars with Pakistan had the potential of inflaming internal Hindu-Muslim tensions but did not produce this negative effect.

(7) Overarching loyalties reduce the strength of particularistic loyalties. Indian nationalism, powerfully stimulated by the Indian National Congress in the period before independence, has been such a unifying force (Khilnani 1992; Masselos 1985; Suntharalingam 1983). The only serious challenge came from the Muslim League, which claimed that India's Muslims constituted a separate "nation," but this challenge was effectively removed by the 1947 partition.

(8) If groups are geographically concentrated, then federalism can be used to promote group autonomy. Although India's religious groups are territorially intermixed, the geographical concentration of linguistic groups has made India's highly successful linguistic federalism possible. Hence, on balance, a positive rating is justified.

(9) Traditions of compromise and accommodation foster consociationalism. The Indian National Congress was a movement based on consensus before it became the party of consensus in 1947. More generally, too, as Austin (1966, 315) writes, "consensus has deep roots in India. Village panchayats traditionally reached decisions in this way. . . . Indians prefer lengthy discussions of problems to moving quickly to arbitrary decisions."

In sum, India rates favorably on seven of the nine conditions for power sharing, or on eight if we accept Weiner's reasoning. These include the two most important factors. Among the other consociational democracies, such a favorable predisposition is matched only by Switzerland and the Netherlands. Perhaps it would have been more surprising if India had *not* adopted and maintained a power-sharing system!

THE WEAKENING OF POWER-SHARING AFTER THE LATE 1960S

Indian power sharing from independence to the present can be divided into two periods: the two decades after 1947, when consociationalism was full-fledged and complete, and the period beginning in the late 1960s, when power sharing continued but in slightly weaker form. How can we account for this shift? Generally speaking, the main reason for the decline (and sometimes failure) of power-sharing systems is an inherent deep-seated tension. Political leaders have to perform a difficult balancing act between compromises with rivals and maintaining the support of their own followers, both activists and voters. Pleasing other elites will tend to displease their own supporters, and vice versa, and the search for compromise is a time-consuming task that may lead to a degree of immobilism, which is also likely to discontent supporters, who expect and demand effective and decisive government action.[6] It is therefore easier for political elites to share power successfully if their followers are relatively passive and deferential, as shown in particular by the Dutch case (Lijphart 1968, 139–77). This also means that strong pressures from below will increase the elites' tendencies to concentrate and centralize power rather than to share it.

The weakening of power sharing in India after the late 1960s fits this explanatory framework very well. As many scholars have pointed out, the 1960s marked the beginning of mounting democratic activism by previously quiet groups, especially the middle peasants (Brass 1990; Frankel 1988; Kohli 1990; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). The resulting pressures for more decisive and less consensual government action have prompted greater concentration and centralization of power, especially in the Congress Party and the federal system. Four factors contributed to this weakening.

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[6] Other possible causes of the decline of power sharing are the emergence of new and unforeseen problems, such as the international crisis that can explain much of the collapse of Lebanese power sharing in the 1970s (Lijphart 1985, 91–92), and the improvement in intergroup relations by successful power sharing to such an extent that full-fledged power sharing becomes superfluous, as in the Austrian and Dutch cases after 1966 and 1967, respectively.

First, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, who became prime minister in 1966 (after the brief interregnum of Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru after his death in 1964), the Congress Party was transformed from an internally democratic, federal, and consensual organization to a centralized and hierarchical party. According to Varshney (1993a, 243), "Nehru had used his charisma to promote intraparty democracy, not to undermine it, strengthening the organization in the process. Indira Gandhi used her charisma to make the party utterly dependent on her, suspending intraparty democracy and debate, and weakening the organization as a result." In very similar terms, Das Gupta (1989, 71) describes the new Congress Party as "less a national institution of interest reconciliation than a central organization for mobilizing endorsement for the leadership and its hierarchical apparatus." It has remained a broadly inclusive party, but less by means of *representation* from the bottom up than by *representativeness* from the top down.

Second, the federal system, never highly decentralized, was centralized even more. One instrument was the increasingly frequent use of so-called President's Rule for partisan purposes. The founding fathers had given the central government the right to dismiss state governments and to replace them with direct rule from the center for the purpose of dealing with grave emergencies, not foreseeing that the central government "would resort to devices intended to safeguard unity and cohesion for undermining democratically elected [state] governments and seeking to diminish their role and importance" (Arora and Mukarji 1992, 8). President's Rule was invoked ten times before the end of 1967 but 66 times in the only slightly longer period from 1968 to early 1989 (Kathuria 1990, 339). Like the centralization of the Congress Party, the similar trend in the federal system is often attributed to Indira Gandhi. It would be wrong, however, to interpret these trends primarily in terms of the—admittedly starkly contrasting—leadership propensities of Nehru and his daughter. For one thing, they can be explained more convincingly in terms of the structural tensions inherent in power sharing. For another, Indira Gandhi's two main successors reverted to a less confrontational and more consensual style of leadership (Rajiv Gandhi intermittently and P. V. Narasimha Rao more consistently) without, however, undoing either the party's or the federation's centralization.

The third source of weakness is that the pressures from below have specifically included calls for the abolition of crucial consociational rules put in place by power-sharing compromises: separate personal laws, minority educational autonomy, and Kashmir's constitutionally privileged (although no longer actually implemented) autonomous status. Not all the criticism of the 1986 Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act necessarily entailed a wholesale condemnation of personal law; many critics objected mainly to the specific provisions of the new law, calling it "a primitive anti-woman bill" (Iyer 1987, xvi). But the Supreme Court judgment in the Shah Bano case explicitly called for the elimination of separate personal laws and their replacement by a "uniform civil code," arguing in a clearly anti-consociational vein that "a common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies" (cited in Engineer 1987, 33). The reversal of the court's decision gave new ammunition to the foes of separate personal laws.

In an examination of the claim that minorities enjoy more rights than the Hindu majority, Sharma (1993, 102, 106) argues that it is valid as far as the minorities' educational autonomy is concerned: Their schools are not "subject to governmental control in the way similar institutions run by the majority community are. The minorities in this respect do in fact enjoy rights not available to the majority community." He concludes that "this in effect means that the majority community subsidizes the educational system of the minority communities." Sharma captures the growing criticism of minority educational autonomy very well, including the tendentious argument that it is the "majority," instead of society as a whole, that does the subsidizing. One way to solve the problem would be to make educational autonomy available to any group, regardless of its majority or minority status and regardless of whether it is a religious, linguistic, or any other kind of group, such as a group of people espousing a particular educational philosophy like Montessori. Instead of such an improvement of the system along consociational lines, as in the Netherlands, for instance, the prevailing tendency among the critics is the anti-consociational one of abolition.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has made itself the main mouthpiece against the government's alleged pandering to minorities, what its leader L. K. Advani calls "minorityism" (Varshney 1993a, 252). The BJP, usually described as a "Hindu nationalist party," is clearly anti-consociational, and its growing strength represents a major potential danger to power sharing in India.[7] The 1991 state elections brought the BJP to power in India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh, with one-sixth of the country's population, as well as in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. After the imposition of President's Rule and new elections in November 1993, the BJP retained control only in Rajasthan, but it also won the election in the union territory (and capital city) of Delhi. In the February 1995 state elections, it extended its influence from the northern Hindi-speaking heartland to the western part of the country by winning elections in Gujarat and, allied with the Hindu fundamentalist party Shiv Sena, in Maharashtra.

The fourth and final source of weakness derives from a combination of the inherent tensions of power sharing and the unique Indian form of grand coalition, based on the predominance of a broadly representative party. All the pressures from below make it especially difficult to maintain broad support for a party explicitly committed to power sharing and minority rights. The Congress Party has never won a majority of the popular vote, and in 1967 its plurality fell to only slightly more than 40%. It lost the 1977 and 1989 elections outright, and because it gained a mere plurality of seats in 1991 it could only form a minority cabinet. In fact, the 1989 and 1991 election results show that India has shifted from a dominant- to a multiparty system. The shift in the effective number of parliamentary parties—the number of parties in parliament weighted by their size (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 77–91)—is instructive in this respect: The eight elections from 1951 to 1984 yielded eight manufactured majorities (seat majorities won without vote majorities) and an average effective number of 2.2 parties, typical of either a two-party or dominant-party system; the elections in 1989 and 1991 failed to produce a majority party, and the average effective number of parties increased to 3.8, clearly a multiparty system.

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[7] The BJP also can be called a majority-control party in the sense that Lustick (1979) uses the term *control*; see note 2.

These weaknesses do not signify that power sharing has ended or is ending in India. Congress Party cabinets have continued to be broadly representative, and non-Congress cabinets have been only marginally less so during their two brief periods in power. Federalism has weakened but is far from dead, and the principle of linguistic federalism is very much alive. Minority educational autonomy and separate personal laws are under attack, but they have so far survived, along with the minority veto and the proportionality principle.

The above description of continued, although weakened, power sharing in India fits consociational theory in two other respects. The theory states that power sharing is a necessary condition for the survival of democracy in divided societies; indeed, Harrison's (1960, 338) dire prediction of India's democratic failure, quoted at the beginning of this article, is not shared by any knowledgeable observer of Indian politics today (see especially Varshney 1995). At the same time, while Indian democracy is quite stable in this fundamental sense, the weakening of power sharing should be expected to be accompanied by increases in intergroup tensions and violence, which clearly has been the case in India. The official figures, which tend to be on the conservative side, on Hindu-Muslim violence in the 1954–85 period presented in P. R. Rajgopal's (1987, 16–17) study show an alarming trend. When the first five years (1954–58) are compared with the last five years (1981–85), the number of violent incidents rose from 339 to 2,290, the number of persons killed from 112 to 2,350, and the number of persons injured from 2,229 to 17,791. This trend, Rajgopal observes, "shows no signs of being reversed." Indeed, in the aftermath of the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya in December 1992, rioting in many parts of India led to about 1,200 deaths in one month, and more than 600 people were killed in anti-Muslim rioting in Bombay in January 1993 (Hardgrave 1993, 64–65).

The causal link between the weakening of power sharing and these problems of governance has also been noted by scholars not explicitly belonging to the consociational school. For instance, Weiner (1989, 11) writes that "conflict management has become more difficult with the decline of the Congress party organization and the weakening of the federal structure." Varshney (1993b, 17–18) finds it "not surprising that the attempt by the post-Nehru leadership of the Congress party to centralize an essentially diverse and federal polity has co-existed with some of the worst stresses that the polity has experienced, including the insurgenc[ies] in Punjab and Kashmir."

A RETURN TO FULL-FLEDGED POWER SHARING?

A final piece of evidence about the close fit between the Indian case and consociational theory is provided by the proposals for political and constitutional reform. If the consociational interpretation of India's democracy is correct, that is, if the survival of Indian democracy can be explained by its power-sharing character and if its increasing turbulence after the 1960s can be explained in terms of the weakening of power sharing, we should expect these proposals to have two characteristics. First, all or most of them should be aimed at strengthening the consociational aspects of the political system. Second, given the growth in intergroup tensions and violence and the growing opposition to the very principle of power sharing, they can be expected to call for far-reaching reform with a sense of urgency.

Both expectations are correct. Although there is no vigorous public debate about or widespread demand for political change, Indians who do call for reform have in mind drastic measures, indeed. For instance, Abid Hussain (1993, 11) asserts that India's "deformed polity" is "in need of drastic surgery." In a volume entitled *Reforming the Constitution*, others have called for "fundamental changes" (Reddy 1992) and "major amendments" (Vira 1992) to the constitution, or even for the election of a new constituent assembly (Malaviya 1992) that should draft an entirely "new constitution" (Rao 1992) as the foundation for a "Second Republic" (Jaisingh 1992). Significantly, the substantive thrust of all but one of the major reform plans is in the direction of stronger power sharing. The one exception, which is only a partial exception, is the frequently voiced suggestion that India should adopt an American-style or French-style presidential system (Pathak 1993; Rao 1992; Sathe 1991, 37–38; Trehan 1993; see also Noorani 1989). From the consociational perspective, the problem with presidentialism is its concentration of executive power in the hands of one person, who, in a divided society, is inevitably a member of one particular group; power sharing requires joint rule by the representatives of all major groups in a collegial decision-making body, ideally provided by cabinets in parliamentary systems. The most prominent and detailed presidentialist proposal for India, however, put forward by B. K. Nehru, explicitly recognizes this disadvantage and tries to compensate for it by recommending a special form of presidentialism, used in Nigeria and also recommended by Horowitz (1985, 635–38) for ethnically heterogeneous societies elsewhere. Nehru's (1992, 138) proposal is to "divide the country into four zones—east, west, south, and north—and require a successful candidate for the Presidency not only to get an overall majority of the votes cast throughout the country but also a specific, relatively small, percentage of votes in all the zones, before he can be declared elected." This would ensure that the winning candidate has at least a minimum of support in regions other than his or her own.[8]

The other major reform proposals, entailing the strengthening of the federal system and the adoption of a proportional representation (PR) election system, are all fully consonant with power sharing. There appears to be almost universal agreement that India's federal system should be decentralized; this is the tenor of the 1988 report of the Sarkaria Commission on Union-State Relations, which Mukarji and Mathew (1992, 280) call "conservative but constructive," since they and other reformers would prefer to go much farther. An especially interesting proposal by Mukarji and Arora (1992, 270) is to establish a three-level federalism, with each state becoming a federation, or even a more radical multilevel federalism. They call such a system a "cascading federalism: a federation of federations." One reason this kind of reform is so attractive is that the Indian states are inordinately large; not counting the seven union territories, the *average* population of the 25 states is about 35 million, larger than California, the most populous state in the United States.

Another and more straightforward solution to the problem of unwieldy state size would be to increase the number of states. Kothari (1976, 81) suggests about 40, and a detailed proposal by Khan (1992, 108–22) specifies 58, 6 of which would be carved out of the huge state of Uttar Pradesh, with a population of almost 150 million. Similarly, Kashyap (1992, 32–33) recommends the creation of "50 to 60 States of almost equal size." A considerable increase in the number of states also offers an opportunity for further fine-tuning of linguistic homogeneity.

Finally, many reformers have proposed the adoption of PR for parliamentary elections (Bhambhri 1971; Nehru 1992). The German system, which combines first-past-the-post elections for half the parliamentary seats with overall proportionality for all seats by means of list PR, is the most frequently mentioned specific suggestion (Hegde 1986, 107; Seth 1971; Singh 1986, 120; see also Vanhanen 1987). PR is based on the consociational principle of proportionality, and, as comparative studies of democratic systems show, it is conducive to multiparty systems, which in turn are conducive to broad multiparty cabinets (Lijphart 1984), although there is no guarantee, of course, that coalitions larger than a bare majority will be formed. In the case of India, even a narrow coalition of parties elected by PR is likely to be based on at least a popular majority, which means that it would be more broadly based than any Indian cabinet so far.

One reform that PR almost certainly would preclude is a return to the "Congress system," which Kothari (1989, 304–6) appears to favor and which, it should be noted, is also consociational in orientation, with either the Congress Party itself or another party becoming the new party of consensus. Without a majority-manufacturing electoral system, it would be difficult for such a party to develop. But it is unlikely anyway that a new party of consensus could form without the advantage of the unique historical circumstances of 1947, when the ruling party emerged from an enormously effective and successful national liberation movement, and without Jawaharlal Nehru's unusually high quality of leadership. Moreover, instead of helping the moderate and centrist Congress Party, first-past-the-post might well bring an anti-consociational party like the BJP to power with a manufactured majority.

CONCLUSION

The big puzzle of Indian democracy—its survival despite the country's deep ethnic and communal divisions—is solved by the consociational interpretation presented in this article. India has had a power-sharing system of democracy during its almost fifty years of independence, and an especially full and thorough form of it during its first two decades, displaying all four of the essential elements of power sharing as clearly as Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Lebanon, Malaysia, and the other well-known examples of consociational democracy. That newly independent India embraced power sharing and has maintained it ever since is not even very surprising, because most of the conditions found to be conducive to it in these other countries are also favorable in the Indian case. After the late 1960s, as a result of greater mass mobilization and activation, power sharing became less strong and pervasive, evidenced by the centralization of the Congress Party and the federal system, the decline of the Congress Party's electoral strength, the attack on minority rights, and the rise of the BJP. As consociational theory would have predicted, Indian democracy has remained basically stable, but the weakening of power sharing has been accompanied by an increase in intergroup hostility and violence. Concern about these trends is reflected in the consociational thrust of the major proposals for political and constitutional change by reform-minded Indians.

The consociational interpretation of India strengthens our understanding of the Indian case by providing a theoretically coherent explanation of the main patterns and trends in its political development. Furthermore, it strengthens consociational theory by removing the one allegedly deviant case and by showing that, instead, the crucial case of India is unmistakably a confirming case.

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[8] A serious drawback of the Nigerian system, used in 1979 and 1983 (in which the winner needs a nationwide plurality plus at least 25% of the vote in no fewer than two-thirds of the states) is that it can easily result in none of the candidates being elected. This is not a problem in Nehru's (1992, 137) plan because he proposes the indirect election of the president—by an electoral college of national, state, and local legislators—in which repeated ballots can be conducted until a winner emerges. Of course, consociationalists would still prefer a broadly *representative* collegial executive to a broadly *supported* presidency.

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The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies

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I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.

The institutional underpinning of parliamentary democracy is the government's dependence on majority support in the legislature. Scholars often note that this institutional arrangement ensures that directly elected members of parliaments can control policymaking activities by the executive. If the government attempts to implement policies that are opposed by the majority, then the majority can vote the government out of office (e.g., Beer 1966, Crick 1964, Mezey 1979, Polsby 1975, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, Wheare 1963).

The "confidence relationship" between governments and parliaments is a two-way street, however. Members of parliaments can certainly attempt to control policy outcomes by submitting, or threatening to submit, votes of no-confidence in the government. But the prime minister and the cabinet can also take the initiative by demanding that parliament participate in a vote of confidence in the government. In fact, governments can generally invoke what I call a confidence vote procedure, which is an institutional prerogative that permits the government to attach the vote on a specific policy or program to an up or down vote on the government. This procedural possibility, I argue, must play a central part in how we understand policymaking processes in parliamentary democracies.

An example from Great Britain illustrates how government-initiated confidence vote procedures operate. On July 22, 1993, the British House of Commons voted on a government motion to adopt the Maastricht Treaty for European Union. The two major opposition parties, the Liberal Democrats and Labour, were generally favorable to the treaty, but they opposed the government's motion because it affirmed Britain's "opt-out" from the treaty's Social Chapter (which guaranteed certain rights to European workers[1]). Conservative Prime Minister John Major therefore needed solid backing from his own party, including the support from approximately twenty Euro-rebels—dissident Tory MPs who openly opposed any legislation that ceded further authority to European institutions. Unfortunately for Major, however, the Euro-rebels decided not to follow their party's leader, voting instead with the opposition and thereby defeating the government's motion to ratify the treaty.

But the fate of Maastricht was not sealed by the defeat of the government's motion. Immediately following the negative vote, Major tabled a motion of confidence on his Maastricht policy, announcing at the same time that if he lost the vote of confidence, Parliament would be dissolved, and new elections would be held. With the most recent polls showing certain electoral defeat for the Tories, the Euro-rebels toed the party line and backed Major in the confidence vote (which succeeded by 339-299). The attempt to torpedo Maastricht therefore ended with a whimper rather than a bang, and Britain ratified the treaty in precisely the form desired by its prime minister.

Major's use of a confidence vote to adopt his Maastricht policy was exceptional parliamentary theater as well as a vivid portrayal of the effect confidence vote procedures can have on parliamentary bargaining. But such dramatic instances of a prime minister putting his job on the line to achieve particular policy objectives do not represent the only ways in which these procedures affect legislative bargaining. Even in the vast number of cases in which confidence vote procedures are not employed, it is likely that these procedures shape behavior because MPs must anticipate the possibility that a prime minister may, at any time, make a particular policy a question of confidence.

Political scientists, however, have little understanding of how confidence vote procedures influence parliamentary behavior because scholars rarely examine how institutional arrangements shape strategic bargaining processes in parliamentary legislatures. Instead, comparative research typically asserts that almost all important policymaking power lies in the cabinet, with the parlia-

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[1] These rights include, among others, establishing a maximum 48-hour work week, increasing government worker training, providing guaranteed maternity leave, and enacting specific rights for part-time workers. In negotiating Maastricht, John Major had won the right for Britain to be excluded from these provisions.

ment playing at most a marginal role.[2] Studies of strategic bargaining processes in parliamentary systems therefore typically ignore legislatures, focusing instead on government formation and cabinet stability.[3] And comparative research on legislatures typically ignores strategic bargaining processes, focusing instead on measuring the relative weakness of parliaments in policymaking, identifying the roles of individual representatives, and delineating the "system functions" that parliaments play across polities.[4]

The propensity to assume away the relevance of bargaining processes that occur between the births and deaths of governments is unwise. Although cabinets clearly hold substantial policymaking powers, the most serious conflict in parliamentary systems generally does not lie primarily between one institutional arena, the government, and another, the parliament. Instead, the most serious conflict generally lies between parties and party factions that are represented both in the government and the parliament. In Great Britain, for instance, there were Euro-rebels in Major's cabinet and among backbenchers in Parliament. Conflict between these factions certainly played itself out in the party caucus, in private debates among cabinet ministers, and on the floor of Parliament. What was significant about the resolution of the intraparty conflict, however, was that Major held control of an important institutional weapon, the confidence vote procedure. Of course, in the many parliamentary systems that routinely produce coalition or minority governments, conflict across governing parties will be on-going, making the role of institutional arrangements in shaping bargaining even more important than in Britain's majoritarian system. It is therefore essential to explore the effect of institutional arrangements on how political parties and party factions reach and maintain policy agreements after government formation is complete.

This paper takes a step toward filling this lacunae in our understanding of parliamentary institutions by focusing specifically on the confidence vote procedure. I first describe the precise structure of confidence vote procedures in eighteen advanced industrial democracies. I then use this description to develop a formal model which analyzes strategic interactions in a multidimensional policy space between a cabinet minister, a prime minister, and the prime minister's majority in parliament. I explore these interactions under several alternative assumptions about the policy, office, and electoral motivations of the agents.

The analysis makes two contributions to the study of parliamentary democracy. First, the model indicates that confidence vote procedures should make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when the procedure is not invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, who manage specific portfolios, nor MPs, who can vote motions of no confidence, can counteract the prime minister's control on the floor of parliament. It is therefore impossible to understand fully the institutional underpinnings of parliamentary democracy without considering the effect of confidence vote procedures on legislative behavior.

The second contribution of the analysis concerns the actual use of confidence vote procedures. In principle, the procedure could be used on every bill a parliament considers. In practice, it is used with great discretion. Why, then, are confidence vote procedures invoked on particular bills?

Some might expect that a prime minister's decision to use a confidence vote procedure will be influenced by the cost of losing his or her job, by the costs to the MPs of throwing the government out of office, by the dimensionality of the policy space, or by the level of policy conflict between MPs and the prime minister. But the analysis indicates that none of these factors directly affects procedural choice. Instead, the model focuses attention on the exogenous costs that prime ministers pay when they use confidence vote procedures, and, more important, on the electoral incentives of MPs. In the model, if the various parties or party factions supporting the government benefit electorally from clearly distinguishing their policy positions from one another, then they can adopt position-taking strategies on the floor of parliament (with each party or faction publicly supporting the policies most preferred by its constituents). In adopting such strategies, the parties or factions communicate valuable information about policy positions to voters, and they *compel* the prime minister to invoke a confidence vote procedure. Consequently, although the procedure clearly provides the prime minister an important tool for favorably resolving disputes among members of the government, the actual use of confidence vote procedures should not be viewed as a strong-arm tactic that a prime minister employs against parliament. Rather, the procedures arise in response to exogenous electoral considerations that encourage position-taking strategies on the floor of parliament.

THE STRUCTURE OF CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURES

The confidence vote procedure is part of a broad class of institutional arrangements that formalize a prime minister's dependence on majority support in the legislature. As noted above, these institutional arrangements are usefully divided into two categories. The first includes procedures that enable members of legislatures to initiate votes on government survival. These procedures, typically called motions of censure or motions of no confidence, exist in a variety of forms, but all share a distinguishing feature: They permit a majority in parliament to vote up or down on the continuation in power of the prime minister and the cabinet. Although I do not formally model votes of no confidence, the existence of such procedures plays an important role in developing

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[2] See, for example, Almond and Powell 1978; Bryce 1921; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1992 (p. 32); Loewenberg and Patterson 1979; Mezey 1979; Polsby 1975; Rose 1984; see also the various essays in Loewenberg 1971 and Norton 1990.

[3] An excellent review of this literature is found in Laver and Schofield 1990.

[4] On the relative importance of parliaments, recent examples include Olsen and Mezey 1991 and essays in Copeland and Patterson 1994a. Searing 1994 is an excellent recent example of research on the roles of legislators. Research on the system functions of parliaments includes Copeland and Patterson 1994b, Wahlke 1971, and Packenham 1970.

TABLE 1. Confidence Vote Procedures in Eighteen Democracies

Country	Source of Prime Minister's Authority	Prerequisites for invoking procedure	Voting Rule
Australia	Convention	Consultation in Party Room	Simple majority of those voting
Belgium	Standing Orders, Article 91	None	PM's motion carries unless a majority of the legislature's members vote No
Canada	Convention	None	Simple majority of those voting
Denmark	Convention and the Standing Orders, Article 24	None	Simple majority of those voting
Finland	Constitution, Section 36 of the Parliamentary Act	Cabinet approval necessary	Simple majority of those voting
France	Article 49 of Constitution	Consultation with cabinet	PM's motion carries unless a majority of the legislature's members vote No
Germany	Article 68 of Constitution	None	Chancellors motion carries unless a majority of the legislature's members vote No
Iceland	None	N/A	N/A
Ireland	Convention and Standing Orders (PM's control of agenda, *Standing Order 25*)	None	Simple majority of those voting
Italy	Article 116 of Standing Orders, see also Constitution, Article 92	Cabinet approval necessary	Simple majority of those voting
Luxembourg	Convention	Cabinet approval necessary	Simple majority of those voting
Netherlands	Convention	Cabinet approval necessary	Simple majority of those voting
New Zealand	Convention	None	Simple majority of those voting
Norway	Convention	None	Simple majority of those voting
Portugal	Article 196 and 203-204 of the Constitution, and Article 235-237 of the Standing Orders	None	Simple majority of those voting
Spain	Article 112 of the Constitution; Sections 173-174 of the Standing Orders of the Congress	Cabinet approval necessary; Consultation with Council of State.	PM's motion carries if supported by a majority of the Congress's members.
Sweden	Convention	Cabinet approval necessary	Simple majority of those voting
United Kingdom	Convention	None	Simple majority of those voting

Note: For all countries except Portugal, sources of data include the Constitution, the standing orders of the lower house, and interviews with at least one member of the permanent staff of the legislature. For Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway, interviews with specialists on parliamentary politics provided additional information. For Portugal, information is taken only from the Constitution and the standing orders.

the assumptions in the model of confidence vote procedures analyzed below.

The second category of institutional arrangements includes procedures initiated by the government. The confidence vote procedure is obviously in this category, as are several other types of confidence votes. In some countries, for example, the prime minister must receive a formal vote of confidence at the time of government investiture.[5] Many countries also permit prime ministers to request a general vote of confidence in the government, without attaching a specific policy declaration to the vote. Some countries permit votes of confidence in specific cabinet ministers, which typically occurs when there are questions of unethical behavior. What distinguishes the confidence vote procedure from these other types of confidence votes, however, is that the confidence vote procedure is used after government formation is complete and in the context of legislative debates on specific policy issues or specific aspects of the government's program.

Table 1 provides data on the institutional structure of confidence vote procedures in eighteen democratic systems. The first column indicates that confidence vote procedures generally exist in parliamentary democracies and that there are three sources of authority for such procedures: constitutions, standing orders, and convention. In Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the constitution authorizes the government to make policies questions of confidence.[6] In Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, provisions in the standing orders of parliament establish or clarify confidence vote procedures.[7] By convention, the government can make the vote on a specific policy a question of confidence in Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.[8] Only in Iceland is there neither a written rule nor a convention that permits the government to make a specific policy issue a question of confidence.

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[5] Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland all require formal investiture votes (Laver and Schofield 1990, 64).

[6] In Spain, confidence vote procedures are intended to be used on the government's program rather than in the context of specific bills, although no provisions explicitly preclude the use of such procedures on narrow policy issues or particular aspects of the government's program.

Where confidence vote procedures exist, they share three important structural features. First, as column two in Table 1 indicates, prime ministers can generally, at least in principle, act unilaterally. In Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway,[9] Portugal, and the United Kingdom, there are no formal institutional constraints on the prime minister (although consultation with the cabinet is generally presumed). In Australia, France, and the Netherlands, the prime minister must formally consult the cabinet but is not bound by these consultations. In Finland, Italy, Spain, and Sweden, the prime minister must receive the formal support of the cabinet before a confidence vote procedure can be invoked. Of course, even if a prime minister is not formally constrained by institutional arrangements, s/he will often be constrained by political factors and may pay large personal costs if s/he attempts to proceed unilaterally to invoke a confidence vote procedure. These political constraints will play an important role in the model analyzed below.

The second important feature of confidence vote procedures is that a prime minister can use them to propose any policy s/he wishes. An example from Italy illustrates. In March 1995, nonpartisan Prime Minister Lamberto Dini submitted a "mini-budget" to the lower house specifying various austerity measures (including increases in the gasoline tax and the VAT). Members of the lower house proposed more than 150 amendments, many of which undermined Dini's goal to contain the Italian budget deficit to 8% of GDP. After several "expensive" amendments were adopted, Dini invoked a confidence vote procedure on his budget package. His motion excluded the adopted amendments as well as many that had not yet been voted. The confidence vote passed, allowing Dini to obtain the austerity measures he desired.

An example from Fourth Republic France further illustrates the lack of constraints on a prime minister's proposal under a confidence vote procedure. During the budget debate in December 1957, numerous amendments opposed by the government were adopted. In response, Prime Minister Félix Gaillard posed the following question of confidence to the National Assembly:[10]

> Vote number 748 on the question of confidence: to move to the general discussion of the articles; to adopt articles 1 through 13 of the government's budget according to the text reported by the Finance Committee, modified as follows: (1) by the adoption of article 2 through 6 of the original government text of the budget; (2) by the addition of the Gaumont amendment to Article 7; and (3) by the addition of the Brusset amendment to Article 8; to exclude all other motions and amendments; and for the adoption of the entire bill (Avril 1965, 403).

As these examples illustrate, a prime minister not only can use confidence vote procedures to propose any policy s/he wishes but also can do so at any time in the legislative process, including at the very end. In fact, confidence vote procedures can be used by a prime minister to reverse parliamentary defeats. The Maastricht example from Great Britain illustrates how this can occur.[11]

The final important institutional feature of confidence vote procedures is the voting rule. In most countries, a prime minister's motion carries if it receives a majority of the votes cast, but there are three exceptions. In Belgium, Germany, and France, abstentions always count for the government because a prime minister's motion carries unless a majority of the members elected to the lower house vote against the motion. In Spain, abstentions always count against the prime minister because a motion of confidence is adopted only if it receives the votes of a majority of the members elected to the lower house.

A MODEL OF THE CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURE

The discussion in the previous section can be used to guide the development of a formal model of confidence vote procedures. The legislative process in parliamentary systems typically begins when a cabinet minister (such as the minister of finance or agriculture) submits a bill to the parliament (although MPs can initiate legislation even if there is no proposal by a cabinet minister). Legislative consideration of a bill then begins in a committee, where amendments are made before a report to the floor. On the floor, the bill is debated, additional amendments are submitted and voted, and

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[7] In Italy, the standing orders permit confidence votes not only on specific issues but also on specific articles or amendments. This procedure formally entered the Italian standing orders in 1971. Prior to that time, it existed by convention. In Belgium, a confidence vote procedure was not established in the standing orders until 1995.

[8] In some countries, there are particular types of bills, such as budgets or supply motions, that by convention are treated as questions of confidence. In each such country, there also exists a convention establishing the confidence vote procedure. Cox (1987) discusses the use of confidence votes and dissolution threats in nineteenth-century England.

[9] In Norway, the Labour Party imposes formal constraints on the autonomy of the prime minister.

[10] The confidence vote procedure in Fourth Republic France was flawed in an important way: It was possible for the government to invoke a confidence vote on a particular policy, for the policy to be defeated, but for the government to survive. This could occur because a simple plurality could defeat a bill, but an absolute majority of members was necessary to defeat the government. There were several efforts to amend this provision during the Fourth Republic, and the procedure was a major issue in the drafting of the Fifth (which corrected the problem). For a discussion, see Lascombe 1981 and Huber forthcoming. The problem in the Fourth Republic is atypical because most countries use the same rule for voting on bills as they do for voting on questions of confidence. Where differences exist, constitutional rules ensure no ambiguity.

[11] Another example of the prime minister using a confidence vote procedure to reverse a parliamentary defeat comes from the 1989 budget debates in Fifth Republic France. See *Journal Officiel*, 1989, 3961.

FIGURE 1. The Sequence of Play in the Confidence Vote Model



Cabinet Minister proposes any policy, $b_C \in \mathfrak{R}^m$.

Each member of the Majority proposes $b_i \in \mathfrak{R}^m$. If $b_i = b_j$ for all $i, j \in M$, then $b_M = b_i$. Otherwise $b_M = x_o$.

The Prime Minister either accepts (a_P) the Majority's proposal (ending the game), or uses a confidence vote procedure to propose any new policy, $b_P \in \mathfrak{R}^m$.

If the Prime Minister invokes a confidence vote procedure, each member of the Majority votes either to accept the Prime Minister's policy (a_i), or to bring the government down (NC_i), maintaining the status quo.

ultimately there is a vote on the entire bill. As discussed, in countries where a confidence vote procedure exists, the prime minister can generally demand a vote of confidence on a specific policy at any time during this process, including after parliament adopts or defeats a bill.

To analyze how confidence vote procedures shape legislative bargaining, the model presented here focuses on the interactions between a cabinet minister (C), the prime minister (P), and the prime minister's majority (M) in parliament, where M is a finite set of n members, the generic element of which is i.

M is assumed to have ex ante identifiable members because, in practice, exogenous constraints associated with government formation almost always prevent a prime minister from crafting ad hoc majorities on a bill-by-bill basis. Instead, the prime minister must be able to find a bill that is supported by a set of parties who are defined when a government forms in support of the prime minister. Thus, in the model each member of M must agree before any legislation is adopted, and each member can ensure that the prime minister falls in a vote of confidence. One may think of these members of M as the parliamentary parties (or factions) in a governing coalition, as the parties in government and the opposition support party (or parties) during minority government, or as some subset of pivotal parties during surplus majority governments. In the case of a strongly unified, single-party majority government, one may wish to think of M as having a single member.

I would underline that the assumption of ex ante identifiable members of M is made only to capture the important constraints that government formation processes typically impose on parliamentary behavior. For those uncomfortable with the assumption, it will become clear below that the analysis would not be fundamentally altered if one were to ignore the constraints imposed by government formation and were to assume instead that, on any policy, any majority of members could accept or defeat a bill.

The model has four stages, which are summarized in Figure 1. First, during the proposal stage, the cabinet minister submits a bill to parliament. C can propose any policy he wishes in a multidimensional policy space. Let C's strategy, then, be a mapping $b_C : x_0 \rightarrow B$, where x_0 is the status quo policy, and B is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of $\mathfrak{R}^m$.

Second, in the parliamentary stage, the bill undergoes the normal legislative process. Formal amendment and voting rules vary across countries, making it impossible to capture all the subtleties of these procedures in a single model. Typically, however, amendment rules in parliamentary systems are quite open, permitting MPs to submit and vote on almost any amendment they wish. The model thus makes two substantive assumptions about the parliamentary stage. First, it assumes that each member of M must go on record for a specific policy. Put differently, each member must vote for a specific policy outcome.[12] Second, the model assumes that, through the amendment process, all members of M can go on record for any policy they wish. In practice, an MP could go on record for his or her most preferred policy by proposing it in an amendment, voting for the amendment, and voting against any policy that differs from the one proposed in the amendment. Similarly, an MP could use the amendment process to go on record for any other policy or could go on record for the status quo by voting against any proposal to change existing policy.

Rather than formally modeling amendment processes and voting on the floor of parliament, I call a member's strategy in the parliamentary stage a proposal and assume that each member proposes any policy s/he wishes. Formally, the proposal strategy for each member is a mapping, $b_i: B \rightarrow B$. The individual proposals by the members of M determine the final policy adopted in the parliamentary stage (called b_M). Since any member of M can veto a bill, to change the status quo, all members of M must agree. Thus, if all members of M propose the same policy, then this policy is the outcome from the parliamentary stage (i.e., $b_M = b_i$, if $b_i = b_j\ \forall i, j \in M$). If any two members make different proposals, then the policy produced by the parliamentary stage is the status quo (i.e., $b_M = x_0$, if $b_i \neq b_j\ \forall i, j \in M$).

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[12] Abstention is, of course, always a possibility in practice, but vote counting rules ensure that abstentions count either for the yeas or the nays.

After the parliamentary stage, the game moves to the procedural stage, where the prime minister can either accept b_M (denoted a_p) or propose any new policy by invoking a confidence vote procedure. The model therefore ignores situations in which there are formal institutional constraints on the prime minister, focusing instead on the more common possibility that the prime minister can act unilaterally. The general logic of the model will apply to situations in which there are institutional constraints on the prime minister, but the model is silent on how members of the government as a whole may arrive at specific confidence vote proposals. Formally, let P's strategy be a mapping $b_P: B \rightarrow Q$, where $Q \equiv \{a_p\} \cup B$. I assume that if P is indifferent between accepting b_M and proposing some other policy by using a confidence vote procedure, then P will accept b_M.

If P accepts the bill adopted by the majority in the parliamentary stage, the game ends, and the policy outcome is the majority's bill. If P proposes a new policy using a confidence vote, then in the voting stage, each member of M must decide whether to accept the policy or vote the prime minister out of office. Formally, let a_i be the strategy for i to accept b_P, and let NC_i be the strategy for i to vote (no confidence) against the government. The voting strategy for all i is a mapping s_i: $B \rightarrow \{a_i\} \cup \{NC_i\}$. Thus, I assume there are no abstentions. The prime minister will fall, retaining the status quo, if any member votes against the prime minister (i.e., if $s_i = NC_i$ for any $i \in M$). I assume that if P invokes a confidence vote procedure, member i will accept P's proposal if i is indifferent between accepting and voting no.

The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Formally, let $b_c^*(x_0)$ be the equilibrium proposal by C; let $b_i^*(b_c)$ be the equilibrium proposal strategy for each $i \in M$; let $b_P^*(b_M)$ be P's equilibrium procedural strategy (where b_M is defined by b_i as noted above); and let $s_i^*(b_P)$ be the equilibrium voting strategy for each $i \in M$.

The standard assumption in spatial models is that legislators are motivated exclusively by the desire to achieve the best possible policy outcome from the legislative process. In the confidence vote model presented here, the standard assumption is a special case. More generally, following studies of party motivations in parliamentary systems,[13] I assume that although the agents in the model always care about the nature of final policy outcomes, they also may be concerned about the electoral implications of their actions as well as the induced outcome if the government falls in a confidence vote. The problem facing the agents is that pursuit of optimal policies in any particular legislative debate may jeopardize future electoral success or future policy success if the government falls.

The utility functions of the agents, therefore, include several parameters. First, I assume that the policy preferences of each agent ($k = C$, P, and i) over the issue space B are represented by strictly quasi-concave utility functions, $u_k(\bullet)$. Let $x_k = \arg\max_{x \in B} u_k(x)$ be k's ideal point, and assume $u_k(x_k) = 0$. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that $x_i \neq x_j$ for all $i, j \in M$.

Agents in parliamentary systems may be concerned about final policies for electoral reasons: Voters often use policy outcomes to reward and sanction political parties. But it may also be that in bargaining for the best possible policy outcomes, parties will actually decrease their electoral support because of the signals they send to voters about policy positions. In parliamentary systems, particularly those with a high incidence of coalition or minority governments, parliamentary agents face the unique challenge of being forced to cooperate in the legislature with their electoral competitors. If Christian Democrats and Liberals, for example, form a coalition government, these parties must reach policy agreements and vote together on a wide range of issues, and they must then campaign against each other for votes in the next election. This obviously creates problems for voters and parties alike. Voters face the problem of assessing which parties are responsible for which policy outcomes and of determining the policy positions of political parties on various issues. Parties face the problem of communicating information about issue positions and political responsibility to the voters. Of course, on some legislation, consensus exists, political debate is innocuous or nonexistent, and communication therefore is unimportant. But on many other issues, voters are attentive and will use party positions on particular issues to determine their choices in subsequent elections. Consequently, the legislative process is important not only as a channel by which policies are chosen but also as a forum for communicating information to voters about issue positions.

I do not explicitly model the behavior of voters. Instead, I assume that the ideal points and utility functions of the agents in the model are induced by the agents' constituencies. Thus, there may be electoral costs associated with making policy proposals that diverge from these ideal points, particularly on those issue dimensions most valued by constituents. Formally, $\alpha \geq 0$ is a parameter that taps voter sensitivity on a particular bill. The electoral penalty from proposals for C is given by $\alpha[u_c(b_c)]$, and the electoral penalty from proposals for all $i \in M$ is given by $\alpha[u_i(b_i)]$. Thus, for any $\alpha > 0$, the electoral penalty associated with any proposal increases as the proposal diverges from an agent's ideal point.

Since the prime minister is chosen by the majority rather than by the voters, and since she makes policy proposals using the extraordinary device of confidence votes (rather than the normal legislative process), the prime minister's electoral implications from making proposals are somewhat different than those faced by C or M. The prime minister, for example, may be sanctioned by voters for using a confidence vote procedure to make policy proposals that are distant from the prime minister's ideal point (i.e., pay $\alpha[u_P(b_P)]$). But the electoral implications may also be important even if α is zero or if P makes a proposal very near her ideal point. The use of confidence vote procedures is a very serious political event that generally receives front-page attention—often of the negative variety. The prime minister often wishes to avoid this kind of attention, fearing that the use of confidence votes will signal to the voters that the government does not have a majority for its policy or is not respecting the wishes of the voters' directly elected representatives. In addition, using the confidence vote procedure may alienate other members of the government. Since adopting strategies that create divisions within a governing party or coalition may be electorally costly (Jennings 1961, 496; King 1976, 1981), the prime minister will often wish to avoid these procedures when their use exacerbates internal conflict. Thus, the prime minister may be willing to make concessions simply to avoid the use of confidence vote procedures.

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[13] See especially Harmel and Janda 1994; Laver 1989; Lupia and Strom 1995; Strom 1990a, 1990b, 1994; and Tsebelis 1990.

Although rare, there may be exogenous electoral benefits from using the confidence vote procedure. This may occur when the use of a confidence vote suppresses debate on specific provisions in a bill, thereby limiting the appearance of internal party divisions. Duverger (1987, chapter 4) and Baumgartner (1989, 178–83) argue that this use of confidence votes has occurred in France.

Since many factors (in addition to the precise nature of the prime minister's proposal) may influence the electoral implications of invoking a confidence vote procedure, I do not focus exclusively on $\alpha[u_P(b_P)]$. Instead, I assume that the prime minister may pay some exogenous electoral "cost," $e \in \Re$, for invoking a confidence vote procedure, where e includes all exogenous costs or benefits from invoking a confidence vote. Since e may be zero or negative, I assume that there may be no electoral implications from using the procedure or that there may actually be benefits from using the procedure to obtain a particular policy.

Next consider the preferences of the agents over induced outcomes from the defeat of the government in the voting stage. When the government falls, the cabinet ministers and the prime minister generally lose not only their job but also important opportunities to influence policy and the distribution of government resources in the future. It is therefore reasonable to assume that C and P may pay a positive cost if the government falls, and thus they may be willing to make policy concessions in order to keep their job.

Similarly, if the government falls on a vote of confidence, there may be costs to the members of M—and there should never be benefits. The justification for assuming that there are no benefits is straightforward. As previously discussed, a parliamentary majority can remove a prime minister from office at any time by submitting and voting a motion of censure. Thus, the existence of any government in power suggests that, other things equal, a majority places a nonnegative value on keeping that government in place. The costs of bringing down the government are equally straightforward. Throwing the prime minister out of office may lead to a government that implements undesirable policies in the future, may entail loss of access to governmental sources of patronage, and may lead to loss of one's seat if an election ensues. The members of M may therefore be willing to make short-term policy sacrifices to ensure that the prime minister is around in the future.[14] Formally, let $c^k \geq 0$ be the censure costs to agents $k = C, P$, and i if the government falls in the voting stage.

I can now summarize the utility functions, U, for each agent in the game. Let y be a final policy outcome from the confidence vote model. Then, the utility function for C is given by:

$$U_C(y, c^C, \alpha) = \begin{cases} u_C(b_M) - \alpha[u_C(b_C)] \text{ if } P \text{ accepts } b_M \\ u_C(b_P) - \alpha[u_C(b_C)] \text{ if } P \text{ proposes } b_P \\ \quad \text{and all } i \in M \text{ accept} \\ u_C(x_0) - \alpha[u_C(b_C)] - c^C \text{ if any } i \in M \text{ censures } P. \end{cases}$$

The utility function for each $i \in M$ is given by:

$$U_i(y, c^i, \alpha) = \begin{cases} u_i(b_M) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)] \text{ if } P \text{ accepts } b_M \\ u_i(b_P) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)] \text{ if } P \text{ proposes } b_P \\ \quad \text{and all } i \in M \text{ accept} \\ u_i(x_0) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)] - c^i \text{ if any } i \in M \text{ censures } P. \end{cases}$$

The utility function for P is given by:

$$U_P(y, c^P, e) = \begin{cases} u_P(b_M) \text{ if } P \text{ accepts } b_M \\ u_P(b_P) - e \text{ if } P \text{ proposes } b_P \text{ and all } i \in M \text{ accept} \\ u_P(x_0) - e - c^P \text{ if any } i \in M \text{ censures } P. \end{cases}$$

Note that when $e = c^k = \alpha = 0$, the utility functions of the agents take the form of the standard spatial model.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROCEDURAL DECISION

Under what circumstances will the prime minister invoke a confidence vote procedure? If the procedure is invoked, what policy will the prime minister propose? To answer these questions, one must solve the model by backward induction, beginning with the strategy for each member of M in the voting stage.

If the prime minister invokes a confidence vote procedure, then a member's voting decision depends solely on the location of the status quo, the member's censure costs, and the prime minister's proposal. Let $A_i = \{x \in$

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[14] This argument is frequently made by scholars of parliamentary government (e.g., Goguel 1971, 85; Jennings 1957, 7, 136; King 1981, 88).

$B{:}u_i(x) \geq u_i(x_0) - c^i\}$. A_i defines all policies that member i would prefer to accept in the voting stage rather than bring down the government with a vote of no confidence. I therefore use A_i to establish the strategies of members of M in the voting stage of the model. Proposition 1 draws on the definition of A_i and is stated without proof.

PROPOSITION 1. *During the voting stage, the best response for all* i ∈ M *is given by*

$$S_i^*(b_P) = \begin{cases} NC_i \text{ if } b_P \notin A_i \\ a_i \text{ if } b_P \in A_i. \end{cases}$$

Since any proposal by P in the procedural stage must be accepted by *all* members of M, the set of policies that P can propose using a confidence vote procedure and that will not lead to the fall of the government is $A = \cap_{i=1}^{N} A_i$. Note that for all $i \in M$, A_i is a closed and convex set containing x_0. The set A is therefore nonempty, closed, and convex. The prime minister will be defeated if she proposes any policy that is not in A. Thus, the best obtainable policy that the prime minister can achieve by invoking a confidence vote procedure is $\hat{x} = \arg\max_{x \in A} u_P(x)$. Since A is nonempty, closed, and convex, by strict quasi-concavity of u_P, $\hat{x}$ always exists and is unique. Note that if the model assumed that P could create ad hoc majorities, then the same logic would permit P to identify $\hat{x}$ (which may or may not be unique), although she would have to compute the set A for all possible majorities.

The utility the prime minister receives from proposing $\hat{x}$ during the procedural stage depends on the exogenous electoral implications, e, associated with actually invoking a confidence vote procedure on a policy issue. One can use $\hat{x}$ and e to define the set of policies that the prime minister prefers to accept in the procedural stage rather than invoke a CVP to propose $\hat{x}$:

$$E = \{x \in B{:}u_P(x) \geq u_P(\hat{x}) - e\}.$$

It is useful to note that if there are large electoral benefits associated with invoking a confidence vote procedure ($e < 0$), then E may be empty.

The strategy for P in the procedural stage follows from the definitions of $\hat{x}$ and E.

PROPOSITION 2. *Let* $Z = \{x \in B{:}\ u_P(x) \geq u_P(x_0)\}$. *During the procedural stage,* P*'s best-response strategy is given by:*

$$b_P^*(b_M) = \begin{cases} a_P \text{ if } b_M \in E \\ \hat{x} \text{ if } E = \varnothing, \text{ or} \\ \qquad E \neq \varnothing, b_M \notin E \text{ and } (\hat{x} \neq x_0 \text{ or } c^P > 0) \\ x \in Z \text{ if } E \neq \varnothing, b_M \notin E, \hat{x} = x_0 \text{ and } c^P = 0. \end{cases}$$

For proof, see the appendix.

The logic behind proposition 2 is simple. The policy preferences and censure costs of the members of M, together with the status quo, determine the set of policies that all members would prefer to accept rather than bring down the government. The prime minister can always, without fear of being voted out of office, obtain the policy ($\hat{x}$) she most prefers from this set of obtainable policies by invoking a confidence vote procedure. But since using a confidence vote may trigger an exogenous electoral cost or benefit, there may also exist a set of policies that P would prefer to accept rather than use a confidence vote to propose the best obtainable policy. Thus, if P's policy utility from accepting M's proposal is greater than the total utility—policy and electoral—that P receives from using a confidence vote, the prime minister will accept M's proposal. Otherwise, with one exception, P will invoke a confidence vote procedure to propose the best policy from this set of obtainable policies. The one exception occurs when the best obtainable policy for the prime minister is the status quo (so that $\hat{x} = x_0$), and P pays no cost of being thrown out of office (so that $c^P = 0$). In this case, if M adopts a policy that is not at least as good for P as the status quo, then P can propose any policy that she weakly prefers to the status quo. If P proposes a policy that she strictly prefers to the status quo, she will provoke censure. Remarks 1 and 2 in the appendix indicate that it should be quite unlikely for this to occur.

Figure 2 depicts the logic of these interactions. Assume there are only two members of M, with ideal points at x_1 and x_2. The set of policies that a member of M would prefer to accept (if proposed by the prime minister under a confidence vote) rather than censure the government is a function of the location of the status quo and the censure costs of the member. This set (A_i) is depicted by the area inside the (bold) indifference curves surrounding the (thin) indifference curves of each member through x_0. The intersection of these two (bold) indifference curves is the set of policies that both members of M would prefer to accept rather than censure the prime minister (the set A).

The best policy from this set for P is $\hat{x}$. The set of policies that P would prefer to accept rather than use a confidence vote procedure (the set E) is a function of

FIGURE 2. An Example of the Confidence Vote Model



the location of $\hat{x}$ and P's electoral costs. In Figure 2, for some arbitrary and positive electoral cost, this set is depicted by the area inside the (bold) indifference curve that surrounds the prime minister's indifference curve through $\hat{x}$. Of course, if P bears no costs of using a confidence vote ($e = 0$), then the set E is defined simply by P's indifference curve through $\hat{x}$.

PARLIAMENTARY STRATEGIES AND THE USE OF THE CONFIDENCE VOTE PROCEDURE

The members of M can make two different types of proposals: those that provoke a confidence vote ("provoking proposals") and those that do not ("acceptable proposals"). To understand when one should observe actual confidence vote procedures, it is necessary to describe the circumstances under which members of M will make each type of proposal during the parliamentary stage.

The utility for each member i from making an acceptable proposal, b_i, is $u_i(b_i) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)]$. The utility for each member from making a provoking proposal depends on whether $\hat{x} = x_0$ and $c^P > 0$. The greatest utility that a member could *ever* receive from making a provoking proposal, however, is $u_i(\hat{x})$, which occurs when $b_i = x_i$, proposing x_i provokes a confidence vote procedure, and the prime minister's confidence vote proposal does not lead to her fall. Let D_i be the set of policies which, if proposed by M and accepted by P, give member i a (weakly) greater utility than i could *ever* receive from making a proposal that provokes a confidence vote. Then,

$$D_i = \{x \in B\colon u_i(x) - \alpha[u_i(x)] \geq u_i(\hat{x})\}.$$

Let $D = \cap_{i=1}^{N} D_i$. If $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$, then there exist policies which would be accepted by P and which would give each member a higher utility than could ever be achieved by making a provoking proposal. The sets D and E play a central role in shaping the strategies of the members in the parliamentary stage.

PROPOSITION 3. *The members of* M *can make an acceptable proposal that alters the status quo if and only if* D $\cap$ E $\neq \varnothing$.

For proof, see the appendix.

Proposition 3 indicates that members of M can adopt a change to the status quo during the parliamentary stage when two conditions are met. First, policies exist that P would prefer to accept rather than use a confidence vote to propose the best obtainable policy (i.e., $E \neq \varnothing$). Second, policies exist in this set that all members of M prefer to propose rather than make position-taking proposals of their respective ideal points (i.e., $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$). Two factors directly affect whether such policies exist: the prime minister's electoral costs and, more important, the electoral implications associated with proposals by members of M.

To understand the logic, return to Figure 2. In the parliamentary stage, a member of M must determine which policies, if proposed unanimously by the members of M and accepted by P, would provide a greater utility than the member would receive from proposing his or her ideal point and obtaining an outcome of $\hat{x}$ (because the prime minister invokes a CVP). In Figure 2, this set (D_i) is depicted for both members (and for an arbitrary α) by the dashed indifference curve that is inside the indifference curve of each member through $\hat{x}$. The intersection of these two sets (D_1 and D_2) is the set of proposals (D) that, if proposed by M and accepted by P, would give both members a higher utility than proposing their ideal points and obtaining $\hat{x}$ following a confidence vote. If $\alpha = 0$, then the set D includes the policies that all members of M prefer to $\hat{x}$.

Note that for the arbitrary α and e depicted in Figure 2, the conditions for the members of M to make an acceptable proposal are met (i.e., $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$). In this case, the electoral value of position-taking by the members of M is not sufficiently large for the members to propose their ideal points, pay no electoral penalty from the proposal, and receive $\hat{x}$ following a confidence vote procedure. Instead, they can propose some policy that lies in the intersection of the prime minister's acceptable set (depicted by the bold indifference curve surrounding P's indifference curve through $\hat{x}$) and M's feasible set (the intersection of the two dashed indifference curves). As rewards for "position-taking" increase (as α increases), however, the probability of observing a confidence vote increases. In Figure 2, as these rewards for position-taking increase, the dashed indifference curves will decrease, shrinking the set D, which will become empty as these rewards become sufficiently large. Thus, other things equal, the use of confidence vote procedures should increase as the rewards for position-taking increase. It is important to recognize that if there are no rewards for position-taking, the members of M can avoid the confidence vote procedure by simply proposing $\hat{x}$ (if the prime minister's electoral costs are nil) or proposing some policy in E (if the prime minister bears some cost of using the confidence vote procedure). The position-taking incentives of the members of M therefore play the central role in determining whether confidence vote procedures are used.

But the prime minister's electoral costs are also very important. As these increase, the likelihood that the set E intersects the set D also increases. As noted, for the positive e depicted in Figure 2, the two sets intersect, and the members can make an acceptable proposal that moves the status quo. But if the electoral costs decrease, then given the position-taking incentives depicted in Figure 2, at some point no policy will be acceptable to P and also in M's feasible set. In general, as P's electoral costs increase, as long as there are feasible policies for the members of M (i.e., D is nonempty) the likelihood that M can make an acceptable proposal also increases. Thus, the use of confidence votes should increase as a prime minister's electoral costs of using the procedure decrease.

So far I have considered only the factors that should lead to the use (or avoidance) of confidence vote procedures. It is also important to highlight factors that the model predicts should be irrelevant to predicting the use of confidence votes. Two factors unexpectedly have no effect on the incidence of confidence vote procedures. The first is the prime minister's censure costs. Some might expect the use of confidence votes to decline as the prime minister's censure costs increase, but the model indicates that those costs will never influence the decision to use a confidence vote procedure because of the sequence of decision making. Since the prime minister can always identify a unique policy that represents the best obtainable outcome from a confidence vote procedure, she never need consider censure costs in formulating legislative strategy.

The second irrelevant variable is the dimensionality of the policy space. Scholars who have studied restrictive amendment rules in Congress may suspect that confidence vote procedures should often be used to stabilize legislative choices that are made on more than one policy dimension, much as closed rules are said to stabilize log-rolls in Congress.[15] On the one hand, this intuition is useful because the prime minister's possibility of using a confidence vote defines in multiple dimension policy spaces a reversion policy around which policy bargaining must be structured. On the other hand, it turns out that the strategic considerations of the prime minister are the same for any dimensionality of the policy space. That is, regardless of whether policy choices can be made on one dimension or many, there exists a unique best obtainable policy which is central to the prime minister's procedural decision.

Several other variables have no direct influence on the use of confidence vote procedures, but may have an indirect effect through an interaction with the position-taking incentives of the members of the majority. These variables include the heterogeneity of the majority, the censure costs of the members of the majority, and the level of policy conflict between members of the majority and the prime minister.[16] Consider the heterogeneity of the majority. If a third member of the majority is added at x_3 in Figure 2, and if there are no electoral implications associated with making proposals, the members of M can adopt $\hat{x}$, and no confidence vote procedure will be used. But if there are any position-taking incentives for the members of M, then there will exist no policy that the members could propose, that would be accepted by P, and that would give all members a higher utility than they receive from proposing their ideal points (i.e., $D = \varnothing$). Thus, for this majority of three members, if position-taking incentives exist, one should expect to observe position strategies in parliament and the use of the confidence vote procedure by the prime minister. It is important to bear in mind, however, that if the ideal point of the third member of the majority were very close to the ideal point of either of the first two members, then it would be more likely that even with positive position-taking incentives, the members of the majority could make a proposal that would be acceptable to the prime minister. It is not, then, the size of the majority coalition but, rather, the heterogeneity of its members' preferences, along with the importance of position-taking incentives, that influences the use of confidence vote procedures.

Similarly, the magnitude of the majority members' censure costs and the level of policy disagreement between members of M and the prime minister influence procedural choice only if (1) these variables take values that move the best obtainable policy away from the members' ideal points, *and* (2) there are position-taking incentives for the parties supporting the government. If there are no such incentives, then regardless of the level of policy conflict or the magnitude of censure costs, the members can propose the prime minister's best obtainable policy and avoid a confidence vote procedure. If position-taking incentives are positive, then to propose a policy that is near the best obtainable policy will result in a larger electoral penalty than would be the case if the best obtainable policy were not so distant from the members' ideal points. Thus, censure costs and policy conflict can only indirectly influence the incidence of confidence vote procedures. If position-taking incentives are positive, and if increases in censure costs or policy conflict move the prime minister's best obtainable policy away from the member's ideal points, then these variables may trigger position-taking strategies. The role of these variables in the analysis, therefore, highlights the fundamental link that exists between position-taking incentives in parliament and the incidence of confidence vote procedures.

THE ROLE OF CABINET MINISTERS

An important implication of the model is that opportunities for members of the majority to make acceptable proposals are *never* influenced by C's initial proposal. Instead, for any b_C, the members must undertake the normal legislative process, whether it be to adopt the same proposal made by C, offer a different proposal, or preserve the status quo. Since a confidence vote proposal by the prime minister can follow any proposal emerging from this legislative process, P's preferences and procedural prerogatives—not C's initial proposal—shape legislative strategies in the parliamentary stage. Thus, in this model, C's proposal never directly affects the outcome of the game. The optimal proposal strategy for the cabinet minister thus depends solely only on whether there are electoral implications associated with proposals. Proposition 4 summarizes this logic and is stated without proof.

Proposition 4. *The subgame perfect equilibrium proposal strategy for the cabinet minister is given by*

$$b^*_C(x_0) = \begin{cases} x \in \text{ if } \alpha = 0 \\ x_C \text{ if } \alpha > 0. \end{cases}$$

Of course, the position of cabinet minister is highly coveted in parliamentary systems, and it is extremely doubtful that individuals seek these positions solely because they wish to signal policy preferences to voters. How, then, may cabinet ministers influence legislative outcomes? The answer suggested by the confidence vote model is that a cabinet minister's proposal can assist the members of the majority in coordinating on a particular equilibrium in the parliamentary stage.

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[15] See, e.g., Shepsle 1979, Shepsle and Weingast 1984, and Weingast and Marshall 1989.

[16] Empirical evidence from France supports the model's results regarding the irrelevance of policy conflict, censure costs, and the dimensionality of the policy space (Huber 1992, forthcoming).

Coordination is important for two reasons. First, all the members will desire to avoid inefficient equilibria that exist even when the necessary and sufficient conditions for acceptable proposals to change the status quo are met. For example, assume there are three members of the majority and that $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$. It is always an equilibrium for each member to propose his ideal point. In this case, the majority's proposal is the status quo, and since there are at least three distinct proposals by the members, no member can propose any policy that will change the nature of the majority's proposal.

But each member of the majority and the prime minister prefer the outcome from an equilibrium with acceptable proposals to the outcome from this alternative equilibrium that provokes a confidence vote procedure. More generally, any equilibrium that provokes a confidence vote when the necessary and sufficient conditions are satisfied ($D \cap E \neq \varnothing$) is inefficient. Members of the majority will therefore prefer to coordinate on the efficient equilibria that avoid confidence vote procedures. C's proposal could facilitate this coordination.

Second, even if the members coordinate on an acceptable policy, the model is silent on how the members of M reach agreement on a particular policy proposal. That is, the model lends no insight into how the members may reach agreement on proposing a particular $\tilde{x} \in D \cap E$.[17] Again, C's proposal can signal which acceptable policy the members of M should propose.

The model, therefore, identifies different opportunities that the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and members of parliaments have to shape policy outcomes. The prime minister's prerogative to invoke a confidence vote procedure permits the prime minister to define the set of acceptable policies from which any final policy outcome must be chosen (the set E). The preferences of the members of the majority determine whether there exist acceptable policies (policies in E) that are also feasible (policies in D). The cabinet minister's "first move advantage" lies in the opportunity to signal to the members of the majority which feasible policy, if one exists, they should propose. Although the cabinet minister is often constrained by the preferences of the prime minister, the opportunity to facilitate coordination on particular policies in the parliamentary stage will often have important benefits for the cabinet minister and his party.

It is important to note that the results from the model presented here lead to quite different conclusions about the role of cabinet ministers than we find in previous models that analyze the distribution of cabinet portfolios. The standard assumption in previous models is that cabinet ministers can dictate policy outcomes on issues within their portfolios (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1995). The model here suggests that when we integrate prime ministers and confidence vote procedures into the analysis, this assumption in previous research is too strong. Instead, in systems in which the prime minister can unilaterally invoke confidence vote procedures, one should assume that cabinet ministers can only choose policy outcomes from within a set of feasible policies defined by the preferences of the prime minister. In systems in which the prime minister cannot unilaterally invoke confidence vote procedures, one must model the precise decision-making structure that leads to the collective decision to invoke confidence vote procedures in order to understand the institutional constraints on individual ministers. Consequently, integrating the prime minister into models of portfolio distribution and analyzing the mechanisms of cabinet decision making should lead to a deeper understanding of portfolio distribution in multiparty government.

DISCUSSION

By allowing the prime minister to make the final policy proposal, confidence vote procedures give the prime minister substantial influence over final policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not invoked. If members of the majority bear no censure cost, confidence vote procedures enable the prime minister to choose any final policy outcome from the set of policies that the majority prefers to the status quo. And if members of the majority pay an exogenous cost of censuring the government (which is likely the case if parties exercise strong discipline or if the prime minister controls dissolution), then the confidence vote procedure is even more valuable to the prime minister because she can use it to extract—in policy currency—the majority's censure costs. Consequently, confidence vote procedures ensure that the ability of political parties in parliaments to shape policy outcomes after government formation is complete will be sharply constrained by the policy preferences of the prime minister.

Several observations about this claim are warranted. First, parties and factions in the legislature will find it difficult to use the institutional arrangements of parliamentary government to negate the effect of confidence vote procedures on policy outcomes. Suppose, for example, that the prime minister bears a cost if she falls in a censure vote. One might expect that in some circumstances the majority could *turn the tables*, forcing the prime minister to make policy concessions in order to avoid being thrown out of office. After all, members of the legislature can always threaten to vote a motion of censure. Is it not possible for the majority to use the threat of censure to extract policy concessions from the prime minister?

The negative answer to this question lies in the structure of censure motions, which unlike confidence vote procedures are used to veto the government, not to implement a new policy. In other words, when members of parliament submit and vote a motion of censure, the immediate policy implications of the vote on this motion are nil. Either the government survives or falls, but in neither case do specific policy changes follow directly from the voting outcome. Confidence vote procedures, because they permit the prime minister to make a take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal, therefore play a more important role than censure motions in influencing parliamentary bargaining processes. As long as the prime minister uses confidence vote procedures only to propose policies that all members of the majority prefer to the induced outcome from censure, majority members cannot credibly threaten censure to obtain a better policy.

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[17] One possibility for addressing this shortcoming would be to model explicitly the legislative structures that constrain decision making in the parliamentary stage. Of course, these structures will differ across countries, and including such structures would not alter the insights from this paper into how confidence votes constrain parliamentary decision making (because for any structure, the government can always make the last move).

It is interesting to observe that this proposal power that a prime minister enjoys thanks to confidence vote procedures creates a relationship between the executive and the legislature that is the inverse of what is found in most presidential systems. In the United States, for example, the legislature typically makes the final policy proposal, and the executive can only veto, not alter, this proposal.[18] In parliamentary systems with confidence vote procedures, although the legislature often appears to be able to propose and vote the final policy, the executive can use confidence vote procedures to make the final policy proposal. If the parliament does not anticipate that the prime minister could use a confidence vote procedure, it will find itself in the same position as the presidential executive, that is, with an ability only to veto someone else's proposal (in this case, by vetoing the executive itself).

A second useful observation about the prime minister's proposal power is related to the previous discussion of cabinet ministers and portfolio distribution. Since the structure of confidence vote procedures grants crucial proposal powers to prime ministers, choosing the prime minister will obviously be among the most important decisions that parties in parliaments ever make. The potential for the prime minister to use confidence vote procedures to move policy outcomes away from those that might be chosen by the parliamentary majority obviously depends not only on the costs to the prime minister of using a confidence vote procedure, but also on the level of divergence between the preferences of the prime minister and the majority. It would seem that high levels of divergence will seldom occur in countries that routinely produce cohesive, single-party majorities (although, as we have seen, even in countries like Great Britain, majorities are at times incohesive). In countries in which coalition or minority governments are the norm, it will be more difficult for members of the legislature to choose a prime minister who will share the policy preferences of all members of the majority across issues and over time. It seems likely, then, that in such countries, parties will be more likely to develop norms that constrain the prime minister's ability to act unilaterally (or, in the language of the model, that make the costs of acting unilaterally very high). The model thus underscores the importance of including the policy preferences of prime ministers and the institutional structures of cabinets in theories of government formation.

Third, although confidence vote procedures give prime ministers a significant last-move advantage, the use of a confidence vote procedure should not be interpreted as an act by the prime minister against the parliament. Since agents in parliament must always anticipate that a prime minister could make a policy a question of confidence, these agents must also weigh the policy gains of cooperation with coalition partners against the electoral gains of adopting position-taking strategies. When position-taking incentives are sufficiently strong, parties can go on record in parliament for the precise policies that their constituents most prefer, knowing that in adopting this strategy, they will trigger a confidence vote procedure. In this sense, the use of confidence vote procedures is not decided by the prime minister. Instead, it is decided by the parties in parliament, who knowingly force confidence vote procedures for electoral reasons.

This model points to the need for empirical research on the factors that influence the exogenous electoral implications associated with legislative strategies. Scholars have analyzed these factors in the U.S. context (e.g., Bianco 1994; Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985; Drotning 1993; Mayhew 1974; Wilkerson 1990), but little is known about this issue in parliamentary systems. An important place to begin would be certain systemic variables, such as the timing in the electoral cycle, the majority status of the government, the organizational structure of the prime minister's party, or the popularity of the government coalition. Other factors may be related to the type of policy under consideration. Policies that must be voted each year, for example, such as budgets, may influence electoral costs differently than do policies that are debated sporadically. Or policies that are closely tied to the government's formal policy program may be treated differently than other policies. The more general point, however, is to underline the need for careful empirical study of the factors that influence the electoral consequences of legislative strategies.[19]

In closing, this analysis underscores the importance of focusing careful attention on the rules and procedures of parliamentary democracies. Scholars have devoted thousands of pages to parliamentary forms of government, and a good share of these pages have stressed the subordination of members of parliaments to leaders in governments. What is absent is an account of how the institutional structures of parliamentary systems shape the strategic incentives of individuals in the legislature and the government. The confidence vote model presented here begins to provide such an account, and in so doing it raises issues that are central to understanding political interactions in parliamentary systems.

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[18] An obvious exception occurs when a president enjoys a line-item veto. A president also often enjoys various types of decree authority which can entail significant policy proposal power (Carey and Shugart 1995).

[19] For a discussion of this issue in the case of France, see Huber forthcoming.

APPENDIX

This appendix provides the proofs for propositions 2 and 3 as well as the proofs of two remarks related to the circumstances under which the prime minister will fall in a vote of confidence.

Proposition 2. *Let* Z = {x ∈ B : $u_P(x) \geq u_P(x_0)$}. *During the procedural stage,* P*'s best-response strategy is given by:*

$$b_P^*(b_M) = \begin{cases} \alpha_P \text{ if } b_M \in E \\ \hat{x} \text{ if } E = \varnothing, \text{ or} \\ \qquad E \neq \varnothing,\ b_M \notin E, \text{ and } (\hat{x} \neq x_0 \text{ or } c^P > 0) \\ x \in Z \text{ if } E \neq \varnothing,\ b_M \notin E,\ \hat{x} = x_0, \text{ and } c^P = 0. \end{cases}$$

Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition 1 and the definition of $\hat{x}$, all members of M will accept $\hat{x}$ if it is proposed by P. The utility P receives from using a confidence vote to propose $\hat{x}$ is therefore $u_P(\hat{x}) - e$, and the utility P receives from accepting any b_M is $u_P(b_M)$.

Consider $b_M \in E$. By definition of E, P prefers accepting any policy in E to proposing $b_P = \hat{x}$. Since $\hat{x}$ is the best policy P can propose using a confidence vote, P also prefers accepting any $b_M \in E$ to proposing any $b_P \neq \hat{x}$.

Consider $E = \varnothing$. If $E = \varnothing$, then by definition of E, the utility P receives from proposing $\hat{x}$ $(u_P(\hat{x}) - e)$ is positive (which implies $e < 0$). Since the utility for P from accepting any b_M is at most zero (if $e = 0$ and $b_M = x_P$), P receives a higher utility from proposing $\hat{x}$ than from accepting any b_M. P prefers proposing $\hat{x}$ to proposing any $b_P \notin A$ (because $b_P \notin A$ results in censure, yielding a utility of $u_P(x_0) - e - c^P$). And by definition of $\hat{x}$, P prefers proposing $\hat{x}$ to proposing any policy other policy in A. Thus, the optimal strategy for P is to propose $\hat{x}$.

Consider $E \neq \varnothing$ and $b_M \notin E$. By definition of E, P receives a higher utility from proposing $\hat{x}$ than from accepting $b_M \notin E$. Thus, P will never accept $b_M \notin E$. P's optimal strategy depends on the relationship between $\hat{x}$ and x_0, and on P's censure costs.

> (*a*) If $\hat{x} \neq x_0$, then, since $x_0 \in A$, P prefers proposing $\hat{x}$ to proposing x_0. By definition of $\hat{x}$, P also prefers proposing $\hat{x}$ to proposing any other policy in A. Finally, since proposing any policy that leads to censure results in an outcome of x_0, P prefers proposing $\hat{x}$ to proposing any policy that is not in A.
> (*b*) By definition of $\hat{x}$, if $\hat{x} = x_0$, then P can make no acceptable proposal that yields P a better outcome than the status quo (because proposing any policy that P prefers to x_0 will result in censure). Since P will not make a proposal that results in a worse outcome than the status quo, P will either propose $\hat{x}$ (yielding x_0) or a policy she prefers to the status quo (also yielding x_0, but resulting in censure). If $c^P > 0$, then proposing $\hat{x} = x_0$ gives P a higher utility than proposing any policy that leads to censure. Thus, P will propose $\hat{x}$. If $c^P = 0$, then proposing any policy that leads to censure gives P the same utility as proposing $\hat{x} = x_0$. Thus, P can propose any $x \in Z$. Q.E.D.

Remark 1. *If* $x_0 \neq x_P$ *and* $c^i > 0$ *for all* i ∈ M, *then* P *strictly prefers* $\hat{x}$ *to* x_0.

Proof of Remark 1. Assume $c^i > 0$ $\forall i \in M$. Since $A_i = \{x \in B : u_i(x) \geq u_i(x_0) - c^i\}$, there exists a positive $\varepsilon < c^i$ such that the open ball, $B_i(x_0, \varepsilon)$, is a subset of A_i for all i. Since the intersection of a finite number of open sets containing x_0 is open and contains x_0, it follows that A is nonempty and that x_0 is in the interior of A. Thus, given $x_0 \neq x_P$ and $\hat{x} = \arg\max_{x \in A} u_P(x)$, for any location of x_P, there exists some $x \in A$ that P prefers to x_0, implying $\hat{x} \neq x_0$. Q.E.D.

Remark 2 follows directly from the proof of Remark 1.

Remark 2. *If* $x_0 \neq x_P$, *then* $\hat{x} = x_0$ *implies* $c^i = 0$ *for at least one* i ∈ M.

Proposition 3. *The members of the majority can make an acceptable proposal that alters the status quo if and only if* D ∩ E ≠ ∅.

Proof of Proposition 3.

Necessity. We must show that if $D \cap E = \varnothing$, then the members of the majority can never make an acceptable proposal to alter the status quo. By proposition 2, if $E = \varnothing$, then any proposal by the members of the majority will provoke a vote of confidence. Thus, we need only concentrate on cases in which $E \neq \varnothing$ but $D \cap E = \varnothing$. If $E \neq \varnothing$ and $\alpha = 0$, then $\hat{x} \in D$, and $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$. Thus, when $E \neq \varnothing$ and $D \cap E = \varnothing$, it must be true that $\alpha > 0$.

First, consider the case in which there is only one member, i, of the majority ($|M| = 1$), so that $b_i = b_M$. I show that this member will never make an acceptable proposal. By proposition 2, the utility i receives from proposing any $b_M \notin E$ is $u_i(\hat{x}) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)]$ (because $E \neq \varnothing$, and by remark 2, if $\hat{x} = x_0$, then $c^i = 0$). Since $x_i \in D_i$ and $D_i = D$ (when $|M| = 1$), $D \cap E = \varnothing$ implies that $x_i \notin E$, which implies that $b_M = x_i$ will provoke a confidence vote by P. Thus, given $\alpha > 0$, the utility i receives from proposing x_i $(u_i(\hat{x}))$ is strictly greater than the utility i receives from proposing any other policy x that provokes a vote of confidence $(u_i(\hat{x}) - \alpha[u_i(x)])$. It only remains to show, then, that i prefers proposing x_i to proposing any policy that is accepted by P. By proposition 2, the utility i receives from proposing any $b' \in E$ is $u_i(b') - \alpha[u_i(b')]$. If $b' \in E$, then $D \cap E = \varnothing$ implies that $b' \notin D$. Thus, by definition of D, $u_i(\hat{x}) > u_i(b') - \alpha[u_i(b')]$, and member i strictly prefers proposing x_i to proposing any $b' \in E$.

Next consider $|M| > 1$ when $D \cap E = \varnothing$. In this case, the proposal by the majority, b_M, is determined by the individual proposals of each of the members. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, each member must make a proposal that maximizes his utility given the proposals by the other members and given the best reply by P. I show that if $\alpha > 0$ and $D \cap E = \varnothing$, then each member must propose his or her ideal point.

> (a) When $\alpha > 0$ and $D \cap E = \varnothing$, it cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium for all members to make the same collective proposal, $b'' \in E$. If $b_i = b'' \in E$ for all i, then since $|M| > 1$, there exists some $j \in M$ such that $b'' \neq x_j$. I show that j can never propose b'' in equilibrium. Assume $b_i = b'' \notin E$ $\forall i \neq j$ and that $b'' \neq x_j$. By proposition 2, the utility j receives from proposing $b'' \notin E$ is either $u_j(\hat{x}) - \alpha[u_j(b'')]$ or $u_j(x_0) - \alpha[u_j(b'')] - c^j$. If j proposes x_j, then given $b_i = b''$ $\forall i \neq j$, the majority proposal is $b_M = x_0$. Thus, the utility j receives from proposing x_j is $u_j(\hat{x})$ (because by proposition 2, if $\hat{x} = x_0$, then, since $x_0 \in E$, P will accept x_0; if $\hat{x} \neq x_0$, P will propose $\hat{x}$). Thus, given $\alpha > 0$, for any location of $\hat{x}$ and any value of c^P, j strictly prefers proposing x_i to proposing b''.
> (b) When $\alpha > 0$ and $D \cap E = \varnothing$, it cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium for all members to make the same collective proposal, $b' \in E$. Suppose $b_i = b' \in E$ for all $i \in M$. By proposition 2, P will accept b'. Since $b' \in E$, $D \cap E = \varnothing$ implies there exists some member j of the majority such that $b' \notin D_j$ (and thus that $b' \neq x_j$). The utility j receives from proposing b' is $u_j(b') - \alpha[u_j(b')]$. If j proposes x_j, the proposal by the majority will be x_0, yielding j a utility of $u_j(\hat{x})$. Since $b' \notin D_j$, by definition of D_j, $u_j(\hat{x}) > u_j(b') - \alpha[u_j(b')]$. Thus, j strictly prefers proposing his ideal point to proposing any policy that is accepted by P.

By (a) and (b), there always exists some j such that for any collective proposal not equal to j's ideal point, j has a strictly dominant strategy to propose x_j. Consequently, in any subgame perfect equilibrium when $D \cap E = \varnothing$, the majority's proposal will be $b_M = x_0$. By proposition 2, therefore, the utility for each member from any proposal, b_i, is $u_i(\hat{x}) - \alpha[u_i(b_i)]$. Given $\alpha > 0$, each member maximizes his or her utility by proposing his or her ideal point. Since $b_M = x_0$, by proposition 2, if $\hat{x} \neq x_0$, P will invoke a confidence vote to propose $\hat{x}$; if $\hat{x} = x_0$, then P will accept $b_M = x_0$, retaining the status quo. Thus, if $D \cap E = \varnothing$, the members of the majority cannot make an acceptable proposal to change the status quo.

Sufficiency. Assume $D \cap E \neq \varnothing$, and let $\bar{x} \in D \cap E$. I show that $b_i^*(b_C) = \bar{x}$ is an equilibrium for any b_C. If the majority proposes $\bar{x}$, then by proposition 2, P will accept $\bar{x}$ (because $\bar{x} \in E$). By definition of D, $\bar{x} \in D_i$ $\forall i \in M$, and by definition of D_i, all members prefer making a common acceptable proposal that is in D_i to making any acceptable proposal that is not in D_i. Thus, we only need to show that the utility for each member from proposing $\bar{x}$ is greater than the utility from proposing any policy that provokes a vote of confidence. The utility for each member from proposing $\bar{x}$ is $u_i(\bar{x}) - \alpha[u_i(\bar{x})]$. The greatest utility that a member could ever receive from proposing a policy that provokes a confidence vote is $u_i(\hat{x})$. Since $\bar{x} \in D_i$ $\forall i \in M$, $u_i(\bar{x}) - \alpha[u_i(\bar{x})] \geq u_i(\hat{x})$ for each member. Thus, proposing $\bar{x}$ gives each member a greater utility than any member could ever obtain from making a provoking proposal. Q.E.D.

The following corollary follows directly from the proof of proposition 3.

COROLLARY 1. *If* $D \cap E = \emptyset$ *and* $\alpha > 0$, *then the members of the majority will propose their ideal points in any subgame perfect equilibrium.*

Proof of Corollary 1. See proof of necessity in proposition 3.

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Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation

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Control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making, yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear. Do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency? I advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question. The principal findings of the paper are two. First, presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts. Second, bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency's response time in processing budgetary signals, limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control. I also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive-branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms. I conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies.

To protect rights and ensure policy responsiveness, contemporary liberal democracy endows elected authorities with powers and devices sufficiently strong to control administrative and regulatory agencies. In the twentieth century, legislative and executive authority over an agency's budget—the proverbial "power of the purse"—has emerged as one of the most forceful and frequently exercised tools of political control. In this paper I study this phenomenon by testing the budgetary control hypothesis. It holds that elected authorities manipulate agency budgets to achieve desired policy outcomes, and that when they do so, agencies respond behaviorally in the way authorities wish, by decreasing performance in response to budget cuts, and by increasing performance in response to funding boosts. This hypothesis has proliferated throughout the bureaucratic and regulatory politics literatures. It informs some classic tracts of regulatory politics and public administration (Bernstein 1955; Downs 1967, 251; Meier 1985, 26–27; Redford 1969, 70–82; Wilson 1989, 214–15). And it is supported in studies of numerous agencies, including the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (Quirk 1980, 185–87), the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (ADOJ) (Yandle 1988), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Wood 1990), and the Federal Communications Commission (Krasnow and Longley 1978), among others.

Moreover, some form of the budgetary control hypothesis may now be found in most game-theoretic and computer-simulation models in bureaucratic politics. Bendor and Moe (1985) frame budgetary control as an incentive-structuring mechanism with which elected authorities continually reward or sanction agencies for their behavior, while others (McCubbins 1985, 728–29) argue that the budget is a more sporadically used control device employed to sustain congressional choice of regulatory structure. Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast (1989, 600–602, 605) argue that the power of the purse in fact shapes agency behavior in both ways; the budget has "aspects of both active and latent control."

Significantly, recent quantitative studies appear to have confirmed both the insights of case studies and the predictions of formal theory in supporting the hypothesis of budgetary control in government regulation. Weingast and Moran (1983) argue that the case choice behavior of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) responded significantly to a variable representing the effect of its appropriations committee on the agency budget. Wood and Waterman (1991, 1993) have shown that enforcement levels of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plummeted in the wake of Reagan administration budget cuts, while Wood and Anderson (1993) argue that ADOJ enforcement levels followed agency budget shifts. In nearly all these studies, the researchers have regressed some indicator of agency performance on the agency's aggregate budget. Controlling for other predictors of regulatory enforcement, they have found uniformly that budgetary influence does exist; t-ratios for budget variables in these studies all exceed critical values of 5% significance.[1]

As lucid as the case for budgetary control may seem, there remains a residue of ambiguity concerning three critical questions. The first is that of causal mechanism: How does budgetary influence work within the agency? If presidents and congressional majorities manipulate agency budgets, are observed agency responses due to shifts in resource constraints, or do regulators respond as well to political signals carried in budget shifts?

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[1] Political "control" does not prevail unless presidents and congresses manipulate agency budgets in a systematic way. For purposes of this paper, I take it as established (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 186–205) that presidents and congressional parties systematically alter yearly changes in agency funding.

Beyond the fact that no study explicitly addresses this question, the existing literature appears to offer conflicting hypotheses; some studies surmise that agencies react to latent political signals in budget shifts (Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Waterman 1993, 512), while others imply that agency response follows the logic of optimization under variable resource constraints (Wood and Anderson 1993, 10; Wood and Waterman 1991, 821–22).[2]

A second question concerns the locus of budgetary control. If budgetary control does prevail in federal regulation, does control lie in congressional or presidential hands? Given that presidential budget requests exert a powerful force on agency appropriations (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991), is budgetary control largely a tool of the president, as Moe (1982) suggests? Or do congressional appropriations carry decisive influence over agency behavior, as scholars in the legislative dominance tradition (Weingast and Moran 1983; McCubbins 1985) argue? Although several studies have attempted to compare presidential and legislative political control generally (Moe 1985; Wood and Waterman 1991), I am aware of no empirical study that sorts out the causal effects of presidential versus legislative *budgetary initiatives*.

Finally, what are the efficiency properties of the budget as a control device? Do agencies respond quickly or slowly to executive and legislative control efforts? How does the budget as a tool of control compare to other strategies and devices of control?

In short, the budgetary control hypothesis is frequently advanced but sparsely and insufficiently tested. In this paper I address the residual questions asked above with new theoretical insight and data. I base my investigation on a now stylized feature of budgetary politics which has received little attention in previous research on federal regulation, a feature first studied by Fenno (1966) and Wildavsky (1988): agency uncertainty over future budgetary outcomes. This uncertainty lies at the foundation of budgetary control—its mechanics, its institutional locus, its efficiency properties. Accordingly, the principal contribution of this analysis is a model of agency behavior under funding uncertainty. Following the call of Padgett (1980a, 1980b), Moe (1984, 749), Radner (1992), and Heimann (1993) for further explorations in stochastic process modeling, I advance, operationalize, and test a simple stochastic process model of signal processing by a hierarchical regulatory agency. The aim is to portray the behavior patterns exhibited by regulatory agencies interpreting signals from the president and Congress as they are transmitted through the budget on a yearly basis, and how the agencies employ this information in performing the tasks charged them under law. This model I call the cascade processing model.

The principal insight of the cascade processing model is that agency information processing is characterized by a pattern of conscious, deliberate delay in inference, and these delays are multiplied as information flows through agency hierarchy. In processing budgetary signals over time under conditions of bounded rationality and uncertainty, agencies react slowly to new information by responding only partially at first and adjusting their response to the next several signals that arrive. In the face of new budgetary information, agencies literally mete out their behavioral response over time. They directly consult information from the past several budgets in order to form expectations about the coming budget. The hierarchical structure of agencies then multiplies this response delay, as operators performing policy tasks are removed from agency leaders and face their own uncertainty and processing constraints. Together, adaptive processing and hierarchy limit the political efficacy of budgetary control efforts.

These arguments are supported in interviews with agency personnel and in documentary evidence, but the primary support I offer for the cascade processing model is statistical. I use performance measures from two federal regulatory agencies—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—from the 1930s to the 1980s to test the predictions of the cascade processing model. I employ these data to test hypotheses about the effect of bureaucratic hierarchy in agency signal processing, and I also explore the hypothesis of Nathan (1983) and Rockman (1993) that the pattern of political control through budgetary signalling changed after the executive and legislative oversight reforms of 1970. Generally, the results of this analysis provide implicit support to scholars in the political control literature who argue that the budget is a limited control device in bureaucratic politics and who emphasize nonbudgetary means of control, such as administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1990, 248–53), appointments (Wood and Waterman 1991, 822), and presidential initiative (Moe 1985, 1101; Rockman 1993).

EXISTING MODELS OF BUDGETARY CONTROL

Budgetary Control as a Supply Constraint: The Aggregate Production Model

Attempts to substantiate the budgetary control hypothesis take one of two forms. The first I call the aggregate production model, which suggests that budgetary control is a matter of resource manipulation. Some variant of this model informs most published theoretical formulations and statistical tests of the budgetary control hypothesis, including the "enforcement production" model of Bendor and Moe (1985, 759) and the analyses of Wood and Anderson (1993) and Wood and Waterman (1993). In these studies, the researchers typically regress an indicator of agency behavior upon the agency's aggregate budget for the corresponding period of performance plus a set of controls, as follows:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \delta_1 BT_t + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \boldsymbol{\beta}_k \mathbf{X}_{kt} + \varepsilon_t, \qquad (1)$$

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[2] Bendor and Moe first noted the conceptual tension between budgets as resources and budgets as incentives (1985, 764).

where Y_t is agency monitoring or enforcement behavior, BT_t is the agency's budget (in real dollars) for year t, $\mathbf{X}_{kt}$ is a set of K control variables (each of t observations), α, δ, and β_k are coefficient parameters to be estimated, and ε_t remains the equation disturbance term.

In economic terms, equation (1) replicates a linear production function with constant returns to scale. It suggests a relationship between the *level* of regulatory performance and the *level* of the agency budget. An exogenous reduction in a "factor of production" (the budget or agency personnel) yields less equilibrium "supply" (agency performance). Hence, the economic rendering of δ_1 is as a coefficient of budgetary factor returns, specifying a constant rate of conversion from resources to performance. δ_1 is expected (and usually found) to be positive. Accordingly, this economic model entails no information absorption whatsoever by the agency. The agency attaches no political meaning to budget cuts because it absorbs them in the manner of an *automaton*, mechanically translating resources into performance. This is the most plausible interpretation of the statistical models which dominate recent bureaucratic research; no more complex explanation need be attached to these regressions.

Budgetary Control as Signalling: The Serial Updating Model

The aggregate production model stands in some tension, however, with other findings suggesting that agencies react to political signals carried in budgetary fluctuations. Wood (1988, 224–26) argued that FY 1982 budget reductions of 24% in the EPA operating budget led to a 41% decline in EPA monitoring activity and a 69% drop in abatement activity in 1981. The ratio of percentage change in performance to percentage change in budget in these episodes is much greater than the unity ratio that the aggregate production model would predict. Accordingly, Wood interpreted plummeting EPA activity aggregates as evidence of signal-driven response. Similarly, Wood and Waterman (1991, 819–20) found that a modest congressional boost of EPA operating funds in 1983 yielded a sixfold increase in hazardous waste inspections through 1983 and 1984.

The signalling power of budgets rests upon the fact of agency budgetary uncertainty. The classic studies of budgetary politics in the executive branch and the House, Wildavsky (1988) and Fenno (1966), agree that agencies have considerable uncertainty over budgetary outcomes: they do not know the future trajectory of their funding. Relative certainty over funding outcomes is important to an agency because agency performance is the result of a complex system of planning. Most regulatory agencies plan yearly enforcement levels as a part of preparing budget estimates over the next two or three years; the FDA, for instance, plans an approximate number of inspections and samples two or three years in advance as part of its normal budgetary process (Claunts 1991). Even when levels of regulatory performance cannot be planned, as for instance when yearly prosecutions or injunctions depend as much upon industry behavior and economic conditions as upon agency plans, the volume of these activities may still depend upon agency planning because the resources necessary for prosecutions and injunctions—funding and staff resources (inspectors, attorneys)—are subject to planning variations.

Because the agency depends so heavily on rational planning, budgetary uncertainty is threatening to program stability and smooth operation. As Fenno (1966, 273) argues, "agencies will be hurt by outright budget reductions. But agencies are also hurt when they cannot be sure what the committee will do from one year to the next." It is the agency's priority of certainty that opens the door for budgetary control. Because agencies value budgetary stability so highly, even apparently small budget cuts can produce sharp declines in performance because of the resulting dissonance between expectations and outcomes. And when political authorities make credible threats to reduce program funding, the agencies' priority of relative certainty guarantees that these threats will be heeded in the form of performance adjustments (cf. McCubbins 1985, 728). As Fenno (1966, 273; emphasis added) summarizes:

> The expectation on the part of executive branch officials that the Committee should act predictably stems, again, from the administrator's concern for program. Rational program development requires planning, and planning is fruitless without some reasonable degree of certainty about the availability of funds. . . . [Budgetary uncertainty] keeps the agency harassed and off balance. It precludes long-range program planning, rational personnel policy, and efficient purchasing. Certainty is a prime desideratum for the department or bureau head. *Conversely, the manipulation of uncertainty is a key weapon in the hands of the Committee.*

A general model of congressional signalling to administrative agencies has been advanced by Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), and previous theoretical work suggests three sorts of signals that may be sent from elected authorities to the agency through the budget process. First, budgetary signals can be auditing statements (Banks 1989), messages from Congress to the agency that its budget exceeds the expected value of its performance. Second, budgetary changes can be used as efficiency incentives whereby politicians attempt to induce efficiency gains under a fiscal reward system (Bendor and Moe 1985; McCubbins 1985). Finally, an account consistent with presidential control arguments or overlapping generations models of legislative politics would render budgetary signals as ideological cues whereby incoming administrations or new congressional generations (such as the new Republican majority in Congress) could both reveal their preferences to the agency and act to ensure that performance increased or decreased. Indeed, House Republicans have not shied away from proposing budget cuts to send strong messages to regulatory agencies (Morgan 1995). All three interpretations are consistent with signalling models in which the principal strategically transmits information to an uncertain agent.

If elected authorities transmit political signals through the agency budget, then the task of research is to specify empirically how agencies respond to these signals in a way that might provide for political control. The simplest model consistent with arguments that agencies respond very quickly to external signals would posit that agencies exhibit speculative expectations formation, which corresponds to the simplest form of Bayesian updating. A speculatively rational actor processes new information immediately in a flexible, sequential fashion (Friedman 1957; Muth 1961). In this model, the agency uses all information available at the time of the most recent signal *and no more*; the agency's previous budgetary history conveys no information beyond that carried in the current budget.

Speculative expectations models usually assume the form of autoregressive equations with a separate term for signals. Accordingly, I interpret the yearly change in the agency's budget as the present-valued signal and operationalize the serial updating model as follows:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \phi Y_{t-1} + \delta_2 \Delta BT + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \mathbf{X}_{kt} + \varepsilon_t, \qquad (2)$$

where Y_{t-1} is one-period lagged performance, ΔBT (= $BT_t - BT_{t-1}$) is the yearly change in the agency's budget, ϕ and δ_2 require estimation, and all other terms are as in equation (1). Equation (2) formalizes agency behavior under the signalling form of budgetary control. It posits that current performance will be a function of performance based on prior beliefs (Y_{t-1}), the current-period signal (ΔBT), and the set of controls. The model's interpretation of the one-period change in the budget as a signal is fully commensurate with anecdotal and statistical evidence for budgetary signalling (Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1991, 820–21), as well as consistent with simple Bayesian models of information processing. Because ($BT_t - BT_{t-1}$) can exceed or fall below some critical value z (say, $z = 0$, for no real-value budget change), the signal carries both valence (negative or positive value) and magnitude (distance from z). Again, we would expect positive δ_2 under true serial updating.

If the aggregate production model portrays the agency as an automaton, the serial updating model envisions the agency as engaged in sequential hypothesis testing (Berger 1985): Each budget is a trial in a political inference problem about future funding trajectories and the preferences of elected authorities. Suppose that the agency is testing the "favorable authorities" hypothesis (H_f), that is, elected authorities favor more agency activity, and thus near-term budgets are likely to rise. In each period the agency infers from its yearly budget change the preferences of elected authorities for more or less performance, and it adjusts its performance based on prior beliefs (Y_{t-1}) accordingly. δ_2 hence measures the weight accorded to new evidence carried in the budget signal. Under a simple scenario, if ($BT_t - BT_{t-1}$) is negative (if it falls below $z = 0$), then the conditional probability of H_f declines, and performance falls according to the magnitude of the signal and the weight δ_2. This is certainly consistent with EPA performance reductions in the early 1980s, as the discrepant messages of early Reagan budget cuts combined with the agency's subjective uncertainty to yield dramatic behavioral response.

The Limits of Speculative Expectations in Budgetary Politics. So formulated, the serial updating model appears intuitively alluring, yet it rests upon some questionable assumptions. The first concerns the rapidity of speculative updating. In this model, each new signal carries unique information only until beliefs have been adjusted, *which by assumption happens before the next signal is observed*. Hence, once a new signal has arrived, the previous signal contains no unique information. In short, the agency's confidence in its prior beliefs about what elected officials will do (and where its budget will go) allow for quick reaction to new signals. Yet, for a regulatory agency trying to divine its budgetary future from presidential and congressional budgetary action, such heavy reliance upon prior beliefs is impossible, if, indeed, anything like equilibrium beliefs can be maintained from year to year. Agency funding trajectories depend most strongly upon presidential and congressional preferences but also depend upon macroeconomic conditions, aggregate fiscal constraints, and often the particular health of the industry governed by the agency. All these factors are subject to constant and unpredictable change. As a result, the agency tests not so much a single hypothesis about future funding as multiple hypotheses over time, such as "*this* president, *this* Cabinet member, *this* committee (as presently constituted) are favorable to agency activity and will vote for stable funding increases."

A second problem with the serial updating model is its hypothesis that agencies assign equal weight to all past information. *An agency engaging in serial updating would accord no more weight to evidence received two budgets ago than to evidence received ten budgets ago or twenty budgets ago*. In short, speculative expectations formation does not allow for retrospective discounting (Muth 1961, 324–26; Padgett 1980b), the systematic assignment of less weight to information as it ages with time.

The Foundations of Adaptive Inference by Regulatory Agencies. Under conditions of political uncertainty, agencies exhibit adaptive expectations formation, a pattern of inference in which the decision maker relies less on prior knowledge, takes into account *consciously and directly* information older than the most recent signal, and engages in retrospective discounting of this older information (Friedman 1957, 143; Muth 1961). Why should we expect such uncertainty and volatility to prevail and influence agency decisions? There are at least two reasons. First, the sheer complexity of the budgetary process complicates the agency's task of political inference (Dodd and Schott 1986, Padgett 1980a, 1980b). The release of a presidential budget proposal or the passage of an appropriations measure transmits not a single numerical constraint but a whole schedule of individual program constraints (and hence separable signals) which the agency must take into account in its decision making. Indeed, the 1974 reforms have only exacerbated this complexity (Dodd and Schott 1986, 259–60). Second, the domains of regulatory and budgetary politics are characterized by significant volatility. In federal regulation, legal constraints, economic conditions, and elected authorities all change constantly and unpredictably, such that budgetary signals more than several years old are irrelevant to present decisions. This fact reinforces the need for retrospective discounting. In sum, the inference of political meaning from budgetary shifts is a complicated task in which agencies rely as much upon congressional decisions of the last several years as they do upon this year's decisions.

AN ADAPTIVE PROCESSING MODEL OF AGENCY INFORMATION ABSORPTION

As a rival to the serial updating model I advance here an adaptive processing model grounded in the behavioral tradition of organizational analysis (Simon 1947), wherein decision makers do not engage in sequential hypothesis testing, they do not ferry a single prior over long periods, and "they do not generalize or otherwise develop belief structures about their environments" (Bendor and Moe 1985, 761). The adaptive processing model attempts to portray the way in which agency administrators receive signals, extract meaningful and communicable information from them, and transmit that information to operations and field units performing the essential tasks of the agency. As a representation of this process, the linear processing model has two components: (1) the mechanism of adaptive expectations and (2) the modeling of a time-invariant linear system with random delay.

Adaptive Expectations

Agencies faced with the task of inferring political meaning from budget shifts exhibit a pattern of conscious, deliberate delay in responding to new information. They slowly adjust their behavior in response to new signals, tempering their reaction in light of signals yet to come. In effect, the agency takes a variable moving average of past budget shifts in order to interpret the current one, in order to set it into context. As the classic scholars of budgetary politics suggest, agencies engage in pre- and post-hoc accounting about the reasons for a budget increase or decrease. They attempt systematically to trace the reasons for any significant budget change and to reduce their uncertainty about their expected budgetary trajectory, an extremely complicated practice (Wildavsky 1988, 86–88). In so doing, they frequently rely upon congressional action over the past few years to guide them (Fenno 1966, 294; Wildavsky 1988, 87–88, 95). Informally conducted interviews with budget officers from selected federal agencies support this adaptive expectations logic. All the officials interviewed reported experiencing a significant degree of uncertainty about the future direction of their budget. Several also noted the "nervousness" they felt before congressional appropriations hearings and meetings with OMB officials. One budget officer reported experiencing "lots of uncertainty as we go into the hearings" with OMB and Congress alike. And consistent with the Fenno-Wildavsky argument for post-hoc accounting, many related that they relied upon budget changes over the past few years to guide them in their preparations and decisions. One said that although forecasting the trend of future budgets is very difficult, "what's been done over the past few years usually gives us a reliable guess." Echoing the use of weighted moving averages in adaptive expectations models, another official pointed to the importance of "histories" in his decision making: "We keep a running history of what the appropriations committee has done over the last four or five years, as well as what the interests of the committee are, and that file is important in thinking about how much more or less Congress will give us next year."[3]

As the budget officer's remarks make clear, the critical feature of adaptive expectations is the conscious and direct use of transmitted information older than that available at present (see note 3). For purposes of illustrating the logic of adaptive adjustment, suppose that an agency receives a nontrivial budget cut after several successive years of budgetary increases. The agency's attempt to infer political meaning from this shift may require the use of more information than that contained in the budget shift itself (i.e., engaging in speculative rational expectations formation may not be an optimal inference pattern). Moreover, the attempt to interpret the budget change and to translate this message into an appropriate performance reduction will require considerable time. For this reason and because the agency does not wish to commit to a course of action when still uncertain about its budgetary future and about congressional and presidential posture (Fenno 1966, 273, 283–89), it will cut performance only partially at first, in part buoyed by the knowledge that it had received budget increases over the past few years. If the following year brings a small budget increase (or no real-value change), the agency may still cut performance slightly, in part because it is still reacting consciously to the budget cut of one year ago. One budget official reported that the Reagan administration budget cuts "did have an effect on our decision making long after the budget started rising again in 1986." In this way a single budget shift persists in an agency's decision processes for several years, and when it becomes sufficiently "old," it no longer affects performance, being effectively discarded. In short, an agency's reaction to current budgetary signals is tempered by its ongoing conscious reaction to past budgetary signals.

The adaptive processing agency is engaged in the ongoing construction and refinement of an accurate picture of (1) the posture of elected authorities toward its programs and (2) its expected budgetary trajectory over the next few years (Fenno 1966, 291–313; Wildavsky 1988, 103–4). Faced with a nontrivial budget change but also with considerable uncertainty about its own budgetary future, the agency literally metes out its response over time. Assuming that the agency discounts older budgetary signals as they age, adaptive inference is rational; it is consistent with more complex versions of rational expectations hypotheses (Friedman 1957; Muth

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[3] All interviews were conducted under the premise of complete anonymity.

1961; Mishkin 1983). In short, adaptive processing is a stable inference pattern for the agency. It guards against unduly impulsive response to budget shifts under uncertainty, hence allowing for relatively stable performance and operation over time.

The Agency as a Linear System

The introduction of adaptive adjustment delay into the agency's behavior is best portrayed by casting the agency as a simple time-invariant linear system in a signal processing model (Oppenheim and Schafer 1989). The aim of linear system modeling is to portray any given response process as an input-output system governed by fixed parameters (time-invariance) and characterized by linear operations. Suppose we model the agency's response to budgetary signals as the simplest input-output system,

$$y[t] = H[x[t]], \tag{3}$$

where the operator H is a transformation of the input series $x[t]$ into an output series $y[t]$ and is itself independent of t. Here, time-invariance implies that input $x[t + \Delta]$ produces a steady-state response $y[t + \Delta]$, and the linear characterization of the system implies that the input $x[t] = a_1x_1[t] + a_2x_2[t]$ yields the response $y[t] = a_1y_1[t] + a_2y_2[t]$. In budgetary politics the input series is the agency's budgetary history defined by the entire sequence of yearly budget shifts still under the agency's consideration:

$$\begin{aligned} x[t] &= (BT_t - BT_{t-1}) + (BT_{t-1} - BT_{t-2}) + (BT_{t-2} \\ &\quad - BT_{t-3}) + \cdots + (BT_{t-k+1} - BT_{t-k}) = \Delta BT_t \\ &\quad + \Delta BT_{t-1} + \Delta BT_{t-2} + \cdots + \Delta BT_{t-k+1} = \kappa(L)\Delta BT, \end{aligned}$$

where $\kappa(L)$ is the distributed lag function. In a linear time-invariant system, the response to this input (as governed by the response function H) is independent of time, that is, its expectation is the same in any particular year. The task of the model is then to describe the response behavior of an agency when H is characterized by random delay.

For these purposes it is useful to specify one characteristic of the model. The schedule of budgetary and agency decision making critically affects the way agencies process information. Budgetary decisions are usually (although not always) made on a rigid timetable, wherein the president's budget proposal is released in mid-January and congressional appropriations decisions are made at some time from spring to late summer (although the month is usually the same for each individual agency). Yet, agencies process these signals in an ongoing everyday manner. It is thus proper to model the agency as engaged in the continuous-time processing of discrete-time signals (Oppenheim and Schafer 1989, 99–101). In formal terms, the budgetary signal may be represented as a unit impulse, $x[t] = \delta[t]$, where $\delta[t]$ equals one if a signal has been sent and 0 otherwise. We are now in a position to introduce random delay into the agency's response process and describe the resulting behavior. If we introduce a delay variable (τ) which takes values in the nonnegative real numbers, then delay can be characterized by the response function $h[t] = \delta(t - \tau)$, so that the agency is at time t processing a unit impulse signal received at time $t - \tau$. Then it can be shown (Appendix A, proposition 1) that the agency's response function will be exponentially distributed as $e^{-\tau}$, and the resulting steady-state output of the agency is

$$y[t] = \delta[t]e^{-\tau}. \tag{4}$$

The exponential density as a probabilistic characterization of the agency's response behavior appears as the strictly decreasing geometric slope in Figure 1. As Muth (1961, 324–25) noted, the response function may be interpreted in two mutually consistent but conceptually separable ways. First, in a strict probabilistic interpretation, the area between intervals of the density displays the probability that the agency has fully processed a given signal received at time t by time $t + \tau$. Notice in this light that the probability of an agency having fully processed a signal received at $t + 0$ by $t + 1$ is but one-half; the model clearly operationalizes bounded processing capacity. A second interpretation reverses the density and considers signals as they recede in negative (retrospective) time, as Friedman (1957, 143) employed exponential weighting in his study of income expectations. In this view, the density displays the relative weight that any signal (whether $t - 1$ or $t - 10$ years old) will receive at time $t + \tau$.

Signal Processing in Hierarchical Agencies: The Cascade Processing Model

As it stands, the linear processing model eclipses a critical dimension of bureaucracy: hierarchy (Light 1994). Most federal agencies have hierarchical structures in which general decisions are made by top-level administrators, but agency performance is carried out by lower-level program units. These units each contribute to the aggregate performance observed in statistical studies (e.g., the EPA in Wood and Waterman 1993). Hierarchy multiplies agency response time because budgetary signals affect program operation only after ratcheting through the agency's *internal* budgetary allocation process. Padgett (1980a, 1981) has shown that the internal budget process of an agency is fraught with the same uncertainty and processing constraints that affect the government budget process generally. The more levels of administration separating agency leaders from program units, the more these internal delays aggregate to slow the agency's overall response to budget signals.

Modeling hierarchy demands a modification of the exponential model. Consider, then, an agency with m levels of hierarchy, where each level is a time-invariant linear system whose response time is independent of the other levels. A cascade system (Oppenheim and Schafer 1989) is one in which the m levels of hierarchy are linked in sequential fashion such that the output of the highest level is the input to the second, the output of the second is the input to the third, and so on. Moe's (1985) three-tier model of the NLRB is one example of such a system. For a cascade system, response delay adds for

FIGURE 1. **Γ(*m*, 1)-Distributions of Signal Response for Bureaucratic Agencies** (*m* = layers of hierarchy)



successive levels of hierarchy. The more hierarchical the agency, the greater the response time in signal processing. We can characterize the aggregate response delay of the agency by the random variable $\tau = \tau_1 + \tau_2 + \cdots + \tau_m$. Then, recalling that each of the m independent delay variables is exponentially distributed, it can be shown (Appendix A, proposition 2) that the response delay is distributed as $\Gamma(m, \lambda)$, as in

$$f(\tau) = \frac{\lambda^m}{\Gamma(m)} \tau^{m-1} e^{-\lambda\tau}. \qquad (5)$$

And then the steady-state output of the agency is

$$y[t] = \delta[t] \frac{\tau^{m-1} e^{-\tau}}{\Gamma(m)}, \qquad (6)$$

where Γ( ) is the gamma function, and λ is scaled to one. Equation (6) elucidates the signal processing behavior of a hierarchical agency in which each level of hierarchy exhibits exponential response delay. The gamma density has been employed by Townsend and Ashby (1983, 209) to represent multistage signal processing in psychological applications. The gamma density for different values of m appears in Figure 1 (where the exponential now appears as a special case). Notice that the m parameter determines the overall mode of the function (the mean is m/λ), as a larger m represents slower response behavior. And for $m > 1$, the agency's behavior violates retrospective discounting, a point to which I return below.

The gamma distribution has two other appealing traits. First, the density may be rather easily incorporated as a distributed lag specification for time-series models. Schmidt (1974) and others have advanced the gamma distributed-lag model as a plausible specification of the adaptive expectations process. This yields the following operationalization of the multidivisional signal processing model:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \delta_3 \Gamma(m, \lambda) \kappa(L) \Delta B T_t + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k X_{kt} + e_t, \qquad (7)$$

where $\Gamma(m, \lambda)$ is the gamma-density function. Second, because different values of m yield different gamma distributions, it is possible to test alternative specifications and, hence, alternative portraits of organizational information processing against one another. We can test whether organizations process signals in a centralized fashion or a decentralized cascade mode by altering the value of m.

FOUNDATIONS OF A COMPETITIVE TEST OF BUDGETARY CONTROL MODELS

The models advanced now await an empirical test, and I briefly outline here a procedure for doing so. I first test the three models of budgetary control by employing the following test model:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \phi Y_{t-1} + \delta_1 BT_t + \delta_2 \Delta BT_t + \delta_3 \Gamma(m, \lambda)\kappa(L)\Delta BT_t + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k X_{kt} + e_t. \quad \textbf{(8)}$$

Here, the cascade processing model of equation (7) contends with the serial updating (2) and aggregate production (1) models. (I test a Cobb-Douglas version of the aggregate production model in Appendix C.) Analysis will focus upon the coefficients δ_1, δ_2 and δ_3.[4] Each of the three models predicts a positive δ. Here, the gamma-distributed lag parameters are fixed, which allows linear estimation of δ_3 (Schmidt 1974, 248). It remains to operationalize the Γ-density processing model, namely, which parameters to choose for m and λ. Here, I propose the simplest possible model of hierarchy—an agency with two levels—and the resulting parameterization of the gamma distribution is $\lambda = 1$ and $m = 2$.

In estimating equation (8) I employ the model-construction approach based upon strategy or agenda criteria (Granato 1991). The modified agenda approach to model construction employed here emphasizes thorough diagnostic testing and model reduction. I first enumerate all possible independent variables consistent with a prior causal model. Estimation of this initial model ensues, followed by application of a battery of diagnostic tests, principally the joint chi-squared statistic of Jarque and Bera (1980), which allows the researcher to test simultaneously for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and nonnormal residuals. Once any violations of model assumptions have been corrected, model reduction follows, resulting in the elimination of all insignificant variables. I then diagnose and estimate this reduced model and report it alongside the initial version, along with some relevant diagnostic statistics.

Where, upon estimation of equation (8), agency response behavior appears to be better explained by the cascade processing model, I then conduct an auxiliary analysis to determine the optimal specification of this model. In other words, I perform tests to determine exactly what the agency's information hierarchy looks like. Essentially, I conduct a grid search over different values of m in the gamma distribution to determine which minimizes a statistical criterion for model specification, namely, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).

In addition, the presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of equation (8) removes the model from the classical regression framework. Accordingly, I use the Hatanaka (1974) method of estimation for autoregressive models under residual autocorrelation.[5]

The final step lies in specifying the set of control variables. Because the primary purpose of the regressions below is to compare the model predictions against one another, I choose a common set of controls for statistical estimation and hold them relatively constant across tests. In particular, I introduce four constructs into estimation.

1. *Presidential appointments* are a measure of which party controls the agency command. For independent commissions, a construct gauging the party balance of the commission will be used (see Appendix B). For executive branch agencies, I use a simple presidential partisanship variable (measuring which party is in office at time t).
2. *Congressional influence (nonbudgetary)* over agencies lies mainly in the oversight function. Past studies have used some form of ideology measure (usually ADA scores) to ascertain the variation in the ideological composition of the agency's oversight committee over time. Because such scores do not exist for many of the years in my data sets, I construct a measure of oversight committee party balance (see Appendix B) and supplement it (for the FCC) with a measure of Southern Democrat presence on the committee.
3. *Size of regulated industry* is measured here by aggregate employment level (see Appendix B). I log this indicator to remove spurious associations arising from strong trends.
4. *Legislation* is added as an intervention variable (scored 0 from 1938 to 1961, one thereafter) to account for the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, which expanded the FDA's regulatory mandate and boosted the agency's funding and publicity.

BUDGETARY SIGNAL PROCESSING IN THE FDA (1938–90) AND THE FCC (1933–90)

The agencies chosen for case studies each bear storied legacies of salience in the respective industries they govern. Both can trace their roots to the early twentieth century, and this feature lends an uncommon historical depth of investigation to the tests conducted here. Previous studies of budgetary influence have employed rather short time-series in which only one or two administrations came into play. The reliability of the lessons derived from such research is dubious; variation on the critical independent variable, a series of budgetary shifts, amounts to only an upward trend (1970–81), followed by a downward trend and a period of stagnation (1982–90). Yet, as a matter of historical fact, the tool of bud-

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[4] Multicolinearity among the budgetary variables may make it difficult to sort out the competing effects, although pairwise correlations suggest otherwise. The gamma-lag and one-year change are correlated at less than .10 with the aggregate budget. The one-year change and gamma-lag variables have a .61 correlation for the FDA and .42 for the FCC. A regression of the budget variables on each other and the rest of the X's does not worsen this prognosis (calculations available upon request).

[5] Hatanaka's two-stage residual-adjusted Aitken estimator promises asymptotically efficient estimates for autoregressive models with serially dependent disturbances (see Harvey 1990, 271). The estimator may retain some bias in small samples, but only for the estimate of ϕ (Hatanaka 1974, 207, 208, n. 24).

TABLE 1. Budgetary Signal Processing at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 1938–90
(Hatanaka Instrumental Variables Estimates; standard errors in parentheses)

Variable	Inspections (full)	Inspections (reduced)	Samples (full)	Samples (reduced)
Intercept	−89113.2 (68813.7)	−95532.0* (36291.5)	102264.0 (196467.4)	27870.5*** (6714.5)
Lagged Dependent Variable (Instrumental Variables Estimate)	0.65** (0.11)	0.69*** (0.07)	0.36** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.10)
BT (total full time equivalents) (*Aggregate Production Model*)	−5.0 (3.0)	—	−2.8 (4.3)	—
ΔBT (*Serial Updating Model*)	1.2 (3.5)	—	−4.5 (6.6)	—
$\Gamma(2,1)\kappa(L)\Delta BT$ (*Cascade Processing Model*)	21.9* (8.5)	23.4*** (5.0)	52.4*** (17.3)	50.6*** (12.6)
Presidential Partisanship (Democrat = 1)	4170.0 (2867.9)	—	−6800.2 (6619.2)	—
House Committee Party Balance	−1889.6 (13554.4)	—	−578.2* (278.0)	−512.0* (209.9)
Senate Committee Party Balance	486.3 (1071.4)	—	309.9 (248.4)	—
Kefauver-Harris Amendments	4281.6 (6245.2)	—	35340.7** (12980.8)	12096.7 (5964.0)
Industry Employment (in millions, logged)	14507.8* (6245.2)	14591.8** (5339.4)	−79.9 (248.8)	—
Number of Cases (df)	49 (38)	49 (44)	49 (38)	49 (43)
Hatanaka ρ	−.20	−.23	.17	.19
Adjusted R^2	.83	.76	.80	.82
Jarque/Bera Joint χ^2	6.47	13.23	47.6***	50.4***

Note: * implies significance at p < .05. ** implies signficance at p < .01. *** implies significance at p < .001. (All tests are two-tailed.) For sources see Appendix B. Standard errors for samples equation calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.

getary influence has been available to presidents and congressional committees for more than six decades. Surely, a strong demonstration of budgetary control would offer evidence that it prevails as a matter of historical regularity in bureaucratic politics. Appropriately, a study of the FDA and the FCC permits an analysis of time-series data on inspections, sampling, and industry monitoring for both agencies that extends from the 1930s to the present. It also allows the comparison of an independent regulatory commission whose appointees are not removable by the president (the FCC) with an executive branch agency whose appointees are removable (FDA).

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Possessing a strong tradition of organizational independence and a core of analytic staff expertise, the FDA has for more than five decades regulated the food, cosmetics, and pharmaceutical industries (accounting for more than 25% of gross national product) under the auspices of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. A reservoir of popular support and a cohesive, proregulatory ideology developed after the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962 (Meier 1985, 82) have given the FDA a strong footing with which to resist political and industry pressures. While many additional demands have been placed upon the FDA in the last twenty years, the agency has practiced several basic forms of regulatory activity for decades. The two I choose for empirical investigation are aggregate yearly measures of product samples taken and inspections carried out by the agency's staff since the 1930s. Congress has attended closely to these activities; no less than five sets of hearings were held by the House and Senate on these two activities between 1987 and 1990 (e.g., U.S. House, Committee on Energy and Commerce 1989). The measures overlap slightly, for some product samples are taken in the course of factory and establishment inspections. But there are strong analytical reasons for separating these indicators. Many samples are not taken by inspectors but are requested by the FDA, either of a firm or of another executive agency (usually the Customs Bureau). Moreover, a focus on sampling activity reveals the intensity of inspections practices; greater sampling often implies increased regulatory surveillance.

The results of statistical estimation for the FDA appear in Table 1. Because astute observers of the FDA have argued that the agency conceives of its resources in terms of personnel rather than funding (Quirk 1980, 120; Claunts 1991), I include only staff appropriations variables in the estimations here. The results show that only the cascade processing model yields positive and robust estimates. For every full-time equivalent (FTE) unit increase in the FDA's staff trajectory (the rate of budgetary change), the agency performs about 16 additional inspections and examines 43 additional samples. Historically, this implies that the increases of more than 1,000 staff for the agency between FY 1972 and FY 1974 would have produced an increase in samples of 50,600 and an increase in inspections of 23,400. But proper substantive interpretation requires attention to the parameters of the gamma-distributed response function. These suggest that *the effect of a signal-transmitting staff-level shift is on average spread out over two years from the date the final appropriations decisions are made* (the mean of the $\Gamma[2, 1]$ distribution is two). Empirically, these coefficients dwarf those for the aggregate production and serial updating models, which fall to statistical insignificance. Substantively identical results are obtained even if the lagged dependent variable (Y_{t-1}) is dropped from estimation. As a portrait of variation explained by the cascade processing model alone, the δ_3's are multiplied by their respective independent variable vectors in Figure 2 and graphed with the dependent variable series.

Moreover, the favorable results for the cascade processing model accord with historical accounts of the FDA, which provide evidence of lagged adjustment to budgets. Roe's (1952) study suggested that the geographical distribution of field staff shifted well after agency leaders' response to budgetary variations and leadership changes in Washington and that similar hierarchical delays also affected the drawing of field and district boundaries. These are precisely the sort of hierarchical factors that lead to lagged adjustment. Just as agency leaders have uncertainty about funding from Congress and the president, so program units are uncertain about the program allocations from agency leaders.

The principal control variable of interest is the intervention representing the effect of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments. This legislation boosted FDA monitoring activity, in some measure because it gave the agency stronger inspection authority over drug manufacturers but in larger measure because it fostered a lasting proregulatory ideology among FDA personnel (Meier 1985, 87). The presidential partisanship variable falls to insignificance, and the logged employment aggregates figure little in either regression. The negative coefficients for the House Oversight Committee in both regressions may reflect the agency's early years, when it fell under the purview of the House Agriculture Committee, which was dominated by southern conservatives like Marvin Jones of Texas.[6]

The Federal Communications Commission

Empowered by the Communications Act of 1934, the FCC has regulated the broadcast industry for more than fifty years and has controlled private market entry by virtue of its sole authority to grant licenses to broadcasters. The lucrative potential of broadcasting and the immense social and cultural power of the nation's electronic media have made FCC regulation highly controversial. Not surprisingly, acute observers of broadcasting regulation, including former FCC Chairman Newton Minow, have detected many political attempts to influence the commission (Krasnow and Longley 1978).

The performance measures I analyze here are similar in most respects to those employed in the FDA analysis. The first two time-series analyzed are (1) the yearly number of (land-based) broadcast station inspections conducted by FCC field staff and (2) the yearly number of discrepancy notices issued to ship radio operators by the agency's field and shore inspection staff. Both activities were authorized in the Communications Act of 1934. Annual broadcast inspections are conducted by FCC field staff to ensure that station operators comply with FCC regulations for station maintenance and frequency stability. Annual ship discrepancy notices actually reflect two kinds of underlying activity: on-site ship inspections and frequency monitoring from FCC field and shore stations. When a ship is found to be operating at a frequency different from that prescribed in its license, or is interfering with other ship radios, the field staff issues a discrepancy notice to the ship operator. Because data for on-ship inspections and ship frequency monitoring are unavailable, I use the enforcement (discrepancy notices) measure instead. Again, these two agency activities have been salient programs in Congress, being discussed in numerous committee hearings on FCC regulation (e.g., U.S. House, Committee on Energy and Commerce 1990).

The third time-series I employ reflects perhaps the most dramatic enforcement sanction available to the commission, the refusal to renew a station's broadcast license (hereafter, "license denial," for the commission is denying a renewal application). No radio or television station in the United States may operate without a license from the FCC, which has sole discretion over whether to grant one to an applicant. When a license is granted, the station receives the rights to a broadcast frequency or "channel" within a certain locality. The commission thus acts as the distributor of airwave "property," but its reach does not end there, since stations must periodically apply for the renewal of their license to continue broadcasting. This license renewal process constitutes perhaps the most politically charged aspect of the history of U.S. broadcast regulation. The FCC's enabling act (Federal Communications Act of 1934, 15 U.S. Code 309) directs it to issue licenses on the basis of "public interest, convenience, and necessity." The patent ambiguity of the statute has led the commission to formulate numerous standards for its renewal decisions, criteria which range from the minutely technical to the politically charged. Although relatively rare, instances in which broadcast license renewal applications have been denied by formal hearing have had a powerful behavioral effect on the broadcast industry, and many of the issues surrounding these actions have long carried political weight (Krasnow and Longley 1978; Wilson 1988, 330). Indeed, unpopular renewal denials (e.g., the 1969 WHDH-Boston decision) have met with congressional dismay and budget cuts. The time-series of annual license denials assumes the form of count data. While the Poisson regression specification is customarily em-

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[6] For this reason, a variable coding the percentage of Southern Democrats on the House oversight committee was included but proved insignificant in both regressions.

FIGURE 2. Cascade Signal Processing Model, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 1938–90

Predicted and Actual FDA Inspections



Predicted and Actual FDA Samples



Source: FDA History Office. Predictions based solely on gamma-lag (cascade) budget variable.

ployed to analyze such data, its embedded assumption that the variance of the dependent variable is equal to the mean is frequently unjustified. I test this assumption with the Lee (1986) statistic and resort to the negative binomial regression framework, under which the dispersion of the variance is parameterized as γ.

The results of estimation of equation (7) for the three FCC time-series appear in Table 2. As in the case for the FDA, the results clearly suggest the superiority of the signal processing model over the rival aggregate production and serial updating models. Only the coefficients for the gamma-distributed signal lag are positive and statistically significant across the three tests. A $1 million increase in the rate of change of agency appropriations, processed through the cascade response function, produces an additional 90 broadcast station inspections and

TABLE 2. Budgetary Signal Processing at the Federal Communications Commission, 1933–90 (standard errors in parentheses)

	(Hatanaka Instrumental Variables Estimates)					(negative binomial regressions)	
Variable	Broadcast Inspections (full)	Broadcast Inspections (reduced)	Ship Violation Notices (full)	Ship Violation Notices (reduced)		License Denials (full)	License Denials (reduced)
Intercept	1618.9 (1460.0)	2888.5* (572.0)	14565.0*** (3390.4)	10631.5*** (2736.5)		−4.49 (2.81)	−2.88** (1.02)
Lagged Dependent Variable (Instrumental Variables Estimate)	0.20* (0.096)	0.20* (0.088)	0.64*** (0.09)	0.65*** (0.12)		0.012 (0.090)	—
BT (millions of 1990 dollars) (*Aggregate Production Model*)	−11.8 (10.6)	—	−9.1 (14.5)	—		0.0040 (0.0101)	—
ΔBT (*Serial Updating Model*)	−10.6 (22.5)	—	−49.8 (47.4)	—		−0.023 (0.035)	—
$\Gamma(2,1)\kappa(L)\Delta BT$ (*Cascade Processing Model*)	116.9* (41.9)	90.6* (25.8)	236.5* (112.8)	165.2* (77.6)		0.21** (0.087)	0.24*** (0.06)
Commission Party Balance	1242.7 (660.3)	1050.9 (540.2)	2350.8 (1332.0)	2752.8* (1256.5)		1.2 (0.7)	2.3* (1.1)
House Committee Party Balance	−77.9 (819.5)	—	−2776.3 (1862.9)	—		0.2 (1.9)	—
Senate Committee Party Balance	50.7 (1202.0)	—	3004.7 (1952.0)	—		2.1 (1.7)	—
Industry Employment (in millions, logged)	182.0 (504.7)	−400.3** (123.2)	−3124.3*** (878.5)	−2093.0*** (532.0)		1.01* (0.39)	0.61** (0.23)
Number of Cases (df)	48 (38)	48 (42)	40 (30)	40 (34)		54 (44)	54 (49)
Hatanaka ρ	.05	.14	−.15	−.02	γ (s.e.)	0.15 (1.17)	0.32 (0.24)
Adjusted R^2	.51	.55	.837	.843	(LLF)	−85.9	−87.0
Jarque/Bera Joint χ^2	10.23**	9.46**	7.23	6.15	Lee ψ	13.8***	11.4***

Note: * implies significance at $p < .05$. ** implies significance at $p < .01$. *** implies significance at $p < .001$. (All tests are two-tailed.) For sources see Append B. Broadcast Station Inspections series contains missing data.

165 ship violation notices. Again, the coefficients for the aggregate production model (the constant-dollar budget itself) and the serial updating model (the yearly change in appropriations) are substantively and statistically negligible, and these results do not change when the lagged dependent variable is dropped from the equation. In the license denials model, a $1 million signal increase in the FCC budgetary trajectory induces an increase of 1.27 in λ, the commission's mean denial rate. The predictions of the cascade-processing model are cast against the actual inspections series, ship violation series, and license denial rate (λ_t) in Figure 3.

Moreover, save for the insignificance of the lagged dependent variable in the license denials equation, *the same reduced model emerges in all three tests*. FCC performance appears to be a positive function of the cascade budget response function, the Democratic composition of the commission, and either a positive or negative function of communications industry employment. Whereas monitoring activities have declined as the industry has grown, license denials have increased. This is probably explained by the multiplication of activities: As the field staff has performed more monitoring functions for an ever more complex industry, the intensity of the activities themselves has decreased. Finally, for all three time-series the reduced equations explain greater variance than do the full models.

Specification of the Cascade Processing Model

Because all five time-series appear to be explained best by the cascade processing model of equation (6), it is important to specify exactly what form that model takes for both agencies studied. While the tests in tables 1 and 2 employed a simple two-level agency hierarchy ($\Gamma[2, 1]$), it is possible that the actual agencies have more or fewer levels. In short, they may behave according to a form of the cascade response function different from $\Gamma(2, 1)$. I conducted tests to determine the precise level of m (the precise structure of informational hierarchy in each agency). The results are striking. While the $\Gamma(2, 1)$ specification uniformly minimized AIC for the FDA series, the $\Gamma(3, 1)$ specification minimized AIC for the three FCC series.[7] The summary response functions are graphed in Figure 4, where the $\Gamma(2, 1)$ and $\Gamma(3, 1)$ graphs correspond to the FDA and FCC response functions, respectively. I return to this issue in the conclusion.

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[7] Akaike's Information Criterion is calculated $AIC = -2 \log L + 2k$, where k is the number of regressors (Harvey 1990, 177–78). The computed AICs are as follows: FDA Inspections ($\Gamma[2, 1]$): 20.7; FDA Samples ($\Gamma[2, 1]$): 21.9; FCC Broadcast Inspections ($\Gamma[3, 1]$): 14.9; FCC Ship Notices ($\Gamma[3, 1]$): 16.8; FCC Denials ($\Gamma[3, 1]$): 181.0. The output for these analyses is available from the author.

FIGURE 3. Cascade Processing Model, Federal Communications Commission

Predicted and Actual FCC Broadcast Inspections, 1933–88



Predicted and Actual FCC Ship Notices, 1942–82



Predicted and Actual FCC License Denials, 1933–90



Source: FCC Annual Reports. Predictions based solely on gamma-lag (cascade) budget variable.

FIGURE 4. Theoretical Signal Response Inefficiencies in Federal Regulation (derived from empirical gamma distributions of cascade processing model)



Testing for Causal Stability after 1970 (Auxiliary Test A)

While the statistical tests conducted above elicit a clear portrait of the causal mechanism of budgetary control in federal regulation, we do not know whether that mechanism is invariant over the course of recent political history. Specifically, Nathan (1983), Rockman (1993), and others have argued that political control efforts have become more intense since 1970, with the transformation of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) into the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), more politicized appointment strategies, and a series of congressional reforms. It is therefore important to test for stability (or a regime change) in the budgetary signal response function. Was the effect of signal response altered after 1970? I test this hypothesis in two ways. To detect whether the signal response coefficients have changed (and in which direction), I first estimate separate regressions for the 1930s–1970 period and the 1970–1990 period using the reduced models from tables 1 and 2. I then perform Chow tests using the full time-series with restricted least-squares regressions. Essentially, the Chow tests tell us whether the regime shift after 1970 is statistically significant. Because the sample sizes are small, the results, which appear in Table 3 as Auxiliary Test A, should be interpreted with caution. While the null hypothesis of stability (no change in the signal response function) cannot be rejected for the FCC, the results for the FDA suggest that budgetary control was more pronounced after 1970 than before. This would be consistent with the qualitative findings of Nathan and Rockman. In summary, while the reforms of the early 1970s may not have affected independent regulatory commissions like the FCC, the rise of the OMB and more politicized appointment strategies have made executive regulatory agencies more amenable to control. Whether OMB influence or politicized appointments is more responsible is a question for further analysis. Again, however, I urge caution in interpreting these results.

A Test of Proposal versus Appropriations Control (Auxiliary Test B)

There remains the critical question of whether Congress or the president holds the reins of influence. Because the "signals" in the models above are constructed from appropriations series, it is important to test a counterhypothesis first intimated in the argument of Moe (1982): The president's budget proposal, not congres-

TABLE 3. Auxiliary Tests (standard error in parentheses)

Auxiliary Test A. Tests of Regime Change in Budgetary Signal Response after 1970
(Cascade Processing Model Coefficient Estimates for 1930s–1970 Period and 1970–90 Period)

Agency Performance Variable	1930s–70	1970–90	F Tests for Restrictions	Chow Tests for Restrictions
Hatanaka Instrumental Variables Estimates				
FDA Inspections [Γ(2,1)]	5.58 (3.65) (N = 29)	11.2 (6.4) (N = 21)	F(1,41) = 1.00	LR = 4.01*
FDA Total Samples [Γ(2,1)]	3.01 (7.43) (N = 29)	43.6*** (10.2) (N = 21)	F(1,40) = 5.07*	LR = 45.2***
FCC Broadcast Station Inspections [Γ(3,1)]	89.4 (53.9) (N = 31)	38.0 (25.6) (N = 19)	F(1,39) = 0.67	LR = 1.35
FCC Ship Discrepancy Notices [Γ(3,1)]	270.9* (111.1) (N = 29)	−66.0* (22.7) (N = 13)	F(1,33) = 1.64	LR = 4.13
Poisson Regression Estimates used due to small sample sizes				
FCC License Denials [Γ(3,1)]	0.16* (0.07) (N = 34)	0.13 (0.07) (N = 21)	F(1,48) = 0.39	LR = 1.12

Auxiliary Test B. A Test of Appropriations Signals versus Proposal Signals
(Coefficient Estimates Reported Only for Signal Processing Models)

Agency Performance Variable	$\Gamma(m,\lambda)\kappa(L)\Delta BP$ (OMB proposal signals)	$\Gamma(m,\lambda)\kappa(L)\Delta BT$ (appropriations signals)
Hatanaka Instrumental Variables Estimates		
FDA Inspections [Γ(2,1)]	9.04 (7.66)	9.34 (6.79)
FDA Total Samples [Γ(2,1)]	0.58 (16.85)	38.52* (15.90)
FCC Broadcast Station Inspections [Γ(3,1)]	−44.0 (97.5)	173.3* (84.5)
FCC Ship Discrepancy Notices [Γ(3,1)]	−374.1 (277.0)	620.7* (280.0)
FCC License Denials [Γ(3,1)]	0.03 (0.05)	0.32*** (0.07)

Note: * implies significance at p < .05. ** implies significance at p < .01. *** implies significance at p < .001. (All tests are two-tailed). "1930s–70" and "1970–90" coefficient estimates in second and third columns taken from separate regressions. F Tests and Chow Tests in fourth and fifth columns refer to restricted least squares estimates of each model for the full time-series, 1930s–90. Broadcast Station Inspections series contains missing data. For sources see Appendix B.

sional appropriations, carries decisive influence over agency behavior. In terms of signal transmission, the central question is this: Are the budgetary signals to which the agencies exhibit responsiveness carried in yearly appropriations or in the president's budget proposal submitted to Congress every January? Moe (1982) argues that the OMB proposal effectively sets the agenda for agency appropriations, and that appropriations rarely depart dramatically from the proposal levels. If so, then under the assumption that the agency knows (or has learned) this feature of budgetary politics, the agency would be much more likely to respond to yearly changes in the budget proposal rather than yearly changes in appropriations, as the latter would carry little or no *unique* information to the agency beyond that already transmitted in the January proposal.

The test I propose is to employ the strongest reduced models from estimation of equation (8) and to operationalize the relevant processing models for both appropriations changes (ΔBT) and proposal changes (ΔBP), including these in the same regression as follows:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \delta_3\Gamma(m,\lambda)\kappa(L)\Delta BT + \delta_4\Gamma(m,\lambda)\kappa(L)\Delta BP + \sum_{k=1}^{K}\beta_k X_{kt} + e_t, \quad \textbf{(9)}$$

where for parsimony X_{kt} may be taken to include the autoregressive term ϕY_{t-1}. These estimations are reported in Table 3 under Auxiliary Test B, where for space considerations only the coefficient estimates for the cascade processing variables are reported. In no single case does the presidential proposal hypothesis yield empirically resilient predictions, and in four of the five regressions the results clearly suggest rejection of the proposal signaling hypothesis in favor of the appropriations signaling hypothesis.

It is important to qualify these results, however, by warning against the inference that congressional budgetary influence in federal regulation is much stronger than presidential budgetary influence. As Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 200–206) have shown, presidential budget proposals strongly influence yearly variations in appropriations. What the results *do* suggest is that, since appropriations variations are not entirely determined by the presidential proposal, agencies appear inclined to "wait" and extract signals from the variations in appropriations since the proposal does not provide a reliable (minimum variance) estimate of appropriations variations six months in advance. Hence, if presidents are effective in transmitting political signals to the agencies through budget shifts, then final appropriation shifts constitute the medium through which they do so.

CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF BUDGETARY CONTROL IN FEDERAL REGULATION

The reigning model of budgetary influence in federal regulation is altogether starved of symbolic politics. Annual budgets impose new (purely fiscal) constraints to which agencies adjust mechanically, with no political guesswork. Yet, the analysis here suggests that when agencies are studied over long periods the aggregate production model of budgetary influence does not offer robust predictions. [Estimations of the Cobb-Douglas (nonlinear) form of the aggregate production model appear in Appendix C.] In contrast, I have argued that the control over regulatory programs exercised by elected authorities through agency budgets may best be characterized as signalling influence. Anecdotal and statistical evidence alike suggest that yearly budgets carry powerful political signals from elected authorities to the agencies. Yet, until now, no systematic test of that influence against an aggregate production model has been conducted. As a result, the literature in regulatory politics itself sends conflicting messages about the mechanics of budgetary influence in federal regulation. What the results here show is that if agencies *do* attend to signals embedded in yearly budget changes, then simple models of Bayesian information absorption appear insufficient to explain how they do so, in part because those models are ill-adapted to explain organizational behavior under bounded processing capacity. The model of simple Bayesian expectations formation operationalized in this analysis has not proven resilient to empirical investigation. Agencies appear to exhibit an adaptive pattern of information processing that is weakly consistent with more complex forms of rational expectations formation. That said, the signal processing model presented here is admittedly a rudimentary one; any number of more complex models could be invoked to study the phenomenon of budgetary influence. My option for a simple variant is premised upon maximal contrast between the simple Bayesian and processing models of information absorption.

Qualifications and Alternative Explanations: Adjustment, Slack, and Strategic Delay

Alternative explanations for these findings must explain the probabilistically structured pattern of agency response delay to changes in the budget trajectory. A mechanical adjustment model would suggest that the pattern of delay is due to the administrative complexity of the agency's regulatory process. In other words, the issue is not adaptive inference but adaptive production response. The problem with this explanation is that it relies fundamentally upon an aggregate production model of bureaucratic supply. An agency characterized by mechanical adjustment delay should be highly sensitive to its *level* of funding. In short, the mechanical adjustment model predicts that agency response should be a distributed lag not of budgetary shifts, but of the budget aggregates themselves.

A slack resources hypothesis would explain slow agency response by reference to the agency's "reserve" resources, upon which it can draw to absorb budget cuts. The results here are consistent with this hypothesis. In fact, agency "slack" and adaptive processing are symbiotic. Slack resources allow agency leaders to attend to political signals, and the slow adjustment of adaptive processing frees up agency resources which can be turned into slack. But while the slack resources hypothesis explains slow adjustment, it cannot explain the departure from rational discounting embodied in the gamma-distributed response function. A rational slack-building agency would have an exponential ($\Gamma[1, 1]$) response function, as "efficient" processing would allow the agency to build up the greatest slack over time.

A strategic delay interpretation of these findings would view the pattern of response delay as either (1) a pattern of shirking by the agency or (2) a practice of costly signalling whereby the agency indicates its bargaining strength by waiting to respond to congressional and presidential signals. Here, the deliberate quality of the delay would again be explained not so much by limited inference capacity as by strategic response. The difficulty is that it is hard to see how this sort of delay would add across successive levels of hierarchy in an agency. Subordinate levels may have uncertainty over their own funding trajectories in the agency's internal budget process, but rarely do these actors have any bargaining power relative to their hierarchical superiors. Indeed, Padgett's (1981) model of ecological control in budgetary decision making suggests that subordinate levels exercise limited control over budgetary outcomes only by shaping the information and the choice set that is passed on to the next level.

Processing Efficiency and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation

These findings bear intriguing implications for theories of the political control of administrative agencies. It is critical that in all specification tests (see Figure 4 and note 7), the agencies were found to have multiple levels of informational hierarchy. In other words, the agencies here do not process signals according to efficient "short-time response" behavior. Indeed, as noted above, for any value of $m > 1$, the multidivisional processing model violates retrospective discounting conditions (see Appendix A, proposition 1). Figure 4 displays the relative response distributions for the two agencies and the resulting theoretical response inefficiencies. For the cascade processing model, given constant λ, every unit increase in m (that is, every additional level of informational hierarchy) yields a linear increase in response inefficiency, as the mean of the gamma distribution is m/λ. In Figure 4 the means of the $\Gamma(1, 1)$, $\Gamma(2, 1)$, and $\Gamma(3, 1)$ distributions are highlighted by three successive vertical lines. Hence, the mean theoretical efficiency loss for the FDA (whose response delay corresponds most closely to the $\Gamma[2, 1]$ model) relative to the "short-time response" model is one year. The agency's response to signals is thus one year slower than would be expected under the hypothetical unitary agency model. For the FCC the relative response delay is even greater, two years.

The implications of this inefficiency lie not so much in losses for the agency as in attenuated responsiveness to democratic processes. If newly elected authorities prefer less regulatory performance and cut agency appropriations to signal this preference, or if a budget cut signals principals' concerns about inefficiencies, the cascade processing model clearly suggests that agencies will not "get the message" for years after it has been communicated. As long as divisions retain autonomy over performance levels, signal response inefficiencies will remain a fact of bureaucratic politics.

The Response of Political Principals to Adaptive Agency Behavior

The inefficiency (or "slowness") of adaptive agency response poses a puzzle: Why (if at all) do elected authorities content themselves with slow agency response to their signaled preferences? Why do they not punish the agency or attempt to restructure it to reduce these inefficiencies? At least three explanations may be considered. The first concerns first-year symbolic response in the agency's processing pattern. Even under extremely lagged adjustment to signals, the agency does, on average, exhibit a response to the budgetary signal in the first year after which it is sent. Notice in Figure 4 that all the response functions show a positive weight from $\tau = 0$ to $\tau = 1$. This positive but small reaction during the first year may function to transmit a "symbolic response" to the elected authorities that some readjustment of behavior is occurring. A second explanation is related to the first and concerns the principals' demand for stability. Assuming that authorities know the agency's response function, they may take comfort in the facts that (1) the effect of their budgetary signal will be enduring (albeit dissipated) due to the lagged nature of the agency's processing behavior, and that (2) their signal will alter the operation of valued political programs without disrupting them too much. In other words, because political principals may value program stability, they may have reasons for preferring adaptive response to the speculative, trigger-like response of the serial updating model. A final explanation concerns the politically symbolic meaning of the budget signal itself. If budgetary shifts are signals not only to the agency but also to the public (and to interest groups and the media), legislative and executive overseers may be less concerned that the agency show dramatic behavioral response. They may be contented to observe a small degree of symbolic response from the agency in the first year and to let the budget shift stand as a message to valued constituencies and groups that the president or the committee has "done its job." That said, this question is clearly an issue for further research, perhaps through the use of simultaneous equations models to assess the reaction of political principals to adaptive agency processing.

In summary, because it provides a rigorous and testable explanation of response inefficiencies, the cascade processing model offers a powerful explanation of the paradox of budgetary control in federal regulation. As daunting as congressional and presidential stature in administrative politics may often appear, public bureaucracies frequently seem invulnerable to budgetary control attempts (Wilson 1988, 274–76). The logic of adaptive processing and the fact of bureaucratic hierarchy explain the paradox. The agency responds slowly to a volatile resource environment, and successive levels of informational hierarchy multiply this delay. Older budget shifts affect regulatory performance as much as do current changes. In order to send strong budgetary messages to the agency, then, a single budget cut or increase usually will not suffice. Elected authorities either must effect large changes which overwhelm prior trends or must be able to push the agency's budget strongly in the same direction for several years in a row. These are potentially costly moves for any president or committee to make (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1990, 252). For this reason, the findings here implicitly support scholarship in the political control literature emphasizing the limits of budgets as sanctioning controls over administrative and regulatory agencies and pointing to other means of control, such as administrative procedures (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; McCubbins 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1990), appointments (Moe 1985, 1110; Wood and Waterman 1991, 822), and presidential initiative (Moe 1985, 1110; Rockman 1993). The novel argument added here is that the very uncertainty over future budgets which makes political control possible also places limits upon budgetary control, given the adaptive inference patterns employed by agency decision makers and the hierarchies in which these inferences are made.

In conclusion, existing statistical models of budgetary influence suffer from inaccurate specification. Students of organization have long recognized that public bureaucracies are not monolithic institutions of the sort that simply translate aggregate resources into output or choice, yet all our statistical models portray regulatory agencies as if they acted in precisely this fashion. The moral lurking in these results is that the available data on regulatory agencies contain much more information than political scientists are currently extracting from them. Further analytic progress will occur when researchers begin to lend greater scrutiny to the specification of causal processes in bureaucratic politics. For now, the cascade processing model provides a stronger and more contextually appreciative footing for the budgetary control hypothesis than has previously existed.

APPENDIX A. PROOF THAT THE RESPONSE OF A LINEAR TIME-INVARIANT AGENCY SYSTEM WITH *M* LEVELS OF CASCADE HIERARCHY UNDER RANDOM ADAPTIVE DELAY IS $\Gamma(M, \Lambda)$

PROPOSITION 1. *The response function of a linear time-invariant agency under adaptive random delay is an exponential density. This function satisfies the rationality axioms of adaptive expectations.*

Consider the linear system $y[t] = H[x[t]]$, where output $y[t]$ is a function of an input sequence $x[t]$ and a response function $H[\;\;]$, an operator which maps the input $x[t]$ into $y[t]$. We consider two cases, the case of complex exponential input and the case without.

Case One: Complex Exponential Input. Assume that the input sequence is given by $x[t] = e^{i\omega t}$. Then it can be shown (Oppenheim and Schafer 1989, 40, 59, 100) that the response of this system to random delay $\delta(t - \tau)$ is given by the Fourier transform

$$y[t] = x[t]\mathcal{F}[\delta(t-\tau)] = e^{i\omega t}\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \delta(t-\tau)e^{-i\omega t}\,dt = e^{i\omega t}e^{-i\omega\tau}. \qquad \textbf{(A-1)}$$

Hence, the response function is a strictly decreasing exponential function of τ, that is, $H[\tau] = e^{-i\omega\tau}$.

Case Two: Noncomplex Input and Adaptive Expectations. Assume that the delay function is as before ($= \delta[t - \tau]$) and that the agency's output is a linear function of its expected budgetary trajectory in the next year, that is, $y[t] = f(x[t]) = f[E(\Delta BT_{t+1})] = H[\Delta BT_{t+1}]$, where $\Delta BT = \Delta BT(t)$ is a continuous function of time, and expectations are formed adaptively (with reference to past history) according to

$$E(x[t]) = E(\Delta BT_{t+1}) = \int_{-\infty}^{\tau} f(t-\tau)\Delta BT\,dt, \qquad \textbf{(A-2)}$$

which obeys the density condition

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\tau} f(t-\tau)\Delta BT\,dt = 1. \qquad \textbf{(A-3)}$$

Assume that forecast errors in ΔBT_{t+1} are generated by a first-order Markov process, $u_t = u_{t-1} + v_t - \lambda v_{t-1}$. Under adaptive expectations (Muth 1961) the expected signal ΔBT_{t+1} is revised according to the forecast error as follows:

$$\frac{dE(\Delta BT_{t+1})}{dt} = \lambda[E(\Delta BT_t) - \Delta BT_t]. \qquad \textbf{(A-4)}$$

Adjustment thus obeys the ordinary differential equation (A-4), with the following first-order solution

$$E(\Delta BT_{t+1}) = \lambda\int_{-\infty}^{\tau} e^{\lambda(t-\tau)}\Delta BT(t)\,dt, \qquad \textbf{(A-5)}$$

which is a strictly decreasing and exponential function of τ with generalized $\lambda = 1/\mu$. Holding $\lambda = 1$ for simplicity, this is the response function for a linear time-invariant system under random delay. This function declines strictly from $\tau = 0$ and is globally convex, as $f'(\tau) = -\lambda^2e^{-\lambda\tau}$ and $f''(\tau) = \lambda^3e^{-\lambda\tau}$, and so satisfies conditions of rational discounting (Muth 1961). Less weight is accorded to signals as they become progressively older, and discounting distinctions become less severe over time.

PROPOSITION 2. *The signal response process for a multidivisional agency with* M *independent levels of hierarchy, each a linear time-invariant system and connected in a cascade structure, is* $\Gamma(m, \lambda)$.

Suppose, now, that we have m independent levels of hierarchy. If we model each level of agency hierarchy as a time-invariant linear system, then the impulse response of a cascade system is $h[t] = h_1[t]*h_2[t]*\ldots*h_m[t]$, and the output of the agency is a convolution of the response functions of the different levels of hierarchy, as follows:

$$y[t] = \sum_{k=1}^{m} h_k[t]x[t]. \qquad \textbf{(A-6)}$$

Given an exponential delay function for each level, it can be shown (Feller 1971, 11) that a convolution of exponentials yields the gamma distribution, and the response function of the agency is

$$f(\tau) = C\tau^{m-1}e^{-\tau}, \qquad \textbf{(A-7)}$$

where $C = 1/\Gamma(m)$. *Q.E.D.*

APPENDIX B. VARIABLE LIST AND DATA SOURCES

Variable List

All variables are measured in the current calendar year unless otherwise stated.

BP (*Funding*): the OMB estimate of the agency's funding for fiscal year *t*

BP (*Staff*): the OMB estimate of the agency's personnel for fiscal year *t*

BT (*Funding*): the final appropriated funding level for the agency in fiscal year *t*

BT (*Staff*): the final appropriated staff level for the agency in fiscal year *t*

Party Balance, *Congressional Oversight Committees*: The number of Democrats minus the number of Republicans, divided by total committee membership, of the oversight committee. Independents are scored as zero. For committees, see "Sources" below.

The Food and Drug Administration

Total Samples: the total number of domestic and import samples taken and examined by the FDA

Inspections: the total number of inspections carried out by FDA inspectors

Presidential Partisanship: a dummy variable scored one if the president is a Democrat, 0 if Republican

Kefauver-Harris Amendments: a dummy variable which switches to one in 1962

The Federal Communications Commission

Broadcast Station Inspections: the total number of on-site inspections performed by FCC field staff

Ship Violation Notices: the total number of notices of frequency discrepancy or interference given to ship operators by the FCC

Broadcast License Denials: the total number of broadcast license renewal applications denied in the formal hearing process by the FCC

Commission Party Balance: the number of Democrats minus the number of Republicans on the commission, divided by total commission membership. Independents are scored as zero.

Sources

All nominal money series were inflated to 1990 dollar value using the GNP implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) from *National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–1982* (pp. 327–28). The series was updated for 1983–90 with figures from July issues of the *Survey of Current Business*. Proposal figures for agency budgets and staff appear in the Appendix of the annual *Budget of the United States Government*. Total budget proposal figures aggregated across program appear for each agency. Where staff proposal figures were not so aggregated, yearly figures were summed across programs by the author (worksheets available upon request). Final appropriations figures for budgets and staff were obtained from successive annual reports for the FCC and, for the FDA, from "A Statistical History of the Food and Drug Administration," an unpublished mimeograph from the FDA History Office. Data on FCC commissioners appears on pp. 3–4 of the FCC 1990 *Annual Report*. Data on broadcast station inspections, ship discrepancy notices, and license renewals denied by the FCC were taken from the commission's *Annual Report*. FDA performance data appear in the mimeograph cited.

Because ADA ideology scores do not extend to the 1930s, I used party balance figures for the relevant oversight committees for each agency studied. Party balance figures for the House and Senate appear for 1789 to 1981 in *Guide to the U.S. Congress*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982), and were updated from successive issues of the *Congressional Directory*. For its entire history the FCC has been overseen by the respective domestic commerce committees in the House and Senate. The FDA was overseen in the Senate by the Agriculture Committee to 1954, by the Labor and Public Welfare Committee from 1955 to 1976, and by the Labor and Human Resources Committee from 1977 to the present; in the House Agriculture and Forestry Committee to 1940, and since then, as part of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and later the Department of Health and Human Services, its formal oversight committee has been the Education and Labor Committee.

Industry employment aggregates appear in the *National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–1982*, in "Full-Time and Part-Time Employees by Industry." For the FCC the relevant industry is "Radio and television broadcasting." For the FDA I aggregated employment figures for the "Food and kindred products" and the "Health services" industries. All figures were updated for 1983–90 from issues of *Survey of Current Business*.

APPENDIX C: ESTIMATIONS OF THE COBB-DOUGLAS (NONLINEAR) FORM OF THE AGGREGATE PRODUCTION MODEL

Following Olson (1994), I tested a Cobb-Douglas nonlinear aggregate production model according to the following functional form: $Y_t = A{*}BT^{\delta_1} \exp[\delta_2(\Delta BT_t) + \delta_3[\Gamma(m, \lambda)k(L)\Delta BT_t] + \Sigma_k\beta_k X_{kt} + e_t]$, where all "signals" and production "shocks" are exponentiated. This yields loglinear regressions as follows:

$$\ln(Y_t) = \alpha + \delta_1\ln(BT_t) + \delta_2(\Delta BT_t) + \delta_3[\Gamma(m, \lambda)k(L)\Delta BT_t] + \Sigma_k\beta_k X_{kt} + e_t.$$

I estimated the reduced models from tables 1 and 2. Here, I report only the budget variable coefficients. For the FDA total samples equation the results are (with standard errors in parentheses):

$$\ln(Y_t) = \underset{(1.1)}{16.3^{***}} + \underset{(0.3)}{0.3^{*}\ln(BT_t)} - \underset{(0.2)}{0.0^{*}\Delta BT_t} + \underset{(0.02)}{0.05^{*}[\Gamma(2, 1)k(L)\Delta BT_t]^{*}}.$$

The FDA inspections equation results are:

$$\ln(Y_t) = \underset{(13.6)}{-33.7^{**}} + \underset{(3.5)}{0.2^{*}\ln(BT_t)} - \underset{(0.002)}{0.0006^{*}(\Delta BT_t)} + \underset{(0.3)}{0.4^{*}[\Gamma(2, 1)k(L)\Delta BT_t]}.$$

The results for the FCC broadcast station inspections equation are:

$$\ln(Y_t) = \underset{(4.1)}{10.6^{*}} - \underset{(0.7)}{0.3^{*}\ln(BT_t)} - \underset{(0.02)}{0.02\Delta BT_t} + \underset{(0.04)}{0.18^{*}[\Gamma(3, 1)k(L)\Delta BT_t]^{**}}.$$

The results for the FCC ship discrepancy notices equation are:

$$\ln(Y_t) = \underset{(3.5)}{9.6^{**}} + \underset{(0.6)}{0.5^{*}\ln(BT_t)} + \underset{(0.02)}{0.006\Delta BT_t} + \underset{(0.05)}{0.04^{*}[\Gamma(3, 1)k(L)\Delta BT_t]}.$$

The results for the FCC license denials equation are:

$$\ln(Y_t) = \underset{(9.2)}{-19.1^{*}} + \underset{(1.4)}{2.1^{*}\ln(BT_t)} + \underset{(0.03)}{-0.02\Delta BT_t} + \underset{(0.09)}{0.2^{*}[\Gamma(3, 1)k(L)\Delta BT_t]^{*}}.$$

Notice that in no single regression does the logged budget term appear statistically distinguishable from zero. Details and full output for these analyses are available from the author upon request.

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Buying Supermajorities

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Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, if vote buyers move sequentially, and if the losing vote buyer is always granted a last chance to attack the winner's coalition, then minimal winning coalitions will generally not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. We provide results relating equilibrium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers, and we show that minimal winning coalitions should occur in only rare cases. We discuss these results in light of empirical work on coalition size and suggest other possible avenues for testing our model.

It is obvious to most students of positive political theory that minimal winning coalitions are cheaper to build than supermajority coalitions. If a coalition builder must pay for each member added to the coalition, then s/he should never pay more than the smallest number required to win. Minimal winning coalitions have appeared either as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of almost all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Denzau and Munger 1986, Gamson 1961, Koehler 1972, Koford 1982, Riker 1962, Shepsle 1974, Snyder 1991).

As an empirical matter, however, oversized coalitions seem to be at least as prevalent as minimal winning coalitions. Divisions on legislative roll calls are seldom near 50–50 (Damgaard 1973, Hinkley 1972, Lutz and Murray 1975, Lutz and Williams 1976, Uslaner 1975), and more refined searches for "minimal winning tendencies" typically fail as well. For example, the "effectiveness" of a majority party appears to be strictly increasing with the party's size, even after it is much larger than minimal winning (Francis 1970, Hinkley 1972, LeBlanc 1969, Moore 1969), and "defections" do not increase as the majority party increases in size (Uslaner 1975). Moreover, in the context of parliamentary coalition government formation, nonminimal winning coalitions frequently form (Browne 1973, Laver and Schofield 1990).

Theorists have responded to this evidence by providing reasons for the formation of nonminimal winning coalitions. One reason is uncertainty (Koehler 1972, 1975, Riker 1962). If there is some chance that legislators who have promised their votes will fail to honor their promise, whether due to reneging or to abstaining for unavoidable reasons, then vote buyers will typically pad their majorities and aim for an expected victory margin of more than one vote. Another possible reason, at least for distributive policy arenas, is the existence of a legislative norm of "universalism." Legislators might prefer to support all distributive projects proposed each session rather than live in an environment in which new minimal winning coalitions form each session and pass only their own projects (Klingaman 1969, Weingast 1979). A third reason is the cost of "ideological diversity," leading to minimal *connected* winning coalitions that may be larger than minimal winning coalitions (Axelrod 1970).[1] In this paper we provide another reason: Nonminimal winning coalitions may actually be *cheaper* than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, we show that if two vote buyers compete for a majority in a legislature, and if they make offers to purchase votes sequentially, then minimal winning coalitions generally will not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. In fact, equilibrium supermajorities will be the rule rather than the exception.[2]

The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the first vote buyer has bribed a minimal winning coalition, then the second vote buyer needs to bribe only one member of the first vote buyer's coalition in order to invade successfully. If the first vote buyer has bribed more than a minimal winning coalition, however, then the second vote buyer must bribe at least two members of the first vote buyer's coalition. Thus, by bribing more than a minimal winning coalition, the first vote buyer can decrease the amount of the bribe paid to each member of his or her original coalition, while keeping constant the amount the second vote buyer must pay to invade successfully. If the savings due to decreasing the bribes are greater than the costs of bribing another legislator, then the first vote buyer is better off bribing a supermajority. We show that the savings are usually greater than the costs.

The recent House vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an illustration.

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[1] Baron and Ferejohn (1989) note that nonminimal winning coalitions are possible in their random-recognition, divide-the-dollar, majority-rule bargaining game, when motions must be seconded before a vote is taken. Their calculations show, however, that supermajority coalitions can occur only when the legislature is very small and the discount rate is quite high. Accordingly, they conclude that their model basically supports Riker's (1962) size principle.

[2] Our results build on the work of Groseclose (1996), who presents an example showing that supermajorities can be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions, and Snyder (1990), who presents a model in which the vote buyer defending the status quo would generally build a supermajority coalition.

According to many observers, President Clinton and Republican House leaders traded favors for votes. The final vote of 234 to 200, however, indicates that these leaders constructed a coalition that was 16 votes larger than minimal winning. While this behavior is an anomaly for many previous models, it is consistent with ours. The president and the Republican leaders faced significant opposition from certain Democrats, such as Majority Leader Richard Gephardt and Chief Whip David Bonior. Since Gephardt and Bonior could have attempted to invade the pro-NAFTA coalition by buying votes themselves, it is conceivable that the pro-NAFTA leaders consciously built a supermajority coalition to deter such an effort. The costs are much higher for invading a properly constructed supermajority coalition than the optimal minimal winning coalition. By making the costs of invasion high enough, the pro-NAFTA leaders may have convinced Gephardt and Bonior to concede the issue rather than spend their resources.

Two assumptions are crucial for our theoretical result. First, we assume there are two competing vote buyers instead of one. In the limiting case when the reservation price of the second vote buyer is zero, our model becomes the single-vote-buyer model. In this case our results are the same as in previous papers (e.g., Denzau and Munger 1986): The first vote buyer buys only a minimal winning coalition.

Second, we assume that vote buyers move sequentially. Although we make this assumption primarily for analytic convenience (if vote buyers were to move simultaneously, then pure strategy equilibria typically would not exist), under several interpretations it accords well with actual coalition building. For example, the status quo is a favored alternative, since all proposed bills must eventually defeat the status quo in a vote. If payments for votes on a bill are typically written into the bill itself (as special conditions, allowances, exemptions, transition rules, and so on) and thus become public when the bill is reported, and if it is costly to change bills, then defenders of the status quo are effectively able to move last.

The assumption of sequential offers also makes sense when coalitions are viewed in a dynamic context, and the problem of *maintaining* a winning coalition is taken into account as well as the problem of forming one. For example, suppose an organized interest group builds a legislative coalition to pass a bill in one session of the legislature and must maintain this coalition in subsequent sessions, when groups that oppose the bill may have opportunities to counterattack and try to rescind it. Then the group supporting the policy effectively moves first, and in building its coalition it should defend against a wide range of possible attacks. One interpretation of our results, therefore, is that supermajorities are generally cheaper than minimal winning coalitions when the costs of maintaining winning coalitions are important. Supermajorities are cheaper in the long run.

THE MODEL AND TWO EXAMPLES

A legislature is to decide by majority rule between two alternatives, a status quo (s) and a new policy (x), both elements of $\mathbb{R}$. Each legislator has preferences over how s/he votes and also over a "political resource," which we call money.[3] For each legislator i, let $v(i) = u_i(x) - u_i(s)$ denote the intensity of i's preference for voting for x over s, measured in money. We call $v(i)$ the reservation price of i. Without loss of generality, label legislators so that $v(i)$ is a nonincreasing function.[4]

Two voters buyers, A and B, have preferences over x and s. The vote buyers could be interest groups, a president or governor, or a party or committee leaders. Without loss of generality, assume that A prefers x over s and that B has the opposite preference. Let $W_A = U_A(x) - U_A(s)$ be A's willingness to pay for x measured in money, and let $W_B = U_B(s) - U_B(x)$ be B's willingness to pay for s. Each vote buyer wants to minimize the total bribes paid, while passing his or her preferred policy in the legislature, but each would prefer to concede the issue than pay more than his or her willingness to pay.

For each legislator i, let $a(i)$ denote A's offer to i, and let $b(i)$ denote B's offer to i. We call $a(\cdot)$ and $b(\cdot)$ the bribe offer functions. Each legislator takes the bribe offers as given and then votes for the alternative that gives him or her the greater payoff. Since legislators only have preferences over how they vote, not over which alternative wins, once the bribe offers are known, each legislator has a dominant voting strategy.

We assume that the vote buyers move sequentially, with A moving first and B, defender of the status quo, moving last. All actors become informed of bribes once they are offered; in particular, B is perfectly informed about the bribes made by A when it is her turn to offer bribes.

We wish to characterize the subgame-perfect, pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. To avoid open-set nonexistence problems and the need to use some type of ε-equilibrium solution concept, we assume that all unbribed legislators who are indifferent between the alternative x and the status quo s vote for s and that all bribed legislators who are indifferent between x and s (given the offered bribes) vote for the outcome preferred by the vote buyer who bribes them last. These are purely technical assumptions, which simplify the analysis and exposition.

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[3] Thus, legislators are primarily concerned with the position-taking aspect of their voting decisions, not with policy outcomes. This is consistent with the view of Mayhew (1974), Fenno (1978), and others.

[4] One may think of legislators' preferences for policies and bribes as indirect preferences induced from other goals. For example, suppose each legislator cares only about his or her reelection probability, and this depend positively on how often the legislator's votes are consistent with constituents' preferences and on total campaign contributions from interest groups, or favors from legislative leaders (pork barrel projects, campaign appearances, contributions from leadership PACs, and so on). The assumptions we make about preferences are consistent with maximizing reelection probabilities; we simply assume the function mapping these two intermediate goals into probabilities is linear and separable. See Denzau and Munger (1986) for further discussion of the relationship between direct and indirect utility functions of legislators.

We allow v_i to be infinite. That is, legislators can have such an intense preference for x or s that no bribe of any size will make them change their vote. Of course, if a majority of the legislators have such intense preferences, then no vote buying takes place, and the model becomes trivial.

The following simple example illustrates why it may be optimal for a vote buyer to build a nonminimal winning coalition.

Example 1. *The legislature contains seven members, all indifferent between the two proposals, that is,* $v(i) = 0$ *for all* i. *Since* B *will move second and attack the weakest part of* A*'s coalition,* A *will offer the same bribe,* a, *to all legislators he bribes. Let* $m + 4 \geq 0$ *be the size of the coalition* A *bribes. If* $m = 0$, *then* B *can defeat* x *by paying* $a + \varepsilon$ *to one member of* A*'s coalition. Thus,* A *must set* $a \geq W_B$ *to win, and* A*'s total bribes are then* $4W_B$. *If* $m = 1$, *then* B *must pay* $a + \varepsilon$ *to two members of* A*'s coalition to defeat* x. *Thus,* A *must set* $a \geq W_B/2$ *to win, and his total bribes are then* $5W_B/2$. *This is* less *than* $4W_B$, *so* A *is better off buying a supermajority of size 5 than a minimal winning coalition. If* $m = 2$, *then* B *must pay* $a + \varepsilon$ *to three members of* A*'s coalition, so* A *must set* $a \geq W_B/3$ *to win, and his total bribes are then* $2W_B$. *In fact,* A *minimizes his total payments by bribing all seven legislators. Here,* $m = 3$, *and* A*'s total bribes are* $7W_B/4$. *Clearly, there is an equilibrium where* x *wins if and only if* $W_A \geq 7W_B/4$. *If* $W_A < 7W_B/4$, *then there are only equilibria in which no bribes are paid and* s *wins.*

It should be clear that this example is easily generalized to a legislature of any size n, so we state the following without proof.

Comment 1. *Suppose the number of legislators* n *is odd, all legislators are initially indifferent between* x *and* s, *and* $W_A \geq 2nW_B/(n + 1)$. *Then, in equilibrium,* A *bribes* all *legislators, with* $a(i) = 2W_B/(n + 1)$ *for all* i.

At least two features of this equilibrium are worth noting. First, if A faced no opposition, then clearly he would only bribe a minimal winning set of legislators.[5] Thus, the existence of an opposing vote buyer is necessary to generate the nonminimal winning coalition strategy.[6] Second, for large n, A's total payments are approximately $2W_B$. Thus, in order for an equilibrium to exist in which x wins, W_A must be (approximately) at least twice as large as W_B. Finally, there is an implicit assumption that A and B cannot collude. Otherwise, A could offer B an amount $W_B + \varepsilon$ in exchange for B's promise not to compete in buying votes. This would be cheaper for A, and Pareto optimal from the vote buyers' point of view, although not from the legislators' point of view. We assume that legal prohibitions or intense antagonism between A and B make this cooperative solution impossible.

It is also easy to produce examples in which A bribes a coalition that is larger than minimal winning but smaller than universal. Consider the following case, in which all legislators are initially opposed to x.

Example 2. *The legislature contains seven members, each with* $v(i) = -1$. *Assume* $W_B = 3$, *and assume* W_A *is large enough that an equilibrium exists in which* x *wins. In such an equilibrium,* A *will offer the same bribe,* a, *to all legislators he bribes. Let* $m + 4$ *be the size of the coalition* A *bribes. If* $m = 0$, *then* A *must set* $a = 1 + W_B = 4$ *to win, and his total bribes are 16. If* $m = 1$, *then* A *must set* $a = 1 + W_B/2 = 5/2$ *to win, and his total bribes are 25/2. If* $m = 2$, *then* A *must set* $a = 1 + W_B/3 = 2$ *to win, and his total bribes are 12. Finally, if* $m = 3$, *then* A *must set* $a = 1 + W_B/4 = 7/3$ *to win, and his total bribes are 49/4. Thus, the optimal strategy is for* A *to bribe six of the seven legislators, neither a minimal winning nor a unanimous coalition.*

Examples 1 and 2 provide an interesting alternative to the standard explanations of the tendency for omnibus public works bills to have universalistic or near universalistic support (Collie 1988, Weingast 1979). These bills usually do not arouse strong opposition, even among legislators who do not receive projects. They typically involve only a small part of the budget, and commentators sometimes refer to them as legislative grease. That is, they are viewed not as part of the main machinery of public policy but only as an accessory that helps it to run smoothly. As a result, legislative preferences are much like those of example 1 or example 2—all legislators are indifferent or nearly indifferent to the bill's passage. The main opposition to such bills usually comes from ideological groups opposed to government spending, such as the National Taxpayers' Union, or ideological conservatives such as James Buckley (see Krehbiel 1991 and citations therein for a discussion of a famous case in which Buckley opposed the 1973 Senate omnibus rivers and harbors bill). As examples 1 and 2 show, the optimal way to prevent such opponents from invading the coalition is to pay small bribes (projects) to a very large proportion of the legislature.

In fact, the two examples may provide an explanation to a puzzle Collie has raised about the issue: If a norm of universalism is the principle actually at work in omnibus bills, then why do not *all* congressional districts receive projects in such bills? For example, Ferejohn (1974) reports that omnibus public works bills typically contain projects affecting 350–400 districts (about 82–90%). Example 2 provides an answer. If legislators who do not receive projects are not indifferent to the bill's passage but instead are slightly opposed, say, because they care (only slightly) about the fact that the bill adds to the tax burden of their constituents, then the optimal coalition size will typically not be universalistic. In example 2, for instance, the optimal coalition size is just over 85%.

Finally, we should point out that many of the assumptions of our model can be relaxed without qualitatively affecting the results presented below. First, although our model assumes only two periods of vote buying, it is easily generalized to any finite number of periods, as long as the two vote buyers still alternate in making bribes. In such a multiperiod model the optimal strategy of the vote buyer who moves last is to wait until the last round before making any bribes. The competing vote buyer therefore only makes bribes in the second to last round. The outcome is exactly as in our two-round game, except there are prior periods during which the voter buyers wait each other out.

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[5] Technically, when there is no opposing vote buyer, A's optimal strategy must be defined as the limit of an open set, since we assume that indifferent legislators vote for s. Alternatively, we could assume there is some minimum positive bribe, say, a penny.

[6] Of course, uncertainty about how legislators may vote (or abstain), even when bribed, also may lead A to bribe a supermajority. It is unlikely, however, that such uncertainty would lead to a very large supermajority, at least in a large legislature. The law of large numbers would reduce the overall uncertainty considerably.

Second, although our model somewhat arbitrarily allows the defender of the status quo a last-mover advantage, this can be supported as an equilibrium result in a more general model in which neither vote buyer is given such an advantage. Suppose a first round is added in which vote buyers first simultaneously decide whether to initiate the vote buying game and then play the game as we specify. If only one vote buyer chooses to initiate in the first round, then s/he is required to move first; if both choose to initiate, then they flip a coin to see who moves first; and if neither chooses to initiate, then the game is not played, no roll call votes are taken, and the status quo remains in place. It is easy to show that in this game the vote buyer who prefers the status quo will never initiate (this buyer can always afford to sit back and wait). Thus, if the game takes place, the vote buyer preferring the status quo necessarily moves last.[7]

Third, we assume that legislators do not have preferences over which policy wins but only over how they vote. That is, our legislators are strictly Mayhewian position takers. The model would change very little, however, if the legislators were also given preferences over outcomes. The reason is that such preferences only matter if a legislator is pivotal; otherwise, a legislator's voting strategy depends only on position-taking considerations. Thus, whenever a vote buyer buys at least one vote more than s/he needs to win, all legislators become nonpivotal, and the outcome-based part of legislators' preferences disappear. All that would remain is the position-taking part of their preferences, as our model assumes.

Fourth, in the formal part of our analysis we treat bribes as if they are simple cash transfers from vote buyers to legislators. It may be more natural, however, to treat them as particularized benefits written into the bill under consideration. The main effect of such a change is that legislators would no longer be indifferent about the bribes received by other legislators; bribes would produce externalities. For instance, suppose that bribes are particularistic projects written into the bill, and these projects are funded by the general tax system, so that every dollar in bribes means one more dollar in taxes spread evenly among the legislators. Then, legislators would strictly prefer that their colleagues receive fewer bribes. Also, given a fixed set of bribes, each legislator's preference for the bill shifts downward by the amount s/he must pay in increased taxes.

To illustrate, return to example 1, but treat bribes by A as district-specific projects written into the bill rather than cash transfers. Also, assume that taxes are apportioned equally, so each legislative district pays one-seventh of the total costs of these projects. Suppose A wants to minimize the total value of the projects, perhaps due to a direct ideological distaste for such projects (they are "pork"), or perhaps because he faces an overall project budget constraint that must be divided across a number of bills. Then it is straightforward to show that the optimal strategy for A is to pay five legislators $7W_B/4$ dollars in bribes, and in equilibrium each legislator pays $5W_B/4$ dollars in taxes.[8] Treating A's bribes as projects added to bill x produces the same results as treating these bribes as cash payments and shifting each v_i down by $5W_B/4$ dollars, the amount of taxes each legislator must pay to finance the particular projects.

With just one exception, all the results presented below would be qualitatively unchanged if we replace the assumption that bribes are money payments with the assumption that bribes are written into bills. The exception is that universalistic coalitions are never optimal under the bribes-as-legislation assumption. When bribes are written into legislation, they must be financed by taxes. Thus, assuming legislators perceive the full tax cost of the bribes, when coalitions are universalistic the bribes act only as transfers between legislators. As a consequence, the bribes do not raise the overall support of legislators for a bill and therefore do nothing to ward off an opposing vote buyer from invading. Thus, when bribes are written into legislation, universalistic coalitions are never optimal strategies for vote buyers.

MORE GENERAL RESULTS

In this section, we characterize equilibrium vote buying under more general configurations of legislators' preferences. Mathematically, it is simpler to assume there is a continuum of legislators rather than a finite number. Therefore, suppose the set of legislators can be indexed by a uniform distribution on the interval $[-1/2, 1/2]$. Clearly, the median voter is at zero. Let $v(z)$ be the reservation-price function (see Figure 1). Assume that $v(\cdot)$ is nonincreasing and differentiable. The strategies of A and B are functions $a(\cdot)$ and $b(\cdot)$ on $[-1/2, 1/2]$. We focus on cases in which W_A is large enough that x wins in equilibrium. (The equilibria in which s wins are less interesting. Since B does not face a potential invader, the results are the same as in a one-buyer model.) Accordingly, let $m + 1/2$ be the fraction of legislators, both bribed and unbribed, who vote for x. Thus, m represents the "excess" size of A's coalition, relative to a minimal winning coalition. In order to defeat x, B must pay bribes to at least m members of A's coalition.

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[7] Alternatively, we might assume that if neither player initiates, then no bribes are offered, but a vote is taken in the legislature to see which policy wins. Then, the buyer who favors the alternative initially preferred by a majority in the legislature (rather than the buyer who favors the status quo) has the advantage.

[8] We assume that since B is defending the status quo, rather than proposing new legislation, if she attacks then she must pay bribes in cash. Although this introduces an asymmetry between the two vote buyers, it seems plausible in many cases. For example, suppose A is an appropriations subcommittee chair who may write projects into a bill as bribes. The opposition to A's bill, if any, is likely to come from the president or minority party leaders in the House. These opponents do not have the same resources as the subcommittee chair. It is more likely that their bribes would take the form of campaign appearances in upcoming elections, promises of help on future legislation, White House visits, and so on, rather than amendments to A's bill.

We call A's bribe offer function $a(\cdot)$ a *leveling* strategy if there is a legislator z_0, such that $v(z) + a(z) = v(z_0)$ for all bribed legislators, that is, all z such that $a(z) > 0$ (see Figure 1). When there is a continuum of legislators, we say the strategy is leveling if $v(z) + a(z) = v(z_0)$ for *almost all* bribed legislators, that is, for all bribed legislators except a set of measure zero. Thus, A leaves B with a level field of legislators from which to choose when deciding whom to bribe. Whenever there are equilibria in which x wins, there is always one in which A plays a leveling strategy. Under some specifications for $v(\cdot)$ and W_B, however, there are also equilibria in which A plays a nonleveling strategy.

The intuition behind a leveling strategy is similar to the "no-soft-spots" theory of international relations (Dresher 1966). Suppose a nation, considering how best to defend itself from enemies, has only two places through which it can be attacked, a plain and a mountain pass. Optimal placement requires that more troops be put along the plain, since this point is easier to invade. In fact, since an invader would choose the weakest point of entry, the defender's optimal strategy is to allocate troops such that each point is equally difficult to invade, that is, no spot is any softer than another. A similar idea is true for coalition building. Since an opposing leader would attack legislators whose support for the bill is weakest, a vote buyer's best strategy is to make each bribed coalition member equally expensive for the opponent to invade.

There are three types of equilibrium in which x wins. In the first case, W_B is very small relative to the initial level of legislative support for x, and A can win without bribing any legislators. In the second case, W_B is in an intermediate range relative to the initial support levels of the legislature. A buys votes but does not necessarily adopt a leveling strategy. Furthermore, A only bribes legislators who already support x, although some must be bribed in order to raise their level of support high enough to prevent B from trying to buy their votes. In the last case, W_B is large relative to the initial level of support for x, and A always adopts a leveling strategy. The three cases are summarized in the following proposition.[9]

FIGURE 1. Payments by *A* under a Leveling Strategy



Note: Each legislator bribed by *A* costs the same for *B* to buy, $v(z) + a(z) = v(z_0)$.

FIGURE 2. Proposition 1, Case 1: Area I > W_B by Assumption, So Total Payments by *A* = Zero



Proposition 1. *Suppose* a*(·) *and* b*(·) *constitute an equilibrium in which x wins. Then, exactly one of the following cases holds:*

1. *if* $v(0) > 0$ *and* $W_B \leq \int_0^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)dz$, *then* $a^*(z) = 0$ *for all* z;
2. *if* $v(0) > 0$ *and* $\int_0^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)dz < W_B < v(0)v^{-1}(0)$, *then* $a^*(z)$ *satisfies* $a^*(z) = 0$ *for* $z \notin [0, v^{-1}(0)]$, $a^*(z) \leq v(0) - v(z)$ *for all* $z \in [0, v^{-1}(0)]$, *and* $\int_0^{v^{-1}(0)} [v(z) + a^*(z)]\, dz = W_B$;
3. *if* $v(0) \leq 0$ *or* $W_B \geq v(0)v^{-1}(0)$, *then* $a^*(\cdot)$ *is a leveling strategy, with* $a^*(z) = W_B/m - v(z)$ *for all* z *such that* $a^*(z) > 0$, *where* m *satisfies* $m > max\{0, v^{-1}(0)\}$ *and* $W_B/m > v(0)$.

Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.

The three cases of the proposition are illustrated in figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2 no bribes are made. Here, the cheapest way for B to invade is to buy all legislators in the interval $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$, which costs an amount equal to area I in the figure. Since this area is greater than W_B by assumption, B prefers to concede the vote.

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[9] We do not characterize B's equilibrium strategies, because they are less interesting. Also, they are more complicated, because B must condition her choices on A's strategies. Here is a rough description of one strategy for B that supports the equilibrium in proposition 1: If A offers bribes such that B can counter with bribes which ensure that s defeats x in the legislature and which also cost B an amount less than W_B, then B chooses any bribe offer function $b(\cdot)$ that minimizes total bribes and ensures that s defeats x. If A offers bribes such that B cannot counter with bribes ensuring that s wins except by offering total bribes greater than or equal to W_B, then B chooses $b(z) = 0$ for all z.

Other strategies for B are possible, however. For example, we could amend the second part of the strategy above to read: If A offers bribes such that B cannot counter with bribes ensuring that s wins except by offering total bribes greater than or equal to W_B, then B chooses $b(z) = a(z) + v(z) - \varepsilon$ for all z, where $\varepsilon > 0$. Here, B makes positive offers, but none of the offers will be accepted (given A's offers), and so B's total payments will be zero. Of course, all of B's optimal strategies will yield the same equilibrium policy and the same payments to legislators.

FIGURE 3. Proposition 1, Case 2: Area II Represents Payments by *A*. At the Optimum, I + II = W_B



In Figure 3 area II represents the bribes paid by A. First note that no point in this area is above the line through $v(0)$. Payments above $v(0)$ would make some bribed members of A's coalition more expensive for B to buy than legislator 0. Accordingly, B would ignore such legislators in an invasion, so A could decrease his total bribes while keeping B's costs of invading constant. Thus, such payments are suboptimal. Next, note that if B were to invade, she must buy $v^{-1}(0)$ legislators, and the cheapest way to do this is to buy all legislators in the $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$ interval. The costs to B are thus represented by the sum of areas I and II. Thus, A must set area II (the total bribes he pays) plus area I (the initial support of these legislators) so that their sum is at least W_B. Any strategy that satisfies this, and which also lies below $v(0)$, constitutes an optimal strategy. Intuitively, there is not a unique optimum because if B invades she must bribe *every* member of A's bribed coalition. Thus, A can always rearrange bribe levels among these legislators without changing his own total payments or B's cost to invade. One optimal choice is a leveling strategy, but other strategies are possible as well. For example, the bribes in Figure 3 do not constitute a leveling strategy, but they are optimal.

It is more interesting to note that in Figure 3 (and all situations in which case 2 of the proposition holds) A makes payments only to legislators who initially support x, so each legislator votes exactly as s/he would have voted if no bribes at all were paid. A's payments are made only to prevent B from invading his existing majority. Empirically, this means that in some cases it may be extremely difficult to detect bribes, since roll call votes may be unchanged by them.

Case 3 of the proposition was illustrated in Figure 1 for the subcase in which $v(0)$ is less than 0 (so only a minority of the legislature initially supports x). The subcase in which $v(0) > 0$ is similar. A always adopts a leveling strategy because A's bribed coalition must contain more than $v(0)$ members. Thus, if B invades, then (in contrast to case 2 of the proposition) she only buys *part* of A's bribed coalition. If one member of A's bribed coalition were more expensive than others, then B would ignore this member when invading. As a consequence, A makes each bribed member equally expensive to B, that is, he adopts a leveling strategy.

Several potentially testable hypotheses about coalition building follow directly from proposition 1. For example, there exist equilibria in which a majority of the legislature initially supports a vote buyer's position, yet the vote buyer still makes bribes. Also, there exist equilibria in which a vote buyer bribes legislators who initially support his position. In fact, in case 2 equilibria of this type, the vote buyer *only* bribes legislators who initially support her issue position. These results contrast sharply with the predictions of the one-buyer model.

Since one typically imagines that bribes take place when a majority of the legislature is initially opposed to the vote buyer, we consider this case in more detail. In the notation of our model, this means $v(0) \leq 0$. This is a subcase of case 3.

Suppose $v(0) \leq 0$, and consider the following two conditions: $v(-1/2) \geq W_B/m$, and $v(-1/2) < W_B/m$ (see figures 4 and 5). The term W_B/m is the minimum amount B must pay to buy the vote of a legislator in A's coalition. In the first case, the leftmost legislator ($z = -1/2$) costs B more than W_B/m, even if s/he does not receive a bribe from A. Thus, A does not need to bribe this legislator, or other legislators with z close enough to 1/2, in order to prevent B from trying to buy their votes in an invasion. We call this a nonflooded coalition. In the second case, the leftmost legislator costs B less than W_B/m if A does pay a bribe. In this case, A bribes every member of his coalition. We call this a flooded coalition. In either case, A's optimal leveling strategies are completely characterized by a single parameter, the excess coalition size, m.

We now characterize the conditions under which flooded and nonflooded coalitions are optimal. With a nonflooded coalition, $a^*(z) = W_B/m - v(z)$ for all $z \in [v^{-1}(W_B/m), m]$, and $a^*(z) = 0$ otherwise. With a

FIGURE 4. Payments by *A* When *A* Constructs a Nonflooded Coalition



Note: Total payments = I + II + W_B.

FIGURE 5. Payments by *A* When *A* Constructs a Flooded Coalition



Note: Total payments = I + II + W_B.

flooded coalition, $a^*(z) = W_B/m - v(z)$ for all $z \in [-1/2, m]$, and $a^*(z) = 0$ otherwise. To buy back a member of A's coalition, B must pay $a^*(z) + v(z)$. This is the initial level support for x, $v(z)$, plus the payment offered by A, $a^*(z)$. To prevent B from invading, A must make offers such that each bribed legislator costs W_B/m to B. Thus, $a^*(z) = W_B/m - v(z)$ for all bribed legislators.

With a nonflooded coalition, A's total payments (T_A) are, therefore:

$$
\begin{aligned}
T_A &= \int_{v^{-1}(W_B/m)}^{m} a^*(z)dz \\
&= \int_{v^{-1}(W_B/m)}^{m} [W_B/m - v(z)]dz \\
&= W_B - (W_B/m)v^{-1}(W_B/m) - \int_{v^{-1}(W_B/m)}^{m} v(z)dz \\
&= W_B + [-(W_B/m)v^{-1}(W_B/m) - \int_{v^{-1}(W_B/m)}^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)dz] \\
&\quad + \int_{v^{-1}(0)}^{m} - v(z)dz. \qquad (1)
\end{aligned}
$$

The three terms in equation (1) correspond to areas W_B, I, and II in Figure 4. In the case of a flooded coalition, A's total bribe payments are

$$
\begin{aligned}
T_A &= \int_{-1/2}^{m} [W_B/m - v(z)]dz \\
&= W_B + W_B/2m - \int_{-1/2}^{m} v(z)dz
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
= W_B + [W_B/2m - \int_{-1/2}^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)dz] + \int_{v^{-1}(0)}^{m} - v(z)dz. \qquad (2)
$$

The three terms in equation (2) correspond to areas W_B, I, and II in Figure 5.

A will choose m^* to minimize T_A. This yields the following proposition (see figures 6 and 7).

PROPOSITION 2. *Suppose* v(·) *is nonincreasing and differentiable, and* v(0) ≤ 0. *Then* m* *is unique, and exactly one of the following holds:*

1. A *constructs a nonflooded, nonuniversalistic coalition, in which case* $m^* \geq W_B/v(-1/2)$, $m^* < 1/2$, *and* m* *satisfies* $-(W_B/m^*)v^{-1}(W_B/m^*) = -m^*v(m^*)$;
2. A *constructs a flooded, nonuniversalistic coalition, in which case* $m^* < W_B/v(-1/2)$, $m^* < 1/2$, *and* m* *satisfies* $(W_B/m^*)(1/2) = -m^*v(m^*)$;
3. A *constructs a universalistic coalition, in which case* $m^* = 1/2$.

Proposition 2 establishes the uniqueness of the optimal coalition size m^*. Cases 1 and 2 are illustrated in figures 6 and 7. The conditions describing these two cases also have a geometric interpretation. Specifically, they imply that at an interior m^*, two particular rectangular areas must be equal, as shown in figures 6 and 7.

An especially interesting and somewhat counterintuitive result is that in cases 1 and 2 $\partial m^*/\partial W_B > 0$. This is easily seen by differentiating the conditions defining m^* with respect to W_B (see Appendix B). Thus, A's optimal coalition size *increases* as B's willingness to pay increases. The intuition underlying this result becomes clearer by considering the limiting case. When W_B is zero, then A faces no vote buying opposition and therefore only bribes a minimal winning coalition (as in Denzau and Munger 1986 and Snyder 1991).

We can characterize m^* more fully in special cases. In the next proposition, we consider the case in which $v(\cdot)$ is linear, that is, $v(z) = \alpha - \beta z$, with $\beta \geq 0$.

FIGURE 6. Payments by *A* When a Nonflooded Coalition Is Optimal



Note: At the optimum, $R = Q$.

FIGURE 7. Payments by *A* When Flooded Coalition Is Optimal



Note: At the optimum, $R = Q$.

Proposition 3. *Suppose* $v(z) = \alpha - \beta z$, *with* $\beta \geq 0$ *and* $\alpha \leq 0$. *Then, the types of coalitions formed and* m^* *are characterized as follows* (see Figure 8).

1. A *constructs a nonflooded, nonuniversalistic coalition iff* $\beta \geq 2(W_B - \alpha) + (W_B^2 - 2\alpha W_B)^{1/2}$. *In this case,* $m^* = (W_B/\beta)^{1/2}$.
2. A *constructs a flooded, nonuniversalistic coalition iff* $4W_B + 2\alpha < \beta < 2(W_B - \alpha) + (W_B^2 - 2\alpha W_B)^{1/2}$. *In this case,* m^* *solves* $\beta(m^*)^2 = \alpha m^* + W_B/2m^*$.
3. A *constructs a flooded, universalistic coalition iff* $\beta \leq 4W_B + 2\alpha$. *In this case,* $m^* = 1/2$.
4. A *never constructs a nonflooded, universalistic coalition.*

Several features of proposition 3 are worth noting. First, m^* is a continuous function of α, β, and W_B. This is easily verified by checking the boundaries between the cases, $\beta = 2(W_B - \alpha) + (W_B^2 - 2\alpha W_B)^{1/2}$ and $\beta = 4W_B + 2\alpha$. Also, m^* is differentiable except at the boundaries. In subcase 1, $\partial m^*/\partial\alpha = 0$, and $\partial m^*/\partial\beta < 0$; in subcase 2, $\partial m^*/\partial\alpha > 0$, and $\partial m^*/\partial\beta < 0$. For fixed α, as β rises, the initial level of support for x in the legislature declines (β is the negative of the slope of v). Also, for fixed β, as α falls, the initial support for x declines. Thus, in either subcase 1 or 2, as the initial legislative support for x declines, A's optimal coalition size shrinks.

FIGURE 8. Values of α and β Corresponding to Cases 1, 2, and 3 of Proposition 3



It is also illuminating to consider the special case in which $\beta = 0$ (all legislators have the same preferences). If $\beta = 0$ and $\alpha \geq -2W_B$, then A constructs a universal coalition. This is similar to example 1 given in a previous section of the paper (where $\alpha = 0$), in which A bribes the entire legislature. If $\beta = 0$ and $\alpha < -2W_B$, then $m^* = (W_B/-2\alpha)^{1/2} < 1/2$. This is similar to example 2 in the previous section.

Another interesting result is the following. The legislators in the interval $[v^{-1}(W_B/m^*), v^{-1}(0)]$ represent the bribed friends of A, that is, legislators who receive payments from A even though they initially support x. It is straightforward to show that in subcase 1 of proposition 3, $v^{-1}(0) - v^{-1}(W_B/m^*) = m^*$. That is, given a linear v function, the size of the bribed friends of A is always equal to the excess majority of A's coalition, m^*. As an illustration of this result, consider the House vote on NAFTA, discussed earlier. The bill passed by a vote of 234-200, suggesting that President Clinton and the Republican House leaders "bought" 16 votes more than the required number of 218. To the extent that the relative willingness to pay among legislators was approximately linear,[10] the equation above implies that approximately 16 members received a favor even though they would have voted for the bill without the favor.

Finally, we should point out that the characterization in proposition 3 holds for some cases with $\alpha > 0$ as well as for $\alpha \leq 0$. (In the interest of continuity, we proved proposition 3 using results from part of proposition 2. Since proposition 2 requires $v(0) \leq 0$, we include the restriction $\alpha \leq 0$ in the statement of proposition 3.) If $\alpha > 0$ and $W_B > v^{-1}(0)v(0) = \alpha^2/\beta$, then proposition 3 holds. If $\alpha > 0$ and $W_B \leq \alpha^2/\beta$, then $m^* = v^{-1}(0) = \alpha/\beta$.

BACK TO FINITE LEGISLATURES

In this section, we derive some necessary conditions for minimal winning coalitions to form in equilibrium in a finite legislature. These conditions are quite strong, suggesting that in most plausible cases, minimal winning coalitions in legislatures are unlikely.

Let n be the number of legislators, n odd. Suppose legislators are uniformly distributed over $\{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, and suppose $v(i) = \alpha - \beta[i - (n + 1)/2]$ for all i, with $\beta \geq 0$ and $\alpha \leq 0$. Thus, $v(\cdot)$ is again a linear function, with $v((n + 1)/2) = \alpha$. As above, let m be the "excess size" of A's coalition, relative to a minimal winning coalition. Also, let M be the total size of A's coalition (see Figure 9). That is, given bribe offer functions $a(\cdot)$ and $b(\cdot)$ such that x wins, let $m + (n + 1)/2 = M$ be the

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[10] Actually, all that is required is that the function is approximately linear over the region in which legislators are bribed.

FIGURE 9. Payments by *A* with a Finite Legislature and Linear *v* Function



number of legislators who vote for x. We then have the following proposition.

Proposition 4. *Suppose* $v(i) = \alpha - \beta\,[i - (n + 1)/2]$, *with* $\beta \geq 0$ *and* $\alpha \leq 0$. *If* $a^*(\cdot)$ *and* $b^*(\cdot)$ *constitute an equilibrium in which* x *wins, then* $m^* = 0$ *only if* $W_B \leq [1/3 + (28/9)^{1/2}]\beta < (2.1)\beta$.

Proposition 4 shows that when $v(\cdot)$ is linear, minimal winning coalitions will be rare. Recall that β gives the difference in the intensity of preference for x over s (measured in money) between two adjacent legislators. The proposition states that as long as vote buyer *B* is willing to pay more than twice this amount, then *A* will buy a supermajority. For example, if the median legislator requires a payment of $10 to vote for x, and the legislator just to his or her right requires $12, then *A* will buy a supermajority as long as *B*'s willingness to pay for s is at least $4.2 (a surprisingly small sum). Put differently, if *B*'s willingness to pay for s is equal to or greater than that of the rightmost legislator (which is true if *B is* the rightmost legislator), then *A* always buys a supermajority if the legislature contains seven or more members.[11]

It is also worth noting that the cut-off value for W_B does not depend on α. That is, *A*'s decision to buy or not buy a supermajority depends only on the *relative* preference intensities among legislators, not the absolute intensities.

Table 1 illustrates more generally how coalition size varies as a function of the slope and intercept parameters of the $v(\cdot)$ function. Notice that when W_B is about twice as great as $v(n)$, vote buyer *B* is willing to pay approximately twice as much to maintain s as the most pro-s legislator, and *A*'s optimal coalition size is about 60%. When *B*'s willingness to pay for s over x is about 20 times as great as that of the most pro-s legislator, *A*'s optimal coalition size is more than 80%.[12]

TABLE 1. An Example Showing Equilibrium Majority Sizes and Total Payments
(number of legislators = 99)

W_B	α	β	v(99)	m^*	$T_A(m^*)$
10	−0.5	0.01	−0.99	25	57.35
10	−0.5	0.05	−2.95	13	35.69
10	−0.5	0.10	−5.40	9	30.00
10	−0.5	0.50	−25.00	3	22.50
10	−0.5	1.00	−49.50	2	20.00
10	−0.5	5.00	−245.50	0	16.50
10	0.0	0.01	−0.49	31	19.69
10	0.0	0.05	−2.45	13	19.30
10	0.0	0.10	−4.90	9	19.00
10	0.0	0.50	−24.50	3	18.00
10	0.0	1.00	−49.00	2	17.00
10	0.0	5.00	−245.00	0	15.00
50	−0.5	0.01	−0.99	49	148.50
50	−0.5	0.05	−2.95	31	132.31
50	−0.5	0.10	−5.40	21	121.16
50	−0.5	0.50	−25.00	9	105.00
50	−0.5	1.00	−49.50	6	100.00
50	−0.5	5.00	−245.50	2	88.00
50	0.0	0.01	−0.49	49	99.00
50	0.0	0.05	−2.45	31	98.44
50	0.0	0.10	−4.90	21	97.80
50	0.0	0.50	−24.50	9	95.00
50	0.0	1.00	−49.00	6	93.00
50	0.0	5.00	−245.00	2	85.00
100	−0.5	0.01	−0.99	49	247.50
100	−0.5	0.05	−2.95	42	243.85
100	−0.5	0.10	−5.40	31	229.50
100	−0.5	0.50	−25.00	13	207.14
100	−0.5	1.00	−49.50	9	200.00
100	−0.5	5.00	−245.50	3	184.50
100	0.0	0.01	−0.49	49	198.00
100	0.0	0.05	−2.45	44	197.78
100	0.0	0.10	−4.90	31	196.88
100	0.0	0.50	−24.50	13	193.00
100	0.0	1.00	−49.00	9	190.00
100	0.0	5.00	−245.00	3	180.00

Notes: W_B is vote buyer *B*'s willingness to pay for policy *s* over policy *x*. α and β are the intercept and slope, respectively, of the legislator reservation price function, *v*.
m^* is the "excess size" of *A*'s coalition in equilibrium; $m^* = 0$ means that *A* buys a minimum winning coalition, $m > 0$ means that *A* buys a supermajority, and $m^* = 49$ means that *A* buys a universalistic coalition. $T_A(m^*)$ is total bribes paid by *A* given at m^*.

CONCLUSION

The model studied here demonstrates that, in situations with competing vote buyers, equilibrium vote-buying behavior will typically not result in minimal winning coalitions. Indeed, coalitions will often be quite large and sometimes will even be universalistic. The reason is that, given the threat of counterattacks by other vote buyers, supermajority coalitions are often cheaper than minimal winning coalitions.

There are, of course, other reasons vote buyers might build supermajority coalitions. The most obvious is uncertainty: If potential voter buyers are uncertain about legislators' preferences, then they will generally pad their majorities somewhat to increase the probability of winning a simple majority.

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[11] In a seven-member legislature, the rightmost member is 3 units to the right of the median, which is greater than 2.1.

[12] Because the legislature is finite, the numbers in Table 1 do not exactly satisfy the equal-area condition noted after proposition 2 and shown in figures 6 and 7.

Analyses of several factors might prove useful in distinguishing among various motives for forming supermajorities. The first is coalition size across policy areas. Recall that the winning vote buyer buys a larger coalition in the legislature, the *greater* the other vote buyer's willingness to pay. In the limit, if a vote buyer faces no opposition, then s/he buys a minimal winning coalition. Agricultural policy may provide an interesting case. For most of its history, agricultural policy in the United States is probably best characterized as an issue area with one-sided vote buying by the farm bloc. More recently, however, food processors and consumer groups have organized more forcefully to oppose farmers, although farmer interests are still powerful. What has happened to the size and structure of the coalitions that support agricultural bills? In other areas, such as labor policy and environmental policy, there have typically been organized interest groups on both sides. What has happened to coalition sizes as the relative resources of various groups have changed over time?

The second factor is coalition size as a function of legislative size and turnover. If uncertainty is the main force driving the formation of supermajorities, then coalition size (as a percentage of the legislature) should be inversely related to the total number of legislators and positively related to turnover. Assuming enough "independence" in decision making across legislators, the law of large numbers will tend to make voting outcomes more certain in larger legislatures, so vote buyers can achieve a high probability of victory with coalitions that are only slightly larger than half the legislature. (One factor working in the opposite direction is that vote buyers may have less information about each member in larger legislatures.) Also, assuming less is known about the preferences of new legislators than about veteran members, a large amount of turnover should lead vote buyers to pad their majorities more heavily.

The third factor is majorities in legislative elections. Incumbents running for reelection to Congress and most state houses typically win with large majorities. Of course, incumbents probably attempt to pad their majorities because of electoral uncertainty—turnout, the strength of partisan tides, and the emergence of scandals are all variable. Yet, these majorities also may be the product of incumbents' strategic efforts to maintain invulnerable coalitions of support, against even the best challengers, at the lowest possible cost. The size of an incumbent's majority depends at least in part on his or her activities on behalf of constituents, that is, the allocation of effort across constituents with respect to ombudsman-like services, securing federal contracts and grants, and so on. We may be able to distinguish between the two motives by studying the size of electoral majorities and measures of constituency service, as functions of such factors as the size of the constituency, variability in turnout, voter turnover (possibly due to redistricting), and the distribution of partisan support.

Finally, at least two theoretical extensions of the paper are worth further study. One is the consideration of alternative forms of agreements between vote buyers and legislators. For example, instead of the simple form of vote buying that we consider, suppose payments and votes are conditional on an outside event, such as whether a majority has already voted for the bill. That is, a vote buyer may pay some legislators to act as "hip pocket" votes—they vote with him or her only if their vote is needed to pass the bill. For instance, Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky seems to have been such a vote on Clinton's 1993 tax bill. She agreed to wait by the vote counter during the roll call and vote for the bill if Clinton did not have a majority near the end of the time limit. This is exactly what she did, and Clinton subsequently rewarded her by speaking at a special entitlements conference that Margolies-Mezvinsky sponsored in her district (King, Zeckhauser, and Feldman 1995, Woodward 1994). How large would optimal coalitions be under this form of vote buying? Would vote buyers be able to build coalitions more cheaply? Are there theoretical reasons suggesting that this type of vote buying should be commonplace in legislatures?

A second extension is to study the outcomes when bribes must be written into the bills being considered by the legislature rather than paid out as "cash." As noted above, this could cause legislators to care not only about their own bribes but also about the bribes received by other legislators. For example, if bribes consist mainly of special projects included in a bill, and these projects are funded by general taxes, then legislators who prefer lower taxes would like to limit the bribes received by other legislators. We argued earlier that this modification of the basic model probably does not qualitatively affect the results. In the case we considered, however, the bribes paid by the vote buyer favoring the bill were written into the bill, while the side favoring the status quo was assumed to pay bribes in cash. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to the case in which all vote buyers must pay bribes by writing them into legislation.

A third extension is to endogenize bill selection. A natural way to model this is to add a prior stage to our game in which a player strategically chooses a bill. The willingness to pay of each vote buyer and the reservation prices of the legislators will then depend on the bill chosen. Of course, once a bill is selected, willingness to pay and reservation prices are fixed, and the analysis above applies. Yet, an extended analysis could answer many questions that our model does not address. What are the equilibrium bills that various proposers would offer? Does there exist a status quo that cannot be defeated by any bill? That is, when vote buying is added to the unidimensional spatial model, does an undefeated policy exist, as in the median voter theorem? If such a stable policy exists, is it unique? How is it characterized? Finally, if the proposer is a legislator but the vote buyers are outside interest groups, would the proposer tend to propose his or her ideal point, or would s/he propose something else in order to extract more bribes from the interest groups? That is, would proposers concentrate solely on maximizing their policy preferences, or would they also tailor their proposals to extort money from vote buyers?

APPENDIX A

Proof of Proposition 1. To prove proposition 1, we first prove the following lemma.

Lemma: Suppose $a^*()$ and $b^*()$ constitute an equilibrium in which A wins. Also, suppose $v(0) < 0$. Then A buys a supermajority.

Proof: Since A wins, he must bribe at least $v^{-1}(0)$ legislators, otherwise his coalition is less than a majority. Next, it is easily shown that optimal strategies for A will involve bribing all legislators in a set $[z_0, \varepsilon]$ for some $z_0 \in [-1/2, v^{-1}(0)]$ and some $\varepsilon \geq 0$. Thus, A's coalition is $[-1/2, \varepsilon]$, and it is a supermajority iff $\varepsilon > 0$. To invade, B must buy ε legislators. Since B is willing to pay a total of W_B to the ε cheapest legislators of A's coalition, A's optimal strategy is to make each member of his coalition cost at least W_B/ε to B. Consequently, A's bribe to any legislator in $[v^{-1}(0), \varepsilon]$ will be at least $W_B/\varepsilon - v(z)$. Since A bribes each legislator in $[v^{-1}(0), \varepsilon]$, his total costs, T_A, are at least

$$\int_{v^{-1}(0)}^{\varepsilon} [W_B/\varepsilon - v(z)]\, dz$$

Since $\forall\, z \in [v^{-1}(0), \varepsilon]\ v(z) \leq 0$,

$$T_A \geq \int_{v^{-1}(0)}^{\varepsilon} W_B/\varepsilon\, dz$$

$$= [\varepsilon - v^{-1}(0)]W_B/\varepsilon$$

$$= W_B - v^{-1}(0)W_B/\varepsilon.$$

Since $v^{-1}(0) < 0$, T_A approaches infinity as ε approaches zero. Hence $\varepsilon = 0$ cannot be an optimal strategy. Therefore A must buy a supermajority. *Q.E.D.*

Proof of Proposition 1. Case (1). If $W_B \leq \int_0^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)dz$, then A can prevent B from invading without bribing any legislators. Thus $a^*(z) = 0\ \forall\, z$ is A's optimal strategy.

Case (2). Since $\int_0^{v^{-1}(0)} v(z)\, dz < W_B$, A must bribe some legislators to prevent an invasion by B. First, we show that A can prevent B from invading by bribing only legislators in $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$ and paying them $a^*(z) = v(0) - v(z)$. With these payments, the cost to B to invade is $v(0)v^{-1}(0)$. Since this is greater than W_B, B does not invade. From this it follows that there exists a strategy in which A (i) only bribes legislators in $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$, (ii) pays bribes not greater than $v(0) - v(z)$ to each z, (iii) pays a total of W_B in bribes, and (iv) makes the cost for B to invade W_B.

Next, we show that A's optimal strategy is to bribe only legislators in $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$. To see this, first suppose A bribes a set of legislators, $\mathbf{C}$, outside this interval, where $\mathbf{C}$ has positive measure and $\mathbf{C} \subset (v^{-1}(0), 1/2]$. Under this strategy A must first pay each member of $\mathbf{C}$ a bribe of $-v(z)$ to make them willing to vote for x. But A must also pay these and other legislators a total of W_B to prevent an invasion by B. A's total payment is thus $W_B + \int_{\mathbf{C}} - v(z)\, dz > W_B$, hence it is not optimal for A to bribe any legislators in $(v^{-1}(0), 1/2]$. Next, suppose A bribes a legislator $z_0 \in [-1/2, 0)$. Define $\mathbf{D}$ as the set of $v^{-1}(0)$ cheapest legislators for B to buy. If $z_0 \notin \mathbf{D}$, then B would not bribe z_0 if she invades. Thus, A could strictly decrease the payment to z_0, while keeping the costs for B to invade constant. If $z_0 \in \mathbf{D}$, then $\exists\, z_1 \in [0, v^{-1}(0)]$ such that $z_1 \notin \mathbf{D}$. This implies that z_1 receives a bribe from A, but if B invaded she would not bribe z_1. Again, A could strictly decrease the payment to z_1, while keeping the costs for B to invade constant. Thus, it is not optimal for A to bribe any legislators in $[-1/2, 0)$.

Finally, suppose A pays more than $v(0) - v(z)$ to some legislator $z \in [0, v^{-1}(0)]$. If this occurs, then B can buy a legislator just to the left of legislator 0 for a cheaper price. As a consequence A could have paid less in bribes, while keeping the costs to B to invade constant.

Case (3-a). If $v(0) < 0$, then by the lemma A must buy a supermajority. Let $1/2 + m$ be the size of A's coalition, which is easily shown to be $[-1/2, m]$. To invade, B's optimal strategy is to buy the m cheapest members of this coalition. Define b as the cost to B of buying the m^{th} the cheapest member of A's coalition. First, notice that no member of A's paid coalition will cost more than b. That is, $\forall\, z \in [-1/2, m]$, either $a^*(z) = 0$ or $v(z) + a^*(z) \leq b$. This follows from the fact that if any bribed member of A's coalition costs more than b, then A could decrease the bribe slightly and keep B's cost of invading the same, while strictly decreasing his own costs.

Next, we show that all members of A's bribed coalition (actually, all members with the possible exception of a set of measure zero) cost at least b dollars for B to buy. That is, $\forall\, z$, $v(z) + a^*(z) \geq b$. To see this, first suppose to the contrary that there exists a positive-measure set of legislators in A's coalition whose cost to B is strictly less than b. This implies that $\exists\ \varepsilon \in (0, W_B/m)$ and a positive measure set $\mathbf{F}$ such that $\forall\, z \in \mathbf{F}$, $v(z) + a^*(z) < b - \varepsilon$. Let $\mathbf{E} = (v^{-1}(0), m]$, and denote the measures of $\mathbf{E}$, $\mathbf{F}$, and $\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}$, respectively, by $|\mathbf{E}|$, $|\mathbf{F}|$, and $|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|$. Also, let $\delta = \min\{W_B/m - \varepsilon, \varepsilon|\mathbf{F}|/(|\mathbf{F}| + |\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|)\}$.

Consider the following strategy for A, which we show is superior to the current one. First, decrease payments to $\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}$ by δ. (This can be done since $\delta \leq W_B/m$ and it can be shown that all members of $\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}$ must receive a bribe of at least W_B/m in order for A to win.) Note that the m^{th} cheapest member of A's coalition now costs at least $b - \delta$ dollars for B to buy. B will buy at most $m - |\mathbf{F}|$ members of $\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}$. Hence, this revision in A's strategy decreases B's costs by at most $(m - |\mathbf{F}|)\delta$ dollars. Next, let A increase the bribe to each member of $\mathbf{F}$ by $\delta|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|/|\mathbf{F}|$ dollars. Since $\delta \leq \varepsilon|\mathbf{F}|/(|\mathbf{F}| + |\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|)$, each member of $\mathbf{F}$ will still be among the m cheapest for B to buy. Hence, this raises the costs to B by $\delta|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|$ dollars. The net increase in costs to B is at least $\delta(|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}| - m + |\mathbf{F}|)$. Since $|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}| \geq |\mathbf{E}| - |\mathbf{F}| \geq m - v^{-1}(0) - |\mathbf{F}|$, and $v^{-1}(0) < 0$, the net increase in costs to B is strictly positive. However, the net change in costs to A is $-\delta|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}| + (\delta|\mathbf{E}\backslash\mathbf{F}|/|\mathbf{F}|)|\mathbf{F}| = 0$. Thus, the revised strategy for A is superior, and it follows that for each member of A's bribed coalition $v(z) + a^*(z) = b$. That is, A adopts a leveling strategy.

Case (3-b). Now suppose $v(0) > 0$ and $W_B \geq v(0)v^{-1}(0)$. This implies that A cannot prevent an invasion by B without bribing legislators outside the $[0, v^{-1}(0)]$ range. Hence, A must bribe (i) a positive-measure set of legislators $\subset (v^{-1}(0), 1/2]$ or (ii) a positive measure set of legislators $\subset [-1/2, 0)$ and no legislators (or at most a set of zero measure) $\in (v^{-1}(0), 1/2]$.

Suppose case (i) applies. Note that A's coalition size above a majority, m, is strictly greater than $v^{-1}(0) > 0$. Let b equal the cost to B of bribing the m^{th} cheapest legislator in A's coalition. It is easily shown that A will not make any member of his bribed coalition cost more than b. To show that none will cost less than b, suppose, to the contrary, that a positive measure set of legislators cost less than b. Next, since (i) applies, there exist bribed legislators whose initial support for x is negative; i.e., for them $v(z) < 0$. A's bribe to these legislators includes two parts: a "base" amount, $-v(z)$, to make them want to vote for x, and a "rent," $a^*(z) + v(z)$, to prevent B from attacking them. A can delete some of these members from his coalition, pocket the "base" amount of the bribe, and transfer the "rent" part of the bribe to legislators whose cost to B is less than b. By doing this A keeps the cost to B the same, while decreasing his own costs.

(Formally, case (i) implies there exist two positive-measure sets, $\mathbf{G}$ and $\mathbf{H}$, that satisfy: (i) $\mathbf{G} \cap \mathbf{H} = \varnothing$; (ii) $\forall\, z \in \mathbf{H}$, $v(z) < 0$; and (iii) $\forall\, z \in \mathbf{G}$, $a^*(z) + v(z) < b - \varepsilon$, for some $\varepsilon \in (0, b)$. Let A take a subset of $\mathbf{H}$, $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$, of measure $(\varepsilon/b)\min\{|\mathbf{G}|, |\mathbf{H}|\}$. Let A delete these members from his coalition. This decreases his total bribe by $\int_{\bar{\mathbf{H}}} a^*(z)\, dz$. Next let A increase the bribe to each member of $\mathbf{G}$ by $\eta = (1/|\mathbf{G}|) \int_{\bar{\mathbf{H}}} a^*(z) + v(z)\, dz$. Since each member of $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$ has $a^*(z) + v(z) \leq b$,

$$\eta \leq (1/|\mathbf{G}|)b|\bar{\mathbf{H}}| = (1/|\mathbf{G}|)b(\varepsilon/b)|\mathbf{G}| = \varepsilon.$$

Hence, if B attacks, she will still buy each member of $\mathbf{G}$. Thus, the transfer from $\bar{\mathbf{H}}$ to $\mathbf{G}$ causes the costs to B to remain constant. However, the net change in A's payment is

$$|\mathbf{G}|\eta - \int_{\bar{\mathbf{H}}} a^*(z)\, dz = \int_{\bar{\mathbf{H}}} v(z)\, dz,$$

which is negative, since $v(z) < 0$, $\forall\, z \in \bar{\mathbf{H}}$.)

Now suppose case (ii) applies. Here, the size of A's coalition is $1/2 + m$, where $m = v^{-1}(0) > 0$. As before, let b equal the m^{th} cheapest member of A's coalition for B to buy. No bribed member of A's coalition can cost more than b. Otherwise, A could decrease the bribe to such a member without decreasing B's cost of invading.

Next, it must be the case that $b \geq v(0)$. To see this, note that the cost to B to invade is not greater than $mb = v^{-1}(0)b$. If $b < v(0)$, then the costs to invade are less than $v^{-1}(0)v(0) \leq W_B$. Since A makes the costs at least W_B to invade, this is a contradiction. It now follows that $\forall\ z \in [0, v^{-1}(0)]$, $a^*(z) + v(z) \le b$. Now, since a positive-measure set of legislators $\subset [-1/2, 0)$ are bribed, it follows that more than m legislators have costs of b or less for B to bribe. Because of this, one can show, as in (3-a), that there exists a way for A to increase the bribe to a positive-measure set of legislators who cost less than b, while decreasing the bribe to all other bribed legislators. Furthermore, A can do this in such a way to keep his total payments the same while increasing the cost for B to invade. This implies that in this case as well, A's optimal strategy is a leveling one.

For cases (i) and (ii) b is defined as the m^{th} cheapest legislator for B to buy. Because A adopts a leveling strategy, each bribed legislator costs b for B to buy. Thus the costs to B are mb. Since A sets these equal to W_B, $b = W_B/m$, and $a^*(z) + v(z) = W_B/m$.

Next note that if legislator 0 is bribed, $a^*(0) + v(0) = W_B/m$. Hence, $v(0) < W_B/m$. If legislator 0 is not bribed, he is the m^{th} cheapest legislator for B to bribe. By definition of b, $v(0) = b = W_B/m$. Either way, $v(0) \le W_B/m$.

All that remains to show is that $m \ge v^{-1}(0)$. Note that A will pay $W_B/m - v(z)$ to each member of his bribed coalition which is $(v^{-1}(W_B/m), m]$. Thus A pays total bribes of

$$\int_{v^{-1}(W_B/m)}^{m} W_B/m - v(z)\, dz.$$

Differentiating this with respect to m and evaluating at $m = v^{-1}(0)$ gives a nonpositive value. Thus A will not increase his total payment by setting $m \ge v^{-1}(0)$. *Q.E.D.*

Proof of Proposition 2. For m close to 0, A's coalition must be flooded. Inspecting equation (2), it is obvious that $T_A \to \infty$ as $m \to 0$. Thus, $m^* > 0$.

Consider first the case of a nonflooded coalition, so $m \ge W_B/v(-1/2)$. Differentiate (1) with respect to m and simplify to obtain $\partial T_A/\partial m = (W_B/m^2)v^{-1}(W_B/m) - v(m)$. Setting this equal to zero produces the condition given in case 1 of the proposition. Differentiating again yields $\partial^2 T_A/\partial m^2 = -(2W_B/m^3)v^{-1}(W_B/m) - (W_B^2/m^4)\ dv^{-1}/dv\ (W_B/m) - dv/dz(m)$. This is positive, since $v^{-1}(W_B/m) < 0$ for all $m > 0$, and $dv^{-1}/dv(W_B/m) = 1/[dv/dz(v^{-1}(W_B/m))]$, and $dv/dz \le 0$ (v is nonincreasing by assumption). Thus, there is at most one optimum m^* satisfying $m^* \ge W_B/v(-1/2)$, and $m^* < 1/2$ iff $\partial T_A/\partial m\ (m^*) = 0$.

Next, consider the case in which A's coalition is flooded, so $m < W_B/v(-1/2)$. Differentiating (2) with respect to m and simplifying yields $\partial T_A/\partial m = -W_B/2m^2 - v(m)$. Setting this equal to zero produces the condition given in case 2 of the proposition. Differentiating again yields $\partial^2 T_A/\partial m^2 = W_B/m^3 - dv/dz(m)$, which is positive since $dv/dz(m) \le 0$. Thus, there is at most one optimum satisfying $m^* < W_B/v(-1/2)$, and $m^* < 1/2$ iff $\partial T_A/\partial m(m^*) = 0$.

Finally, to see that there is only one optimum, suppose instead that there are two: one in which A's coalition is nonflooded, m_a, and one in which his coalition is flooded, m_b. Then, $m_a > W_B/v(-1/2) > m_b$, which implies that $v(m_a) < v(m_b)$ and $-v^{-1}(W_B/m_a) < 1/2$. If m_b satisfies the first-order condition for an interior flooded coalition, then $-W_B/2m_b^2 - v(m_b) = 0$. But then the conditions $v(m_a) < v(m_b)$ and $-v^{-1}(W_B/m_a) < 1/2$ imply that $(W_B/m_a^2)v^{-1}(W_B/m_a) - v(m_a) > -W_B/2m_b^2 - v(m_b) = 0$, so m_a cannot satisfy the first-order condition for an interior nonflooded coalition, a contradiction. Also, $m = 1/2$ is not optimal, since this requires $(4W_B)v^{-1}(2W_B) - v(1/2) \le 0$, but $(4W_B)v^{-1}(2W_B) - v(1/2) > -W_B/2m_b^2 - v(m_b) = 0$. *Q.E.D.*

Proof of Proposition 3. Since v is decreasing, proposition 2 implies that T_A is convex and m^* is unique. Suppose A constructs a nonflooded coalition. Substituting $v(m) = \alpha - \beta m$ and $v^{-1}(W_B/m) = \alpha/\beta - W_B/\beta m$ into the first-order condition in case 1 of proposition 2 gives $-(W_B/m)[\alpha/\beta - W_B/\beta m] = -m(\alpha - \beta m)$. Rearranging yields $-m\alpha + \beta m^2 - W_B^2/\beta m^2 + W_B\alpha/\beta m = 0$, or $(m/\beta)[-\alpha\beta + \beta^2 m - W_B^2/m^3 + W_B\alpha/m^2] = 0$. Adding $W_B\beta/m$ and $-W_B\beta/m$ to the term in brackets yields $(m/\beta)[W_B\beta/m - \alpha\beta + \beta^2 m - W_B^2/m^3 + W_B\alpha/m^2 - W_B\beta/m] = 0$, which can be factored as $(m/\beta)[\beta(W_B/m - \alpha + \beta m) - (W_B/m^2)(W_B/m - \alpha + \beta m)] = 0$, or $(m/\beta)(W_B/m - \alpha + \beta m)(\beta - W_B/m^2) = 0$. The first two terms in this product are strictly positive (the second term is positive because $m > v^{-1}(W_B/m)$), so the equation holds iff $m^* = (W_B/\beta)^{1/2}$. Case 1 of proposition 2 shows that this is an interior solution for a nonflooded, nonuniversalistic coalition iff

$$m^* = (W_B/\beta)^{1/2} \ge W_B/(\alpha + \beta/2) \tag{A-1}$$

and

$$m^* = (W_B/\beta)^{1/2} < 1/2. \tag{A-2}$$

Since $a + \beta/2 > 0$ (otherwise, $v(-1/2) < 0$ and only flooded coalitions are possible), (A-1) implies

$$\alpha + \beta/2 \ge (W_B\beta)^{1/2}. \tag{A-3}$$

Squaring both sides, multiplying by 4, and adding $4(a - W_B)^2 - 4\alpha^2 - 4W_B\beta$ yields

$$[\beta + 2\alpha - 2W_B]^2 \ge 4W_B^2 - 8\alpha W_B. \tag{A-4}$$

Next, note that (A2) and (A3) imply that the term in brackets in (A4) is positive. Thus, taking square-roots and rearranging yields

$$\beta \ge 2(W_B - \alpha) + (4W_B^2 - 8\alpha W_B)^{1/2}. \tag{A-5}$$

Finally, since $\alpha \le 0$, it is easily shown that (A-5) implies (A-1) and (A-2). To show that (A-5) implies (A-1), reverse the steps above; to show that (A-5) implies (A-2) set $\alpha = 0$ in (A-5). Thus, a nonuniversalistic, nonflooded coalition is optimal iff (A-5) holds, proving case 1 of the proposition.

To show case 4, suppose A constructs a nonflooded, universal coalition. If A's coalition is nonflooded, then $v(-1/2) > W_B/m^*$ by definition. Substituting for $v(-1/2)$ and $m^* = 1/2$ (since the coalition is universal) gives $\alpha + \beta/2 > 2W_B$. Using the definition of T_A for a nonflooded coalition and differentiating, $\partial T_A/\partial m(1/2) = (4W_B/\beta)(\alpha - 2_B) - \alpha + \beta/2$. Since the coalition is universal, this is nonpositive. But this implies $\beta \le 4W_B$, which contradicts $\alpha + \beta/2 > 2W_B$.

Next we prove case 3 of the proposition. First, to show sufficiency, suppose the coalition is universal and flooded. Then $\partial T_A/\partial m\ (1/2) = \beta/2 - \alpha - 2W_B$. Since the coalition is universal, this must be nonpositive, which implies $\beta \le 4W_B + 2\alpha$. To show necessity, assume

$$\beta \le 4W_B + 2\alpha. \tag{A-6}$$

Next, the coalition is either flooded or nonflooded. If it is flooded, then $\partial T_A/\partial m(1/2) = \beta/2 - \alpha - 2W_B \le 0$, which, by (A-6), implies the coalition is universal. If it is nonflooded, then $\partial T_A/\partial m(1/2) = (4W_B/\beta)(\alpha - 2W_B) - \alpha + \beta/2$. This is nonpositive, since (A-6) and $\alpha \le 0$ imply that $\beta \le 4W_B$, which implies the coalition is universal. Thus, whether the coalition is flooded or nonflooded, (A-6) implies it is universal. By case 4 it must be flooded. This establishes case 3 of the proposition.

Finally, the only remaining possibility is that A's coalition is flooded and nonuniversal. Cases 1, 3, and 4 imply that this occurs iff $4W_B + 2\alpha < \beta < 2(W_B - \alpha) + (W_B^2 - 2\alpha W_B)^{1/2}$. Substituting $v(m) = \alpha - \beta m$ into the definition of T_A for flooded coalitions and checking the first-order condition shows that m^* must satisfy $\beta(m^*)^2 = \alpha m^* + W_B/2m^*$. This concludes the proof. *Q.E.D.*

Proof of Proposition 4. Given A's bribe offer function $a(\cdot)$, B must pay $b(i) > a(i) - v(i)$ to all legislators $i \in \{(n + 1)/2, \ldots, m + (n + 1)/2\}$ in order to defeat x. It is straightforward to prove that A's equilibrium bribe offer function must be a leveling strategy (the proof follows the same line of argument as the proof of case 3 of proposition 1). Let $a(\cdot)$ be a leveling strategy such that x wins. Let $M = \max\{i \mid a(i) > 0\}$, and let $m = M - (n + 1)/2$. Note that B must pay $m + 1$ legislators in order to defeat x. Let i_0 solve $\min\{i \mid v(i) \le W_B/(m + 1)\}$ or, equivalently, $\min\{i \mid i \ge [\alpha - W_B/(m + 1)]/\beta + (n + 1)/2\}$, and let $\delta(m) = i_0 - [\alpha - W_B/(m + 1)]/\beta - (n + 1)/2$. Then, A's total payments are $T_A = \Sigma_{i=i_0}^{m+(n+1)/2} [W_B/(m + 1) - v(i)] = \Sigma_{i=i_0}^{m+(n+1)/2} [W_B/(m + 1) - \alpha + \beta\ (i - (n + 1)/2)] = [m + (n + 1)/2 - i_0 + 1][W_B/(m + 1) - \alpha + \beta i_0 - \beta(n + 1)/2] + \Sigma_{i=0}^{m+(n+1)/2-i_0} \beta_i = (\beta/2)\ [m + (n + 1)/2 - i_0 + 1][2W_B/\beta(m + 1) - 2\alpha/\beta + i_0 - (n + 1)/2 + m] = (\beta/2)[m + W_B/\beta(m + 1) - \alpha/\beta + 1 - \delta(m)][m + W_B/\beta(m + 1) - \alpha/\beta + \delta(m)]$. It is straightforward to show that T_A is convex in m, so $m^* = 0$ if and only if $T_A(0) \le T_A(1)$. Substituting and rearranging, $T_A(0) \le T_A(1)$ iff $3W_B^2 - 2\beta W_B - 8\beta^2 \le -8\alpha\beta + 4\alpha W_B + 4\beta^2[\delta(1) - \delta(1)^2 - \delta(0) + \delta(0)^2]$. Since $\delta(m) \in [0, 1]$ for all m, the term in square brackets is less than or equal to 1/4, so the right-hand side of this inequality is less than or equal to $4\alpha(W_B - 2\beta) + \beta^2$. Thus, $m^* = 0$ implies $3W_B^2 - 2\beta W_B - 9\beta^2 \le 4\alpha(W_B - 2\beta)$. If $W_B > [1/3 + (28/9)^{1/2}]\beta$, then the left-hand side of this inequality is positive, and the right-hand side is negative (recall that $\alpha < 0$), a contradiction. Thus, $m^* = 0$ only if $W_B \leq [1/3 + (28/9)^{1/2}]\beta$. *Q.E.D.*

APPENDIX B

Proof of comparative static stated following proposition 2.

Consider proposition 2, subcase (2), in which m^* is defined by $-(W_B/m^*)v^{-1}(W_B/m^*) = -m^*v(m^*)$. Differentiating this equation with respect to W_B yields $-[v^{-1}(W_B/m^*) + (W_B/m^*)\, dv^{-1}/dv\, (W_B/m^*)][1/m^* - \partial m^*/\partial W_B\, [W_B/(m^*)^2]] = -\partial m^*/\partial W_B\, [v(m^*) + m^* dv/dz(m^*)]$.

Rearranging gives $\partial m^*/\partial W_B = [v^{-1}(W_B/m^*)/m^* + (W_B/(m^*)^2)\, dv^{-1}/dv\, (W_B/m^*)]/[(W_B/(m^*)^2)v^{-1}(W_B/m^*) + (W_B^2/(m^*)^3)dv^{-1}/dv\, (W_B/m^*) + v(m^*) + m^*\, dv/dz(m^*)]$. Both terms in the numerator are negative, as are all four terms in the denominator, so $\partial m^*/\partial W_B > 0$. An even simpler set of calculations shows that $\partial m^*/\partial W_B > 0$ also holds for subcase 3.

In interpreting $\partial m^*/\partial W_B$, changes in W_B should be viewed as the result of changes in vote buyer B's preferences over x and s, not due, for instance, to a change in the actual location of x or s.

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A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs

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A collective goods program, such as an entitlement program, distributes benefits and costs according to constituents' characteristics. This paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal-making and voting in a majority-rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted. A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem, comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures, and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs. Equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time, but they ultimately converge to the median. On the path to that point, legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem—that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature—by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make.

Formal theories of distributive politics focus on either particularistic or collective goods programs. Particularistic (e.g., pork barrel) programs involve allocations of divisible benefits to individual legislative districts. Pork barrel programs are important, but they account for a relatively small part of federal expenditures and legislative activity. As Krehbiel (1991, 95) notes, "pork may be a lubricant for the legislative machine, but it is not the machine's main product." The main product of the legislative machine is the provision of collective goods that distribute benefits to districts based on characteristics of constituents. Thus, in contrast to particularistic goods over which legislators have diametrically and hence maximally opposed preferences, preferences for collective goods are aligned and differ over, for example, the scale of the program provided. Because collective goods are the principal product of legislative activity, a theory of distributive politics focusing on collective rather than particularistic goods should provide a sounder basis for reasoning about legislatures and their behavior, organization, and product.

Formal analysis of collective goods programs in the context of the rational choice paradigm was initiated by Downs (1957), and the fundamental theorem is Black's (1958) median voter theorem. That theorem is static and limited to a single policy dimension. This paper presents a dynamic theory of collective goods programs focusing on continuing programs with the property that the legislature can change them in each session by enacting new legislation. In the absence of new legislation, however, the programs continue in effect, as in the case of entitlement programs and regulation.

The theory is developed from the sequential choice perspective in which legislative activity is represented as a sequence of proposal-making and voting stages, and the model used is an infinitely repeated, noncooperative game.[1] This approach is in contrast to theories based on social choice in which all feasible alternatives are considered simultaneously. Those theories provide predictions of stable points, when a stable point exists, and are silent about the path to a stable point. The sequential nature of the legislative model results in equilibrium predictions of proposals, voting, and program outcomes. Although the sequential choice approach differs fundamentally from social choice theory in that an explicit choice process, or game, is specified, the basic intuitions from social choice theory are compelling and should also be found in sequential choice models. In the case of collective goods, the two principal intuitions are that programs should be centrally located in the set of preferences and that the location of the status quo can provide leverage to the legislator making a proposal. Both of these properties are present in the equilibria characterized here.

Sequential choice theory provides a characterization of the dynamics of programs as well as the steady state. Kramer (1977) studied a dynamic process for multidimensional collective goods in which at each stage candidates and voters act myopically, with candidates alternating in making a proposal that maximizes the number of votes it receives. In one dimension this process reaches the median ideal point in one step. In the model considered here, the legislators are not myopic, and convergence is not necessarily immediate.

Collective goods programs can be characterized by the magnitude of the associated benefits and costs as distributed according to the characteristics of legislative districts.[2] For example, entitlement programs in the United States typically have eligibility requirements, benefits to which the eligible are entitled, and the right to sue if benefits are not provided (Weaver 1985, 308).[3] These programs had their origin with the Social Security Act of 1935, but their expansion is primarily attributable to the

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[1] See Baron (1994) for a discussion of the implications of sequential choice theory for legislative organization.

[2] This paper focuses on the benefits side of collective goods programs; the other side of the coin is their costs. Those costs are collectivized and, in the case of programs that involve outlays, are distributed through the tax system. The politics of the taxation side has a life of its own, which is not considered here. Inman and Fitts (1990) provide a theory and test of the fiscal side of distributive politics.

[3] Wildavsky (1988, 259) defines entitlements as "legal obligations created through legislation that require the payment of benefits to any person or unit of government that meets the eligibility requirements established by law."

Johnson administration's Great Society, which beginning in 1965 broadened the set of programs and increased benefits. In addition, many of these programs were indexed to protect the purchasing power of recipients (Weaver 1988). Since the mid-1970s the aggregate growth in entitlement programs has been more limited. Nevertheless, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that entitlements represented 55% of the 1996 federal expenditures (excluding interest payments) and 10.3% of GDP (Ways and Means Committee 1994, 1250–51, 1266).[4]

A number of other government programs, including public goods, repeated formulaic allocations of pork (Hird 1991), and regulation, have characteristics similar to those of entitlement programs, and the theory presented here can be applied to them as well. An important distinction from both theoretical and legislative perspectives is whether the program is once-and-for-all or continuing. Continuing programs have the characteristic that their eligibility standards and benefit levels continue as specified in the most recently enacted legislation. In contrast, once-and-for-all programs provide funds for specific projects and terminate once the project has been completed. Public goods and formulaic pork tend to fall in this category. Continuing programs typically have a status quo corresponding to the extant legislation, whereas once-and-for-all programs have the null status quo. The theory presented here pertains to continuing programs with a status quo, and once-and-for-all programs are considered in Baron (1993).

Continuing programs include entitlements, regulation, and both distributive and redistributive programs in Lowi's (1964) terminology. Regulation, for example, provides benefits to certain individuals and imposes costs on others, as determined by the characteristics of those subject to the regulation. Regulatory programs also typically continue in effect unless changed, although some have sunset provisions or require periodic reauthorization. Examples include regulation requiring workplace safety, ambient air quality standards, automobile fuel efficiency standards, and limits on interstate telecommunications prices through a price cap system. The primary difference between regulation and entitlements is that the costs of regulation are borne directly by private parties rather than indirectly through the tax system. Many collective goods programs have a special status in Congress in that both eligibility and benefits are under the jurisdiction of authorization committees, in the case of entitlements primarily the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, and are not under the control of the appropriations committees.[5] Similarly, regulation is under the jurisdiction of authorization committees.

The sequential choice theory of collective goods programs presented here provides predictions of both statics and dynamics. The comparative statics predictions pertain to the location of programs in the space of preferences and how that location is related to preference parameters and the status quo. The principal focus is not on statics, however, but on the dynamics of collective goods programs. One question investigated is why some entitlement programs start at modest funding levels and then expand substantially, for example, by broadening eligibility, whereas others, such as means-tested programs, contract over time. Changes in these programs are frequent. For example, in the 97th through the 101st Congress, substantive changes were made in the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program (Ways and Means Committee 1992, 31–40). Eligibility standards for entitlement programs are thus the subject of substantial congressional tinkering (Barrilleaux and Miller 1988). A theory of collective goods programs such as entitlements thus should be capable of providing predictions about the dynamics of programs. Another question is whether programs can be expected to have relatively stable outcomes; for example, do they converge over time to a stable program or continue to change? Outlays under many entitlement programs, particularly those that are means tested, depend to a large extent on the economy, and a theory should also predict the relationship between program outlays and aggregate economic performance on dimensions such as unemployment and inflation.

The dynamic theory developed here provides a generalized median voter theorem for unidimensional collective goods programs along with comparative statics. The theory predicts that collective goods programs can start modestly or at a large scale, depending on whether the initiator is a low or high demander, and predicts that the program initiated by a low demander receives more votes than one initiated by a high demander. Over time, however, the programs converge to that preferred by the median legislator, and the votes for modification of the program approach a minimal majority. On the path to convergence a program can exhibit periods of stability or can oscillate in size as a function of the preferences of those who make proposals or offer amendments. The equilibrium programs, however, never move farther from the median ideal point than the status quo at the beginning of the period. The comparative statics of equilibrium programs can be characterized and show, for example, that a downturn in the economy which increases the social value of the benefits results in expanded programs and higher government outlays.

A distributive politics theory of collective goods programs can also be used to study aspects of legislative organization and procedures. Three aspects considered here are proposal initiation authority, the effect of amendments, and the implications of gatekeeping authority. For example, allowing amendments to proposals reduces proposal power and speeds convergence to the median.

The implications of this dynamic theory of collective goods programs can differ from those developed from social choice theory. For example, durability is a concern in the latter, since a future majority may change a program enacted in the current session. The resolution to the durability problem is generally through institutional means intended to allow the current majority to protect its programs from changes by a future majority. From the sequential choice perspective adopted here, changes in unidimensional collective goods programs are always constrained by the status quo. In addition, depending on preferences, there can be an endogenous response to the durability problem that is preference-based as opposed to institutionally based. That is, to constrain future changes, a committee can choose a program closer to the median ideal point even though it could successfully enact a program closer to its own ideal point. This endogenous response to the durability issue limits future changes and results in more stable programs.

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[4] Some discretionary components of the federal budget also provide collective goods with properties similar to those of entitlements. For example, agricultural programs provide subsidies or support payments based on characteristics such as production or acreage, and all producers of a crop can be eligible.

[5] Entitlement programs are included in the congressional budgetary process established by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and are included in the reconciliation process, which has restricted their growth.

The legislative model of collective goods programs is presented next, and then the legislative choice structure. In the following section, the legislative equilibrium for collective goods programs is presented and interpreted, and conclusions are offered in the final section.

LEGISLATIVE CHOICE STRUCTURE

A unidimensional collective goods program will be characterized by its scale z, $z \geq 0$, and the distribution of benefits $B_i(z)$ and costs $C_i(z)$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, where n is the number of legislative districts. In the case of a regulatory program, z could represent the stringency of an environmental standard, $B_i(z)$ the benefits from the reduction in environmental damage, and $C_i(z)$ the cost of compliance by firms and municipalities in district i. In the case of an entitlement program, z could represent the program expenditures and $C_i(z)$ the social cost of the program, including the outlay, the administrative cost, and the cost of the distortions caused by the taxes required to fund the program. The net benefits, $N_i(z)$, for district i in a session in which z is implemented thus are

$$N_i(z) = B_i(z) - C_i(z), \qquad (1)$$

where $B_i(0) = C_i(0) = 0$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$. To simplify the characterization of an equilibrium, the net benefit functions are assumed to be strictly concave and differentiable and to have a unique and finite maximizer z_i^o, which is i's single-session ideal point.

Legislators are assumed to have preferences for the net benefits $N_i(z(t))$ for their districts, where $z(t)$ is the program implemented in session t. The preferences could reflect the policy preferences of the legislator, the preferences of constituents, or the effect of net benefits on the electoral prospects of the legislator. Preferences are assumed to be separable over time, and the preference function, U_i, of legislator i is specified as

$$U_i(z(1), z(2), \cdots) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta^t N_i(z(t)), \qquad i = 1, \ldots, n,$$

where $\delta \in [0, 1)$ is a discount factor common to all legislators. The discount factor represents time preference, and higher values of δ correspond to greater patience and mean that the future matters more to legislators. The discount factor could also reflect electoral prospects, with lower values corresponding to less favorable electoral chances.[6]

The collective goods program is decided in a unicameral, majority-rule legislature. This simple legislative structure is intended to reflect the fundamental structure of choice under majority rule, such as that which underlies the median voter theorem. The model of the legislative system could be extended to include a bicameral structure in which differences are resolved by bargaining between the chambers, an executive with veto authority, decision making by a cabinet with ratification by a parliamentary majority, or multiple institutions such as those involved in the European Union. Such extensions would substantially increase the complexity of the analysis and make comparisons to the static theory of choice considerably less straightforward.

The scale of the collective goods program can be changed in each of the infinite number of legislative sessions, and the legislative process is modeled as a sequence of proposals and votes on those proposals. Each session (period) of the legislature, t, includes two stages. In the first, a legislator i is selected to propose a program z^i, and in the second the legislature votes on it. If proposal z^i is approved in session t, it is implemented; that is, $z(t) = z^i$, and it becomes the status quo (i.e., $q_t = z^i$) at the beginning of session $t + 1$. If it is rejected, $z(t) = q_{t-1}$, where q_{t-1} is the status quo at the beginning of the session. The status quo for the next session is thus q_{t-1} (i.e., $q_t = q_{t-1}$). Then, in session $t + 1$ the legislature can enact a new program scale. This process is illustrated in Figure 1. If z^i is approved, it yields net benefits $N_i(z^i)$ in the current session. If it is rejected, the status quo remains in effect, yielding net benefits $N_i(q_{t-1})$. Discounting takes place at the beginning of each session. The status quo at $t = 0$ is denoted by q_0.

The model may be interpreted as a legislature in which the committee with jurisdiction over the program has initiation authority, the right to make the first proposal at $t = 0$, and other legislators subsequently have opportunities to make proposals or offer amendments. The committee is not assumed to have gatekeeping authority, so even if it makes a proposal (i.e., $z^i = q_0$) to preserve the status quo, another legislator can be recognized in the next session to make a proposal. Initially, the proposer is assumed to be selected at random, and then a generalization to any probability of selection is presented. The proposals initially will be considered in the legislature under a restrictive procedure, a closed rule, that does not allow amendments, so a proposal is voted up or down against the status quo. This is not a strong assumption because there is no restriction on which alternatives can be proposed, and the legislature can always reject the proposal, live with the status quo for the current session, and consider

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[6] With this interpretation a legislator who is defeated in an election is assumed to be replaced by a legislator who also seeks to provide net benefits $N_i(z)$ to the district.

FIGURE 1. Legislative Process for Collective Goods Programs



another proposal in the next session. Once the basic model and its equilibrium have been characterized, an extension will be presented in which the committee has initiation authority in each session and other legislators can offer amendments in each session. The qualitative characteristics of the equilibria are the same under both legislative processes, although allowing amendments can affect how rapidly the program converges to a steady state. The implications of gatekeeping authority are then considered.

The model involves complete information, and the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash. Let h_τ denote the history of play up to (game) time τ, and let H_τ denote the set of possible histories up to time τ. A history records the status quo, who has been selected to propose programs, the proposals made, and the votes on the proposals. A strategy is a mapping from the set of histories to the choice set corresponding to time τ. If time τ corresponds to a proposal stage, the proposer chooses $z^i \in \Re^+$, and the other legislators have no move. If time τ corresponds to a voting stage, a legislator's strategy is a yes or no vote on the proposal. An equilibrium requires for each history that each player's strategy at time τ be optimal for the remainder of the game given the strategies of the other legislators. This must be true for all τ. To focus on reasonable equilibria, weakly dominated voting strategies are ruled out.

This sequential choice model has an infinite number of equilibria, most of which are implausible. These equilibria involve complicated punishment strategies that force legislators not to consider even small deviations from the equilibrium. The focus here is on equilibria with a particular property, referred to as stationarity. In a stationary equilibrium a legislator chooses a history-independent strategy in each strategically identical subgame. In this model, all subgames with the same status quo at the beginning of a session are strategically identical, since their action sets and the future sequence of moves are the same. Stationary equilibria have a Markovian property that allows a closed-form characterization of the equilibrium for unidimensional programs. The equilibrium considered thus is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. These equilibria have the property that strategies depend only on payoff-relevant information. In addition, these equilibria have the property that, in contrast to punishment strategy equilibria, small changes in behavior result in small effects.[7]

When there are many equilibria, it is appropriate to ask whether there is a natural focal point that provides a specific prediction of outcomes. One basis for a focal point is the concept of simplicity. Baron and Kalai (1993) adopt this approach and show that the simplest subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a game with a structure similar to that considered here is the stationary equilibrium characterized by Baron and Ferejohn (1989).[8] The principle underlying this concept of a focal point is that, if players are faced with a game with many equilibria, they are more likely to focus on simple rather than complex ones. The stationary equilibria are the uniquely simplest equilibria.

The choice structure of the model of collective goods programs can be represented by how legislators vote on a proposal and which program they propose when accorded the opportunity to do so. A legislator may make a proposal equal to the status quo (q) or may make a proposal s/he prefers to q. Since rejection of the proposal preserves the status quo, only programs at least as preferred to q by the proposer and by a majority will be proposed. Since information is complete in the model, a legislator will always propose either the status quo or a program s/he and a majority prefer to the status quo.

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[7] See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 13) and Maskin and Tirole (1994) for treatments of Markov perfect equilibria and for discussions of their reasonableness.

[8] Simplicity is defined by the number of states of a machine that can play a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The simplest such machines are shown to play the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) equilibrium.

The legislator i selected in session t will choose a proposal z^i according to

$$z^i \in \arg\max_z N_i(z) + \delta v_i(z), \qquad (2)$$

$$\text{subject to } N_j(z) + \delta v_j(z) \geq N_j(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_j(q_{t-1}), \text{ for } j \in M,\ |M| > \frac{n}{2},$$

where $N_j(z)$ is the session t net benefits, and $v_j(z)$ is the continuation value if the program z is enacted and becomes the status quo ($q_t = z$) for the next session. Similarly, $N_j(q_{t-1})$ is the session t net benefits, and $v_j(q_{t-1})$ is the continuation value if the program is defeated and the status quo $q_t = q_{t-1}$ is preserved. The majority M is the set of legislators for whom the inequality in (2) is satisfied, and hence $j \in M$ votes for z over q_{t-1}.[9] The continuation value is i's expected utility in the stationary Markov equilibrium of the subgame, with z as the status quo entering the next session, that is,

$$v_i(z) = \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} E N_i(z^*(\tau)),$$

where $z^*(\tau)$ is the equilibrium program in session τ, and E denotes expectation with respect to the process that selects the proposer. Since the continuation value is determined in equilibrium, it depends on the strategies of all the legislators. As indicated in (2), all legislators are forward looking and take into account the effect of their proposal making and voting on both their net benefits in the current session and the equilibrium choices in future sessions. In their voting, legislators thus anticipate the proposal making in the subgames commencing if the current proposal is approved or rejected, and they thus vote for the proposal or the status quo based on the current net benefits and the equilibrium outcomes anticipated in future sessions.

The induced ideal point $\hat{z}^i$ of legislator i is defined in terms of the current net benefits and the continuation value, or

$$\hat{z}_i \in \arg\max_z N_i(z) + \delta v_i(z), \qquad i = 1, \ldots, n. \qquad (3)$$

The induced ideal points are the proposals the legislators would make if they were not constrained by the requirement of majority approval. That is, $\hat{z}_i$ solves (2) if and only if a majority prefers $\hat{z}_i$ to q_{t-1}. The legislators will be numbered in the order of their induced ideal points.

A proposal must obtain majority approval to be enacted, and legislators are assumed to vote for a proposal over the status quo if they weakly prefer the proposal. Legislators are forward looking in their voting and take into account both the current session net benefits and the outcomes in future sessions. For a unidimensional program, approval requires that the median legislator and all those with induced ideal points on one side of the median vote for it. That is, the equilibrium for unidimensional programs has the property that the majority in the constraint in (2) includes the median legislator and all legislators with induced ideal points on one side of the median who vote the same as the median legislator. It is thus sufficient to consider only the approval condition for the median legislator m, who will vote for z^i if and only if enactment of the program is at least as preferred as defeating it, thereby preserving the status quo (i.e., $q_t = q_{t-1}$) and continuing to the next session. The median legislator thus will vote for z^i in session t if and only if it satisfies the approval condition

$$N_m(z^i) + \delta v_m(z^i) \geq N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1}). \qquad (4)$$

The right-hand side of the approval condition in (4) is the expected utility if the status quo remains in place and thus is the reservation value of the median legislator.[10]

Because when voting (in [4]) the legislator chooses between two alternatives—proposal z^i and continuation of the status quo into the next session—majority rule is well behaved.[11] Note that in this model there is no restriction on which programs may be proposed or on how many programs over time may be proposed. Because a proposal can be made in each session, this model incorporates the durability problem addressed by Weingast and Marshall (1988), that is, a new majority in session $\tau > t$ may "revoke" the program a majority enacted in session t. As will be demonstrated, however, equilibria for unidimensional collective goods programs are well behaved and converge to the program preferred by the median legislator.

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[9] As indicated below in (4), the choice of the proposal z^i depends on the status quo, but as a result of the stationarity (Markov) assumption, z^i is otherwise independent of the history of play.

[10] Romer and Rosenthal (1978) consider referenda in which a program reverts to the same status quo q_0 in each period. That is, unless a new program is approved by the voters, the program scale is q_0. In their model the median voter will vote for a program z if and only if $N_m(z) + \delta v_m(q_0) \geq N_m(q_0) + \delta v_m(q_0)$, or $N_m(z) \geq N_m(q_0)$. When there is a fixed reversion point, the stationary equilibrium program for the model considered here is thus the same as that characterized in the static model of Romer and Rosenthal.

[11] Sequential choice theory can also be directly applied to multidimensional collective goods programs, although characterization of equilibria is much more difficult. Since the legislature always compares a multidimensional program proposal to continuation, as in the approval condition in (4), or to an amendment, legislators face only two alternatives when voting—enacting the proposal and continuation at the status quo.

EQUILIBRIUM UNIDIMENSIONAL PROGRAMS

To develop the logic and intuition of the equilibrium, the analysis will be presented for a generic session t, and an example of the full dynamics will be presented subsequently. The approach to characterizing the equilibrium is based on a set of evident properties of the equilibrium. The first is that the legislator will propose a program, possibly the status quo, that will be adopted, since a defeated program results in the status quo being preserved. This implies that, for status quo q_t at the beginning of session $t + 1$, the continuation value, $v_m(q_t)$, for the median legislator, for example, satisfies

$$v_m(q_t) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} [N_m(z^i(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z^i(q_t))], \qquad (5)$$

where $z^i(q_t)$ is the (successful) proposal made by legislator i in session $t + 1$, when the status quo is q_t, and $1/n$ is the probability that i is selected to make a proposal.[12] The reservation value, $R_m(q_t)$, of m in session t is the expected discounted net benefits that m must receive to vote for z^i, or

$$R_m(q_{t-1}) \equiv N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1}),$$

where $q_t = q_{t-1}$ if m votes against z^i.

The second property, as discussed above, is that the proposer requires the vote of the median legislator, who will support proposal z^i if it satisfies the approval condition in (4). This is illustrated in Figure 2, which graphs the expected utility of m, the left-hand side of (4), and indicates the reservation value, the right-hand side of (4). Since each legislator requires m's vote, the proposal by legislator $m - 1$, for example, must give the median legislator his or her continuation value.

The third property is that a legislator to the left (right) of the median will propose the maximum (minimum) of his or her induced ideal point in (3) and the program that satisfies the approval condition in (4) as an equality for the median legislator.

FIGURE 2. Equilibrium Collective Goods Programs



The characterization of the equilibrium will be presented by first starting with a status quo close to the median-induced ideal point and then working backward away from the median. If δ is sufficiently close to one and q_t is sufficiently close to the median legislator's induced ideal point, then the approval condition in (4) will be binding for each legislator's proposal (other than the median legislator's); that is, no legislator $(i \neq m)$ can propose his or her induced ideal point $\hat{z}_i$ and have it enacted. Then, as illustrated in Figure 2, in session t each legislator with an ideal point to the left of the median will propose the same program, $z_\ell(q_t)$, and all $(n - 1)/2$ of those to the right of the median will propose the same program, $z_r(q_t)$. The continuation value in (5), then, is

$$\begin{aligned} v_m(q_t) = {} & \frac{n-1}{2n} (N_m(z_\ell(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z_\ell(q_t))) \\ & + \frac{n-1}{2n} (N_m(z_r(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z_r(q_t))) \\ & + \frac{1}{n} (N_m(z_m(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z_m(q_t))), \end{aligned} \qquad (6)$$

where $(n - 1)/2n$ is the probability that a legislator to the left (or right) of the median will be selected, and $z_m(q_t)$ is the program proposed by the median legislator. As is evident from (3) and (4), the median legislator, if selected, proposes his or her induced ideal point $z_m(q_t) = \hat{z}_m$. Solving for $N_m(z_\ell(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z_\ell(q_t))$ and for $N_m(z_r(q_t)) + \delta v_m(z_r(q_t))$ from (4) for session $t + 1$, substituting into (6), and solving yields

$$v_m(q_t) = \frac{(n - 1)N_m(q_t) + N_m(\hat{z}_m) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n - 1)}, \qquad (7)$$

where $N_m(q_t)$ is the net benefits in session $t + 1$ when status quo q_t remains in effect.

The fourth evident property of the equilibrium is that when the median legislator has proposed his or her ideal point and it becomes the status quo, subsequent proposals can never change the status quo, since s/he and all those to one side of him or her will vote against that proposal. Consequently,

$$v_m(\hat{z}_m) = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} N_m(\hat{z}_m), \qquad (7a)$$

and thus $\hat{z}_m \in \arg\max_z N_m(z)$ and is unique given the strict concavity of $N_m(z)$.[13] Then, (7) is

$$v_m(q_t) = \frac{(n - 1)N_m(q_t) + \frac{1}{1 - \delta} N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n - 1)}. \qquad (8)$$

The continuation value thus inherits the properties of $N_m(\,\cdot\,)$ and hence is strictly concave.

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[12] The model will be extended below to consider probabilities of selection that differ among legislators.

[13] Restricting the discount factor to be less than one is required only so that the continuation value, $v_i(z)$, is finite. If the net benefit stream were finite for all z, an equilibrium would exist for $\delta = 1$.

The continuation value in (8) holds when all legislators $i \neq m$ must give the median legislator exactly his or her reservation value. The continuation value is a linear combination of the benefits if the status quo remains in effect and the benefits if the median voter's ideal point is enacted. Substituting the continuation value in (8) for session $t - 1$ into the right-hand side of the approval condition in (4) yields the reservation value[14]

$$N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1}) = \frac{nN_m(q_{t-1}) + \dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n-1)}. \quad \textbf{(9)}$$

Then, in session t, proposal $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ by a legislator to the left of the median satisfies (4), or, using (9) in (4),

$$N_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1})) + \delta v_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1})) = \frac{nN_m(q_{t-1}) + \dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n-1)}. \quad \textbf{(10)}$$

The continuation value $v_m(\cdot)$ is given in (8), and (for $\hat{z}_{m-1} < q_{t-1} < \hat{z}_m$) substituting $v_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1}))$ into (10) yields $z_\ell(q_{t-1}) = q_{t-1}$. Then, $z_r(q_{t-1}) > \hat{z}_m$ is given by $N_m(z_r(q_{t-1})) + \delta v_m(z_r(q_{t-1})) \equiv N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1})$, or $N_m(z_r(q_{t-1})) = N_m(q_{t-1})$. These proposals are identified in Figure 2. Any legislators to the left of the median thus can do no better than propose the status quo when it lies between their ideal point and that of the median, since the median legislator has to be given his or her reservation value. Similarly, a legislator to the right also must propose a program that gives the median legislator his or her reservation value, and that proposal is supported by the median legislator and those to the right. The proposer thus has only that power given by the leverage resulting from the location of the status quo, as in the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978).

These results are summarized as:

PROPOSITION 1: A MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM WITH A STATUS QUO. *For* (δ, q_{t-1}) *such that the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all legislators* $(i \neq m)$ *in session* t *(e.g.,* $\hat{z}_{m-1} \leq q_{t-1} < \hat{z}_m$*),*

a. legislators with induced ideal points on the same side of the median as the status quo propose the status quo, that is, $z_\ell(q_{t-1}) = q_{t-1}$*, and*

b. those on the other side of the median propose $z_r(q_{t-1}) > \hat{z}_m$*, satisfying* $N_m(z_r(q_{t-1})) = N_m(q_{t-1})$.[15]

c. The continuation value is given in (8).

The intuition underlying this result is that the median legislator is indispensable to the legislators on either side and hence can expect proposals to attract his or her vote from both sides. In a stationary equilibrium this implies that no legislator can do better than to offer the median legislator his or her reservation value. Legislators other than the median legislator thus have proposal power to the extent allowed by the status quo. The result in proposition 1b indicates that if the proposer is on the other side of the median from the status quo, as in the case of a change in the majority party in the legislature, the change in the program can be substantial.

The comparative statics of this equilibrium are immediate.

PROPOSITION 2: COMPARATIVE STATICS I. *For* (δ, q_{t-1})*, such that the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all but the median legislator, the equilibrium proposals by legislators are independent of* δ*. Both* $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ *and* $z_r(q_{t-1})$ *are farther from the median ideal point* $\hat{z}_m$*, the farther the status quo is from that point.*

Proof. Suppose that $\hat{z}_{m-1} \leq q_{t-1} < \hat{z}_m$. Then, $z_\ell(q_{t-1}) = q_{t-1}$, so $dz_\ell(q_{t-1})/dq_{t-1} = 1$, yielding the result. For $z_r(q_{t-1})$, totally differentiating the condition $N_m(z_r(q_{t-1})) = N_m(q_{t-1})$ yields

$$\frac{dz_r}{dq_{t-1}} = \frac{N'_m(q_{t-1})}{N'_m(z_r)}.$$

Since $\hat{z}_{m+1} > z_r(q_{t-1}) > \hat{z}_m > q_{t-1}$, $N'_m(z_r) < 0$ and $N'_M(q_{t-1}) > 0$ establish the result. The proof for $\hat{z}_{m+1} \geq q_{t-1} > \hat{z}_m$ is analogous. Q.E.D.

A GENERALIZATION: SENIORITY AND COMMITTEE PROPOSAL PREROGATIVES

The above development is based on the case in which each legislator in session t has an equal chance of being selected to make a proposal. Some legislators, however, may have a greater likelihood of being selected than others. For example, the legislature may operate under a policy in which seniority governs certain allocations, such as committee assignments and proposal priority.[16] In the context of sequential choice theory, this may be represented by the probability that a member will be selected to make a proposal. To represent this case, consider a general formulation in which each legislator has a probability p_i of being selected, where $\Sigma_{i=1}^{n} p_i = 1$. The p_i could, for example, reflect relative seniority. For the case in which the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all $i \neq m$, the equilibrium continuation value corresponding to (8) is[17]

$$v_m(q_t) = \frac{(1-p_m)N_m(q_t) + p_m\left(\dfrac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{1 - \delta(1-p_m)}. \quad \textbf{(11)}$$

The continuation value of the median voter thus depends on the probability that s/he is selected to make a proposal.

The comparative statics are straightforward. First, if $p_m = 1$, the continuation value is $v_m = (1/(1-\delta))\, N_m(\hat{z}_m)$. That is, if the median legislator is the only legislator who will be selected, s/he is able to obtain his or her ideal point. As a function of p_m, the continuation value is strictly increasing, since

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[14] Since $N_m(\cdot)$ is strictly concave, the continuation value $v_m(\cdot)$ in (8) is strictly concave, as is $N_m(\cdot) + \delta v_m(\cdot)$. The proposer's choice problem in (2) thus is the maximization of a strictly concave function over a convex set. An optimal proposal thus exists.

[15] If $\hat{z}_m < q_{t-1} < \hat{z}_{m+1}$, then $z_r(q_{t-1}) = q_{t-1}$, and $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ is given by $N_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1})) = N_m(q_{t-1})$.

[16] McKelvey and Riezman (1992) provide a theory of the endogenous development of seniority.

[17] If $p_i = 1/n$, (11) is the same as (8).

$$\frac{dv_m(q_t)}{dp_m} = \frac{N_m(\hat{z}_m) - N_m(q_t)}{(1 - \delta(1 - p_m))^2}$$

is positive when $\hat{z}_m \neq q_t$. It is straightforward to show that the continuation value is strictly concave in p_m when $\hat{z}_m \neq q_t$. The gain to the median legislator from a higher probability of being selected is thus increasing but at a decreasing rate. Consequently, if the median legislator becomes relatively more senior and hence p_m increases, his or her continuation value increases.

The expression corresponding to the expected utility of the median legislator in (10) is strictly increasing in p_m, since

$$\frac{d(N_m(q_t) + \delta v_m(q_t))}{dp_m} = \frac{\delta(N_m(\hat{z}_m) - N_m(q_t))}{(1 - \delta(1 - p_m))^2},$$

and $N_m(\hat{z}_m) > N_m(q_t)$ if $q_t \neq \hat{z}_m$. The equilibrium programs are then closer to the median legislator's ideal point. Consequently, more senior nonmedian legislators (lower p_m) benefit from their greater proposal priority.

If the relative seniority of the median legislator remains constant and the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all legislators, then changes in the seniority of other members do not affect the equilibrium programs. That is, suppose a member other than the median gains in (relative) seniority and a legislator other than the median has a corresponding decrease in seniority. As indicated in (11), the equilibrium is unaffected when the approval conditions in (4) are binding. If the decrease in seniority is experienced by the median legislator, the equilibrium programs can be farther from his or her ideal point.

This formulation also has implications for the role of committees. If committee members are more likely to be selected to propose a program, the equilibrium programs are still governed by the preferences of the median legislator. But to the extent that committee privileges make it less likely that the median legislator will be selected, the equilibrium programs are farther from the median ideal point and closer to the ideal point of the committee member making the proposal. Consequently, one source of committee power is the opportunity to make proposals, and the greater is that opportunity and the lower the opportunity of the median legislator, the greater is the committee's power.

STRATEGIC CHOICE OF THE STATUS QUO

The preceding analysis pertains to the case in which (δ, q_{t-1}) is such that the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all legislators other than the median legislator. This section characterizes the equilibrium when those conditions are not all binding. If those conditions are not binding for $m - 1$ at $\hat{z}_{m-1} > q_{t-1}$ but are binding for all other legislators (other than the median), legislator $m - 1$ is able to propose his or her induced ideal point $\hat{z}_{m-1}$, since the median legislator prefers $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ to q_{t-1}. Then, if selected, $m - 1$ will be choosing not only the benefits in the current session but also the status quo with which the legislature will begin the next session. (This equilibrium is characterized in more detail in Appendix A for the case in which more legislators can propose their strategic ideal points.) The continuation value $v_{m-1}(z)$ for session $t + 1$ when legislator $m - 1$ chooses z is

$$v_{m-1}(z) = \frac{n-1}{2n}[N_{m-1}(z) + \delta v_{m-1}(z)]$$
$$+ \frac{n-1}{2n}[N_{m-1}(z_r(z)) + \delta v_{m-1}(z_r(z))]$$
$$+ \frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_{m-1}(\hat{z}_m), \qquad \textbf{(12)}$$

where $z_r(z)$ is the proposal that a legislator on the right, if selected, will make in session $t + 1$ when $q_t = z$ is the status quo. That is, legislator $m - 1$ recognizes that a legislator on the right may have an opportunity next session to propose a change in the program, and s/he can strategically limit the extent of the change that can be made in the next session and in subsequent sessions.

Writing the expression for $v_{m-1}(z_r(z))$ indicates that it has the same form as $v_{m-1}(z)$ in (12).[18] This results because, if $z_r(z)$ is enacted in session $t + 1$, then in $t + 2$ all legislators to the right of the median will propose $z_r(z)$, and all to the left will propose z. Then, (12) yields

$$v_{m-1}(z) =$$
$$\frac{\frac{n-1}{2}(N_{m-1}(z) + N_{m-1}(z_r(z))) + \frac{1}{1-\delta}N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n-1)}. \qquad \textbf{(13)}$$

Legislator $m - 1$ will make an unconstrained proposal, $\hat{z}_{m-1}$, satisfying (3), which takes into account both the current session benefits and the equilibrium in the subgame commencing in the next session when $q_t = \hat{z}_{m-1}$. The maximand in (3) is, using (13),

$$N_{m-1}(z) + \delta v_{m-1}(z) = \frac{\left(n - \delta\left(\frac{n-1}{2}\right)\right)N_{m-1}(z) + \delta\left(\frac{n-1}{2}\right) \cdot N_{m-1}(z_r(z)) + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}N_{m-1}(\hat{z}_m)}{n - \delta(n-1)}.$$
$$\textbf{(14)}$$

Legislator $m - 1$'s proposal $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ maximizes (14) and satisfies the first-order condition[19]

$$N'_{m-1}(\hat{z}_{m-1}) =$$
$$-\frac{\delta(n-1)}{2n - \delta(n-1)}N'_{m-1}(z_r(\hat{z}_{m-1}))\frac{dz_r(\hat{z}_{m-1})}{dz}. \qquad \textbf{(15)}$$

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[18] This results because the legislators ($i = 1, \ldots, m - 2$) on the left find the approval condition binding at z.

[19] The second-order condition is assumed to be satisfied. A sufficient but not necessary condition is that $z_r(z)$ is convex in z.

Since $z_r(z) > \hat{z}_m > \hat{z}_{m-1}$, $N'_{m-1}(z_r(\hat{z}_{m-1})) < 0$. Also, as is evident from Figure 2 and as established in proposition 2, $dz_r(z)/dz < 0$. These properties imply that $N'_{m-1}(\hat{z}_{m-1}) < 0$, and since $N_{m-1}(z)$ is concave, the proposal $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ is greater than the single-session ideal point, z^o_{m-1}, that maximizes $N_{m-1}(z)$.

The proposal $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ will be referred to as a strategic ideal point, since when unconstrained by the median legislator's reservation value, legislator $m - 1$ chooses a program that compromises on the current session net benefits so as to constrain future programs to be closer to the median. That is, legislator $m - 1$ constrains the future proposals of those on the other side of the median by choosing a program, $\hat{z}_{m-1}$, closer to the median, even though s/he could choose a program ($z < \hat{z}_{m-1}$) closer to his or her single-session ideal point, z^o_{m-1}. This results because the legislators are forward looking and take into account the subsequent equilibrium behavior when the status quo q_t becomes the proposal $\hat{z}_{m-1}$. Legislator $m - 1$ thus strategically positions the status quo to constrain future programs.[20]

When a legislator can strategically position the status quo, s/he exerts a degree of power over outcomes—both for the present session and in the future. To illustrate this and how that power depends on the parameters of the model, consider an example in which net benefits are

$$N_i(z) = a_i z - \tfrac{1}{2}z^2, \qquad i = 1, \ldots, n, \qquad \textbf{(16)}$$

where $z^o_i = a_i$ is the single-session ideal point. The strategic ideal point in (15), then, is[21]

$$\hat{z}_{m-1} = \frac{n - \delta(n-1)}{n} a_{m-1} + \frac{\delta(n-1)}{n} a_m. \qquad \textbf{(17)}$$

The strategic ideal point is a weighted average of the single-session ideal points a_{m-1} and a_m of legislators $m - 1$ and m, respectively, where the weights depend on the impatience of the legislators and the probability of being selected to be the proposer. When $\delta = 0$ the legislators are completely impatient, and $\hat{z}_{m-1} = a_{m-1}$, indicating that $m - 1$ exercises full proposal power. As δ increases, the proposer cedes power by choosing a program closer to the median. The limit as δ approaches one is

$$\hat{z}_{m-1} = \frac{1}{n} a_{m-1} + \frac{n-1}{n} a_m,$$

which reflects the power of the median legislator when legislators are very patient.

The strategic ideal point in (17) is a strictly decreasing function of the number (n) of legislative districts, and as indicated above, this can be interpreted in terms of the likelihood that legislator $m - 1$ will be selected to make proposals in the future. If $m - 1$ is a committee with proposal initiation privileges, its power is an increasing function of its probability of making a proposal.

This analysis indicates that when the median legislator's preferences are not constraining and the net benefit functions are strictly concave, a legislator (other than the median) does not propose his or her single-session ideal point but instead takes into account the constraining effect of his or her proposal (as the next status quo) on subsequent program changes. The proposer strategically positions the status quo closer to the median ideal point because that limits the ability of those on the opposite side of the median to obtain a program closer to their ideal points. The choice of the proposal thus is intended to constrain the changes the legislators on the opposite side of the median can make. As discussed below, this is a preference-induced (equilibrium) response to the durability issue. These results are summarized as:

Proposition 3: an extended median voter theorem. *In any session the equilibrium program is either the proposer's strategic ideal point satisfying (15) or satisfies the approval condition in (4) as an equality. If* $N_i(z)$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, *is strictly concave, the strategic ideal point in (15) is between the legislator's single-session ideal point and the median legislator's single-session (and strategic) ideal point, reflecting the incentive to constrain future changes in the program.*

This result follows from the same intuition that underlies the strategic versions (Ledyard 1984, Calvert 1985) of Black's median voter theorem. This is thus the sequential choice theory analog of Black's median voter theorem.

This analysis also provides predictions of the number of votes a program receives. Consider first the case in which all the approval conditions in (4) are binding for all legislators, and the status quo is to the left of the median ideal point. If a legislator to the left of the median is selected, his or her proposal will be the same as the status quo, so the number of votes for the proposal is indeterminate. If the legislator selected is to the right of the median, his or her proposal, $z_r(q_{t-1})$, will be approved by a minimal majority of votes. When (δ, q_{t-1}) is such that some legislators can propose their strategic ideal point, a proposal can receive more than a minimal majority of votes. For example, if $q_0 = 0$ and legislator $i = 1$ with the lowest ideal point is selected in the first session, then s/he proposes $\hat{z}_1$, and all legislators prefer it to the status quo and vote for it. If a high demander ($i > m$) is selected in the first session, then all those to the right of i will vote for the proposal, and some to the left will also vote for it. Over time, as the status quo moves closer to the median ideal point, however, the number of votes for a change in the program becomes closer to a minimal majority.

The comparative statics of the equilibrium programs when a legislator can propose his or her strategic ideal point follow directly from the analysis in (12)–(17) and are summarized as:

Proposition 4: comparative statics ii. *When the approval condition in (4) is not binding for a legislator, his or her strategic ideal point is independent of the status quo. For the example in (16), the strategic ideal point for legislator* m − 1 (m + 1) *is a strictly increasing (decreasing) function of the discount factor; that is, greater patience*

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[20] As considered below, this property results from the strict concavity of $N_i(z)$.

[21] For this example the function in (14) is strictly concave.

increases the incentive of the proposer to propose a program closer to the median ideal point.

THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE GOODS PROGRAMS

Since the legislature can change collective goods programs such as entitlements and regulation in any session, the equilibrium programs can change over time. The ideal point of the median voter, however, is an absorbing state; once it is reached, no further change can occur.[22] This results because whenever the median legislator is selected s/he proposes $\hat{z}_m$, and the proposal is approved and becomes the status quo. Every subsequent proposer finds that no other proposal can be enacted because the median legislator and all those to one side of the median will oppose any change. Consequently, whenever the program reaches $\hat{z}_m$, it remains there. This analysis provides one explanation of why it is difficult to change mature collective goods programs.

Even when it is not already at the median, the status quo can remain in effect over a number of periods, as is the case of a young program. For example, if the discount factor is high so that the proposals are $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ and $z_r(q_{t-1})$ in Figure 2, the program will remain at $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ as long as a legislator $i < m$ is making the proposal. The program thus can exhibit periods of stability.

As observed above and is clear from Figure 2, the program in session $t + 1$ will never be farther from the ideal point of the median voter than is $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ or $z_r(q_{t-1})$. The program enacted in session $t + 1$ is thus contained in the set $[z_\ell(q_{t-1}), z_r(q_{t-1})]$. Similarly, if a legislator i, $i < m$, can propose his or her strategic ideal point $\hat{z}_i$, subsequent programs can never be farther from the median than the interval $[\hat{z}_i, z_r(\hat{z}_i)]$. If in the next session a legislator with a strategic ideal point closer to the median than that of i is selected to make a proposal, then that legislator will propose his or her strategic ideal point. That is, if $q_{t-1} = \hat{z}_{m-k}$, $m > k > 1$, and if a legislator $j \in \{m - k + 1, \dots, m\}$ is selected, then the program jumps to $\hat{z}_j$, which is closer to the median than is the status quo. The sets containing the equilibrium programs in future sessions thus are decreasing, and the program "hops" toward the median. These dynamics are summarized as:

PROPOSITION 5: A DYNAMIC MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM. *If* $p_m > 0$, *with probability approaching one, then the equilibrium programs converge to the median of the legislators' single-period ideal points, and the median ideal point is an absorbing state. On the path to convergence the scale of the equilibrium program can increase, decrease, or remain stable for a number of sessions, but the equilibrium proposals are in a set that (weakly) decreases over time.*

To illustrate how the equilibrium programs change over time, consider a five-member legislature with net benefit functions in (16). Assume that the single-session ideal points (a_i) are symmetrically distributed about the median, $a_m = a_3$, and that each legislator has an equal probability of being selected to make a proposal in each session. Suppose that the initial status quo is $q_0 = 0$ and that the a_i are sufficiently large such that in session 1 any legislator selected can propose his or her strategic ideal point. The equilibrium programs in the first session, then, are

$$\hat{z}_i = a_i + \frac{2\delta}{5}(a_m - a_i), \qquad i = 1, 5,$$

$$\hat{z}_i = a_i + \frac{4\delta}{5}(a_m - a_i), \qquad i = 2, 4, \text{ and} \qquad \textbf{(18)}$$

$$\hat{z}_m = a_m.$$

The programs that can be adopted in the first session thus are symmetrically distributed around the median ideal point, and the programs proposed by nonmedian legislators are chosen to constrain future programs; for example, $\hat{z}_5 < a_5$, and $\hat{z}_2 > a_2$. Consequently, if a committee is a preference-outlier (e.g., $i = 5$), it could propose its single-session ideal point (a_5), but it prefers a program closer to the median so as to restrain the changes that those on the other side of the median can make in the future. The amount by which a legislator seeks to restrain future changes is an increasing function of the discount factor, since greater patience means that the future is more important.

The program enacted in the first session becomes the status quo in session 2. Table 1 presents the equilibrium programs that result in session t as a function of the status quo at the beginning of that session. For example, if $\hat{z}_1$ is enacted in session 1 and thus is the status quo entering session 2, it can be verified that the legislator selected in session 2 will propose the program s/he would have proposed in session 1, as indicated in the first row of the table. If $\hat{z}_2$ is enacted in session 1, and if legislator 1 is selected in session 2, s/he will propose $\hat{z}_2$, since the median legislator will not accept a program farther away than the status quo $\hat{z}_2$. If legislator 2 is selected, s/he will again propose $\hat{z}_2$. If legislator 4 or 5 is selected, s/he will propose $\hat{z}_4 = z_r(\hat{z}_2)$. If the median legislator is selected in any session, then the median single-session ideal point, $\hat{z}_m = a_m$, will remain in effect thereafter. Over time, the equilibrium proposals thus hop toward the median ideal point, $\hat{z}_m$, and once there, they remain there.

The probability that the median legislator is not selected through session t is $(1 - p_m)^t$, which has a limit of zero as t increases. The equilibrium proposals thus

TABLE 1. Equilibrium Programs

Status quo	Program in Next Session When Legislator *i* Proposes 1	2	3	4	5
$\hat{z}_1$	$\hat{z}_1$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_4$	$\hat{z}_5$
$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_4$	$\hat{z}_4$
$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_m$
$\hat{z}_4$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_4$	$\hat{z}_4$
$\hat{z}_5$	$\hat{z}_1$	$\hat{z}_2$	$\hat{z}_m$	$\hat{z}_4$	$\hat{z}_5$

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[22] Moreover, in the limit with probability one, the program will be $\hat{z}_m$ if $p_m > 0$.

converge with probability one to the single-session ideal point of the median voter. As indicated in Table 1, that ideal point is an absorbing state, and the static median voter theorem is a limit property of the equilibrium.

This example also identifies the voting pattern on equilibrium programs. If in the first session legislator 1 is selected, his or her proposal will be unanimously approved. If legislator 5 is then selected, his or her proposal could receive as few as three votes, depending on the a_i. Over time the proposals receive votes that approach a minimal majority. There are thus smaller majorities supporting changes in mature collective goods programs and (weakly) larger majorities supporting changes in young programs.

LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES WITH COLLECTIVE GOODS PROGRAMS

Amendments

The above analysis is based on the assumption of a temporary closed rule, where "temporary" means that in a session no amendment can be offered: Since any proposal can be made in the next session if the current proposal is rejected, the assumption of a temporary closed rule is not a strong one over the long run. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the implications of allowing amendments within a session. As will be indicated, the principal consequence is to decrease the gains to the legislator making a proposal. If the proposer is a committee with jurisdiction over the program, this implies that a closed rule is a source of committee power. It also implies that the legislature can control committee power by allowing amendments to proposals.

Consider a legislative process in which once a proposal is made another legislator is selected either to offer an amendment or call the question on the proposal. If the question is called, then the proposal is voted up or down against the status quo. If an amendment is offered, then the amendment is voted first against the proposal, and the winner is then voted up or down against the status quo.

The equilibrium is straightforward to characterize. Suppose the legislator selected to make the first proposal is to the left of the median legislator and that the proposal is $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$, as in Figure 2, where the functions graphed in the figure now correspond to the model in which an amendment is allowed. If the proposal $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ is to the right of the ideal point of all those to the left of the median, and if the legislator selected to offer an amendment is to the left of the median, then s/he will move the previous question, and the outcome will be $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$. If the legislator recognized to offer an amendment is to the right of the median, then s/he will offer $z_r(q_{t-1})$ so as to obtain the vote of the median legislator (assuming that the median legislator will vote for the last proposal if indifferent). The legislature then approves the amendment and passes it as the new status quo. The equilibrium outcomes thus continue to have the same qualitative properties as with a closed rule. Similarly, if the approval condition analogous to (4) is not binding for the legislator selected to offer an amendment, then s/he can propose his or her strategic ideal point.[23] A characterization of the equilibrium with amendments is provided in Appendix B, and a result analogous to proposition 1 is presented next.

PROPOSITION 6: AMENDMENTS. *If an amendment is allowed in each session and the approval conditions analogous to (4) are binding, then the equilibrium is analogous to that characterized in proposition 1. If a legislator to the left (right) of the median is selected, s/he proposes* $\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1})(\bar{z}_r(q_{t-1}))$, *characterized in (B3) in Appendix B. If* $\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1})$ *is proposed and a member to the left is selected to offer an amendment, then s/he calls the question, and* $\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1})$ *is adopted in that session. If* $\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1})$ *is proposed and a member to the right of the median is selected next, then s/he offers* $\bar{z}_r(q_{t-1})$ *as an amendment, which defeats* $\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1})$ *and then is adopted. If the condition analogous to (4) is not binding, then the legislator proposes his or her strategic ideal point (which takes into account the possibility of amendments in future sessions). If the median legislator is selected to offer an amendment, s/he offers his or her ideal point* $\hat{z}_m$, *which defeats the proposal, is adopted by the legislature, and remains in place thereafter.*

Proposal Initiation Authority

One implication of the above analysis is that allowing amendments decreases the gains to a committee with proposal initiation authority, since its proposal can be defeated by an amendment offered by another legislator. This decreases the incentive, particularly for preference outliers, to be on a committee with a jurisdiction over collective goods programs. This also suggests that a committee would seek protection for its proposals by means of a restrictive procedure granted by the Rules Committee in the House or a unanimous consent agreement in the Senate. In this model, however, the parent body has no reason to grant a restrictive procedure.

Another implication of allowing amendments relates to the probability that the committee's proposal will be approved. A legislator who prefers to offer an amendment rather than move the previous question will offer an amendment that will be approved. Consequently, in equilibrium, the probability that a committee's first proposal (by a legislator other than the median) is approved is equal to the proportion of legislators on the same side of the median as the proposer and farther from the median. If additional amendments were allowed, that probability would decrease.

The comparative statics results in propositions 2 and 4 also have implications for the incentives to be on a committee with initiation authority. For sufficiently high impatience (low δ) or a status quo far from the median legislator's ideal point, the committee can propose its strategic ideal point when the median legislator prefers that to continuation at the status quo. This suggests that the incentive for preference outliers to be on a committee with the right to initiate legislation is stronger, the farther the status quo is from the median ideal point and the greater is the impatience of legislators.

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[23] The continuation values are different because of the opportunity to offer an amendment, so the strategic ideal point can be different from that characterized in (15).

Preference outliers might be expected to seek seats on committees with jurisdictions over new policy areas for which the status quo is far from the ideal point of the median legislator. Thus, if legislators had control of their own committee assignments, preference outliers might be expected to be found disproportionately on committees with jurisdictions over new areas, and those with more central preferences would be expected to be found disproportionately on committees with more stable policy domains. Since the policies converge to the ideal point of the median legislator, the incentive to be on a committee with jurisdiction over collective goods programs decreases over time. That is, as policy areas mature, programs become more stable. Membership on these committees thus becomes less important over time, unless, of course, the legislative median is changed, as in electoral tides.

Gatekeeping

In a legislature with policy jurisdictions, bills are referred to committees that have monopoly initiation authority within their jurisdictions in the sense that no other committee can report the bill. If an authorizing committee with monopoly initiation authority were assigned a closed rule, the committee would be able to preserve the status quo, if it preferred to do so, by proposing the status quo or equivalently making no proposal. Consequently, initiation authority and a closed rule allow gatekeeping to be exercised.[24] When the committee either makes a proposal different from the status quo or makes no proposal, allowing amendments or discharge, respectively, can control that power.[25]

To investigate the nature of that control, consider the case in which in each session the committee has initiation authority and one amendment can be made to the committee's proposal. Assume that the amendment procedure in a session is as above with the amendment voted against the proposal and then the winner voted against the status quo. As in the case in which legislators are selected at random and their proposals are assigned a temporary closed rule, this legislative process with monopoly initiation authority and amendments will result in proposed programs (weakly) closer to the median ideal point than to the single-session ideal point of the proposer. To see this, suppose that the initial status quo is $q_0 = 0$. Suppose that a high-demand committee c with initiation authority can propose its strategic ideal point $\hat{z}_c$ and that it is to the right of the median ideal point. If a legislator to the right of c is selected to offer an amendment, s/he will move the previous question, and $\hat{z}_c$ will be adopted. If a legislator i with a strategic ideal point to the left of $z_\ell(\hat{z}_c)$ is selected to offer an amendment, however, s/he will propose $z_\ell(\hat{z}_c)$, and it will defeat $\hat{z}_c$ and then defeat the status quo. If the legislator i selected to offer an amendment has a strategic ideal point $(\hat{z}_i)$ between $z_\ell(\hat{z}_c)$ and $\hat{z}_c$, s/he will propose $\hat{z}_i$ and it will be adopted. In the next session the committee can do no better than to propose $\hat{z}_i$, if $\hat{z}_i$ is to the right of the median, or $z_r(\hat{z}_i)$, if it is to the left. The power of a committee with monopoly initiation authority but not gatekeeping authority thus is limited by the opportunity to offer amendments, since the equilibrium programs continue to be governed by the preferences of the median legislator and those who can offer amendments.

Durability

The sequential choice theory of collective goods programs has implications for the durability problem addressed by Weingast and Marshall (1988). A legislature operating over time faces the fundamental problem that it cannot bind a future legislature in the sense of preventing it from changing a program. Hence, the present legislature cannot be assured that a program it adopts will not be modified or indeed repealed by a future legislative majority. Although the durability problem is present in the model of continuing collective goods programs considered here, it does not limit the ability of legislatures to act.[26] The durability problem has two parts. The first is the opportunity to make changes in programs, and the response to this part must be institutionally based, as in the case of a grant of gatekeeping authority to a committee. Such institutional responses to the durability problem, however, are subject to the inheritability issue addressed by Riker (1980). The second part of the durability problem reflects preferences regarding the magnitude of changes and whether preferences are such that more extreme changes are at the margin more serious than less extreme changes.

For a unidimensional collective goods program, future changes are always limited by the status quo, and changes diminish over time as the program converges to that preferred by the median legislator. When durability is a concern to legislators, they take it into account in their proposal making by choosing, whenever possible, a program equal to their strategic ideal point, $\hat{z}_i$. As illustrated in (17), those programs are between the single-session ideal point of the proposer and the single-session ideal point of the median legislator. The durability problem is thus mitigated endogenously by individual legislators taking into account the future proposals of the other legislators and constraining those proposals by positioning the status quo closer to the median. This response to the durability problem is preference induced rather than institutionally based.

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[24] Denzau and Mackay (1983) and Epstein (1995) study the effect of gatekeeping authority.

[25] The extent to which committees can keep gates closed is the subject of some disagreement. Formally, there is no gatekeeping authority in the Senate, since a rider can be attached to any bill on the floor. In the House a majority can use a discharge petition to bring a bill to the floor. Furthermore, in some instances individual legislators and other committees can circumvent a committee to bring legislation to the floor for a vote. Gatekeeping power surely exists to the extent that a committee can delay changes in programs, and assumptions about the extent of delay could be incorporated into the sequential choice structure considered here.

[26] Diermeier (1995) presents an overlapping generations model in which the durability problem is overcome by endogenous expectations that future majorities will sustain current decisions.

The response to the durability problem characterized by (15) and illustrated in (17) reflects preferences with the property that a change (Δz) in a collective goods program that is close to a legislator's single-period ideal point is less serious than a change in a program farther from that ideal point. That is, the net benefit function has been assumed to be strictly concave. If legislators do not have preferences with this property, the second part of the durability problem may not be present. For example, suppose that legislators have absolute value preferences so that the (absolute value of the) marginal effect of a change in a program is the same for all program scales. With these preferences replacing those in (16), the strategic ideal point equals the single-session ideal point for all legislators. With these preferences the second part of the durability problem is not present, and hence legislators do not respond to it.

Entitlement Programs and the Economy

Outlays under some entitlement programs depend on the performance of the economy. This can be investigated in this model using the example in (16). Suppose that each of the parameters a_i increases by an amount Δa, the weaker the economy is on dimensions such as unemployment or inflation. That is, the benefits are more important to recipients in a weaker economy. From (18) an increase in the a_i increases the program scale for whichever legislator is selected. A downturn in the economy thus can result in a larger program and higher government outlays, but the process can adjust slowly if those with proposal initiation authority have induced ideal points to the left of the median.

Entitlement programs are enacted in anticipation of economic fluctuations, and the timing and magnitude of those fluctuations are uncertain. The model could incorporate aspects of economic cyclicality by having the parameters of the net benefit functions governed by a stochastic process. For example, consider a program of unemployment benefits. In the specification in (16), suppose that the parameters a_i increase in an economic downturn and decrease in an upturn. Then, if the parameter is represented as a stochastic process, the analysis is the same as above, with expectations taken over the distribution of the a_i, and the strategies conditioned on them. The qualitative features of the equilibria should be unchanged.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents a dynamic theory of collective goods programs developed from a sequential choice perspective. Equilibrium collective goods programs can, in the case of a low-demand committee, start small and expand toward that level preferred by the median legislator or can start large, as in the case of a high-demand committee, and contract over time. Programs that start small would be expected to be approved by a substantial majority or even unanimously. Strong support for a program does not, however, imply that it will not be changed. Indeed, the prediction of the theory is that a program that begins small will expand incrementally when proposers are on the same side of the median as the initiator or, when proposals are from legislators on the other side of the median, in large steps before contracting. There can also be periods of stability to the extent that those making the proposals are to one side of the median. If a party, for example, controls the proposal initiation and amendment systems, then collective goods programs can be relatively stable and change only incrementally. To the extent that legislators with quite divergent preferences have opportunities to propose programs, as in the case of a change in the majority party in Congress, changes in programs can be large. When all legislators have the opportunity to make proposals, however, programs converge toward the median ideal point. Correspondingly, support for changes in a program diminishes over time as it converges toward the median.

The politics of collective goods programs are driven by the distributions of benefits and costs, and both would be expected to be of interest to legislators and hence the subject of legislative activity. In the case of entitlements, the distribution of costs largely depends on the tax base and can take the form of designated taxes, as in the case of Social Security, or can be borne through general revenues. The high demanders for collective goods programs thus should be those legislators whose constituencies have large numbers of eligible recipients and/or a low tax base. To the extent that the high demanders can obtain proposal-making opportunities through the committee assignment and seniority systems, they can (at least for some period) obtain larger programs than preferred by the median legislator. To the extent that the legislative process is open, however, such programs would be expected to contract toward the median. Programs that begin small because of a committee composed of low demanders will experience growth toward the median to the extent that the legislative process is open to proposals for change.

The theory provides comparative statics predictions as a function of the status quo, preferences, and the opportunity to make proposals. The (weakly) farther the status quo is from the median ideal point, the more proposal power legislators have, and the farther the equilibrium program can be from the status quo. If the status quo is sufficiently far from the median ideal point, then the proposer is unconstrained by the preferences of the median legislator. Even in the case in which the proposer can propose his or her own single-session ideal point, however, with strictly concave preferences s/he strategically chooses a proposal closer to the median ideal point so as to constrain those future proposers on the other side of the median. Legislators thus can address the second part of the durability issue endogenously through strategic proposal making rather than through institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements, such as restrictive amendment rules and committee jurisdictions, which restrict alternatives that can be put on agendas can also be used to limit future changes, but these arrangements are subject to the inheritability problem, since a future legislature can undo those arrangements or establish new ones. The sequential legislative process considered here could also be changed, but if some such process is fundamental and enduring, then the sequential choice theory provides a different perspective on the durability issue. Present programs are subject to the durability problem, but when unconstrained by the status quo, legislators choose their proposals strategically to position the status quo to constrain future programs. The response to the second part of the durability problem thus is preference induced.

Equilibrium programs depend on preferences in two ways. First, they depend on the benefits and costs of the programs, with, for example, the benefits depending on the economy. Second, the dynamics of the programs depend on time preference. The more impatient legislators are, the (weakly) farther the equilibrium proposals can be from the median, since legislators are not as concerned with the future changes in programs on the other side of the median. Consequently, greater patience results in equilibrium paths of programs that are closer to the median.

The equilibrium also depends on the opportunities legislators have to make and amend proposals. When the status quo and time preferences are such that the approval condition for the median voter is binding, the less likely the median legislator is to have the opportunity to make a proposal the farther from the median are the equilibrium proposals. More generally, power is associated with proposal initiation authority, but even in the presence of such authority outcomes depend on the preferences of the median voter and the status quo. Gatekeeping authority allows a committee to protect the status quo, but in this theory there is no reason for the parent legislature to grant such authority.

This theory is based on a sequential choice structure in which legislators make proposals and vote on them sequentially. This minimal legislative structure implies that legislators are always voting between two alternatives—either the proposal against continuation or a proposal against an amendment—so equilibria exist. Even though the theory is different from social choice theory, it provides equilibrium predictions that are consistent with Black's fundamental intuition that the outcome for unidimensional alternatives will be the median ideal point. A generalized median voter theorem results, with the equilibrium path of proposals depending on the status quo and the time preferences of legislators. Nevertheless, over time, unidimensional collective goods programs converge to the median ideal point. The sequential choice theory of collective goods programs also is consistent with the intuition that the status quo can provide leverage to those on the other side of the median. That is, the farther is the status quo from the median, the more likely is the program to change, and the larger can be the change.

APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS OF UNIDIMENSIONAL PROGRAM EQUILIBRIA

This appendix indicates how the stationary equilibrium is characterized for the case in which q_{t-1} is to the left of $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ and

$$N_m(\hat{z}_{m+1}) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_{m+1}) < N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1}) < N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}).$$

Also, to simplify the presentation, the condition in (4) is assumed to be binding for all legislators to the right of the median. These conditions imply that the equilibrium proposal for $m - 1$ is his or her strategic ideal point ($\hat{z}_{m-1}$), characterized in (15); for those legislators to the left of $m - 1$, the equilibrium proposal is $z_\ell(q_{t-1}) = q_{t-1} < \hat{z}_{m-1}$; and for those legislators to the right of m the equilibrium proposal is $z_r(q_{t-1})$.

If $\hat{z}_{m-1}$ becomes the status quo, then in session $t + 1$ all legislators to the left of $m - 1$ propose $z_\ell(\hat{z}_{m-1}) = \hat{z}_{m-1}$, and all those to the right propose $z_r(\hat{z}_{m-1})$, given by $N_m(z_r(\hat{z}_{m-1})) + \delta v_m(z_r(\hat{z}_{m-1})) \equiv N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1})$. The continuation value $v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1})$, then, is

$$v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) = \frac{n-1}{n}(N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1})) + \frac{1}{n}(N_m(\hat{z}_m) + \delta v_m(\hat{z}_m)).$$

Solving for $v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1})$ yields

$$v_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) = \frac{1}{n - \delta(n-1)} \cdot \left[(n-1)N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + \frac{1}{1-\delta}N_m(\hat{z}_m)\right]. \qquad \textbf{(A-1)}$$

Then, substituting (A-1) and the expression for $v_m(\hat{z}_m)$ in (7*a*) into $v_m(q_t)$ yields

$$v_m(q_t) = \frac{(n-1)N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + (n+1-\delta(n-1))\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right) \cdot N_m(\hat{z}_m) + (n-2)(n-\delta(n-1))N_m(q_{t-1})}{(n-\delta(n-2))(n-\delta(n-1))}.$$

The equilibrium proposals $z_\ell(q_{t-1})$ and $z_r(q_{t-1})$ in session t then are obtained from (4); that is,

$$N_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1})) + \delta v_m(z_\ell(q_{t-1})) = N_m(q_{t-1}) + \delta v_m(q_{t-1}) = \frac{(n-1)N_m(\hat{z}_{m-1}) + (n+1-\delta(n-1)) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_m(\hat{z}_m) + n(n-\delta(n-1))N_m(q_{t-1})}{(n-\delta(n-2))(n-\delta(n-1))}.$$

The equilibrium can be characterized in a similar manner for the cases in which additional legislators can propose their strategic ideal point.

APPENDIX B: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AMENDMENTS

This appendix provides a partial characterization of the equilibrium for the case in which an amendment can be offered in each session. Consider the final passage vote on either the proposal or the amendment, and let $\bar{v}_m(q_t)$ denote the median legislator's continuation value for the subgame commencing with the next session. In the subgame, proposals and amendments will be made such that they will win on final passage, so the continuation value is

$$\bar{v}_m(q_t) = \frac{n-1}{2n}\left[\frac{n-1}{2n}(N_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_t)) + \delta v_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_t))) + \frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_m(\hat{z}_m) + \frac{n-1}{2n}(N_m(\bar{z}_r(q_t)) + \delta v_m(\bar{z}_r(q_t)))\right]$$
$$+ \frac{n-1}{2n}\left[\frac{n-1}{2n}(N_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_t)) + \delta v_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_t)))\right.$$

$$+\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_m(\hat{z}_m)+\frac{n-1}{2n}\left(N_m(\bar{z}_r(q_t))+\delta v_m(\bar{z}_r(q_t))\right)\Bigg]$$

$$+\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{1}{1-\delta}\right)N_m(\hat{z}_m), \qquad \textbf{(B-1)}$$

where the terms in brackets reflect the outcomes resulting from the selection of a legislator to offer an amendment. For example, the first term in the first set of brackets corresponds to the outcomes if the proposal is $\bar{z}_\ell(q_t)$ and a legislator on the left is selected to offer an amendment. That legislator will call the question, and the legislature will adopt $\bar{z}_\ell(q_t)$.

Substituting from the approval conditions in (4) into (B-1) yields

$$\bar{v}_m(q_t)=\frac{(n-1)^2N_m(q_t)+\dfrac{1}{1-\delta}(2n-1)N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n^2-\delta(n-1)^2}. \qquad \textbf{(B-2)}$$

Substituting (B-2) into (4) yields

$$N_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1}))+\delta\bar{v}_m(\bar{z}_\ell(q_{t-1}))$$

$$=\frac{n^2(1-\delta)N_m(q_{t-1})+\delta(2n-1)N_m(\hat{z}_m)}{n^2-\delta(n-1)^2}$$

$$=N_m(\bar{z}_r(q_{t-1}))+\delta\bar{v}_m(\bar{z}_r(q_{t-1})). \qquad \textbf{(B-3)}$$

If (δ, q_{t-1}) is such that the approval conditions in (4) are not binding for all legislators, $i(i \neq m)$, then the equilibrium is characterized in a manner analogous to that in (15) and Appendix A.

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Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond

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Many bemoan divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy. The logic of The Federalist *arguably defends it, in ways heretofore unappreciated, by appeal to a least-common-denominator definition of the "public interest." That quasi-*Federalist *logic is explored, and alternative political structures are assessed against the public interest criterion to which it appeals. Another and more defensible notion of the public interest is introduced, and its very different political styles, institutions, and policies are adduced.*

In words that resonate in our own day, James MacGregor Burns (1963, 3) bemoans "the deadlock of democracy."

> We have often been too late, and we have been too late with too little. Whether we can master depression in peacetime is still in doubt. . . . Currently baffled by a sluggish economy, we seem unable to promote long, sustained economic growth. Negroes still do not share the basic rights of citizenship promised in the 14th and 15th Amendments. We have done almost nothing about . . . a coordinated and vitalized transportation policy. Our social welfare measures are inadequate, especially in medical care. We cannot play our full economic role abroad because of inhibiting forces in Congress.

He traces those ills to America's constitutional structure.

> This model was the product of the gifted men who gathered in Philadelphia over 175 years ago, and it deserves much of the admiration and veneration we have accorded it. But this is also the system of checks and balances and interlocked gears of government that requires the consensus of many groups and leaders before the nation can act; and it is the system that exacts the heavy price of delay and devitalization that I have noted (Burns 1963, 6).[1]

There is too much checking and too little balancing, too much advising and too little consenting, for the effective conduct of public affairs. Institutional gridlock has become the order of the day. Divided government has been much more the rule than the exception throughout the postwar period.[2]

Revisionists urge a more balanced perspective (Mayhew 1991; Jones 1994, 1995). They point out, quite properly, that periods of divided government are no less productive of important legislation or major treaties than periods of unified rule (Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1992, chapter 6). They point out, quite properly, that the three-cornered bargaining game among the separate branches of government in the United States may not be so very different, in its formal properties or practical effects, from a three-cornered bargaining game among minority parties in a coalition government anywhere else in the world (Laver and Shepsle 1991; Fiorina 1992, chapter 7).

True and important though those observations are, they nonetheless mask real differences in the content of the enactments and the quality of the responsibility emerging from American-style divided governments. True, divided government gets things done. But the need to compromise among multiple centers of power typically leads either to incoherent policy packages (induced by the drive toward political log-rolling) or to watered-down legislation (induced by the drive toward the common ground).[3] True, parliamentary parties may face a formally analogous task in hammering out the legislative agenda for a coalition government. But where there is a formal coalition, collective agency has been created, and all parties to it will be judged at least in part by its successes or failures. Where, as in the United States, there is merely coalition-*like* governing, there is no collective agency and no shared responsibility. Even if in formal terms there were a core of policy compromises which would be Pareto-superior from the point of view both of a Democratic president and a Republican Congress, in terms of the larger reelection game it may be more in the interests of each to eschew compromise and try to lay the blame for consequent policy failures on the other.

My focus here is not, however, on the pragmatics of divided government, its causes, or its consequences. Instead, my concern is with matters of principle. I shall examine a principled defense of the deadlock of democracy, not exactly Madison's own, perhaps, but one that can be pieced together out of fragments from *The Federalist* and plausibly ascribed to the Founders as one among several theories at work in their multilayered

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[1] See similarly Burns 1984; Sorenson 1984; Committee on the Constitutional System 1987; Robinson 1985, 127–224; Cutler 1988; Sundquist 1988–89, 1993; Cox and Kernell 1991; Thurber 1991; Harris 1993.

[2] Earlier periods, particularly the first half of the twentieth century, were characterized by strikingly unified government in contrast (Fiorina 1992, chapter 2). "Unified" government here means that the same party controls the presidency and both houses of Congress. Taking account of the extent to which the third branch of government—the Supreme Court—is controlled by appointees of the other party would reduce those periods of unified government still further.

[3] Those phenomena, familiar enough from House-Senate conference committees (Longley and Oleszek 1989), inevitably characterize interbranch negotiations as well. Occasionally, interbranch competition may lead to "stronger" legislation than either alone would have championed, as in the case of the Clean Air Act of 1970 or the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981; but where that is the result simply of partisan outbidding of political opponents, there is no reason to suppose that stronger is necessarily better (Fiorina 1992, 91).

defense of the separation of powers.[4] Despite the homage to historical precedents, this should be clearly understood as an exercise in analytical rather than historical political philosophy. My focus is firmly upon the arguments, in stripped-down, cleaned-up, stylized forms, rather than upon the rich complexities to be found in the complete corpus of any particular historical author or authors.

The centerpiece of the analysis which I thus wrench from *The Federalist* is a particular definition of the "public interest," introduced in the next section. Alternative political structures are then assessed against that criterion. Finally, I advocate another and more defensible notion of the public interest, indicating some of the sorts of political institutions, practices, and public policies toward which such a revised notion might lead.

THE FEDERALIST DEFENSE OF DEADLOCK

Making a Constitution and Defending It

Political history is one thing, political philosophy another. Madison's ([1840] 1966) *Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787* speaks clearly to the former. As is evident from those transcripts, the constitutional separation of powers in the United States, and the checks and balances among them, largely emerged from political horsetrading of a perfectly ordinary sort: between small states and large, slave states and free, farmers and manufacturers, creditors and debtors; between advocates of states' rights and of central authority, of a strong and of a weak executive; and so on.

A vaguely principled appeal was occasionally made, both in Philadelphia and elsewhere (Kenyon 1966; Storing 1981), to Montesquieu's ([1748] 1949, chapters 9–12) precepts about the separation of powers and checks and balances being necessary to ensure liberty and avoid tyranny. More often than not, those appeals looked much more like prudential reassurances (in the case of the federalists, the opposite in the case of the antifederalists) that the proposed political structures would give people adequate power to protect their own interests. The concern seemed to be less with liberty in the abstract, as a matter of high principle, than with each person's or faction's own liberty, as a matter of sheer personal or factional interest. Or at least so it seems to modern eyes: As has already been noted, these historical authors themselves typically ran a much more complex (nuanced, perhaps just confused) set of arguments alongside one another.

If Madison's *Notes* recount the U.S. Constitution's history, *The Federalist* constitutes its principled defense. There, too, appeals to Montesquieu's notions of liberty and tyranny recur, in the same apparently principled-cum-prudential way. In *The Federalist*, though, various other arguments of a much more forthrightly principled nature also emerge. Here I shall focus upon one in particular, the kernel of which can be found at least in the interstices of *The Federalist*'s text. The interpretation and elaboration of this argument is in many ways my own: It is a construction, arguably a concoction; perhaps it is more aptly described as "federalish" rather than fully "federalist." Nevertheless, it is an interestingly different argument (and, as I shall show, wrong in important respects) deserving of attention in its own right.

The most significant difference is that the Montesquieu-style argument provides no real defense of deadlock to those to whom it needs defending. Saying that checks and balances promote liberty by precluding tyranny is at least in one sense merely to say that politics is a zero-sum power struggle, that any power given to the government is power (cum liberty) taken away from the people. Where the balance should be struck—how separated the powers of government should be and how strong the checks—depends on the relative importance attached to the government's ability to act relative to the public's freedom from government actions. Those who bemoan deadlock, thinking that government is too tightly hamstrung, will be unpersuaded by being told that deadlock is necessary to avoid tyranny and protect liberty. They see the same tradeoff, they just strike the balance differently. To say deadlock is justified in order to protect liberty and avoid tyranny is, in that context, merely to restate precisely what is at issue. It constitutes reiteration, not argument.

In contrast, the argument I shall adduce in the interstices of *The Federalist* appeals to an independent principle in defense of deadlock. Instead of merely trying to persuade people to weigh competing considerations differently, it points to a neglected reason for thinking that, at least in certain circumstances, deadlock may be the right outcome. Although the reasons it gives are in the end bad reasons, they nonetheless are well worth exploring and exposing.

Defining the Public Interest

The positive defense of deadlock builds on a particular analysis of what constitutes the public interest. This analysis styles the public interest as the "common good" or (in the phrase the Preamble to the Constitution borrows from Article III of the old Articles of Confederation) as the "general welfare." The Founders themselves had relatively little to say explicitly on that topic, either in their Philadelphia debates or in their *Federalist* pamphleteering. Like virtually all political writers of the period, the Founders tended to employ the phrase "public interest" with relatively little reflection. Assuming as they did that the term's meaning was relatively transparent, writers of this period tended to devote little care or attention to its precise elaboration.

The closest the Founders come to defining the public interest is Madison's famous *Federalist* 10 (p. 57) definition of the contrasting notion of "a faction": "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."

There are many ways those words could be read. Against the Enlightenment background so evident in

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[4] All references, including specific page citations, are to the Cooke edition of *The Federalist* (Hamilton, Madison and Jay [1787–88] 1961).

Philadelphia, however, there is only one really obvious reading (Riley 1986). "Faction" is clearly a reference to what French *philosophes* and theologians from Malbranche through Montesquieu ([1748] 1949, book 11) to Rousseau ([1762] 1973, book 2, chapter 3) had been calling the "particular will" and what today we might more readily term "personal (or sectoral) interests." The contrasting notion of the "general welfare" is clearly a reference to what they had been calling the "general will," which today we might more readily term the "common good."[5] Seen in that light, the Founders' contrast is clearly between the disreputable pursuit of narrow factional interests, particular to the members of that faction, and the enlightened pursuit of broad public interests, general in form and held in common across all segments of the community.

That, in effect, amounts to a "least-common-denominator" definition of the notion of the public interest. The public interest is equated, literally, with the common good, with that which is common among my good and yours. In Locke's (1689, I, sec. 92) perspicacious phrase, "the public good" is equated with "the good of every particular Member of that Society."[6] As I shall show, that is not the only (or the best) way of construing the public interest. Yet, the Founders are naturally drawn toward that conclusion by their way of anchoring the conceptual contrast in view. Fixating on the contrast between the general and the particular inevitably makes the general that which is not particular, that which is common to all. A least-common-denominator notion of the common good/public interest follows quite naturally from that way of framing the problematique.

That said, it must be added, of course, that the Founders gestured at many meanings. Most were subtly different from one another, some blatantly in conflict, all in ways largely unnoticed by these writers themselves. Thus, in ascribing this view of the public interest to the Founders I mean merely to say that this was one view of it, among others, that they held. My interest being analytical rather than purely historical, I intend simply to set those historical issues to one side. My aim is to explore the way this particular strand of thought about the public interest may articulate with thought on the separation of powers and other institutional mechanisms for promoting it.

Determining and Defending a Separation of Powers

I shall query the wisdom of that analysis of the public interest below. For now, let us accept it uncritically and proceed to demonstrate how the separation of powers and checks and balances might be justified as a contribution to the public interest thus construed. The root idea, which might be visited upon if not literally adduced from *Federalist* 51, is this.

The Federalist' Model

1. Separate the powers of government among as many distinct branches or subbranches of government as possible;[7]
2. make each branch or subbranch of government independent of (i.e., not under the control or power of) one another, insofar as possible;[8]
3. make each branch or subbranch of government responsible to the entire public but partitioned in a different way, insofar as possible;[9] and
4. give each branch or subbranch of government an effective veto over government action, insofar as possible.[10]

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[5] A parallel distinction, familiar from Roman law via the republican revival (Gunn 1989) and Blackstone's *Commentaries* (1769, book 4), is between "public" and "private" interests, rights and wrongs.

[6] Locke adds at the end of this sentence: "as far as by common Rules, it can be provided for," thus forshadowing my reconceptualization below. Locke's "i.e." at this point indicates a strictly analytical connection, in contrast to the merely causal claims ("what is good for the community is good for each of its members") that characterize other (e.g., Jacobin) versions. Likewise, by saying "every" rather than "all," Locke makes his a distributed version of the argument, in contrast to the aggregative utilitarian forms that came later. On these other versions, see Gunn (1989)

[7] "Subbranches" alludes to possibilities such as dividing the legislature into two chambers. Insofar as the executive itself is not unitary (Easterbrook 1994; Lessig and Sunstein 1994), it may be logically possible to parse powers within it as well, although *The Federalist* adamently opposes "a plurality in the executive" (Hamilton, *Federalist* 70).

[8] "The necessary partition of power ... must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constitutent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.... In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, ... each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.... It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 347–48; see similarly Madison, *Federalist* 47 and 48, and Hamilton, *Federalist* 71 and 73).

[9] The constitution aims "to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part ... by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole, very improbable, if not impracticable.... [T]he society itself will be broken into so many different parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 351). This proposition emerges particularly clearly in Madison's discussion of the logic a bicameral legislature apportioned on different bases: "To divide the legislature into different branches[,] and to render them by different modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will admit" ensures that "no law or resolution can ... be passed without the concurrence first of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the states" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 350 and *Federalist* 62, 417).

[10] "The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.... The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, ... [is] particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual, may be a centinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the state" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 349).

If we define the public interest in least-common-denominator terms, it follows that the greater the extent to which all of these propositions are satisfied, the greater the chances that any policy which emerges will be in the public interest.

This follows fairly straightforwardly from propositions 1–4 above. If each branch of government is independent of the others (2) and has a veto over outcomes (4), then the policies that emerge unvetoed will represent a "least common denominator" of what can be agreed upon among all branches of government. If, furthermore, each branch of government is responsible to the entire population but partitioned in a distinct way (3), and if there are many such partitions of the population institutionally vested with vetoes in this way (1), then that "least common denominator" of what can be agreed upon among all branches of government will also be a "least common denominator" of what can be agreed upon among the public at large. If the public interest is construed in such least-common-denominator terms, then such a system of separated powers and checks and balances will indeed promote only policies in the public interest.[11]

Deadlock is clearly defensible in these terms, in the converse case.[12] Suppose separate branches of government represent the interests of separate and distinct partitions of the population. In addition, suppose that a government in pursuit of the "general welfare" should undertake only those activities upon which all can agree.[13] Then, if one branch of government blocks actions, that is as it should be. This is not merely a matter of preventing majority tyranny, violations of rights, or neglect of interests of particular minorities (Dahl 1956, chapter 1). The argument here in view is that such policies do not even serve the *public* interest, properly understood.[14]

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Obviously, this is not the only (or perhaps even the most straightforward) way of reading *Federalist* 51. That is the force of the prime sign in the Federalist′ model. As footnotes 7–10 suggest, however, each of those component propositions certainly figures centrally there. All the building blocks are present, even if Madison himself never quite puts them together in precisely this way.[15]

Equally obviously, this constitutes a highly qualified defense of the separation of powers as built into the U.S. Constitution itself. In each of the above propositions, the injunction is to maximize "insofar as possible" the number of branches of government among which powers are divided, the independence of those branches from one another, the distinctiveness of the public to which they are responsible, and their capacity to veto one anothers' actions. But whereas maximization is enjoined (and relied upon, mathematically, for any proof of the proposition that such separation of powers serves the public interest), the U.S. Constitution manages to divide the powers of central government only four ways, among the executive, judiciary, and two chambers of the legislature. None of those branches is entirely unified within itself. None is wholly independent of every other. None has a complete capacity to veto every other's actions.[16]

The most that can credibly be claimed is that, under the U.S. Constitution, each of the four branches is responsible to the public partitioned in a slightly different way: the House by population, the Senate geographically, the executive by an Electoral College constituting a curious mix of the two, and the judiciary by history (being chosen by a president and Senate of times past).[17] But only four partitionings of a population, even one as small as that of the United States at the founding, with only imperfect separation among the partitions, provides an infirm guarantee that any dissenting interest will indeed by represented by an institutional actor interested in vetoing the offending proposal and the capacity to make that veto stick.

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[11] At least no proposal will pass which is clearly *contrary* to the least-common-denominator public interest, that is, which any power holder would rather veto than see enacted. There is no guarantee that all proposals which pass the least-common-denominator test will necessarily be enacted. There may, for example, be several proposals which everyone would like to see enacted in preference to the status quo but which different power holders rank differently; and because they cannot agree on a ranking, they may fail to enact any of these proposals.

[12] Beyond this particular argument, and perhaps underlying it for many of the Founders, may be a more general argument for "erring on the side of inaction," either on political grounds that "the government which governs least governs best" or on moralistic grounds that mere "omissions" are somehow preferable to wrongful "acts" (cf. Bennett 1983).

[13] Perhaps retaining the status quo is not something upon which all can agree, either. Logically that should be treated as an option, alongside all others, and it may well be one which would itself be vetoed by someone or another (Rae 1975). Then the public interest, understood in least-common-denominator terms, for that community simply comprises the null set.

[14] This argument assumes, however, that vetoes are used only defensively. But they can also be used offensively in rent-seeking ways, that is, people threatening to veto policies they do not actually mind (or from which they would actually benefit) unless others who stand to benefit substantially from those policies make a large side payment to them (Barry 1965, 245–50). Such vetoes will block Paretian outcomes only accidentally (when others call their bluff, and to preserve credibility they have to carry out a threat that makes them worse off) or at the margin (where people are otherwise indifferent to the policies, and then only if vetoes are essentially costless), although accidents and margins are both common enough in any large polity.

[15] He comes closest when couching his argument for a large and extended republic in the following terms: "In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 352–3). He goes off in other directions, however, in explicating the logic underlying this proposition. In *Federalist* 10, Madison writes: "The greater number of citizens and extent of territory . . . renders factious combinations less to be dreaded. . . . Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other" (Madison, *Federalist* 10, 63–64). As Dahl (1956, 16, 29) says, however, this argument "contains a number of exceedingly doubtful statements" and in any case offers no mechanism for winnowing "good" majorities from "bad" ones: "The effectiveness of any majority whatsoever is severely limited if the electorate is numerous, extended, and diverse in interests. Whether or not the majority is factional is irrelevant to the operation of the restrictions imposed by the existence of a numerous, extended, and diverse electorate."

[16] Partitioning the nation into several states similarly helps to ensure that society is "broken into . . . many parts, interests and classes of citizens" (Madison, *Federalist* 51, 351–53). But in contradistinction to the Articles of Confederation, states are explicitly denied any effective veto over the actions of the national government within its legitimate sphere of sovereign authority. Thus, the mechanism by which "federal principles" are supposed to work to promote "the republican cause" of liberty must be something other than the Federalist′ logic here in view, depending as it does upon each partition of the population enjoying a veto over the actions of all others. Alternatively, "federal principles" might merely work indirectly through their influence on the other branches, with states' peculiar interests being represented in the Senate and to a lesser extent in the Electoral College (*Federalist* 45 and 62, 311, 416–17).

Still, it is worth noting that the Founders arguably did the best they could to maximize along all these dimensions. Whether their best was good enough for the mathematics to work remains an open question. But arguably they did, "insofar as possible," strive to maximize the number of distinct branches of government among which powers were to be shared and to give each a genuine check on the other. How many truly distinct branches of government there can usefully be, in those terms, is presumably constrained by how many distinct kinds of powers, activities, or functions are involved in the process of governing. From Aristotle's *Politics* (1946, book 4, chapters 14–16) onward,[18] we have been accustomed to talking in terms of three: the legislative (deliberative), the executive, and the judicial. Further subdividing the legislative power between two chambers arguably marks the limits to which that can usefully be done while preserving any real independence among the powers thus distinguished. There are only so many jobs to do in government, only so many ways that branches can be given effective power to check one another.

Similarly, there are only so many ways of politically institutionalizing partitions of the population. Apportioning representation in branches of government according to population, or territory, or temporality just about exhausts the traditional catalogue.[19] Hybrids between them (like the Electoral College, combining the first two) are pointless unless such hybrids can somehow secure the requisite independence from their rootstock to serve the political checking function envisaged for them in this scheme.

ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL STRUCTURES

This strategy of separating powers among distinct branches of government, each responsible to a distinct partitioning of the population—the Federalist' strategy—is not the only way of pursuing the public interest, conceived in least-common-denominator ways. Next let us consider a few other familiar political structures which might be thought to promote that version of the public interest.

Interest-Based Partitions

The Federalist' strategy described above works by taking several cuts through the population and giving each of them an institutional embodiment with a veto over political outcomes. The idea is that the more cuts we take, the more likely we will be to turn up all the diverse interests afoot in the community. Giving each of them an institutional veto then ensures that we will be limited to least-common-denominator policymaking in consequence.

There is no need, with such a strategy, to know in advance what the dimensions of cleavage in the community might be, where clusters of interests may lie. The strategy of taking several cuts, of partitioning the population in many different ways and giving each partitioning an institutionalized veto, is designed precisely to obviate any need for such prior knowledge of the interest structure of the community.

The most famous alternative is precisely opposite to the Federalist' strategy in this respect. The basic idea, in very schematic form, is this.

The Estates-General Model

1. Identify all distinct communities of interest within the community, insofar as possible;
2. constitute each of those distinct communities of interest a separate electorate for a separate branch or subbranch of government (typically, a separate chamber of the legislature), insofar as possible;
3. make each branch or subbranch of government independent of (i.e., not under the control or power of) one another, insofar as possible; and
4. give each branch or subbranch of government an effective veto over government action, insofar as possible.

I call this the Estates-General model loosely after prerevolutionary French political arrangements carried over from feudal times (Berman 1983, 307–10, 393–94; Keohane 1980, 7–8).[20]

Despite the deliberate quaintness of that designation, this is a model with many echoes, both historical and contemporary, in both political theory and practice. It figures centrally in Calhoun's ([1853] 1992) arguments for concurrent majorities, the most important modern version of which is Low Country consociationalism at home (Lijphart 1975) and abroad (Lijphart 1977, 1984). It is similarly central to arguments for anarcho-syndicalism and guild socialism (Cole 1920), culminating in current thinking on market socialism (Bardhan and Roemer 1993); to corporatist arguments for interest-group intermediation (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979); and to arguments for prioritizing civil society (Putnam 1993), particularly through models of "associational democracy" (Hirst 1994).[21]

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[17] Hamilton (*Federalist* 60, 405), echoing Montesquieu's concerns with sectional self-protection, refers to the virtues of "the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The house of representatives being elected immediately by the people; the senate by the state legislatures; the president by electors chosen for that purpose by the people; there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors."

[18] Certainly through Montesquieu ([1748] 1949, book II, chapter 6), who was so influential on the Founders' thinking on separation of powers; see similarly Madison, *Federalist* 37, 235.

[19] Although there may be many ways of operationalizing each, particularly the last. Longer term perspectives can be secured by setting higher age qualifications for electors or candidates, by increasing the length of terms of service (from two years for the House, to six for the Senate, to life for judges), by making certain posts hereditary (thus hopefully tapping "lineage" interests beyond the term of a natural life). *The Federalist* employed all of the former devices, balking only at the last.

[20] The Florentine constitution, famous among Atlantic republicans, similarly required that to become law a measure must be approved by three chambers (the nine senators/magistrates; the Council of the People; and the Council of the Nobles) as a means of ensuring that only measures transparently in the public interest were eventually enacted (Bruni 1987).

It is easy enough to see how this Estates-General Model is supposed to promote the public interest, understood in least-common-denominator terms. If each organ of government is independent of the other (3), and each has an effective veto over outcomes (4), then the policies which emerge unvetoed will represent a least common denominator of what can be agreed upon among all organs of government. If, furthermore, every interest is embodied in a distinct organ of government with just such an effective veto over policy (2), then that least common denominator of what can be agreed upon among all organs of government will also be a least common denominator of what can be agreed upon among the public at large.

This Estates-General strategy, however, embodies various questionable presuppositions. One is that we will be able to identify in advance all distinct communities of interest and that we will be able to give them all an effective veto over government policy. That, in turn, presupposes relatively few distinct communities of interest (otherwise we may end up needing too many corresponding "branches or subbranches of government" for them to be given any distinct functions or hence any effective veto over one another).[22] The Estates-General strategy further presupposes some substantial permanency in that cleavage structure (since those communities of interest are to be ossified in enduring branches or subbranches of government).

Occasionally, those preconditions are all met. It turns out to be easy to identify all truly distinct communities of interest; they turn out to be sufficiently few in number for each to be embodied in a distinct branch or subbranch of government with effective veto powers of its own; they turn out to be stable enough for that political structure to serve the community well for a protracted period. More often, a few major cleavages will be identified and institutionalized while others are overlooked and institutionally neglected. Furthermore, over time social structures and salient cleavages typically change far more quickly than political institutions which have been set in constitutional cement.

Note that the problems here in view concern only neglected interests. On this construction of the public interest, the problem is not that the Estates-General is unrepresentative of the larger public—that it is malapportioned, that it gives more power to certain segments of society than they rightfully deserve. That, though true, is irrelevant to the least-common-denominator criterion of the public interest. According to that criterion, anyone who wants to exercise a veto should have one to exercise. The problem, in this analysis, is not too many vetoes but too few. The fear is that there may be (or may come to be) some distinct interests which are left out of the Estates-General regime, people whose distinct interests are not protected by institutionalized vetoes embodied in that system of government.

Responsible Party Government

The notion of responsible party government is what is ordinarily offered in response to problems created by excessive separation of powers and checks and balances.[23] The root idea is to circumvent the constitutional separation of powers through the extra-constitutional device of political parties. If there is unified party which is in control of all the separate branches of government, it can make them all act in unison. Power can then be exercised effectively, albeit in an unchecked way (or, rather, checked only by the obligation of governing parties to present themselves periodically for reelection).

This model of Responsible Party Government is most often offered as a solution to the problem of how to get coherent action out of a constitutionally fragmented political system. The solution it offers is predicated, among other things, on more unified parties than we recently (or perhaps ever) have known. It is predicated, furthermore, on more unified single-party control of all branches of government than we have recently experienced. Those twin facts give rise, respectively, to large literatures on party reform (Kirkpatrick 1971; Ranney 1975) and on divided government and the consequent deadlock of democracy, alluded to at the outset.

Here I want to interrogate that model from a different perspective. I want to query whether, even if those particular problems could be overcome, the model of Responsible Party Government could constitute a credible alternative to the Federalist' strategy for promoting the public interest, understood (still) in strictly least-common-denominator terms.

In that context, the model of Responsible Party Government amounts to altering condition 2 in the Federalist' model. Where the latter enjoins us to "make each branch of government independent of (i.e., not under the control or power of) one another," the model of Responsible Party Government effectively enjoins us to "make each branch dependent upon (under the control or power of) some common agent," that is, the political party.

With that alteration, there is no reason to suppose that the rest of the Federalist' logic will work to promote the public interest. No matter how many or distinct the partitionings of the population to which separate branches of government are responsible, if there is a common agency directing the activities of all of them, then they can provide no effective check on one another. Whichever partitioning of the population is represented by the party in power will work its will through government, unchecked by representatives of any other partitioning of the population.

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[21] None of these other writers would give vetoes to every individual with a distinct interest: They would, rather, give vetoes only to distinct "communities of interest," which they typically tend to see as sectorally distinct and functionally defined.

[22] This objection might be overcome if, as some assert is the case, (1) branches of government are themselves internally deeply divided, and (2) each interest can find some executive agency or legislative committee with an effective veto over policies of interest to them. See footnote 7.

[23] This was, and remains, Burns's (1963, 6; 1984) own preferred remedy. See similarly APSA 1950; Fiorina 1980; cf. Kirkpatrick 1971; Ranney 1962, 1975.

How may we revise the model of Responsible Party Government to promote the public interest, understood in least-common-denominator terms? One way—call it RPG^1—would be for parties themselves to be internally diverse rather than unified. If the political party were itself rather like what the Founders thought the national government should be—full of centers of power with effective vetoes, each center being responsible to different partitionings of the population—then perhaps only least-common-denominator propositions would ever be adopted for a party's program. Of course, if each party were literally like that, if each were perfectly representative of the least common denominator among the population as a whole, then there would be no substantive policy-based competition among them. Tweedledee-Tweedledum politics, with parties differentiated only by stylistic differences and personality cults, suggests that they may at least sometimes be like that. But the evidence suggests that is far from the standard pattern of party competition (Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Page 1978).

There is a second version of the Responsible Party Government model, call it RPG^2. Whereas RPG^1 assumes that parties are internally diverse, RPG^2 takes them to be internally unified; but, unlike RPG^1, RPG^2 assumes that government is divided, so each party must cut a deal with other parties in order to enact and implement policy. More formally, RPG^2 holds that:

Responsible Party Government^2 Model

1. Make each party represent distinct communities of interest, insofar as possible;
2. give each party control of a distinct branch of government, insofar as possible;
3. make each department of government independent of one another, insofar as possible; and
4. give each branch of government an effective veto over the proposals of the others.

What all this adds up to is another justification of deadlock. It says that the different parties represent different interests and control different branches of government, each with a veto over government policy. On this account, the public interest (understood still in least-common-denominator ways) will be effectively promoted by institutionalized vetoes, just so long as: Each distinct community of interest is represented politically by a party (1) with an effective veto over government policy (4), which it can exercise independently of the choices of any other party/branch of government (3).

This, however, is just a party-based version of the Estates-General Model, prey to the same difficulties. The RPG^2 model presupposes that there are relatively few dimensions of cleavage (few enough to be represented by parties with effective representation in the legislature), and it presupposes that party structures are at least as fluid as are dimensions of cleavage in the larger society. Occasionally, that is true. More often, there are many more dimensions of cleavage than there are parties, with parties functioning as consolidators rather than representing distinct communities of interest (Kirchheimer 1966). And cleavages often get frozen in party structures (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), with new dimensions of cleavage being politically neglected for some substantial time.

In those circumstances, obviously, there is no reason to believe that divided government embodying institutionalized party-based vetoes on policy would guarantee policies promoting the public interest, even in least-common-denominator terms. As with the Estates-General Model, newly emerging interests would be neglected. Indeed, as with the other Responsible Party Government Model (RPG^1), parties would represent compromises among various interests rather than standing forthrightly as bastions of any given interest. Either, much less both, would seriously compromise the capacity of the RPG^2 model to guarantee least-common-denominator outcomes.

Legislative Unanimity

Finally, there are two slightly silly proposals. One, to be discussed here, suggests that in principle (if not—not for any principled reason—in practice) we should insist upon unanimity within the legislative chamber to guarantee least-common-denominator policies in the public interest.[24] The other, discussed in the next subsection, extends that to the population of voters at large.

The fullest development of the legislative version of this argument is found in Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) *Calculus of Consent*. The root idea is this.

Legislative Unanimity Model

1. Represent each distinct interest in the community at large with at least one member of the legislature, insofar as possible;
2. make legislators or groups of legislators representing distinct interests in the legislative assembly independent of one another, insofar as possible; and
3. give each legislator or group of legislators representing a distinct interest in the legislature a veto over policy, insofar as possible.[25]

Transaction costs make it wildly impractical to negotiate literally unanimous outcomes, as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) themselves say in support of dropping the requirement to a mere three-quarters majority. All sorts of "supermajorities" are required for all sorts of purposes all over the world. Such requirements all seem logically grounded, in precisely this fashion, on a compromise between the principled appeal of unanimity conjoined with the practicalities of minimizing the transaction costs that would be involved in coming to literally unanimous decisions (Lijphart 1984).

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[24] The more appealing application of unanimity rules comes at another level altogether, in the adoption of a constitution in the first place: Only those jurisdictions which want to be included can decently be included under its rule (Madison, *Federalist* 39, 254; Ostrom 1987, chapter 3).

[25] The classic historical exemplar is the much-maligned "liberum veto" by which every deputy was able to veto any act of the old Polish Diet (Hamilton, *Federalist* 22, 140; Rousseau [1772] 1986, 191).

Be issues of practicality as they may, it is important to acknowledge the power of the Legislative Unanimity Model—and, in the next subsection, of its Direct Democratic analogue—in promoting the public interest, understood strictly in least-common-denominator terms. From that perspective, the Legislative Unanimity Model seems to be a variation on the Estates-General Model that might actually work. After all, there are many more legislators than there are parties; and they can be changed much more frequently than we can realign the fundamental cleavages dividing political parties. Thus, it is much more reasonable to suppose that each distinct community of interest in the population may find at least one representative (among the 535 in the U.S. Congress, for example) to speak for them.[26] Insofar as that representative truly represents a distinctive interest, and insofar as the public interest truly is nothing more than the least common denominator among all distinct private interests, then it is indeed proper that public policy should not proceed unless all representatives of all interests are agreed.

It may well be that not much gets done that way (Gray and Lowery 1995). But on the model of public interest here in view, that is as it should be. If the least common denominator is truly what the public interest amounts to, then the sheer fact that there is someone who wants to veto a proposal is conclusive proof that the proposal is not in the public interest after all.[27] If we think that conclusion is wrong, then we ought to reconsider the premises—most particularly, that way of construing the public interest—which leads so inexorably to it.

Direct Democracy

Finally, after the fashion and in the spirit of the Legislative Unanimity Model, let us consider an analogous model of Unanimous Direct Democracy. There are various ways of instantiating that model. Perhaps the least impractical among them would be along these lines: Let some representative assembly develop proposals and, indeed, enact legislation; but then let that legislation be subject to repeal by the negative votes of some moderately small proportion of the electorate at large, in a subsequent referendum on that legislation.[28]

If we take the least-common-denominator notion of the public interest seriously, it is clear that this sort of mechanism (assuming transaction costs to be as modest as modern technology apparently guarantees that they can be) would ensure that the public interest is well served. Any proposal contrary to the interests of any nonnegligible proportion of the population would be vetoed in such a referendum. Lots of items would thus be vetoed. But, by this standard of the public interest, lots should be.[29]

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The latter two models seem to constitute *reductios ad absurdum*. What is it that those *reductios* render absurd? Some, including some advocates of the Legislative Unanimity Model, would trace the absurdity to any attempt to justify strong state action, especially by appeal to notions of the public interest. My counterproposal is that the absurdity lies in least-common-denominator standards of the public interest.[30]

To help motivate that conclusion, consider this case. Everyone must breathe tolerably clear air and drink tolerably clean water in order to live, and (at least in the days before filtered air and bottled water) everyone must breathe and drink much the same air and water as everyone else around them. If anything at all is in the public interest, surely those things must be (or, rather, have been).

Some people, however, stand to profit from polluting the air or water, and their personal profits from so doing sometimes exceed the costs they must personally pay in terms of damaged lungs and livers. Now, insofar as anyone at all has a strong private interest in undermining such common pool resources, least-common-denominator logic would conclude that protecting those resources is not in the public interest after all. But surely that is precisely what is wrong with the logic. To say that clean air or water is not in the public interest merely because someone in the community would privately profit from abusing it is surely a gross and palpable perversion of the notion. We may think public interests should sometimes *yield* to private interests in such situations. Surely, however, we would not want to say that the mere existence of a strong private interest suffices to *extinguish* the public one.

Reconceptualizations

There are many ways of framing alternatives to the least-common-denominator model of the public interest.[31] Instead of focusing upon interests we happen to have in common, we may focus upon interests we *must* have in common: the public interest is necessarily, and not merely contingently, public. Rather than scanning all our sundry interests for ones which may be shared, we may fix our focus on interests deriving from certain shared public roles: the public interest is that interest which we all share *qua* members of the public (Barry 1964; 1965, 190–92). Instead of looking for shared interests, we may look for *shared mechanisms* for serving our interests: the public interest is a reference to those interests which could best (perhaps only) be pursued publicly.

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[26] They may, of course, find several to speak for them. But since this model presupposes perfect responsiveness of representatives to interest communities, they will all say the same thing, so their multiplicity hardly matters, either for good or ill.

[27] In the Paretian terms preferred by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), that veto constitutes conclusive proof that, even after all possible log-rolling has been done, the winners still cannot compensate losers for their losses from the proposed change.

[28] A "relatively small proportion," rather than a single negative vote alone, out of deference to the same sorts of practicality considerations that commend supermajority rules rather than literal unanimity in the Legislative Unanimity case, above.

[29] Another instantiation of this same basic logic might be to invite individual citizens to seek judicial remedies for state action that is contrary to their interests, in some suitably strong sense. Assuming courts with power of judicial review, each individual empowered to petition in this way might be conceived as having a veto of sorts over public action. But assuming citizens can equally well sue against public inaction as action, different citizens' claims and counterclaims may well cancel one another out, leaving courts to determine the public interest by balancing those claims and counterclaims without treating either as an absolutely determinative "veto."

[30] Which persist powerfully to this day, most recently and most famously in John Rawls's (1993, 131–72) model of "overlapping consensus" as the essence of liberal justification.

Rather than fixating upon the fine differences between those alternatives, let us focus on the broad area of overlap between them. Something may be regarded as being in the public interest if and only if: (1) It is an interest that people necessarily share (2) by virtue of their role as a member of the public (3) which can best or only be promoted by concerted public action. In contrast to the least-common-denominator analysis, let us call this the "highest common concern" model of the public interest.[32]

A great many of the classic collective consumption goods are, thanks to "scale" and "contagion" effects, public in that third sense. It is cheaper and easier to prevent disease through public health measures (sanitary sewers, mass innoculations), to move people through congested urban centers on public carriers (buses, subways) than private ones (cars), and so on. It is not that private alternatives are impossible or that public provision is strictly necessary. It is simply that, as a matter of policy, we prefer collective provision—in these cases, typically for lowly pragmatic reasons.

The sense in which these can claim to be "highest" common concerns appeals to the other two components of that definition. As a matter of principle rather than pure pragmatism, people sometimes want to see themselves as a member of some particular "public," composed in some particular way; and in consequence of that shared membership, sharing certain other things necessarily follows. What exactly those may be depends upon how exactly the public in question is construed, what exactly is taken to be constitutive of it.[33] The necessity of certain interests being "necessarily shared" (feature 1) clearly resides, however, not in any objective features of the goods themselves, but rather in the socially constructed internal logic of "membership of the public" in question (feature 2).

Thus, the highest common concerns that define the public interest point to things (shared roles and the shared interests, values, objects, and activities following from them) people *want* to have in common, rather than to things they just happen to have in common. In registering their highest common concerns, people are not just recording their interests and preferences. They are also taking a "critical reflective attitude" toward them.

That fact justifies according public interests, thus defined, at least a certain measure of priority over people's more purely private concerns. The fact that highest common concerns reflect an evaluative stance that people have taken toward their own preferences and values makes those higher-order value judgments, which are privileged for that very reason. Whatever reason we have for respecting people's preferences also gives us a reason to respect, all the more strongly, their preferences for preferences (Frankfurt 1971), their evaluations of their own preferences (Watson 1975).

What people's second-order preferences may turn out to be cannot, of course, be stipulated a priori. What is analytically clear, however, is that to qualify definitionally as "highest *common* concerns," the concerns will have to be shared across (virtually) the entire community, the standard applying to the community as a whole. Everyone (or virtually everyone) has to want themselves, and everyone else, to want those things.

How extensive such shared concerns may be varies from place to place and waxes and wanes with time. But insofar as there are any highest common concerns within a community at all, they typically will and logically ought to include certain "collective consumption goods" of one sort or another—not because they themselves constitute the highest common concerns as such, but merely because they are causal prerequisites of communal interactions sufficient to generate a sense of commonality in any other respect.[34]

Implementation

Having sketched the contours of this alternative conception of the public interest, let us now consider briefly how best to implement it. The overall aim of political arrangements designed to promote the highest common concerns would be (as the reference to *common* concerns suggests) to encourage people to take a comprehensive view of issues, to get everyone to take an expansive view of things, to see things from everyone's perspective, to take the "view from everywhere" (cf. Nagel 1986).

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[31] See Flathman 1966; Gunn 1989; Held 1970; Schubert 1960. Here, I confine my attention to essentially individualistic models, construing interests as being at root *people's* interests rather than predicating them on some supraindividual organic entity, The Public (cf. Held 1970, chapter 5).

[32] This concept is certainly true to the rhetoric of self-styled "public interest groups" (Gardner 1972; Berry 1977). Hints of it are found in the Rousseauian turn of Locke's phrase quoted in footnote 6 and even in *The Federalist* itself, most famously perhaps in Madison's *Federalist* 10 characterization of "the great object to which our enquiries are directed" as being "to secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a [majority] faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government" (Madison, *Federalist* 10, 61).

[33] Voting rights are conventionally taken to be constitutive of membership in a democratic polity: Sharing political power with others in that way is thus written into the internal logic of one's membership in a democratic community. The sharing of articles of faith and religious practices is similarly written into the internal logic of one's membership in a religious community, and the sharing of certain specific goods and services into the internal logic of one's membership in a mutual-aid society.

[34] This argument, structurally similar to Shue's (1980) for basic rights, draws on a tradition of cooperative socialism running through Tawney, Cole, and Crosland, its fullest current flowering coming in Barry (1965, 231–32; 1993). For empirical evidence, see Kasarda and Janowitz 1974.

Institutionalized vetoes, although they may be useful for implementing least-common-denominator goals, are powerfully counterproductive of highest-common-concern ones. They simply send the wrong signals. They miscue people—voters and politicians alike—to think in narrow terms of personal and sectional interests. A veto is a device designed precisely to protect one's particular interests against the designs of others. It is not a device by which a group of people can sensibly decide what they collectively want to do.[35] Even if people internalize "higher" common concerns alongside their more particular interests, operating through a system of internalized vetoes is no way to evoke those higher concerns—indeed, quite the contrary.

Thus, it is clear what we should avoid in trying to evoke these all-encompassing highest common concerns. Alas, no similarly simple and straightforward institutional mechanisms can be guaranteed to evoke them. A panoply of conventional and not-so-conventional devices will be surveyed briefly below. None, however, is in itself sufficient; none is strictly necessary; all of them together are somewhat less than sufficient.

First, there are various prescriptions for vesting more power in more all-inclusive entities. These are the terms in which corporatists praise peak trade and labor associations such as the all-encompassing Swedish Labor Organization (Olson 1982, 89–92), in which *The Federalist* praised a more "extensive" republic over a smaller ones (Madison, *Federalist* 10, 62–65) and the executive over the legislature (Hamilton, *Federalist* 76, 511), in which New Dealers and their successors praise Washington over the states. These, or something like them, are the terms in which contemporary critics of deadlock also praise some of the various schemes for securing more unified national government (Sorensen 1984; Robinson 1985, part 3). The root sentiment underlying all these propositions is that any institutions which respond to a single, unified, nationwide constituency are presumably more likely to take an all-encompassing, highest-common-concern view of matters.

A second set of prescriptions is procedural in form. One, analogous to Wicksell's ([1896] 1967) for public goods provision, is to bundle legislation into inseparable omnibus bills wherever possible. A less extreme version might be restrictive rules, such as those governing congressional budget deliberations, precluding floor amendments to bills as reported out of committee (Krehbiel 1989). Another, after the fashion of Rousseau ([1762] 1973, book 1, chapter 6, book 2, chapter 6), is to require that all laws be "general in form."[36] In all these cases, the root idea is that procedures which make policymakers look at the "big picture" will presumably make them more likely to take an all-encompassing, highest-common-concern view.

A third set of prescriptions points to the ways in which public discussion induces people to think in terms of shared mutual concerns.[37] The sheer fact of communication, utterly unattached to any sanction or retaliatory threat, can in itself cause subsequent behavior to take more cooperative, public-spirited forms, as anthropology suggests (Bilmes 1979) and prisoners' dilemma collective action experiments confirm.[38] Such reflections may make us warm, in ways we almost certainly otherwise would not, to the various archaic practices and vaguely monastic institutions of the unreformed U.S. Congress.[39] Whatever we say against them, ossified elites and iron triangles at least have the virtue of ensuring ongoing discursive engagement of a sort which may well lead interlocutors to inculcate more expansive public-spirited concerns. Indeed, *The Federalist* itself praises the capacities of elite assemblies (particularly the Senate and Electoral College) to "promote deliberation and circumspection and . . . to check excesses in the majority," thus supplanting fleeting passions and factional interests with the "cool and deliberate sense of the community" (Hamilton, *Federalist* 70; Madison, *Federalist* 63, 475, 425; see also Madison, *Federalist* 10, and Hamilton, *Federalist* 68 and 71, 61–65, 482–83).

In the end, though, each of those institutional fixes is liable to misfire. Representatives of broad national constituencies may serve as agents of majority tyranny over distinctive local or sectoral interests: there is no reason to suppose that the various proposals for breaking deadlocks and making all institutions speak with the same voice will necessarily make them speak with the nation's one uniquely authentic voice. Omnibus legislation may merely enshrine manipulative agenda-setting on the part of those putting together the package; and laws that are general in form may nonetheless narrowly serve venal interests.[40] Members of cozy cabals can easily serve one another's interests without in any way promoting broader public interests. There can simply be no institutional design offering *mechanistic* guarantees of good government. However well designed, any mechanisms that strive to be sensitive to the disparities of interests and the peculiarities of local knowledge are inevitably prone to manipulation by anyone so disposed (Hurwicz 1977).[41]

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[35] We may want to retain a system of vetoes, in case the collective enterprise goes badly off the rails, just as we may want to retain a system of vested rights for much the same reason. But trying to shape our joint public projects through constant exercise of veto powers is as futile as trying to conduct intimate relations while constantly standing on our rights (Waldron 1993).

[36] Madison (*Federalist* 57, 386–87) echoes this is saying that representatives will be "restrained from oppressive measures" by the fact "that they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rules and the people together. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments . . . without which every government degenerates into tyranny."

[37] At a crassly calculating level, interlocutors must appeal to interests and opinions shared by others if the latter are to be moved by the appeal. At a deeper level, internalizing the perspective of the other—actively representing the other's thoughts inside one's own head—lies at the core of contemporary philosophical understandings of how language works at all, given the impossibility of literally getting inside "other minds" and gaining direct access to the speaker's own thoughts (Goodin forthcoming).

[38] Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell 1990; Frey and Bohnet forthcoming; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994, chapters 7–9; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992.

[39] Among them: late-night legislative sessions and shared lodgings in ramshackle old hotels; low turnover and seniority systems; norms of comity, deference, and courtesy; and closed sessions and other rules encouraging deliberation and consensus-building within committees, on the floor, and with opposite numbers in other branches of government (Matthews 1959; Uslaner 1991).

[40] As with a proposed 1975 revision in the tax code, which notwithstanding the generality of its formal language would have enriched H. Ross Perot and (as tax legislation goes) him virtually alone (Hardin 1982, 78). If we were to ask what restrains the House of Representatives from making legal discrimination in favor of themselves and a

Where mechanism design fails, moral psychology—political culture and personal commitments—must step into the breach (Putnam 1993; Taylor 1996). Mechanisms are not irrelevant. But the real service that each of the mechanisms surveyed above performs is, I submit, not so much to *make* politicians and the voters they represent respect the public interest as it is to *remind* them to do so.[42] Anyone determined to flout such duties can always work around such mechanisms. Still, having to do so will discomfort any who harbor even minimal respect for their public responsibilities. We may prefer to rely as little as possible on people internalizing the demands of morality and being prepared to do the right thing for its own sake. But broadly speaking we can, and ultimately we must, count on people's internalized moral codes and sense of duty to make them do the right thing, when prompted by sufficiently salient reminders.[43]

Moral psychology is powerfully reassuring in this respect. There is substantial evidence that both voters and public officials do indeed internalize public-spirited conceptions of the particular responsibilities attaching to their public roles. Voters reward or punish incumbents according to whether they have been good for the economy or the environment of the community as a whole, whether or not the voter has been personally benefited or burdened by those policies (Kiewiet 1983; Rohrschneider 1988). By the same token, politicians seem genuinely to strive to promote the public good, according to their varying but very genuine conceptions of it (Maass 1983; Reich 1988). In short, people have particular role responsibilities, which are situationally activated; and there is every reason to suppose that, in their public capacities, they act (or at least are capable of acting, when called upon to do so) in an appropriately public-spirited fashion.

Psychologically, what is going on when people respond in such ways to the situational promptings of their role responsibilities is precisely what the highest-common-concern model would prescribe. Responding in terms of their public role responsibilities, as members or servants of the public, people fix their focus on precisely those interests they share with all other members of the public simply by virtue of their shared membership in the same public. By the same token, they suppress considerations of countervailing interests of a more particular sort, not shared across the entire community, which on a more personal calculation of interests (or, indeed, on a least-common-denominator conception of their public role responsibilities) may tempt them to act contrary to those shared public interests. Public discourse facilitates this by forcing people to internalize the perspectives of others and cast their appeals in terms others can share, not only to win support but also to conduct a public conversation at all.

In the course of acting on their public role responsibilities, it is perfectly proper for each to explain to the others how his or her particular interests will be affected by a policy, in hopes of making his/her concerns their own. To outsiders, such proceedings may well look like log-rolling of a fairly ordinary sort. But from the inside—and even, upon closer inspection, from the outside—there will be important differences. In an ordinary strategic bargaining game, the last thing you want to do is admit to your counterparts across the table your strategic vulnerability. The last thing international fisheries negotiators should do, when bargaining over catch limits, is admit that their country is highly dependent upon the catch in question for protein in its diet. In a less strategic setting, in which everyone is trying to come to some common solution in a more cooperative way, that is the first thing you should do, and it is in fact the first thing that international fisheries negotiators do (Midgaard 1976; Underdal 1980). Cooperative discussions of this sort may serve as a model for the pursuit of higher common concerns in politics more generally.

CONCLUSION

In the end, ideas matter. Both public officials and the voters to whom they are answerable take their public roles and the responsibilities attaching to them seriously. Both voters and public officials have shown themselves capable of internalizing broader notions of the public interest in the more all-encompassing highest-common-concerns terms here advocated. But for too long they have been told that the job of elected officials in an American-style system was simply to "check and balance" one another, thus "promoting the public interest" in narrow least-common-denominator terms. That, I submit, is the wrong way of understanding the public interest: the wrong way for us, as both citizens and public servants, to conceptualize our public roles and their attendant responsibilities.

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particular class of society, *The Federalist* could merely answer "the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws, and the vigilant and manly spirit which activates the people of America" (Madison, *Federalist* 57, 387). All that bluster adds up, roughly speaking, to saying "nothing, much"—save the sense of "duty, gratitude, interest and ambition" which *The Federalist* goes on to discuss in the following paragraphs.

[41] The same is true of institutionalized vetoes as guarantees of least-common-denominator results: The strategic employment of vetoes for "offensive," rent-seeking purposes (footnote 14 above) constitutes a distortion with the same root causes as those discussed here.

[42] After the fashion of the effect that relatively toothless requirements simply to file an Environmental Impact Statement nonetheless "make bureaucracies think" about the damage they may do to the environment and alter their activities, at least at the margins, in consequence (Taylor 1984).

[43] Goodin 1992, 1995, chapter 9. Here, again, we find Madisonian echo. Perhaps "neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control" all by themselves (Madison, *Federalist* 10, 61). Still, "duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which [representatives] will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can devise?" (Madison, *Federalist* 57, 387). See further Scanlan 1959.

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The Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment: Rousseau and the New Religion of Sincerity

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Rousseau inaugurated the counter-Enlightenment—that attack on secular rationalism and quest for "re-enchantment" that has, in one form or another, been with us ever since (and which, if the postmodern age has really arrived, now enjoys its heyday). The crowning expression of this event was Rousseau's effort to revive (while transforming) Christianity. Yet, paradoxically, it is also in Rousseau that the polemical core of the Enlightenment—the critique of Christianity—reached its fullest development. This strange co-presence of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment suggests an unsuspected continuity between the two. Rousseau, by pursuing more radically the underlying goal of the Enlightenment critique of Christianity—the restoration of human wholeness—was led to extend that very critique to Enlightenment rationalism itself and thence to propose a return to religion, but to one that, rooted in sincerity, would not only avoid the dangers of traditional Christianity but also better fulfill the Enlightenment's own humanistic goal.

The counter-Enlightenment begins with Rousseau. He not only launched the famous attack on the arts and sciences or on modern rationalism generally but also initiated that paradoxical effort, pursued variously by Romantics, Existentialists, and postmodernists: the philosophical project to re-enchant the world.

The crowning expression of Rousseau's revolt against the Enlightenment was his new religious doctrine, which marked a major turning point in modern Western thinking. From the Renaissance through the Enlightenment, the dominant current of modern philosophy was essentially hostile to religion: It was openly anticlerical and covertly anti-Christian. Rousseau inaugurated what may be called the philosophical return to Christianity, which was continued, in different ways, by such thinkers as Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Tocqueville, and Kierkegaard. Going beyond the Enlightenment efforts to "manage" religion found in Locke, Hume, Voltaire, and others, he made an earnest attempt to revive and reinvigorate Christianity, if in a new, more politically salutary form.

Thus, Rousseau's religious writings—once so famous and now virtually ignored—are crucial for understanding the whole phenomenon of post-Enlightenment religiosity, which is, of course, still very much alive today, in our surprisingly pious age. Is this religious revival purely a reaction against the secular Enlightenment, a simple resurgence of traditional religious beliefs and impulses? Or, despite appearances, does it spring from and continue the Enlightenment in some fundamental way, thus transforming all earlier Christianity?

At stake in these questions is the character not only of modern religious belief but also of the Enlightenment itself and its role in spawning the movements that oppose it. Does the Enlightenment, which seems secular and rationalistic at its core, have a still more fundamental core that is hospitable to religion and re-enchantment? Does the counter-Enlightenment, which seems so radical (especially in contemporary, postmodernist forms) represent less a rejection than a deepening, or alternate form, of the Enlightenment?

For the study of these still larger issues, Rousseau's religious writings are the veritable Rosetta Stone because they are the only texts that somehow embrace both sides of the ideological divide. On the one hand, they contain, indeed initiate, the post-Enlightenment renewal of Christianity; on the other, they restate, indeed bring to fullest expression, the scathing Enlightenment critique of it. These opposite elements, moreover, are not only copresent but dialectically related: In Rousseau's works, the Enlightenment is not rejected but transformed before our eyes into the religious counter-Enlightenment. Thus, it is in these privileged texts, if anywhere, that we may hope to decipher the inner relation between the two.[1]

In the somewhat complex argument to follow, I begin with Rousseau's "Enlightenment side," elaborating his political critique of Christianity, which in its candor and comprehensiveness provides the single best statement of the underlying antireligious thrust of early modern philosophy as a whole. In examining this critique, however, we will also see at every turn how Rousseau extends it to include modern rationalism, how—penetrating to its core concern to make humanity whole and at home in this world—he transforms the Enlightenment critique of religion into a critique of the alienating effects of Enlightenment. Through this dialectical self-overcoming of modern rationalism, Rousseau is led back to religion as something politically and morally necessary. Turning to Rousseau's "revivalist side," then, I outline the new religion of sincerity presented in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar." Finally, I demonstrate that this religious doctrine, with its radical innovations, is systematically structured not only to solve each of the problems of the above critique but also to fulfill the Enlightenment goal of wholeness that underlies it. In this important

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[1] On Rousseau as both member and dialectical critic of the Enlightenment, see Hulliung 1994.

sense, the Rousseauian counter-Enlightenment is ultimately a deeper, more self-consistent expression of the Enlightenment.

ROUSSEAU'S CRITIQUE: THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY

In a brief letter to a friend attacking *Emile*, Voltaire, Rousseau's implacable foe and persecutor, is compelled to make an admiring exception for "some forty pages against Christianity, some of the boldest that have ever been written" (letter to Damilaville, June 14, 1762). Indeed, although a certain hostility to Christianity characterized and motivated Western philosophy at least since Marsilius of Padua, it seems that no one wished or dared to present an open and comprehensive formulation of the problem until Rousseau. This formulation may be found distributed among various passages in *Emile* and other writings but above all in the famous chapter "On Civil Religion" in the *Social Contract*. Thus, this brief chapter, when illuminated through reference to Rousseau's other discussions, is an invaluable document, clarifying the underlying motives of early modern thought as a whole. In other words, modern philosophy, as is often remarked, was highly polemical in its origins and purposes. Yet, for the most part, it stated its solution without hazarding a full explanation of the problem. "On Civil Religion" is the clearest statement we possess of the political problem of Christianity.[2]

Christianity, as formulated in the Gospels, claims to be unique in the strictness of its moral demands and the other-worldly spirituality of its final ends, and Rousseau, for one, fully accepts this characterization. One might then expect so moral a religion to be socially and politically salutary. Rousseau acknowledges an element of truth to this view: Christianity has softened men and made them, for the most part, more merciful, humane, and obedient (*Emile*, 313n; letter to Usteri, July 18, 1763; *Montagne*, 706; *Geneva Manuscript* [henceforth *GM*], 162). Yet, these advantages notwithstanding, "Christian law is fundamentally more harmful than useful to the strong constitution of a state." "I know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit" (*Social Contract* [henceforth *SC*], 127, 128). Indeed, it is because of Christianity, according to Rousseau, that ancient liberty or republican freedom has all but disappeared from the world: "I am mistaken when I speak of a Christian republic; these two words are mutually exclusive" (*SC*, 130). That is why, as he bitterly declares, "these two words, *fatherland* and *citizen*, should be effaced from modern languages" (*Emile*, 40). It is no exaggeration to say that, in Rousseau's view, Christianity has ruined the politics of the West.[3]

These bold and blasphemous criticisms, which Voltaire found so delightful, other readers will find offensive. They *are* offensive. Nevertheless, it should be important to scholars of every persuasion to understand this now half-forgotten critique, which in one version or another played so crucial a role both in the rise of modern thought and in the subsequent transformations of Christianity itself.

The political problem of Christianity, to state it most briefly, is that it destroys the unity of the state and, ultimately, of the soul. The deepest goal of the Enlightenment critique of religion was to re-attach men's hearts to the earth, to their political communities, and to themselves. To understand what this means, however, it is better to begin on a more general level, where the critique, as Rousseau elaborates it, takes the form of seven distinct, if interrelated, charges. In examining them, however, we will see that, for Rousseau, the Enlightenment itself is also guilty of these same charges, partly because the *philosophes* were driven to copy the Church in order to combat it and, more generally, because abstract, secular rationalism is ultimately no less divisive and alienating than Christian revelation.

Persecution and Sectarian Conflict

The most familiar charge is that of intolerance and persecution, of "pious cruelty" (in Machiavelli's phrase), symbolized historically by the "horrors of the inquisition" and, more personally for Rousseau, by the desperate plight of his fellow Protestants in Catholic France (*GM*, 199–201, 208, n42). A dangerous increase in intolerance, Rousseau suggests, flows almost inevitably from the two central Christian tenets of monotheism and the afterlife as well as from the crucial emphasis Christianity places on doctrine or belief.

Pagan religion was civil religion, growing from political needs and passions. "As soon as men live in society, they must have a religion that keeps them there. A people has never subsisted nor ever will subsist without religion" (*GM*, 195; see *SC*, 124, 69–70). The gods are needed to legitimize and enforce devotion to the particular political community by combatting both individualistic self-love and cosmopolitan love of humanity. But "by the sole fact that God was placed at the head of every political society, it followed that there were as many Gods as there were peoples" (*SC*, 124). Polynationalism resulted in polytheism. This, in turn, produced a kind of religious tolerance. For the existence of our neighbors' god in no way puts in question the existence of ours; and why should we expect our neighbors to worship our god, who sides with us, instead of their own? Thus, as Rousseau puts it, "the Gods of the pagans were not jealous Gods. They divided dominion over the world among themselves" (*SC*, 125). In the world of pagan polytheism, there was a natural pluralism and toleration.

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[2] In the first half of the eighteenth century in France, however, there were more than 100 unpublished, "clandestine" manuscripts in circulation that attacked Christianity, the most influential of which was Boulainvilliers' *L'Esprit de Spinosa*, also entitled *Les Trois imposteurs*. See Ira O. Wade's classic work, *The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750* (1938); see also Spink 1960, 238–311. Also worthy of mention is Holbach's *Le Christianisme dévoilé*, which was published, albeit anonymously, around 1756.

[3] If Rousseau's views should seem unrepresentative, consider Locke's statement in an early, unpublished essay: "You can by no means, nor without the greatest tyranny, prescribe [someone] a way of worship; which was so unreasonable to do, that we find scarce any attempt towards it by the magistrates in the several societies of mankind till Christianity was well grown up in the world, and was become a national religion; and since that it hath been the cause of more disorders, tumults, and bloodshed, than all the other causes put together" ("Sacerdos" 288–89; see 290). Again, the "Christian religion hath made more factions, wars, and disturbances in civil societies than any other" ("Essay on Toleration" 194; cf *Letter Concerning Toleration* 54–55; see *Two Tracts*, 160–61).

This is not to say that paganism encouraged international harmony and brotherhood. Just the contrary: It grew out of and gave further expression to the preexisting group conflicts and xenophobic passions of the human species. It strengthened, by sanctifying, the hatred of outsiders, the primitive tendency to identify "foreigner" with "enemy"; and it emboldened cities in their lusty and competitive pursuit of wealth, freedom, and empire (*GM*, 197, 162; *SC*, 127–28; *Emile*, 39–40). But although it intensified these quasinatural forms of human conflict, at least it added no new ones of its own: In the pagan world, Rousseau asserts, there were no wars of religion. "Far from men fighting for the Gods, it was—as in Homer—the Gods who fought for the men" (*SC*, 125). Occasionally, there may have been wars punishing a particular act of desecration or sacrilege, but there were, and could be, no holy wars, no campaigns fought to convert the nonbelievers to the worship of the one true God. The pagan gods were ambitious but not "jealous": Each sought to be the most powerful god, but not the only one.

All of this changed with the rise of Christian monotheism. Its God was inevitably jealous, because one and universal. Henceforth, the gods of one's neighbors were an affront to the one true God. They were also an affront to oneself: a threat to the validity of one's faith (and thus the security of one's salvation), which is put in question by the inexplicable persistence of nonbelievers. Hence, the nonbelievers must be converted. This is not only a new doctrinal imperative of Christianity but also a psychological one. One feels a need to confirm one's faith by heeding its call to spread it. Whereas paganism expressed, Christianity is at war with the most massive fact of the world: the multiplicity of nations and gods. Christian monotheism thus contains an inherent tendency toward proselytism and intolerance.[4]

This dangerous tendency is further strengthened, according to Rousseau, by the Christian doctrine of the afterlife. When our duty to care for others is expanded to comprehend their eternal salvation or damnation—when the stakes become literally infinite—it may appear reasonable to apply even the most violent measures for the others' own good, a violence for which God's punishments seem to give us the example. "It is impossible to live in peace with people whom one believes are damned. To love them would be to hate God who punishes them. They must absolutely be either brought into the faith or tormented" (*SC*, 131; see *Emile*, 309n; *Julie*, 698). Paganism led to cruelty because it united nations by intensifying the natural hatred for outsiders; but Christianity tends to put men at war with their friends and fellow citizens. "You must think as I do in order to be saved. This is the horrible dogma that desolates the world" (*GM*, 199; see 160–61).

But, as this statement implies, it is not only monotheism and the afterlife but also and above all the uniquely doctrinal or "theological" character of Christianity, its suspension of Old Testament legalism and emphasis on salvation through belief, that tends to produce sectarianism and persecution. In the Gospels, it is true, the required beliefs were very simple. Early Christianity, like the Judaism from which it sprang, was firmly antiphilosophical; for "it was not to the learned that Jesus Christ wished to entrust his doctrine and his ministry . . . [but to] the lowly and the simple." Yet, as time passed, Christians were compelled to become learned to defend themselves against attack from pagan philosophy, and eventually they drew the fateful conclusion "that religion cloaked in the authority of philosophy would thereby become more respectable." This is what gave rise to Christianity as we know it. The crucial event was the "introduction of ancient philosophy into Christian doctrine," so that there came a time "when it was necessary to be a Platonist in order to be orthodox" (*Observations*, 44–46).[5] This theological Christianity, which connected faith with uncertain and controversial metaphysical doctrines (e.g., the Trinity), generated perpetual sectarian conflict. "Who does not see that dogmatic and theological Christianity is, by the multitude and obscurity of its dogmas, above all by the obligation to acknowledge them, a field of battle always open among men" (*Montagne*, 705; see *Emile*, 257; *Observations*, 45–48; see Voltaire *Philosophical Dictionary*, "Religion," "Toleration"; Locke "Error," 282–83; Holbach, *Christianisme dévoilé*, 118–22).[6]

With regard to the charge of persecution, Rousseau makes some distinctions among Christian sects, although in practice they seem to amount to little. Roman Catholicism is intolerant deliberately and on principle (hence it should be excluded from the legitimate state [*SC*, 131–32]), but the same is not true, he asserts, of *true* Christianity, "not that of today, but that of the Gospel, which is totally different from it," "the pure and simple religion of the Gospel, true theism" (*SC*, 128, 127). But still Rousseau finds that "Saint Paul . . . was naturally persecutory" (*Montagne*, 702). Similarly, the essence of

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[4] Rousseau held that ancient Judaism, with its doctrine of the Chosen People, was a national religion and not yet fully monotheistic, which explains why, of the many wars fought by the Israelites as recounted in the Bible, none were religious wars (*SC*, 125; *Montagne*, 703).

[5] Voltaire especially emphasizes the Platonic origins of Christianity. "When at last some Christians adopted the doctrines of Plato and mixed a little philosophy with their religion, they separated from the Jewish cult and gradually won some eminence." "It was the philosophy of Plato that made Christianity" (*Philosophical Dictionary*, "Toleration"; *Histoire de l'Etablissment du Christianisme*, 72). On these themes, see Arkush 1993. One is reminded of Nietzsche's famous formula: "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people' " (*Beyond Good and Evil*, Preface).

[6] While it is not possible to evaluate Rousseau's argument at every point, it is worth mentioning here that there is an important tradition, best represented by Fustel de Coulanges' *Ancient City*, that accuses the Enlightenment of romanticizing Greek and Roman antiquity especially by understating the persecutory tendencies of pagan religion. Paganism contained at least one important seed of persecution—fear that the gods would punish the whole city for the offenses of one individual—that Christianity, with its moral individualism, removed.

true Protestantism is to leave the interpretation of scripture to each individual; hence "the Protestant religion is tolerant by principle . . . [and] essentially" (*Montagne*, 712–13, 716). But in practice, Calvin was "inconsistent," and the history of Protestantism "is full of facts that reveal a very severe inquisition, and that, from persecuted, the Reformers soon became persecutors." As for Lutheranism, it is "intolerant like the Roman Church" (*Montagne*, 715, 716n).

Rousseau goes on, however, to attack the Enlightenment *philosophes* as no less intolerant than their clerical opponents. "Their apparent skepticism is a hundred times more assertive and more dogmatic than the decided tone of their adversaries" (*Emile*, 312, see 268; *Reveries*, 32). Rousseau even imagines, presciently, the coming of a "philosophical inquisition" (*Dialogues*, 239). The philosophers, transformed by the exigencies of their battle with the Church, had themselves become a dogmatic sect for the honoring of a universal being—the rational Truth. They, too, enforced unity in their ranks by persecuting "heretics" (as Rousseau would experience personally). In the great battle then raging between these two parties, "the most cruel intolerance was, at bottom, the same on both sides" (*Confessions*, 436; see *First Discourse*, 33; *Dialogues*, 967–68, 971; *d'Alembert* 11n).[7]

The Destruction of Republican Virtue

Rousseau's second criticism, although less immediately intelligible to us, is a staple of the republican tradition, represented most clearly here by Machiavelli. Christianity, the indictment runs, destroys "republican virtue," the militant and single-minded patriotism that is the precondition of true political liberty.

The premise, which stands at the core of Rousseau's whole political thought, is that the large commercial republic based on enlightened self-interest, which was favored by the Enlightenment, is not workable. It inevitably leads to class conflict, moral decay, political despotism, and military defeat. Human beings are naturally solitary creatures who, to live together harmoniously, must be transformed into vigorous patriots, united in a small, highly disciplined, popularly ruled, militantly patriotic city-state like ancient Sparta. But this fervent citizenship is possible only if supported by an exclusive, national religion—by citizen gods, so to speak, who are themselves loyal partisans of the fatherland, sanctifying and enforcing its laws.

Christianity, however, destroys the very possibility of an exclusive, national religion (*SC*, 131). There is one God for all the world: He has no country; He takes no sides. We have forgotten what a strange revolution in human consciousness is involved in the rise of monotheism. It shatters the unity of moral life. Ever since this event, we in the West have been living in a torn, divided world where there are many fatherlands but only one God. Consider what this means.

Our country says to us: It is us versus them; loyalty is the highest virtue. But Christianity says: These lines on a map are meaningless; we are not Romans or Carthaginians but children of a single God. "In the eyes of a true Christian the citizen, the stranger, even the enemy are equally his brothers; nothing is more contrary to the spirit of Christianity than exclusions and preferences. And yet what is love of the fatherland if not preference and exclusion?" (*Montagne*, 704 variant c; for the same points in the finished text see *Montagne*, 704, 706 and n; see also *GM*, 162; *SC*, 127; *Emile*, 39; letter to Usteri, April 30, 1763).

Our country says: You must give yourself, heart and soul, to the fatherland. But Christianity says: Yes, to the heavenly fatherland. "Christianity is a totally spiritual religion" and therefore "far from attaching the citizens' hearts to the state, it detaches them from it as from all worldly things. I know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit" (*SC*, 129, 128; see *Montagne*, 704–6).

Our country says: You must be courageous, proud, and unyielding in defending freedom. But Christianity says: You must be gentle, humble, and willing to turn the other cheek. It also says: Put your trust in God, not in your own arms. This is the problem that provokes Rousseau's harshest rhetoric. The militant defense of liberty, which he is striving to reawaken, "is inconsistent with the gentleness of a Christian. And after all, what does it matter whether one is free or a serf in this vale of tears? The essential thing is to go to heaven, and resignation is but an additional means of doing so." Thus, "Christianity preaches nothing but servitude and dependence. Its spirit is so favorable to tyranny that tyranny always profits from it. True Christians are made to be slaves. They know it and are scarcely moved thereby; this brief life is of too little worth in their view" (*SC*, 129, 130; see Machiavelli, *Discourses* II:2, 16; Bayle, *Pensées Diverses*, chapter 141).

In sum, for Rousseau, there can be no true political liberty outside Sparta, and there cannot be a Christian Sparta. The three central characteristics of Christianity—universalism, other-worldliness, and passivity—all combine to destroy republican virtue and, with it, political freedom. Rousseau makes clear, moreover, that this problem, unlike that of persecution and intolerance, is inseparable from true Christianity and not merely from its corruption.

One is struck once again, however, by the fact that Rousseau levels almost identical charges against the *philosophes*. This is precisely the thesis of Rousseau's initial philosophical work, the *First Discourse*. The arts and sciences have contributed to the destruction of republican virtue by their rationalistic universalism or cosmopolitanism, by their elevation of talent and intellectual accomplishment over moral virtue and dedication to the fatherland, by their contemplative passivity and detachment which destroy the martial spirit, by their unabashed self-centeredness which unleashes the forces of luxury and self-indulgence, and by their corrosive skepticism, materialism, and atheism, "which are preached and propagated with all the ardor of the most zealous missionaries" (*Dialogues*, 968; see *First Discourse*, 49–62; *Emile*, 312n). As indeed anyone may observe, intellectuals tend to be even more disdainful of patriotism than Christians.

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[7] Voltaire, in the letter to Damilaville quoted earlier, goes on to say that "by an inconsistency worthy of this head without brain, and of this Diogenes without heart, he speaks as many insults of the philosophers as of Jesus Christ." He then adds: "But the philosophers will be more indulgent than the priests." Yet, the next day, he writes a friend: "Omer Fleury ought properly to denounce Jean-Jacques for having insulted the philosophers" (letter to Cramer, June 15, 1762). And two days later, on hearing that Rousseau had been forced to flee France, he writes to d'Alembert that he would pity Rousseau if he were hanged, but "be sure that whoever abandons the philosophers will come to an unhappy end" (June 17, 1762). Voltaire is indeed the archetype of the politically correct intellectual. Still, he is not yet Robespierre or Lenin. Rousseau's accusations seem exaggerated or, rather, premature.

The Destruction of Political Unity

If Christianity could have remained a purely internal, spiritual religion, without external institutional expression, then its political harm would have been confined to the moral effects just described. But inevitably it took on external forms through established ceremonies and rites, through a concern for education and public preaching, and through an official priesthood and Church. This temporal institutionalization of Christianity forever destroyed political unity. "By giving men two legislative systems, two leaders, and two homelands, [it] subjects them to contradictory duties." "By separating the theological system from the political system, [it] brought about the end of the unity of the state, and caused the internal divisions that have never ceased to stir up Christian peoples." It "has resulted in a perpetual conflict of jurisdiction that has made any good polity impossible in Christian states" (*SC*, 128, 126).

The problem is greatest in Catholic countries. "The assemblies of the clergy of France are, in my opinion, the real government of the nation" (*GM*, 200; see 202; *SC*, 127n, 128). By contrast, "experience teaches that of all the Christian sects, Protestantism . . . is the only one in which the laws can maintain their dominion and the leaders their authority." This difference is tenuous, however, for "wherever the clergy constitutes a body, it is master and legislator in its own domain." Therefore, in Protestant England "there are . . . two powers, two sovereigns . . . just as everywhere else" (*GM*, 201; *SC*, 127; see *Montagne*, 801, *Second Discourse*, 88–89; see Marsilius, *Defender of Peace* I:1.3, II:26.19, III:1; Machiavelli *Discourses* I:12; Hobbes, *De Cive*, VI:11, and *Leviathan*, chapters 46–47; Holbach, *Christianisme dévoilé*, 118, 123).

Once again, the *philosophes*, as well as the secular natural lawyers like Grotius and Pufendorf on whom they relied, posed a similar if less extreme danger to the unity of the state, in Rousseau's view. "The Jesuits became all-powerful by . . . in the name of *God* making themselves the arbiters of good and evil. The philosophers . . . while appearing to explain *nature* to their docile sectaries and making themselves its supreme interpreters . . . established themselves in its name as an authority no less absolute than that of their enemies" (*Dialogues*, 967, emphasis added). By publishing detailed and comprehensive books of natural jurisprudence, systematic codes of natural law, these thinkers created a natural standard above the state that undermined its authority and unity (see Melzer 1990, 144–49).

Clerical Tyranny and Personal Dependence

The temporal power of the Church is harmful, Rousseau continues, not only because it dangerously weakens that of the state but also because, in itself, it tends to despotism. The Christian clergy, in his analysis, had invented an altogether new means of attaining and exercising power. First, Christianity's great emphasis on the afterlife made the rewards and punishments of the present world less powerful a concern than those of the next. The clergy then gained control of this new power by depreciating the importance for salvation of moral action, which is in each person's own control, and emphasizing that of doctrinal orthodoxy, which the priests could define. Finally, by uniting together, for the first time, in a political body (the Church), the clergy found the means to unify and enforce (through excommunication) its definition of orthodoxy. "Communion and excommunication are the social compact of the clergy, a compact by means of which it will always be master of peoples and kings. . . . This invention is a political masterpiece. The pagan priests had nothing that resembles it" (*SC*, 127n).

But this new clerical power, without democratic check or constitutional balance, is by its nature nearly absolute, hence prone to despotic abuse, to religious extortion and exploitation. Though a religion of humility, Christianity unwittingly introduced into the world frightful new methods, weapons, and opportunities for tyrannical ambition (*SC*, 126; *GM*, 183, 200–201; *Dialogues*, 967; see Marsilius, *Defender of Peace*, II:26.19; Machiavelli, *Discourses*, III:1; Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chapters 46–47, and *Behemoth*, 174–76; Locke, "Error," 285–86; and "Defense of Nonconformity," 358; Voltaire, *Philosophical Dictionary*, "Priests").

This problem of abusive clerical authority is, of course, a familiar one, but it has a special meaning for Rousseau, the first "philosopher of freedom," the passionate republican who would liberate men from every last authority but their own general will. Rousseau's ardent love of liberty can, in turn, be traced back to his "fundamental principle": Men are by nature good and free, but society makes them bad because dependent and unfree. The true, and heretofore unseen, source of all human evil, he argues, is the destructive relations of "personal dependence" formed in society, through which men become divided both against themselves and others because they need one another too much.

Natural man is healthy and whole because, while caring only for himself, he also depends only on himself. But social man is fundamentally divided because, while he continues to love only himself, his vastly increased needs and desires make him slavishly dependent on others. His need of others may be limited at first, but his initial, traumatic experiences of personal dependence set him on a downward spiral. He begins a feverish quest for wealth, power, and status in the hope of freeing himself from dependence; but these new social needs only increase his dependence. The end result is the fragmented social man whose soul is divided between his intense self-concern and the total preoccupation with others, the need to flatter and manipulate them at every turn, that this very selfishness necessitates. This fateful contradiction turns him against others as well as himself, making him at once evil and unhappy. In other words, the dependency relations formed in society, and the process of psychological corruption they produce, culminate in the *other-directed self-seeker*, who spends his life obsessed with others precisely because he cares only about himself (see *Second Discourse*, 151–52; *Emile*, 83–84; *Beaumont*, 966–67; Melzer 1990, 69–85).

But if personal dependence is the great cause of human corruption, then what is it that most heightens this dependence? Rousseau's famous answer is: "inequality"—meaning, economic, social, political, and also religious inequality. The clerical hierarchy, controlling the keys to salvation and damnation, holds all other men in a condition of utter dependence (*Second Discourse*, fragments, 97–98). It destroys the possibility of the individual self-reliance or freedom that, on Rousseau's principles, is essential for psychological health and wholeness, for the maintenance of our natural goodness. Thus, Rousseau's fierce opposition to the temporal power of priests and clerics stems directly from the deepest level of his thought. The philosopher of freedom hates not merely their abuse of authority but their authority as such.

Also opposed to the despotic power of the Church, of course, were the *philosophes*, but only, Rousseau contends, because they aspired to a similar power themselves. "These two bodies, both imperious, both intolerant, were consequently incompatible, since the fundamental design of the one and the other was to reign despotically" (*Dialogues*, 967; see 890, 964–68). Rousseau saw that the Enlightenment philosophers, in their battle with the Church, had studied its power and systematically copied its "political masterpiece." They, too, had united for the first time in a single body, a philosophical church or party (the Republic of Letters), held together through partisan loyalty and persecutory threats of "excommunication," putting forward an official dogma about Nature (instead of God), and pursuing power through public preaching or "enlightenment," through the dissemination of a book (the *Encyclopedia*), and through the concerted control of public opinion and reputations (instead of consciences and immortal souls).[8] In seeing all this, Rousseau became the first to denounce the modern intellectual as a secular priest and the first to warn—well before the French, Russian, and Fascist revolutions—of the transformation of modern philosophy into "ideology," that is, into a dangerous new source of partisan crusading and sectarian persecution as well as, more generally, of intellectual tyranny and personal dependence.

The Weakening of Morality

Rousseau believes that traditional Christianity, despite its high moral aims, does harm not only to politics but also to morals. It is, above all, the doctrine of original sin, against which Rousseau targets his fundamental principle of natural goodness, that tends to undermine the power of morality.

In the first place, this doctrine denies what Rousseau was particularly eager to affirm: human free will. It teaches that all human beings are born sinners who are incapable, without the unmerited aid of divine grace, of ruling their own souls. Rousseau sees this doctrine as profoundly discouraging to those who would strive for virtue and, more, as subversive of the very idea of virtue, since it denies that men are free or morally responsible for their own good deeds.

Second, although Christianity commands us to love others, the doctrine of original sin teaches us rather to hate them. Our priest shows us "all men . . . as victims of the Devil whose company can only corrupt the heart and cast us into Hell. And what is most peculiar is that after all of these beautiful declamations, the same man gravely exhorts us to love our neighbors, that is, this whole troop of rascals for whom he has inspired us with such horror" (*Oeuvres complètes* 4:19). In its portrait of human nature, Christian doctrine is too negative and misanthropic.

Yet, in what it demands of human nature, Christian morality is too exalted. "By exaggerating all duties, Christianity makes them impracticable and vain" (*Emile*, 374). By aiming too high, demanding too much, and opposing the natural sentiments, this morality forsakes all hold on human souls and renders itself ineffectual. In so doing, moreover, it becomes positively corrupting. It makes morality seem foolish and slavish, casts all restraint into disrepute, and thus turns men into cynics and libertines.

A realistic and effectual morality must grow out of real human passions, like patriotism or romantic love. Yet, Christianity, in its demand for moral purity, not only ignores but also weakens or distorts these salutary passions. "All human institutions are founded on human passions and preserve themselves through them: that which combats and destroys the passions is not therefore suited to fortify such institutions" (*Montagne*, 704; see *Emile*, 212, 390, 392).

Even these charges against Christianity have their parallel in Rousseau's critique of the Enlightenment. The *philosophes'* materialism led them too to deny free will (as well as conscience and the afterlife), while their skeptical, Hobbesian view of human nature—strengthened by a fashionable drawing-room cynicism—encouraged a contemptuous and uncompassionate attitude toward humanity. (Hence, "the natural goodness of man" targeted the Enlightenment no less than Christianity). They did not, of course, aim too high in their morality but did as much harm by aiming too low, neglecting virtue for base self-interest. "Ideas that are too sublime and ideas that are too base are equally insufficient" (*Emile*, 392; see *Oeuvres complètes* 4:18–20; *Franquières*, 1145; *Dialogues*, 842–43, 890–91).

The Weakening of the Family

A further accusation involves a concrete application of the preceding one: The excessive purity of Christian morality, especially its hostility to the sexual passion, weakens both the morals and the passions that sustain the institution of marriage.

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[8] Voltaire, according to Hulliung (1994, 217), "rarely spoke of the philosophical party without calling it a church staffed by apostles"; and Helvetius, in *De l'Homme* (section VII, chapters 11–12), wrote admiringly of the organizational genius of the Jesuits.

The harm is done primarily to and through women. In the education of young girls, one finds the same contradiction noted above between the disparagement of human nature by the doctrine of original sin and the excessive demands made upon it by Christian morality: "After having humiliated her by disparaging her body and its charms as the dirtiness of sin, one then makes her respect as the temple of Jesus Christ the very body which has been made so contemptible to her" (*Emile*, 392). More generally:

> By enslaving decent women only to gloomy duties . . . by forbidding women song, dance, and all the entertainments of the world, [Christianity] makes them sullen, shrewish, and unbearable in their homes. There is no other religion in which marriage is subjected to such severe duties and none in which so holy an obligation is so despised. So much has been done to prevent women from being lovable that husbands have become indifferent. I understand quite well that this ought not to be. But I say that it had to be, since after all, Christians are men (*Emile*, 374; and see 262, 390–92; *Second Discourse*, 137; *Oeuvres complètes* 3:1894; see Bayle, *Pensées Diverses*, chapters 142, 163–65; Holbach, *Christianisme dévoilé*, 125).

The result of all this, according to Rousseau, is not sexual repression but adultery and a contempt for all the joys and duties of domestic life (*Emile*, 388–89; see Schwartz 1984, 63–65).

Rousseau, the ideologist of the modern, sentimental, child-centered family, seeks to restore a genuine respect for sexual modesty and marital fidelity by grounding these on the liberated and resuscitated passions of romantic love and domestic intimacy. But while opposing Christian puritanism, he had also, once again, to combat "the party of reason," with its corrosive skepticism. "I see where the maxims of modern philosophy lead in ridiculing the modesty of the fair sex and its alleged falseness, and I see that the most certain effect of this philosophy will be to take from the women of our age the bit of honor remaining to them" (*Emile*, 386; see 391). He explicitly accuses the *philosophes* of being defenders of adultery (*Julie*, 270–72, 359–62). Rousseau, in other words, seeks to reconstitute and defend the family by becoming the "father of Romanticism"; and to this end he must shelter love and all its preconditions, not only from Christianity but also and especially from the arid and heartless rationalism of the Enlightenment.

The Divided Soul

The final criticism, indeed, the sum and culmination of all the others, is that Christianity, which, like Rousseau, proclaims the terrible fallenness or dividedness of our souls, is itself the greatest source of that psychic affliction.

For Rousseau, unity of soul is the supreme good, the fundamental ground of the heightened existence and selfhood that we naturally seek. Inner conflict or fragmentation, conversely, is the greatest evil. Hence, Rousseau's fundamental principle of the natural goodness and happiness of man ultimately means this: By nature, the human soul is one and unified, but it has fallen into disunity, not through original sin but through the corrupting effects of society (see Melzer 1990, 35–46). And Christianity brings this inner dividedness to its peak.

Rousseau sees two possible forms of inner unity for civilized human beings: republican citizenship and solitary individuality. "Give [man] over entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you divide his heart you will tear it" (*Oeuvres complètes* 3:510). Yet, as all the preceding accusations combine to argue, Christianity destroys both of these possibilities. Its universality, passivity, and other-worldliness destroy citizenship but without returning the individual to the natural self. Rather, by its strenuous moral demands Christianity forces the individual to declare war against his passions, while it also subverts his capacity to win that war by undermining respect for humanity and belief in free will. In conflict both with his country and his individuality, his social and his natural self, homeless in this world, torn by sin, the Christian is the divided soul *par excellence*.

Yet, Rousseau makes the identical charge against the "bourgeois," the human product of Enlightenment rationalism. Just as the transcendent "kingdom of heaven" turns the Christian against both self and city, so "civil society," that realm of economics and social prestige between the individual and the state, does the same to the bourgeois. His self-seeking other-directedness prevents him from being either sincerely social or authentically individual. "Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen. . . . He will be one of these men of our days: A Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing" (*Emile*, 40). According to Karl Löwith, "Rousseau's writings contain the first and clearest statement of the human problem of bourgeois society. It consists in the fact that man, in bourgeois society, is not a unified whole" (1964, 232). Rousseau, in other words, is the first to identify the bourgeois as the "secular Christian," in some sense. The Enlightenment, seeking to combat the heavenly paradise by building a materialistic one, created the divided modern self, which is no less torn than the Christian self.

In sum, Rousseau seems well to have merited Voltaire's reluctant praise: He presents a remarkably open and comprehensive statement of the political problem of Christianity. This religion, he argues, especially in its historical corruptions, has destroyed political unity and republican virtue, has increased persecution and clerical tyranny, has weakened private morality, especially family morals, and in doing all this has divided the human soul.

ROUSSEAU'S CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

As we have seen at every step in the argument, Rousseau attributes nearly identical problems to modern philosophy. That is, not only does he inaugurate the counter-Enlightenment attack on secular rationalism, as is well known, but also he does so precisely in terms of a more comprehensive version of the Enlightenment attack on

Christianity. There are two general reasons for this remarkable parallel.

Modern philosophy, we have seen Rousseau argue, systematically copied the Church in order to combat it. Just as early Christianity was decisively transformed through its struggle with and strategic imitation of Greek philosophy (*Observations*, 44–46), so modern philosophy was transformed through its struggle with Christianity. The Church had succeeded in the world through certain new techniques for the propagation of ideas and the organization of the priesthood; and the Party of Reason, to succeed against the Church, adopted the latter's new techniques as well as its crusading spirit. Thus, it became politically pernicious—and eventually internally corrupt—in ways closely paralleling the religion it opposed. Longstanding enemies eventually come to resemble one another.

But, on a deeper level, this parallel points to the fact that not only modern philosophy but also philosophy or rationalism as such is politically dangerous in ways resembling Christianity. Through the combination of abstract universalism and restless skepticism, it tends to subvert all particular worldly attachments and thus to destroy the wholeness of political life, just like Christian revelation. Yet, here, too, modern philosophy greatly exacerbated the problem through its crusade for popular enlightenment—something studiously avoided by classical philosophy—a crusade stemming from the battle against (and imitation of) Christianity.

Not only is there a parallel of content between Rousseau's two critiques but also a continuity of motive. Rousseau attacks the Enlightenment precisely in the tone and spirit of Enlightenment anticlericalism, call it "outraged humanism." This point can best be seen by raising an obvious objection to Rousseau's critique: One cannot refute or delegitimize philosophic rationalism simply by showing that it is politically harmful. Classical rationalism, for example, while clearly aware of the danger it posed for political life, remained ultimately undaunted (if politically cautious) because its justification lay not in its practical effects but in the happiness of the contemplative few. But just this response was not possible for the so-called Age of Reason, which in fact always boasted that it embraced rationalism not for its own sake, for the detached contemplative life, but precisely in order to be politically useful to humanity, not to understand the world but to change it. This view was shared by Rousseau. Thus, when he attacks secular rationalism as politically harmful, he makes a very specific and telling critique of the Enlightenment, an internal, dialectical critique showing that the Enlightenment's humanistic ends, which he never questions, are ultimately subverted by its rationalistic means. In short, his famous counter-Enlightenment attack on rationalism, made in the spirit of outraged humanism, intends to be less a rejection of the Enlightenment than a more self-consistent expression of it.

Rousseau's next step in this dialectical advance is the realization that, despite all its historical abuses, some form of religion is indispensable precisely for the Enlightenment goal of restoring political and psychic unity. It is foolish to seek purely rational foundations for the state, Rousseau argues, when "what private interests have in common is so slight that it will never outweigh what sets them in opposition." Patriotism and the police can unite individuals only so far: God is needed to close the gap. When all is said and done, "in every state that can require its members to sacrifice their lives, anyone who does not believe in the afterlife is necessarily a coward or a madman" (*Emile*, 312n; *GM*, 195; see *SC*, 131).

More generally, an individual's practice of moral virtue, amid so many others who are vicious, is a dangerous act of folly unless there is an afterlife where the virtuous receive their just rewards, as they manifestly do not in this world. To all the secular moralists and natural lawyers of his time, Rousseau declares: "If the divinity does not exist, it is only the wicked man who reasons, and the good man is nothing but a fool" (*Emile*, 292, and see 263, 282; *Dialogues*, 968; *Franquières*, 1142–44).

Finally, Rousseau's new defense of religion is also an integral part of his humanitarian defense of the people and the oppressed. He knows and understands the doctrine that religion is a tool of oppression but believes that this Enlightenment doctrine itself is also such a tool. After all, the political masters of this world are eager to be free of any divine power that might restrain their authority and passions. The philosophers, for their part, are eager to oblige them in order to win their favor, to triumph over their clerical rivals, and to indulge their intellectual pride, which requires them always to think other than the credulous multitude (*Emile*, 269; *Oeuvres complètes* 3:609–10; *SC*, 61). The true need for God is felt only by the suffering people—and by "*pauvre* Jean-Jacques," who is their representative. Atheism, "this convenient philosophy of the happy and the rich, who make their paradise in this world, cannot long be that of the multitude, the victim of their passions, who, for want of happiness in this life, need to find here at least the hope and consolations of which that barbarous doctrine [atheism] deprives them" (*Dialogues*, 971; see *Emile*, 312, 314n; *Julie*, 592; letter to Deleyre, October 5, 1758). Hence, in his *Letter to Voltaire* and elsewhere, Rousseau makes a point of embracing the people's argument for God: "I have suffered too much in this life not to expect another one" (p. 121; see *Dialogues*, 727; *Reveries*, 34; letter to Moultou, December 23, 1761).

In all these arguments, Rousseau confronts the Enlightenment dialectically or from within: Its own humanitarian intention, which he accepts, requires the rejection of secular rationalism and the return to religion, albeit of a new, more salutary kind. We turn, then, to Rousseau's "revivalist" side to see what form this new salutary religion must take (and, in the final section, to ask how it will solve the political problems common to traditional Christianity and modern rationalism alike).

ROUSSEAU'S NEW RELIGION OF SINCERITY

Rousseau's positive religious teaching is presented in the other great religious document of his corpus, the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar," which occupies about fifty pages in the fourth book of *Emile*: "a set piece, and the most important of the whole work" (letter to Rey, March 11, 1762, p. 148). (For reasons to be considered below, Rousseau presents his new religion of sincerity, paradoxically, in the voice of another, a fictitious priest from Savoy).

At the time of this writing, the religious state of Europe, at least in Rousseau's analysis, was as follows: "Religion, discredited in all places by philosophy, had lost its ascendancy even among the people"; "all religion is sapped at the foundations" (*Montagne*, 802; letter to Néaulme, February 22, 1762, p. 113; see *Emile*, 313n, 310, 295n). Nevertheless, Rousseau was certain that "this infatuation with Atheism is an ephemeral fanaticism, a product of fashion that will be destroyed by it too" (*Dialogues*, 241; see *Reveries*, 36–37; *Emile*, 312–13n; *Franquières*, 1138). Religion is a natural tendency of the heart and a necessity of the people: It must inevitably return. The only question was, in what form? Through the "Profession of Faith," Rousseau set out to hasten and mold the coming religious revival, to be its prophet. He cherished the hope that this unique writing, although "vilely prostituted and profaned among the present generation," would yet "one day make a revolution among men" (*Reveries*, 34).

A New Foundation for Belief

Examining the content of the "Profession of Faith," one initially fails to see the basis for Rousseau's grand prophetic ambitions. With its four simple tenets of God, free will, conscience, and the afterlife, it seems a watered down Christianity not uncharacteristic of eighteenth-century Deism. The true revolutionary significance of this doctrine comes to light only if one turns from its content to its foundation. Upon what is the Savoyard Vicar's religious teaching based?

Certainly not on revelation. The whole second half of the "Profession" is a bold and powerful critique of revelation placed alongside a lukewarm defense of it. Is it based on reason, then? Is the "Profession" another example in the long history of "natural religion": the philosophic effort, first undertaken in Plato's *Laws*, to derive religion on the basis of reason alone? Again, the clear answer is no. The Vicar begins his speech with a scathing attack on reason and philosophy and concludes that reason is not an adequate guide for human life.[9]

The "Profession of Faith," sandwiched between a critique of reason and of revelation—of the Enlightenment and traditional Christianity—takes a new, third road: It is based on what Rousseau calls the "inner sentiment." By this he means the collection of those beliefs that, in the sincerity of our hearts, we can never stop believing, whatever reason may say. Freedom of the will is one example. I may think that I have rationally demonstrated my will is not free, but I can never succeed in believing or living as if this were so (*Emile*, 272). Building upon this, the Savoyard Vicar is, as it were, the first religious "antifoundationalist." His religious doctrine rests on the "inner sentiment" or on "sincerity" broadly construed: on what, at the bottom of our hearts, we really *do* believe, regardless of foundations.

That is why the Vicar's treatise takes the form of a "profession of faith": It is one man's sincere confession of belief, designed not to "philosophize with you, but to help you consult your heart." He calls upon us not to follow him but to return to ourselves. His sincerity will show us the way back to our own. "Always remember that I am not teaching my sentiment; I am revealing it" (*Emile*, 289, 277). In the "Profession of Faith," the revelation of inner sentiment replaces Biblical revelation.

This is Rousseau's great innovation in the history of religious thought, distinguishing him not only from traditional Christianity but also from all earlier forms of natural religion and Deism. Yet, precisely how it should transform Christianity and how it will "make a revolution among men" remain to be seen. If we first examine how the Vicar arrives at and defends his new principle of sincerity, we will be in a better position to understand its larger meaning and consequences.

The Argument for Sincerity

The Vicar does not begin his account abstractly but personally, in a tone of the profoundest sincerity and simplicity. I was lost, unsure of how to live, but I desperately wanted to be happy. I consulted the great philosophers, studied their books with pathetic earnestness. But I found only disagreement and dogmatism. The philosophers always seem to disappoint us.

Deploring the scandalous state of philosophy, the Vicar sought its cause. His answer takes the form of an elementary "critique of reason": "I comprehended that the insufficiency of the human mind is the first cause of this prodigious diversity of sentiments and that pride is the second" (*Emile*, 268). There are two problems with reason, then, the first concerning the weakness or insufficiency of the faculty itself, the second concerning the passion that motivates our use of it. He will find a solution to both problems in the principle of sincerity.

Consider the second first. Two thousand years of philosophical disagreement would seem to suggest that man is not the "rational animal" with a disinterested love of truth and contemplation. Philosophy, like most everything else, has its roots in vanity or *amour-propre*. "Where is the philosopher . . . who in the secrecy of his heart sets himself any other goal than that of distinguishing himself?" (*Emile*, 269; see *Reveries*, 29). The philosophers are ultimately insincere or inauthentic: It is honor they love and not truth.

But if this is correct, if speculative reason goes wrong due to vanity, then the true "philosophical method" will be a combination of utility and sincerity. One must begin by renouncing all idle metaphysical subtleties, which only serve to stimulate *amour-propre*, and by strictly confining one's thinking to useful, practical questions directly related to one's interests and happiness. But this good Lockean advice does not reach deeply enough: One has to overcome society as well as metaphysics. One must withdraw from the public world into the sincerity of one's own heart, avoiding all disputation and almost all conversation. Constantly checking oneself with the question "do I really believe this?" one must overcome the natural other-directedness of reason by cleaving to the sincerity of one's longing for happiness. Only sincere self-communion can make us stop thinking for others and start thinking for ourselves (see *Emile*, 269, 277, 311; *Reveries*, 29–39).

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[9] It is true that the Vicar initially praises and appears to endorse Samuel Clarke's system of natural religion, but the doctrine he goes on to elaborate is in fact very different from Clarke's (see Masters 1969).

Precisely if one makes this sincere effort to know one's nature and place, however, one will soon be confronted with the first problem. Our senses and reason are inherently limited and have no access to the truth about the whole. "We know neither its first laws nor its final cause. We do not know ourselves; we know neither our nature nor our active principle. . . . Impenetrable mysteries surround us on all sides. . . . We believe we possess intelligence for piercing these mysteries, but all we have is imagination." Thus, every philosophical system is subject to "insoluble objections" (*Emile*, 268; see *Reveries*, 34; *Dialogues*, 170). In short, the sincere use of reason, free of vain pretension, leads inexorably to philosophical skepticism.

But when eternal salvation and especially eternal damnation are potentially in the balance, skepticism is not humanly possible. "Doubt about the things it is important for us to know is too violent a state for the human mind, which does not hold out in this state for long" (*Emile*, 268). Thus, we cannot attain certain knowledge, and yet we cannot live without it. Certainty is impossible, and doubt unbearable. This is the Vicar's dilemma. And because of the Enlightenment, Rousseau means to say, this is now everyone's dilemma.

To this great problem of reason's limitations, the Vicar has found a two-part solution, both based on sincerity. The more general argument runs as follows. What we know with greatest certainty is that if God exists, He is just. (For goodness and therefore justice are "the necessary effect of a power without limit and of the self-love essential to every being aware of itself" [*Emile*, 282].) But if God is just, He cannot require me to know what He has not given me the faculty to know. Thus, all He can demand of me is a *sincere effort*. After that, I am entitled to say, with the Vicar: "I have done what I could to attain the truth but its source is too elevated. If the strength for going further is lacking to me, of what can I be guilty? It is up to the truth to come nearer." Julie, heroine of the *Nouvelle Héloïse*, makes her own profession of faith, which includes the same claim: "I have always sought sincerely for that which is consistent with the glory of God and with the truth. I may have made mistakes in my investigation . . . but my intention was always pure, and I always believed what I said I believed. . . . If God did not enlighten my reason beyond that, He is clement and just; could He hold me to account for a gift which He has not given me?" In the *Reveries*, Rousseau repeats the same crucial point: "If we fall into error in spite of [our sincere efforts], we could not justly suffer the penalty, since we would not be at fault. That is the unshakable principle which serves as the basis of my security" (*Emile*, 294; *Julie*, 714; *Reveries*, 34; see *d'Alembert*, 11–2; *Montagne*, 698–700; letter to Deschamps, June 25, 1761).[10] The weakness of reason is not fundamentally problematic because, in the end, it is less important to be right than to be sincere. The Vicar builds on a kind of piety of sincerity: so long as I am sincere, I will be safe. Sincerity replaces truth or orthodoxy as the basis of salvation.[11]

But in what does a "sincere effort" consist? To establish our sincerity, must we pass the whole of life in pondering these questions, remaining perpetually anxious and permanently undecided? The Vicar responds that, precisely because reason is and will always remain insufficient, there is no reason continually to postpone a decision. Reason will be no more adequate to the task tomorrow than today. Instead, he proposes the following method and course of action, a kind of sincerity-based Cartesianism.

At an age in life when your faculties are mature and yet the heart is still energetic and earnest, you must, like Descartes, pick a moment to call everything to a halt, to go on retreat; and there, holding all beliefs in abeyance, you must, for once in your life, give yourself over entirely to life's largest questions and deepest doubts, with the understanding that you will settle your beliefs now once and for all. Inspired by the momentousness of the occasion, knowing that the whole future course of your life depends on the outcome of your present deliberations, you will think with a degree of intensity, sincerity, and courage of which you would, at any other time, be incapable. The decision you reach in these circumstances, therefore, you will follow for the rest of your life. For you have no reason to believe that you could improve upon it later; and you know that if once you were to reopen these questions, you would continue to do so, spending your life in fruitless uncertainty. Above all, the determination to settle your opinions once and for all is what guarantees the most sincere possible effort; conversely, this guarantee is what makes settling your opinions possible, for you will rest confident in the knowledge that God will not blame you for your errors (see *Emile*, 267, 294, 310–11; *Reveries*, 27–40; *Julie*, 715).

Still, if reason is so limited, then on what basis do you come to any decision at all in your retreat? The Vicar's response, the second part of his solution, appeals again to a sincerity-based Cartesianism. Like Descartes, you must overcome skepticism by first giving it free reign. You must doubt everything until you reach something indubitable and then build your system on that. But by the "indubitable," Descartes meant what cannot be doubted logically; the Vicar means what cannot be doubted psychologically. Descartes appealed to reason; the Vicar, convinced of the inadequacy of reason, appeals to the inner sentiment. His method is to "accept as evident all knowledge to which in the sincerity of my heart I cannot refuse my consent" (*Emile*, 270).[12]

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[10] Something like this use of sincerity is already in Locke: "It is in vain for an unbeliever to take up the outward show of another man's profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things which procure acceptance with God. . . . No religion which I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto me" (*Letter Concerning Toleration*, 34). Locke argues that sincerity is a necessary condition of salvation (in order to discourage persecution) but not yet that it is sufficient (which would calm the fear for one's own salvation). See the excellent article by Kraynak (1980), to which I am indebted.

[11] There are certain difficulties with this argument. It seems aimed more at calming the fear of damnation than assuring the hope for salvation. After all, sincerity cannot guarantee that God exists, hence that salvation exists, but only that, *if* God exists, then we will not be damned. Furthermore, if God does not exist, sincerity ceases to be an adequate substitute for the truth: It cannot compensate us for ignorance of the good. (Elsewhere, however, Rousseau makes a secular argument that sincerity itself is the good.) Finally, the whole argument rests on God's justice, which is deduced from his "power without limit"; but the Vicar never really proves or claims to have proved God's omnipotence (see *Emile*, 277, 285).

In support of this method, the Vicar offers a vague epistemological argument. Whereas passive sensation is incorrigible—"it is never false that I sense what I sense"—the active power of reflection, through which I compare sensations, is fallible and the source of all error. Therefore, "the less of myself I put in the judgments I make, the more sure I am of approaching the truth. Thus my rule for yielding to sentiment more than to reason is confirmed by reason itself" (*Emile*, 271–72). But this argument involves the dubious conflation of simple sensation and the complex judgments formed by the inner sentiment.

There is a second argument that might be thought to justify the appeal to the inner sentiment. After the Vicar has used the inner sentiment in deducing the existence of God, he appears to reinterpret this sentiment as a "divine instinct" and infallible "celestial voice." Nevertheless, he avoids the obvious circularity of relying upon this assumption from the beginning (*Emile*, 290). In the end, it would seem to be left unclear how, or even whether, the Vicar distinguishes between the inner sentiment and mere wishful thinking of some kind. (See letter to Moultou, December 23, 1761; *Letter to Voltaire*, 118, 121; *Emile*, 283; *Dialogues*, 170, 239, 242; *Franquières*, 1138–39; *Reveries*, 35; letter to Vernes, February 18, 1758; letter to Dom Léger-Marie Deschamps, June 25, 1761).

The question of the ultimate basis of the Vicar's doctrine and the legitimacy of its appeal to the inner sentiment will be revisited after a brief summary of its argument and content.

The Content of the "Profession of Faith"

The Vicar employs a form of the argument from motion to deduce the existence of a divine will with the power to cause motion. Then he uses the argument from design (supplemented by appeal to the inner sentiment) to add intelligence to God's attributes. From God's will, power, and intelligence, the Vicar deduces His goodness. Beyond these four attributes, he concludes, nothing can be known of God or needs to be known. Obscure metaphysical dogmas that confound reason necessarily push men into either atheism or fanaticism (see *Emile*, 277, 378).

Turning, then, to himself, the Vicar establishes, through the inner sentiment, that he possesses free will and "as such is animated by an immaterial substance" (*Emile*, 281). To guide this will, we all have within us a conscience (which the Vicar seems to assimilate to the inner sentiment). It is "an innate principle of justice and virtue," a divine and infallible guide, an immaterial principle that "raise[s] him to the study of eternal truths, to the love of justice and moral beauty" (*Emile*, 289, 278, 280–92).

Finally, the Vicar reaches the culmination of his whole doctrine. Based on the goodness and justice of God and the shocking prevalence of injustice and undeserved suffering in this world, he deduces the existence of the afterlife in which the good are compensated and the bad punished (*Emile*, 282–83). If there were no otherworldly settling of accounts, God would be unjust, which is impossible. Thus, the afterlife is a moral necessity. It is not deduced from any metaphysical considerations, nor does it answer to any human needs other than morality. This is what is new in the *content* of the Vicar's creed: Faith in the afterlife is wholly derivative from faith in *morality*. The Vicar's is an "ethical theology"—it spells out the metaphysical demands of conscience, it makes theology the handmaid of morality.[13]

One remarkable demonstration of the meaning of this change is that the Vicar rests uncertain as to whether life in the other world is perfectly happy or even whether it is everlasting. All that he insists upon is that it be good and lasting enough to restore justice (*Emile*, 283). Morality displaces the more transcendent concerns of eternity and perfection.

In keeping with this change, morality becomes virtually the sole criterion for the distribution of the rewards and punishments of the afterlife. Faith or dogma plays no role. For example, salvation does not require belief in the divinity of Jesus, according to the Vicar (*Emile*, 307). In the end, he does concede that some form of belief in and worship of God is necessary for salvation, but he leaves this as vague as possible: "The essential worship is that of the heart. God does not reject its homage, if it is sincere, in whatever form it is offered to Him" (*Emile*, 308). In the *Letter to Franquières* (1136–37), Rousseau goes farther: He "believes in God without believing this faith necessary. . . . I think that each will be judged, not on what he believed but on what he did." Julie is of the same opinion (*Julie*, 698–99). Moral conduct is all that matters.

This position goes well beyond the familiar disputes concerning the relative priority of faith and works. As Robert Derathé puts it: "All the Christian moralists, Pascal in particular, have shown how faith can contribute to our acquiring the human virtues, but for them faith maintains its own proper value. . . . [It] is itself a virtue. It is no longer so for Rousseau. For him, to believe is no more than a means for becoming honest and virtuous" (1948, 394–95).

So radical a depreciation of faith or piety at the hands of morality could only result from a similar depreciation of the role of God. Rejecting original sin and strongly affirming free will, the Vicar denies the need for redemption. Jesus, in his view, was a great moral teacher, but the Crucifixion has no theological significance (*Emile*, 307–8). Similarly, there is no need for divine grace, a doctrine not even mentioned in the "Profession of Faith" (but see *Julie*, 672–73, 683–85). We freely control our own moral conduct and thus our otherworldly fate. Therefore, as the Vicar frankly acknowledges: "I do not pray to [God]. What would I ask of Him? . . . [I do not] ask Him for the power to do good. Why ask Him for what He has given me? Did He not give me conscience for loving the good . . . and liberty for choosing it? . . . To ask Him to change my will is to ask Him what He asks of me. It is to want Him to do my work while I collect the wages for it" (*Emile*, 293–94). The doctrine of grace is rejected as incompatible with morality.

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[12] On the relation of the Vicar to Descartes, see also Gouhier 1962 and Masters 1968, 58–64.

[13] As Scott (1992, 706) points out, however, Rousseau argues in the *Letter to Voltaire* (p. 111) that the sentiment of existence is enough to make us prefer life to death, and "if it is better for us to be than not to be, this would be enough to justify our existence, even though we would have no compensation to expect for the ills that we have to suffer" (see also *Reveries*, 69).

Even when it comes to salvation and damnation in the afterlife, God is scarely involved. The Vicar suggests that these consist, not in some external reward or punishment imposed by God, but in the joy of a good conscience and the torment of a bad one, now experienced more intensely because without interference from the body (*Emile*, 284). Even in heaven, "the supreme enjoyment is in satisfaction with oneself" (*Emile*, 281; see 293). Virtue is its own reward. God and the afterlife only provide the occasion, as it were, for the flowering of the natural self-sufficiency of morality. As Jacques Maritain writes, for Rousseau the "eternal Being is really hardly more than a name for Conscience" (1929, 110).

In sum, the central Christian doctrines of original sin, the Crucifixion, redemption, grace, and prayer all entail the ultimate subordination of proud morality to humble piety and love of God. In rejecting these doctrines, the Vicar reverses this priority. His "Profession of Faith" entails a great secularization: It makes morality—man's free moral action in this world—the highest thing (see *Montagne*, 700–701, 801; *Julie*, 699). It systematically cuts off the dialectical tendency of morality to point beyond itself to love and contemplation of God. It is no longer a religion of redemption, transcendence, or eternal life but a moral religion, supplying the metaphysical needs of the conscience. God is a demand of morality and not the reverse.

This transformation, which is the Vicar's great innovation with respect to *content*, follows directly from his innovation regarding *foundations*. For, at the core of the inner sentiment, as we will see shortly, stands an unshakable faith in the existence of moral order (*Emile*, 282). Consequently, the new religion of sincerity, replacing reason and revelation with the inner sentiment, is necessarily a religion of conscience, a theology born of ethics, a metaphysics of morals.[14]

THE POLITICAL MEANING OF THE "PROFESSION OF FAITH"

Having examined the foundation and content of Rousseau's new religion, let us turn finally to its significance. What considerations led this philosopher, at this moment in history, to introduce these particular innovations? Perhaps the answer is to be found strictly on the religious or theological level, in the specific arguments the Vicar presents. But these are less than compelling, especially since they make no serious attempt to distinguish the inner sentiment from a kind of wishful thinking.

Rousseau, moreover, does not even claim to accept these arguments in their entirety. He not only put them in the mouth of another but also protested bitterly against those who simply equated the "editor" of the "Profession of Faith" with its "author" (*Montagne*, 750; *Beaumont*, 935, 1029). He states that, in regard to the Vicar's profession, as well as Julie's, one should assume only that "if he [Rousseau] does not adopt both of them in their entirety, at least he favors them a good deal"; they are "approximately" what he believes (*Montagne*, 694; *Reveries*, 34; but see letter to Moultou, December 23, 1761).

Yet, even these qualified statements are open to question. When an ardently public-spirited thinker declares that belief in God is absolutely indispensable for the very survival of states and the happiness of most individuals, one cannot but suspect that, even if he did not himself believe, he might say he did. Indeed, Rousseau defends the practice of salutary lying in the "Fourth Walk" of the *Reveries* (which immediately follows a discussion of the Savoyard Vicar), and he openly asserts the necessity of religious myth-making in his discussion of the legislator and civil religion in the *Social Contract*. In the conclusion to his *Letter to Voltaire* (p. 120), he movingly appeals to the poet to write a "civil profession of faith," although he there hints, and elsewhere states, that Voltaire himself is an atheist.

Crucial elements of the "Profession of Faith," moreover, contradict central Rousseauian doctrines. The Vicar claims that man is "by his nature sociable, or at least made to become so," and that God placed man on earth in order to practice morality, whereas the *Second Discourse* argues that the evolution of both society and morality was entirely accidental and, for the most part, unfortunate (*Emile*, 290, 281; *Second Discourse*, 95, 140). Accordingly, the Vicar also posits the existence of a binding natural law, which the *Second Discourse* and *Social Contract* deny. Finally, the Vicar and his moral God—the God of rewards and punishments—blame all human wickedness on the individual's misuse of his freedom, whereas the central thesis of the *Second Discourse* is that society is what corrupts the individual and makes him wicked (see Groethuysen 1949, 249–51). No wonder that most of the *philosophes* doubted the seriousness of the "Profession of Faith" (Hulliung 1994, 218, 261, n82) and that some contemporary scholars have concluded that Rousseau was "a complete agnostic" or worse (Shklar 1969, 108; see Scott 1992, 710, n11; Groethuysen 1949, 273–81).

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[14] For the view of traditional theology, see especially Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, chapter 34, "That Man's Ultimate Felicity Does Not Lie in Acts of the Moral Virtues." On Rousseau's ethical theology as a precursor of Kant, see Cassirer 1963, 43–55, and 1954, 114–15; and Henrich 1992, 10–15.

In the end, it is perhaps impossible to know with certainty whether Rousseau considered the Savoyard Vicar's creed to be true or only socially useful, a "civil profession of faith" like the one he urged Voltaire to write. But if, leaving the question open, we focus on the social utility of this doctrine, we will in fact be following Rousseau's own clear practice. There are "two manners of examining the diverse religions," he explains, "the one according to the true and false to be found in them . . . the other according to their temporal and moral effects on earth, according to the good or evil that they may do to society and to the human species (*Beaumont*, 969; see *Montagne*, 703; see Montesquieu *Spirit of the Laws*, XXIV, chapter 1). Rousseau himself openly adopts the latter perspective in almost all his discussions of religion, including his several defenses of the "Profession of Faith." Following his lead, then, let us try to interpret the religion of sincerity, with its puzzling innovations, as "post-Enlightenment Christianity," that is, as a systematic effort to solve the several political problems of traditional Christianity (and of Enlightenment rationalism) as outlined above.[15]

First among these is intolerance and persecution. Adherents of the "Profession of Faith," Rousseau declares in one of his defenses of it, "will be tolerant . . . they will be so more than one could be under *any other doctrine*" (*Montagne*, 701, emphasis added). The reason for this is partly to be found in the content of the Vicar's doctrine: its questioning of eternal punishments (*Emile*, 284) and its great emphasis on morality and concomitant deemphasis of dogma and belief.

But above all, the reason is to be found in what most clearly distinguishes the Vicar's from "any other doctrine": its foundation in sincerity. Through this, it will restore, after a fashion, pagan pluralism and toleration. Like any monotheist, the Vicar is troubled by the shocking multiplicity of religious opinions in the world. But he, and he alone, has a principled reason for not tormenting himself or others over these differences. In his view, although people disagree with respect to beliefs, they can *all be right* in the decisive respect: They can all be saved, just so long as they are sincere with themselves. Both reason and revelation establish a single, universal truth and so can never eliminate the problem of difference or the temptation to intolerance. But the Vicar's reliance on the inner sentiment replaces truth with sincerity, which all may possess regardless of disagreement. On this basis, each individual, containing within himself the true measure of the adequacy of his own beliefs, acquires a principled indifference to the differing opinions of others. Whatever they may say, he is safe so long as true to himself. The only heresy is to follow others. To be sure, he may object to others' opinions for *their* own good, but this, too, can no longer justify persecution, for only sincerity saves, not the truth. Each individual must save himself, and only himself (see *d'Alembert*, 11n; *Montagne*, 697–703, 727, 800 variant c).[16]

In a similar way, the new religion of sincerity responds to the danger of clerical tyranny as well as to the central Rousseauian problem of personal dependence. Where revelation is the standard, the clergy tends to claim authority and make all others dependent on them. Where reason is the standard, the philosophers and intellectuals of every kind seize a similar authority. But the standard of sincerity, and it alone, necessarily frees the individual from this oppressive and corrupting knowledge-dependence. If fully accepted, this principle would create a theological self-reliance, a moral and spiritual self-sufficiency that would eliminate religious inequality, hierarchy, and dependence. Rousseau believes that, given the inescapable power of moral and religious opinion in civilized life and the crucial danger of dependence, the principle of sincerity is the indispensable foundation of human independence and psychic health within society.

As for the conflict between Christianity and republican virtue, Rousseau never mentions it in his various defenses of the "Profession of Faith." Unlike the others, this is a problem that cannot be solved, and Rousseau is left simply to lament that "there is no longer and can never again be an exclusive national religion" (*SC*, 131; see 127). It is true that the Vicar does moderate Christian otherworldliness and passivity (and the *Social Contract*'s "civil religion" goes still farther, claiming that God sanctifies the social contract and the laws [p. 131]). But in the end, the Vicar still takes all men for his brothers and heaven for his fatherland. In Rousseau's view, the age of Roman patriotism and liberty is over, never to return (see *Emile*, 40; *Montagne*, 881).

Rousseau has greater hopes that his doctrine, if accepted, could manage the problem Christianity poses for political unity. We have already seen that the principle of sincerity, by placing each person's salvation completely in his own hands, disarms the clergy. By making religion more inward and private, the "Profession of Faith" undermines the political power of the Church, thus strengthening and unifying the state.

Rousseau's strategy here is more complicated, however. The simple, liberal tactic of privatizing religion in order to remove it from politics is not open to Rousseau, who believes that a healthy state requires an official, public, legally enforced "civil religion" (*SC*, 124–32). He is against religious disestablishment. But if he cannot eliminate public religious authority, how can he keep it in the hands of the state and out of those of the Church? His solution is to argue that true piety, rooted in sincerity, is private, and therefore the established public forms and ceremonies, although wielding the power of custom and useful for political well-being, do not affect the salvation of souls. And just for this reason, the regulation of these ceremonies falls entirely within the jurisdiction of the state and not of the Church (or individual conscience).

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[15] This approach has the further advantage of being relatively untried. Previous writers have interpreted the "Profession of Faith" as reflecting the doctrines of Malebranche (Bréhier 1938); or Malebranche, Clarke, and Plato (Hendel 1934, vol. 2, 124–62); or the general religious thought of Rousseau's times (Grimsley 1968); or the Quietism of Mme de Warens (Maritain 1929, 155–8); or the Pelagian doctrines of Molina (Thomas 1956); or the combination of Genevan Calvinism and Enlightenment rationalism (Burgelin 1962); or simply the deepening dialectic of the Protestant spirit (Barth 1959; Mitchell 1993, 119–20, 225, n 136). Some have interpreted his politics in terms of his religion (Cotta 1965; Mitchell 1993). Virtually none have tried the reverse (Groethuysen 1949 being the most important exception).

[16] In this argument, as in those to follow, Rousseau describes the likely social effects of the "Profession of Faith" assuming it were completely adopted. He knows, of course, that this is an unlikely eventuality and that the social effects will differ somewhat under conditions of partial acceptance. Presumably, he knows that some negative effects are possible as well (the danger, for example, that people might remain in anxious uncertainty as to whether they have been sufficiently sincere; see Arendt 1963 on this famous problem). But precisely if the "Profession of Faith" is a political strategy, then it need not work perfectly, only better than the available alternatives.

Most readers of the "Profession of Faith," not seeing its political purposes, are surprised by the Vicar's attitude toward state power over religion. With his unique emphasis on inward sincerity, he ought, it seems, to oppose all public control of religion (see Grimsley 1968, 81, 137). Instead, he defends it. "While waiting for greater enlightenment, let us protect public order. In every country let us respect the laws, let us not disturb the worship they prescribe; let us not lead the citizens to disobedience. . . . In the uncertainty in which we dwell, it is an inexcusable presumption to profess a religion other than that in which we were born" (*Emile*, 310–11; see 296, 308; *Montagne*, 701, 787–88). Similarly, Rousseau himself is surprisingly hard on religious dissenters. Except in the most extreme cases, they must conform to the external cult prescribed by the laws (*Montagne*, 701–2). In a letter to Jean Ribotte, who had asked for Rousseau's aid on behalf of a Protestant minister in France condemned to death for conducting public services, Rousseau writes:

> I know how hard it is to see oneself ceaselessly at the mercy of a cruel people . . . without even having the consolation of hearing in peace the word of God. Nevertheless, Monsieur, this same word of God is explicit on the duty to obey the laws of princes. The forbidding of assembly belongs incontestably to their rights, and after all, since these assemblies are not of the essence of Christianity, one can abstain from them without renouncing one's faith (October 24, 1761).

Needless to say, Rousseau deplored the persecutory French policy toward Protestants. But he is opposed to religious dissent regarding any matter of external ceremony and is a firm supporter of the government's right to regulate all public religious practices.

Rousseau's position, if complex, is rigorously consistent. Seeking to restore forceful political unity to the Christian world, he wants, on the one hand, to preserve and even strengthen the political role of religion and yet, on the other, to prevent it from ever becoming a force separate from the state. The religion of sincerity, if accepted, would accomplish this double goal. By making "orthodoxy," for the first time, completely internally defined and individual, by thus draining every public ceremony of its relevance for salvation, it frees up the public world for complete political control. Precisely by pushing Christianity farther in its own direction of privacy, Rousseau would wholly repoliticize public religion, thus regenerating something like the lost pagan unity of the state.

Rousseau's solution to the problem that Christianity poses for morality is more straightforward. His new creed is precisely a "moral religion," which grows directly out of the demands of conscience, serving and strengthening it at every turn, even to the exclusion of other religious ends. He resolves the great tension between morality and piety squarely in favor of the former. Thus, he rejects the doctrines of original sin, the Crucifixion, redemption, grace, and prayer and affirms in the strongest possible terms freedom of the will, individual responsibility, divine rewards and punishments, and the almost total primacy of moral action over faith as grounds for salvation.

Furthermore, Rousseau repudiates the excessively demanding or puritanical elements of Christian morality, which he sees as crippling its power. "If God were to tell man to annihilate the passions which He gives him, God would will and not will; He would contradict Himself. Never did he give this senseless order" (*Emile*, 212). Indeed, the Gospels show that Jesus "fled neither pleasures nor celebrations, he went to weddings, he saw women, he played with children, he loved perfumes, he dined with financiers" (*Montagne*, 754). The story that leads up to the "Profession of Faith" seems designed to illustrate the disorders that can result from excessive Christian puritanism: The Vicar first meets the young Jean-Jacques when the latter seeks his help in escaping from a Catholic almshouse where he had been subject to homosexual assaults (*Emile*, 261–62). And the Vicar himself, we are told, who claims to "perform with all possible exactness the tasks prescribed to me [as a Catholic priest]," nevertheless continues to violate one of his oaths, for "in obliging myself not to be a man I had promised more than I could keep" (*Emile*, 308, 267, see 265; *Beaumont*, 970n). Rousseau seeks to downplay the ascetic dimension of Christian morality in favor of its "humanistic" side: compassion and fairness.

This softening or liberalizing of Christian morality, especially regarding sexual matters, is especially intended to reverse the harm that Christianity has done to the family bond. Known through the inner sentiment, the Vicar's God turns out to be a sentimental God, who supports all the idealizing inclinations of a romantic heart. Fifty pages later, He will play an important, nurturing role in the love story of Emile and Sophie (see *Emile*, 426). Thus, the religion of sincerity is expressly designed to support the new love-based, sentimental, and intimate bourgeois family.

Finally, the "Profession of Faith" responds to the last, most comprehensive problem of Christianity and in so doing plays a central role in Rousseau's most fundamental project: to heal the dividedness of the civilized soul and to re-create something like our lost natural goodness or unity. Rousseau's primary strategy is to create a "virtuous" individual who avoids psychically divisive relations of personal dependence and who, more positively, achieves a forceful unity of soul—an inner integrity and integration—through the strict and energetic adherence to moral principle (compassionate fairness). For this purpose, the "Profession of Faith" is absolutely essential, in ways we have already seen. It strengthens both the state and the family, which help to support virtue. It weakens the authority of clerics and intellectuals and the dependency relations founded upon these. Above all, the new religion of conscience supports and strengthens morality itself while also making it less ascetic and repressive. The intended result is an energetic, unified, virtuous soul which rejects and disdains the other-directed self-seeking that splits the bourgeois while also rising above the debilitated self-repression that divides the Christian.

It is true that, in contrast to the spontaneous natural unity found in the state of nature, this "virtuous unity," the only kind possible within society, involves the painful conquest of the natural inclinations. Nevertheless, it is a genuine form of unity because it integrates, if by force, all of one's actions and gives one a single, forceful identity, a unified sense of self.

Having arrived at Rousseau's deepest concern, unity of soul, we are finally in a position to grasp the deepest meaning of the religion of sincerity. We left unresolved, above, the crucial question of how the Vicar defends his reliance on the inner sentiment and, in particular, how it can be distinguished from mere wishful thinking.

Let us now look at what the Vicar actually says on this subject. "I understood that the philosophers, far from delivering me from my doubts, would only cause those which were tormenting me to multiply.... Therefore, I took another guide, and I said to myself, 'Let us consult the inner sentiment; it will lead me astray less than they lead me astray; or at least my error will be my own, and I will deprave myself less in following *my own illusions* than in yielding to *their lies*'" (*Emile*, 269, emphasis added). The Vicar admits here that the inner sentiment may, indeed, lead to illusions and wishful thinking, but these at least will be one's *own* wishes. The implied argument is that the dishonest doctrines coming from others serve the interests of those others, whereas the illusions of one's own heart serve one's own good. Viewed in this light, the Vicar's theological revolution comes to this: Religion, which has throughout the centuries been a tool of others' interests, should at last become a tool of one's own. The turn to the inner sentiment ensures that, true or false, one's religious beliefs will, for the first time, grow out of, express, and harmonize with the deepest need of one's own soul.

And what is this need? It is to be happy. But it seems that for civilized human beings, aware of their vulnerability and mortality, this need virtually always translates into another: the need for the world to be a moral order. "The more I return within myself, and the more I consult myself," the Vicar reports, "the more I see these words written in my soul: Be just and you will be happy" (*Emile*, 282). We need to believe that the world is fair, that virtue is rewarded, that justice brings happiness. Reason and the senses do not show this to be the case, but something within us tells us that it *must* be. Moral order is the ultimate message of the inner sentiment. That is why the religion of sincerity is the religion of conscience.

This new religion is essential for human happiness, in Rousseau's view, not only because it encourages moral behavior or gives consolation but also and above all because, by growing from our deepest need, it unifies the divided soul, bringing together head and heart. Here, as in other spheres of his thought, Rousseau embraces sincerity ultimately for the sake of unity. Founded on the inner sentiment, the "Profession of Faith" makes contact with the innermost hope or faith of the civilized soul, brings this faith to the surface, and gives it systematic elaboration. It thus produces a "natural religion" in the new sense of "the natural ideology of the soul." It is the "true faith" in that it makes a religion of what we all truly believe. And in doing all this, the religion of sincerity unifies the soul by uniting reason and sentiment, head and heart, by putting conscious thought and reasoning in harmony with the belief that inexorably wells up from within us.

That is something neither revelation nor reason can do. Revealed religion, by definition, does not grow from inner feelings but brings dogmas from without or above, dogmas that we can rarely fully understand or make wholly our own. Thus, except in the rarest of cases, it must produce an involuntary hypocrisy, a rift in the soul between what we espouse or try to believe and what, deep down, we really do believe.

But, on this score, Enlightenment rationalism is no better. The philosophers urge us to put our beliefs in harmony with reason, but for most if not all human beings this is impossible. Reason is too weak or too superficial a force to move belief. There are things we cannot make ourselves stop believing. Many people claim, for example, not to believe in a moral/religious order, but on some level they always do. Virtually all skeptics are ultimately hypocritical or out of touch with themselves: They do not believe what they think or think what they believe. Thus, they are not whole.

In order to unify thought and belief, one must put the former in agreement with the latter and not the reverse, according to Rousseau. This is precisely what the Vicar does by beginning with the inner sentiment. If successful, the "Profession of Faith" would make possible the totally integrated individual: The principles by which he lived he would believe on every level of his being. He would be solid, sincere, and of a piece. He would act as he speaks. He would believe his thoughts with all his heart. He would thus be redeemed, to the extent possible, from the inner dividedness of fallen humanity.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Rousseau's writings present the most rigorous and comprehensive formulation of the Enlightenment critique of Christianity: It destroys political unity and republican virtue, increases intolerance and clerical tyranny, weakens private morality, especially family morals, and, in doing all this divides the human soul. Yet, precisely by bringing the Enlightenment critique to full clarity and fixing resolutely upon its ultimate goal, Rousseau brings about its dialectical self-overcoming. The Enlightenment struggle was motivated, at bottom, by the humanistic enterprise to make man unified and at home on earth, and to this end it embraced rationalism as a necessary ally. Rousseau was the first to argue that this enterprise must turn against its erstwhile ally—however necessary it may have been at the beginning—for it is ultimately alienating in ways very similar to Christianity. What is more, it must reshape and re-embrace religion as the truly necessary ally in the quest for unity. In this way, the various counter-Enlightenment attacks on reason, beginning with Rousseau and including most of contemporary antifoundationalism, are actually a continuation of the underlying goal (and crusading spirit) of Enlightenment anticlericalism. Similarly, Rousseau's new religion and its varied re-enchanting progeny, which promote self-attachment rather than transcendence, represent not a rejection of the Enlightenment project but a different, perhaps more searching, effort to fulfill it.

This post-Enlightenment religion is constituted by a new content and, above all, a new foundation. From the standpoint of the Enlightenment's deepest concern, both reason and revelation eventually come to appear dangerous to humanity, and the crucial task becomes to find a "third way," a new foundation for belief. Rousseau finds it in the inner sentiment or sincerity. (He also plants the seeds of the other main alternative, "history," that is, prescriptive custom, the *zeitgeist*, the folk mind, the general will—the inner sentiment of the nation, as it were, the communal sincerity). This new foundation, replacing truth with sincerity as the ground for salvation, removes both the motive and basis for intolerance while also subverting the claim to authority made by priests and philosophers, the claim to privileged knowledge, preventing them from dividing state sovereignty or tyrannizing individuals.

The new foundation also produces a new content: The deepest message of the inner sentiment is the primacy of morality. Thus, Rousseau's new religion of sincerity is also the religion of conscience, a metaphysics of morals that subordinates piety and transcendence. As such, it reinspirits the communal dedication, familial attachment, and whole-souled belief in moral virtue needed for political and psychic unity.

Since Rousseau, the principle of sincerity has continued to exercise enormous influence; today, it can be found almost everywhere, if in attenuated form. But few thinkers have embraced his religious doctrine *in toto*. To some extent, so radical a strategy as Rousseau's became less necessary owing to certain historical changes, such as the political disestablishment of religion, the multiplication of sects, and the spread of a secularized, commercial culture. Other strategies arose, whether consciously or unconsciously, to accomplish the same ends. Nevertheless, the "Profession of Faith" established the paradigm for post-Enlightenment religion. It continued and "fulfilled" the Enlightenment critique of Christianity by solving the problems set forth in that critique, as well as in the parallel critique of Enlightenment rationalism, while also furthering the positive goal that underlay both: the restoration of this-worldly wholeness.

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From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*

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While recent scholarship has provoked renewed interest in the Education of Cyrus *as an important work for our understanding of the origins of classical political philosophy, it has yet to produce a coherent interpretation that preserves the unity of Xenophon's vision of political life. Following a short review of three recent books on the subject, I argue that the obstacles in the way to such an understanding can be resolved by focusing on the underlying causes in Xenophon's account of the transformation of a republican regime into a universal empire and, in particular, on the various deficiencies and self-contradictions of the republican conception of the common good. I show how an understanding of Xenophon's analysis of virtue within both republican and imperial political orders can lead to a fruitful confrontation with the thought of his most famous student, admirer, and antagonist, Machiavelli.*

Recent scholarship has reestablished Xenophon as a theorist of considerable importance and stature for our understanding of the origins of classical political philosophy.[1] At the center of this revival lies a renewed interest in his *Education of Cyrus*, and in the past five years three book-length studies of this work have been published: *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods*, by Bodil Due; *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction*, by James Tatum; *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique*, by Deborah Levine Gera. Each makes a persuasive case for the view that Xenophon's works demand a more serious philosophical and literary analysis than previously considered. Yet, to read these three books together is to be struck by the fundamentally contradictory character of their conclusions with respect both to Xenophon's overall intention and his attitude or relation to the "hero" of the work, Cyrus. All three authors agree, however, that the controversial epilogue in which Xenophon describes the swift collapse of Cyrus' empire contains the key to deciphering the meaning of the *Education of Cyrus*. Each considers the ability to explain its inclusion in the work as a whole to be a test case for the soundness of his or her interpretation. In the introductory section to this article it will be shown how the different and often conflicting evidence they adduce to support their claims forces us to abandon all three interpretations and to reexamine the whole work in the new light cast by their combination,[2] a light which points to an inevitable confrontation with Xenophon's greatest student, admirer, and antagonist, Machiavelli.[3]

Bodil Due (1989) gives the most straightforward account of the *Education of Cyrus*. Xenophon's "ideal ruler" is intended to provide a paradigm for imitation by Xenophon's own contemporaries (Due 1989, 234, 25). The need for such a model arises from Xenophon's view that "without the highest possible moral standards in the leader—and a leader there must be in a state, as well as in any army or a family—there is no hope of improving the sad and confused conditions of human life" (p. 237). To confirm that Xenophon shares this understanding of political life, Due refers to his descriptions of Cyrus' "kindness, clemency and concern for other people, combined with strength, discipline, and capacity for endurance in both a moral as well as physical sense" (p. 37). Due also makes much of Cyrus' "generosity and natural deportment towards his men" (p. 232). In short, Cyrus is a paragon of human virtue and perfection.

Given this laudatory presentation, Due knows it may come as a shock to some readers that the empire founded by this ideal ruler collapsed immediately upon his death. Is this not a severe reproach to the craft and judgment of its founder, one that either casts doubts on the solidity of Cyrus' virtue or shows his failure to comprehend the sad recalcitrance of political reality to its mastery by human labors?[4] Due, however, claims that Xenophon does not mean to detract from Cyrus' virtue by including an account of his empire's fate. Rather, "by implicit contrast, he succeeds in underlining, for the last

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[1] Xenophon (c. 429–c.357 BC), with Alcibiades and Plato, was among the most famous and influential students of Socrates. Like the former, he led an active political life, formed ties with Sparta and Persia, and ultimately was exiled by the Athenians. Like the latter, he wrote Socratic dialogues but also works on more historical and practical subjects. In antiquity the *Education of Cyrus* seems to have been frequently paired with Plato's *Republic*, either as its complement or rival; the two contain many common themes. The *Education of Cyrus*, *Memorabilia*, and *Anabasis* are considered Xenophon's three greatest works and roughly correspond to his preoccupation with politics, philosophy, and the relation between the two (see Bruell 1987).

[2] The fact that these works were conceived and written at approximately the same time appears to have prevented their authors from stating these contrasts themselves, although Gera does include a few passing references to Tatum and Due.

[3] The importance Machiavelli placed on Xenophon is indicated in several ways. First, Machiavelli mentions Xenophon more often in his major works than Plato or Aristotle combined. Second, in the *Prince*, itself written in a compressed style for the busy executive with little time for study, Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus* is the only book cited by name and is even recommended for further reading. Third, Xenophon's Cyrus is one of the four great founders held up by Machiavelli for admiration in the *Prince* and again serves as a model for imitation in the *Discourses*. Fourth, one of the grand themes of the *Education of Cyrus*, the place of an outstanding ruler in both republican and imperial politics, holds an equally prominent place in Machiavelli's works (Machiavelli 1983, 59, 71, 93, 259). For several passages in the *Prince* and *Discourses* that can be traced directly to the *Education of Cyrus*, see Tatum 1989, 8, 106.

[4] This latter view is argued by W. E. Higgins (1977, 57ff).

time, the exceptional nature of Cyrus.... Thus the first and the last chapter form a circle or train of thoughts around the whole work. The only way to avoid such a [miserable] state of affairs is to have a perfect leader" (Due 1989, 19). The strength of Due's argument derives from its simplicity, which in turn leaves the unity of Xenophon's conception perfectly intact.

Due intends his book to provide not only an interpretation of the *Education of Cyrus* but also a vindication of Xenophon's reputation before a community of scholars that has too much disdained and reviled him (Due 1989, 9, 10). Accordingly, Due writes with the passion of one moved by the sight of injustice, a passion which he freely admits may sometimes get the better of his judgment (p. 230). He also adopts a particular moral standpoint quite foreign to a Socratic like Xenophon and even more so to his Cyrus. In the course of rejecting the view that one possible lesson Xenophon meant to convey with the final chapter of the *Education of Cyrus* was "the sad lesson that all things pass," Due declares: "All mortal things do, of course, pass, but ideals, morals or beliefs do not" (p. 20; compare *Cyropaedia*, 7.5.73). Certainly, Due admires Xenophon more as a literary stylist than political philosopher (Due 1989, 230–34). In order to defend the work against a possible slight cast on its high literary character, Due goes so far as to deny that political considerations are in the forefront or even realm of Xenophon's concerns: "The vagueness and ambiguity as regards the nature of Cyrus' power is not, I think, clumsiness on the part of Xenophon, but originates from lack of interest" (p. 25). For Due, vagueness, ambiguity, and clumsiness are flaws much less excusable than a lack of interest in or attention to politics. But this is certainly not Xenophon's view (see *Cynegeticus*, 13.1–6). One might then wonder whether in attempting to demonstrate what he takes to be the enduring character and importance of Xenophon's work, Due does not go too far in idealizing or purifying Cyrus' virtues, giving us a portrait that lacks the hard political edge and therefore the cutting nuances and subtlety of Xenophon's own presentation. Such, at any rate, is the kind of question James Tatum would likely pose, for by entering more deeply into the political dimensions that Due explicitly dismisses, he finds a Cyrus who possesses both moral and immoral virtues.

The Cyrus presented to us by Tatum (1989) is a fitting model for Xenophon's most well-known admirer, Machiavelli (Tatum 1989, 8). Tatum's Cyrus regards those around him only as useful tools to be manipulated for his own ends and makes so little distinction in his treatment of family, friends, and foes that Tatum can describe his mother and grandfather as among "his first victims" (pp. 66, 97, 71, 115). Furthermore, "he is ruthlessly self-serving and subversive of the status-quo" (p. 98); willing "to bend the laws and customs of the Persians to his own interest" (p. 71), which is to submit the government of the world to his single will (p. 218); and ready "to abandon the norms of one society for another when it suits his purposes" (p. 106). As one might gather from this list, Cyrus cannot be suspected of harboring any "simple piety" (p. 86).

The only thing more shocking than this admittedly accurate if incomplete catalogue of Cyrus' less than reputable qualities is Tatum's firm and repeated insistence that Cyrus is at the same time Xenophon's "paradigm of the ideal ruler" whose "positive example" is to provide a model for imitation (Tatum 1989, xv, 37, 62, 68, 233). The suspicion that Tatum considers Xenophon and his Cyrus to be ruthless Machiavellians some two thousand years *avant la lettre* and, moreover, that he himself approves of this today is in no way allayed by his placing on one and the same page Xenophon's claim that Cyrus enjoyed the "willing obedience" of his subjects together with a description of them "obeying out of terror" (p. 62). The only comment this juxtaposition elicits from Tatum is that Cyrus is indeed an "ideal ruler" (p. 63). Does neither Xenophon nor Tatum recognize a distinction between consent freely given and that compelled by fear (compare Hobbes's *Leviathan*, chapters 19 and 14)? Several passages from the *Memorabilia* (see Xenophon 1904, e.g., *Memorabelia*, 4.6.12, 3.2.2) reassure us that Xenophon did distinguish between tyranny and kingship, and Tatum himself uncovers evidence within the *Education of Cyrus* to show that Xenophon disapproved of rule by terror. According to Tatum, it is the "evil Assyrian," Cyrus' adversary and moral opposite, who rules by fear; and in Tatum's view "the Assyrian king provides a nice example of the futility of attempting to rule an empire by terror" (Tatum 1989, 93). Following a syllogism familiar to students of twentieth-century politics, Tatum then infers that Cyrus, who ultimately defeats this incarnation of pure evil, cannot therefore himself be bad (p. 94).

It remains, however, for Tatum to show how the harsher, less principled sides of Cyrus can be reconciled with his standing as an ideal ruler. While admitting that the more questionable details of Cyrus' behavior may be instructive of certain unavoidable if unpleasant political necessities (Tatum 1989, 188), Tatum concludes by denying their essential importance to the narrative. What is important is that in the end Cyrus comes out completely clean. "If there are any sinister aspects to Cyrus' rise to power, they disappear with the death of Panthea and Abradatas. From the moment Babylon falls and the evil Assyrian is slain, the world of the *Cyropaedia* is a radiant and happy place with not a villain in sight" (p. 189). Yet, this explanation leaves Tatum with the same problem faced by Due: If the mature Cyrus is so good, why does his empire fall so quickly?

Following the strictly philological arguments advanced by Eichler (1880), Tatum accepts the authenticity of the epilogue describing that fall. But, unlike Eichler, who wished to discourage speculation on the chapter's actual meaning, Tatum pushes the issue on to more substantive grounds in order to consider "what this ending reveals about the connections between what Xenophon created and actual political experience" (Tatum 1989, 225). Certain aspects of his interpretation coincide with that of Due. To the extent that Cyrus is an "ideal prince," Tatum recognizes that the swift collapse of his empire could be taken as a reproach. But, like Due, he finds that "the focus here is really more on [the decadence of] Cyrus' descendants and contemporary Persia than on the text of the *Cyropaedia*." The comparison is meant to work in Cyrus' favor. Tatum, however, also wishes to develop a further and more elaborate point.

According to Tatum, the inconsistencies between the body of Xenophon's text and its unexpected ending are real. This does not necessarily mean the epilogue is an interpolation by some later writer. Rather, the inconsistencies reflect fundamental equivocations that Xenophon experienced in his own attitude toward the text and its hero over the course of writing the *Education of Cyrus*. Xenophon was a gifted dramatist capable of transforming a few bare scraps of history into an "ideal fiction," a "romantic world" where perfect virtue always triumphs (Tatum 1989, 216, xiv, 189). But he also could be a hard-nosed political thinker and historian who took his bearings from the facts (p. 237). Tatum claims that ultimately "the very pressures from the world that drew Xenophon toward writing fiction, in the end impinge on the perfected world that he creates through Cyrus.... The fantasy cannot continue" (p. 238). Thus, "the gap between the political and historical world he lived in and the romantically successful but fictional world of the *Cyropaedia*, finally outweighed his authorial desire to preserve the integrity of the text he created. *Contradictory strategies* and *mutually exclusive points of view* exist side by side at many places in his writings" (Due 1989, 224, emphasis added). Tatum pointedly entitles the section of his book dealing with the epilogue, "Revision." Yet, the "revision" he ascribes to Xenophon is nothing like the kind of thorough rewrite such inconsistencies and equivocations would seem to call for, but rather a hasty postscript recanting much of the previous 200 pages. In this way Tatum saves the authority of the text, though only by sacrificing that of its author.

Deborah Levine Gera's *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique* is above all a study of the literary influences that have left a mark on Xenophon's book. As such, it is a comprehensive and sensitive guide to Xenophon's possible sources and is particularly illuminating on the use he made of Herodotus' *Histories*.[5] She also provides many useful cross-references to passages in other works of Xenophon. But Gera goes well beyond merely compiling and comparing sources. In the final section of the book she examines "Xenophon's attitude toward his hero" (Gera 1993, vi) and gives her own interpretation of the meaning of the *Education of Cyrus*. She, too, focuses on the problematic relationship between the epilogue and all that comes before it as the key to understanding Xenophon's intentions.

Like Tatum and Due, Gera takes Xenophon's Cyrus to be "a model to others who wish to cultivate virtue" (Gera 1993, 7; cf. 284). She describes him as an "ideal ruler" who turns out to be "a kind of philosopher king" (p. 122). He is "wise, virtuous, and ever successful in achieving his ambitions" (p. 280), even while remaining "a zealous guardian of the property of others" (p. 222). Yet, like Tatum, Gera detects another side to Cyrus. She notes that "his seemingly kind and thoughtful policies are consistently shown to be motivated by utilitarian, if not selfish, considerations," and he practices a disquieting policy of "divide and conquer" against his *friends* (Gera 1993, 294). In addition, he confiscates the property of his allies, curries popular opinion with methods typical of tyrants, and in the end resembles no one so much as his grandfather Astyages, the lawless, "self-aggrandizing" despot of Media (pp. 289, 290, 293). Gera even suggests we should take Cyrus' well-known epithet, "Shepherd of the People," in a Thrasymachean rather than a Biblical sense (p. 295). With no small understatement, she notes that "each of the less than ideal features of Cyrus' behavior as a ruler of an empire, taken by itself, is perhaps no more than slightly disquieting; viewed cumulatively, they are disturbing and require some sort of explanation" (p. 296).

Gera's own explanation runs as follows. The overarching lesson Xenophon wishes to teach in the *Education of Cyrus* is that "both benevolence and despotism are needed to run a large empire successfully" (Gera 1993, 297). The first corollary of this major premise is that one must choose between "the careful and virtuous republic of a small-scale polity and the more extensive, but despotic, empire" (p. 297). From this it follows that "the second consequence of Cyrus' enlightened absolutism is that it must in fact be enlightened" (p. 297). What she means by this apparent tautology is that the institutions and ways of life Cyrus created were not themselves able to sustain the empire without his skillful guidance (p. 298). Subsequent Persian decadence was not the result of abandoning the practices instituted by Cyrus but rather their fruit. It follows, then, that "the despotism he inaugurates is what is left to the following generations of Persians—along with the conquered empire—and it is a poor legacy. The epilogue only serves to confirm this point, if in an extreme and outspoken way" (p. 298). Here, Gera takes us to the point of a real breach between Xenophon and his Cyrus. Her analysis forces us to ask not only whether Xenophon approved or disapproved of how Cyrus founded his empire but also, and more fundamentally, whether he considered Cyrus' choice of empire over republic to be wise.

Yet, Gera fails to raise this question and ultimately equivocates by coming to two separate and contradictory conclusions. First, the collapse brought on by the character of Cyrus' empire shows that he instituted practices "which cannot be considered, either by the author himself or by his readers, ideal. Thus there is a certain distance or tension in this final section of the work between Xenophon and his hero" (Gera 1993, 299). Second, the collapse serves to show "how much better [Cyrus] was than present day Persians," in other words, it is yet another method or technique "to idealize Cyrus" (p. 300). This unsettled conclusion, that Xenophon both loves and does not love his Cyrus, turns out to be another way of expressing Tatum's thesis on the ambiguity of the relation between the artist and his creation. It goes almost without saying that Gera also ends by asserting the essential incoherence of Xenophon's work.

What is perhaps most interesting in the comparison of Gera's and Tatum's interpretations is not the similarity of their conclusions but the different path each takes to arrive there. While Tatum finds several aspects of Cyrus' childhood and rise to power disturbing, he is altogether satisfied with the ideal character of the empire Cyrus founds: It is "a radiant and happy place without a villain in sight" (Tatum 1989, 189). Gera, in contrast, is relatively pleased with Xenophon's Cyrus up until the moment he founds his empire (Gera 1993, 285). The abuses she documents are almost all taken from the final sections of the work (pp. 287–96). Moreover, while Tatum is reassured as to Cyrus' ultimate goodness by his victory over the "evil Assyrian," Gera shows troubling similarities between Cyrus and his enemy (pp. 112, 287). The fact that where Tatum sees good Gera sees bad and vice versa suggests the possibility that Xenophon's presentation of Cyrus is in fact consistent throughout the work, indeed, consistently Machiavellian.

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[5] See also Tatum 1989, 147–57, for what he calls the "intertextuality" of the *Education of Cyrus* and Herodotus' *Histories*.

Yet, the career of Cyrus remains perplexing, especially as an object of imitation, in either Xenophon's or Machiavelli's eyes. After all, both knew that Cyrus was the Persian most responsible for transforming a stable if small republic into an expanding and despotic empire, an empire whose subsequent collapse entailed the corruption of a large part of the known world (*Cyropaedia*, 8.8ff.). To get to the heart of the matter it will be useful to return to Gera's thesis that the *Education of Cyrus* teaches us the necessity to choose between republican virtue and despotic empire (Gera 1993, 297). Yet, rather than accept this simple, stark polarity as an obvious statement of fact, one must raise the following question: What, in Xenophon's view, makes possible or justifies the choice of one over the other? To formulate an adequate response it is necessary first to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the original Persian republic as described by Xenophon, a part of the *Education of Cyrus* too much neglected by the three books considered here. In the following two sections I will show how the inadequacies and self-contradictions of the republican conception of the common good made possible, encouraged, and in some sense justified its transformation into empire and also how similar defects in the new regime Cyrus founds caused it to splinter and quickly destruct. By understanding the obstacles that Xenophon thinks hinder the establishment of a genuine common good between citizens or subjects in either political order, I hope to provide a better understanding of the immense difficulties raised by Machiavelli's bold claim to labor himself "for the common benefit of each" (Machiavelli 1983, 127).

REPUBLICAN VIRTUE AND THE COMMON GOOD

Xenophon's Persia bears little or no resemblance to what is known of historical Persia and, as frequently noted, is in fact an improved version of the republican regime he describes in the *Lacedaemonian Constitution* (Croiset 1873, 147, 150; Delebecque 1957, 385; Grant n.d., 126–28, 131; Xenophon 1983, viii), that is, a regime that understands the common good to demand both the citizens' equal submission to the law and their public education toward virtue. But whereas Sparta inculcated courage and military prowess in its citizens, an education which Xenophon's satirical analysis shows to use beatings and short rations to teach that undetected theft is good (Proietti 1987, chapter 5; Strauss 1939, 529), the Persians devote themselves to the more comprehensive virtue of justice. Their children actually attend special schools of justice where the instruction is facilitated by the fact that among them, as among grown men, there occur various disputes and conflicts. The children's rulers make the best of this and turn each transgression into an occasion to impress upon their pupils' minds the dictates of justice. One can estimate the frequency of these disputes since Xenophon tells us their rulers spend "most of the day" sitting in judgment while the children listen (Xenophon 1904, 1.2.6).[6]

This education forms the heart of "the regime through the use of which [the Persians] think to produce the best men" (Xenophon 1904, 1.2.15, cf. 1.2.5). Virtue, here, is an entirely public, or political, concern. Yet, Xenophon seems to have some reservations about the Persians' claim and expresses them in his typically understated style. While he relates that the boys were educated to be "the best boys" and the youths to be "the best youths," Xenophon refrains from saying of the mature men that they were educated to be the best men. Rather, he says, they were formed to be "the best executors of the orders and requirements of the highest authority" (1.2.5). Obedience and dispatch may, no doubt, be necessary political virtues, yet by themselves they remain ambiguous. After all, obedience to a mob or dispatch in the execution of unjust orders could hardly be considered acts of true virtue. Whether or not a good and dutiful citizen is at the same time a good man depends upon the regime in which he lives. Unless, or until, the Persian regime can be shown to be unqualifiedly the best regime, Xenophon withholds his judgment on whether the Persians were correct to believe theirs produced the best men.

Xenophon makes clear that an analysis merely of the laws is insufficient for the complete understanding of a regime. While the laws may first appear to be what most of all constitutes the regime, to a large extent they are derivative or follow from it (see Xenophon 1904, *Memorabilia*, 1.2.40–46; *Ways and Means*, 1.1). The deepest strand of Xenophon's critique of the Persian republic, therefore, comes only after he has turned away from a discussion of its laws. To mark this new phase of his analysis and to signal his break with the official Persian line, Xenophon writes for the first time in the first person singular: "In order that the whole regime of the Persians be made clear, I will go back a little; for from what has already been said it may now be set forth in a very few words" (1.2.5). Of the 120,000 Persians, none is prevented by law from attaining honors or public office. All Persian children are permitted to attend the common schools of justice where advancement through the ranks is based on merit. The Persian republic is then a democratic republic whose most fundamental and publicly declared principle is equality before the law. But this equality turns out to be limited by the economic conditions of life in Persia. Only those in a position to maintain their children without putting them to work can send them to the schools; and only those who complete the training given to the boys can pass into the ranks of the youths, and so on. Those whose families lack the wherewithal to keep them in school can never become members of the class of "Peers" and are effectively barred from the opportunity to gain honors and public office, regardless of their merit. The case of Pheraulas, who quickly rises to a place of great responsibility and rank once these barriers are removed (8.3.2ff., 8.3.37ff.), is perhaps only the most extreme example of the talents left uncultivated by the original Persian regime.

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[6] Citations of the *Education of Cyrus* are from the edition edited by E.C. Marchant, 1904, *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*. Translations are my own.

As promised, this insight into the economic limitations imposed on education does indeed "make clear the whole regime." How, we may wonder, do those few families come to have the means to educate their children, especially when the productive or mercantile arts are forbidden them (Xenophon 1904, 1.2.3)? There is only one way. A democracy in name, an oligarchy in practice, Xenophon's Persia is in fact ruled by a small number of men who owe their position less to their justice than to the possession of military arms and the discipline that allows them to live, however austerely, off the labor of the "uneducated" (2.1.3). The resulting tensions between the two classes, Commoners and Peers, is then determinative throughout the regime. Forced to camp out every night in the central square in order to guard against enemies without and especially within, the Peers make a virtue of their deprivation and call it self-control or moderation (1.2.9). To encourage the self-sacrifice and public spirit necessary to maintain such a military camp, they forbid the pursuit of any strictly individual or private aims (1.2.3). The only kind of private end allowed is praise or honor for excellence in the many martial contests they institute (1.2.12); honor rewarded for service to the city creates a common ground between individual and community interests and satisfies to some degree the desire for individual fulfillment while binding that individual to those who hold him in esteem (cf. 1.2.9). Yet, praise bestowed on all ceases to be praise; and the sweetest honors are those one tastes alone. While a spirit of competition and a desire for distinction can foster excellence and service to others, they also can encourage and even create faction and strife among citizens, especially if fueled by an inclination to seek advancement as much from others' faults as from one's own merits (1.2.14).[7] The need to counteract this tendency explains the Persians' great concern with punishing false accusations. It also accounts for their emphasis on patriotism and their great disdain of foreign customs (1.5.1). The conviction of the superiority of one's native ways forms the foundation for the love of country that sets a farthest bound or limit to internal strife. The republican community, according to Xenophon, is necessarily a closed, conservative society that venerates and clings to the ancestral way of life at the expense of all others.

When understood in the context of a society in which the elders hold pride of place as well as most political power (1904, 1.2.14, 1.5.1), the revolutionary character of Cyrus' first public speech is unmistakable. Having been chosen as general of the Persian army in a defensive war against the Assyrians, Cyrus addresses a gathering of Peers on the eve of their departure to go to the aid of their allies: "I have observed," he tells them, "that our forefathers were in no way worse than we are," that is, they were no better (1.5.8). Indeed, following this already remarkable assertion of equality, Cyrus goes on to claim the ancestral ways were rather foolish. "[Our forefathers] too spent their lives practicing what are held to be the works of virtue. But what good thing they acquired through being men of this sort, either for the common good of Persia or themselves, I am no longer able to see" (1.5.8). They were like those who expend themselves in toil and then allow themselves to become old and weak without reaping any fruit from their labors, like farmers who plant and sow only to leave the crop ungathered and rotting on the ground (1.5.10). From now on the Persians will practice virtue not for its own sake but, as Cyrus tells them, for the sake of "great wealth and happiness and honor both for themselves and the city" (1.5.9). Cyrus' objections to the ancestral ways are, of course, somewhat exaggerated and disingenuous. Imitating the public silence of the Persian laws, he leaves unmentioned the substantial advantages the Peers enjoy from their domination of the Commoners. But inasmuch as the necessity to keep the Commoners in check compels them to remain at home and hence moderate the scope and profitability of their military strength, there is also some truth to Cyrus' claims.[8] Yet, for the Peers to abandon their traditional understanding of virtue and turn to its practice for the sake of wealth and honor (1.5.9) will require a fundamental transformation in the relationship between Commoners and Peers, a transformation Cyrus prudently leaves unmentioned here but which will make any return to "the city" all but impossible (see 2.1.1, following MS z).

Cyrus begins to lay the groundwork for this transformation at the earliest possible moment. He arrives in Media alone and well ahead of his army in order to consult with Cyaxares on the military situation. He tells his uncle that he is bringing 20,000 Commoners and an unspecified number of Peers (1904, 2.1.2).[9] The two generals estimate the number of men on each side and conclude that they are dangerously outmatched. If both sides fight according to their customary fashion, then victory will surely go to the one with more men (2.1.7–8, cf. 4.5.16, 7.5.70). The only alternative to certain defeat appears to be an innovation in tactics. Cyrus proposes that the Persian Commoners be provided with the same kind of weapons used by the Peers: short swords and shields for fighting at close quarters. In this way the Persians will face those who stand their ground, while the Medes with their cavalry will deal with those who turn their backs and flee. Cyaxares is so taken with the strategy that he immediately sets about preparing the new equipment. Military expediency may be thought to justify this plan, but alone it cannot explain why Cyrus chose to employ only Persians for this new force when he well could have used some of the more numerous Medes. Thus, on his own and without consulting either his fellow Peers or the authorities back home, Cyrus undertakes to arm and train 30,000 Commoners.

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[7] That "gentlemen" in particular quarrel most bitterly over honors is shown at *Memorabilia*, 2.6.20.

[8] We get a glimpse of the constraints under which the Persians operate if we consider the few figures Xenophon supplies. There are 120,000 Persians. The first army Cyrus leads out of Persia is made up of 1,000 Peers and 30,000 Commoners. Later, reinforcements of 40,000 Commoners are sent out, and Cyrus takes an additional 10,000 Commoners to make up his body guard. No Peers beyond the original 1,000 are ever allowed to leave Persia. Thucydides suggests a similar explanation of the source of the remarkable moderation practiced by the Spartans and Chians even in times of prosperity and "peace" *Peloponnesian War*, 8.24 with 8.40).

[9] The usual emendation of δισμυριους (20,000), found in all the manuscripts, to τρισμυριους (30,000) in order to make Cyrus' figure agree with the actual number of Commoners in the army (cf. 1.5.5) is unnecessary if one takes into account the dramatic setting of the exchange. Cyrus underestimates his own numbers to make the situation appear even more desperate to Cyaxares, who, after all, must be "persuaded" to bear the expense of arming them. Thus, the very first word Xenophon puts in Cyrus' mouth here, "δισμυριους," is but the

When the army finally arrives in Media, Cyrus addresses the assembled Peers. He begins by exaggerating the immediate threat of danger (1904, 2.1.11 with 2.1.20) and claims he feared the Peers might have fallen in with a large number of the enemy.[10] Had this happened, Cyrus claims, the Commoners, equipped only for fighting at a distance, would not have been able to help them.[11] He therefore presents arming them as a measure taken for the greater safety of the Peers. Should some among them feel apprehensive about his plan, Cyrus offers a subtle, double-edged, and flattering assurance: To those who wonder whether the Commoners will be up to fighting by their side, he claims that their souls only need to be whetted a bit for battle, something easily accomplished by the Peers who will serve as their officers; the same reflection also quiets the concerns of those who worry about the aftermath, since it suggests that the Commoners without their officers would again prove no match for the Peers, even if similarly armed. They accept Cyrus' proposal by acclamation.

Cyrus obviously must employ a different strategy to persuade the Commoners to submit to their new role. With them he argues that since all were born and bred in Persia there is no difference between the bodies of Commoners and Peers. Moreover, he now asserts, "it is not fitting that your souls be any worse" (1904, 2.1.14). In the face of this essential natural equality, Cyrus attributes any differences between the classes to a necessity which previously "compelled the Commoners to earn their living" (2.1.15). As to how the Peers escaped this "necessity," Cyrus' formulation points to a possible resolution of the tensions between the two. Necessity, being blameless, acts itself as a kind of excuse. More important, Cyrus is now in a position, with the help of the gods (2.1.14) and, more prominently, Cyaxares' treasury (2.1.10, 2.4.9), to abate or even conquer this "necessity," which once removed will no longer be the cause of such inequality. By a certain blurring of the facts on both sides, that is the shortcomings of the Commoners' souls and the degree of culpability on the part of the Peers for that shortcoming, Cyrus is able to initiate a reconciliation between the two classes, but only under pressure of a foreign threat and with wealth supplied from outside the regime.

Still, it would be a mistake to believe that Cyrus has resolved all tensions between the two groups or even that he thinks this is desirable. The true state of affairs is revealed in a speech made later by Pheraulas, a Commoner who urges his fellows to accept the distribution of rewards commensurate with merit (1904, 2.3.7–16). Pheraulas never mentions the common good or expresses any concern for the survival of the army or even Persia. Instead, he tells his comrades to make the most of this opportunity and "hasten into a war with those here who have been educated. For now [the Peers] have been trapped into a struggle with the common element" (2.3.15). Cyrus harnesses this resentful spirit of competition and strife through the institution of various war games within the army and in this way brings its fighting spirit to a fever pitch (3.3.10, 3.3.57).

In the course of rewarding the victors of these games Cyrus exhausts the funds he brought from Persia (1904, 2.4.9–10). The distribution of the spoils taken in the preliminary expedition against Armenia proves to be only a temporary stopgap. Indeed, despite these generous rewards, and even encouraged by them, the soldiers begin to turn on one another out of envy. On account of this incipient discord Cyrus decides to lead them out against the enemy "as quickly as possible," for only the "common dangers" run in war can make the soldiers sufficiently attentive to the "common good" and thereby extinguish the envy that threatens to tear them apart (3.3.10). It is worth noting that had the Assyrian at this point decided to call off his expedition in the face of the Medes' and Persians' preparations, Cyrus would have been forced to become the aggressor. Having armed 30,000 Commoners and given them the basics of military training, he could not return to Persia without destroying the delicate balance that gave the regime its stability. Whether or not they yet realized it, Cyrus has already put the Persians on a course which they must follow to the end or fail.[12]

It is now possible to understand how Cyrus exploited the incipient discord and dissatisfaction within the re-

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first of many deceptions he will practice on his uncle. See Machiavelli's account of the relation between Cyrus and his uncle in *Discourses*, 2.13.

[10] For a similar expression of disingenuous fear by Cyrus, see 4.5.48 with 4.3.3.

[11] In fact, the very opposite proves to be true. See 4.3.5.

[12] The similar transformation of the Peers into a cavalry force provides yet another testament to Cyrus' quiet and skillful manipulation of his friends, fellow citizens, and allies. Acquiring the horses from among the early spoils (1904, 4.3.4–7), Cyrus manages, in violation of his own proclaimed meritocracy (2.2.28–31, 7.4.14) as well as strict military expediency (4.2.34, 1.6.10), to provide mounts for every single one of the original Peers (4.3.3, 2.1.22, 5.2.1, 4.5.58, 6.2.7, 7.1.46). His aims are twofold. First, the acquisition of Persian cavalry makes his forces self-sufficient, freeing them from their dependence on the Medes (for the full implications of this, consider 1.6.10). Second, in the name of learning horsemanship, Cyrus convinces the Peers to pass a law making it shameful to go anywhere on foot, thus turning them as much as possible into "centaurs" (4.3.15ff.). Xenophon also relates that Persia is a mountainous country where due to the difficulty of raising and riding horses it is rare even to see one (1.3.3). Hence, the Peers' first (and last) act of legislation, enacted at the suggestion of Cyrus, serves to render them unfit to live again in Persia (see 8.8.19).

public to put the Persians on the path to empire so quickly. It remains to be seen what, if anything, may have justified this departure. We also begin to see why Xenophon and his Cyrus so much attracted the attention and admiration of Machiavelli. For although Xenophon presents Cyrus as achieving his ends through the manipulation and deception of his allies, fellow citizens, friends, and even family, at no point does he explicitly denounce these apparent violations of strict justice and morality. The reasons behind this surprising lack of indignation seem to be connected to several difficulties, uncovered in the course of Cyrus' education, with the Persian understanding and practice of justice.

In their schools the Persians are taught the strict equation of justice and obedience to the laws (1904, 1.3.17). This leads, however, to an obvious problem. If the just is understood as the legal, what are they to do when faced with the existence of conflicting codes of law? Of course, such a dilemma is not always or perhaps necessarily troubling. So long as one's own way of life is thought to be entirely self-sufficient and experienced as a complete and seamless whole, the mere existence of other, different ways will not of itself pose the slightest difficulty. Consider, for example, the Persians as described in Herodotus' *Histories* (1.134), who held their own way of life to be best, that of their nearest neighbors to be second best, and so on, ranking all foreigners according to how distant they were; or even Xenophon's young Cyrus, who rejects the elaborate dinner his Median grandfather had prepared for him as inferior to Persian fare without even tasting it (1.3.5, cf. 8.2.4).

Yet, Cyrus does not reject everything he finds in Media. The moment he first sets eyes on the despot of Media he kisses him and declares: "Oh mother, how beautiful my grandfather is" (1904, 1.3.2). Cyrus is quite taken with Astyages' elaborate makeup and finery. It is this admiration for something both beautiful and foreign that draws Cyrus most powerfully away from the Persian way of life, for the attraction to something foreign cannot help but be accompanied by an awareness of some deficiency or incompleteness in what is one's own. Cyrus' mother worries that this "corruption" of her son's tastes will have grave consequences for him upon his return home (1.3.3, 1.5.1), especially since in Persia justice is considered equality and obedience to law, while in Media it is the self-aggrandizement of the tyrant's will (1.3.18). The situation becomes acute when Cyrus decides he wants to stay and live with his grandfather rather than return to Persia with his mother. She asks him: "But how, my child, will you learn justice here, while your teachers are over there?" Cyrus replies that he already knows these things and recounts the particular lesson that taught him so thoroughly about justice. In Persia

> the teacher appointed me to decide cases for the others, as being myself very exact in the knowledge of justice. Yet in one case I received a whipping for not having decided correctly. The case was this. A big boy with a small cloak put it on a small boy who had a big cloak and then took the other's for himself. When I tried the case, I thought it better that each keep the cloak that fitted him. Upon this the teacher whipped me saying that when I was the judge of a good fit I should do as I had done, but when I was to judge whose cloak it was I must examine what just possession is; whether he who took something from another by force should have it, or whether he who made or bought it should possess it. And since what is lawful is just, and force is unlawful, he commanded the judge always to render his verdict in conformity with the law. So, mother, I understand what is just in all cases very exactly. And if I am at all deficient my grandfather here will teach me that (1904, 1.3.16–17).

Cyrus based his decision in the case on a reasonable consideration of what each of the boys could best use. There was a common good or coincidence of interests between the two; they both benefit from the exchange. Yet, as we have seen, economic scarcity imposes certain restrictions on the degree to which all Persians may share in the common good. Above all, education is limited to those whose families can afford it (1904, 1.2.15). Certainly, however, there are some children born into poor families who have the natural disposition to take advantage of this education, children for whom such an education would be more fitting than it is for at least some of the children of the rich.[13] Yet, to recognize the legitimacy of Cyrus' decision and to apply the standard of best use not only to cloaks but also to all other goods would have revolutionary and disastrous consequences for this as well as any other society. The direct appeal to what is good or useful is therefore forbidden by the laws, which unequivocally declare that just possession depends on making or buying, and one must *always* decide according to the law.

Many commentators have been tempted to conclude that Xenophon fully agrees with the Persian equation of the just and the legal,[14] especially since he presents his Socrates endorsing this opinion on more than one occasion (1904, *Memorabilia* 4.4ff., 4.6.4). Indeed, much of Xenophon's defense of Socrates rests on just this point (e.g., 4.4.1, 1.1.17). Here, in the *Education of Cyrus*, we find evidence that this view must be considerably qualified, and elsewhere Xenophon records a conversation between Socrates and the young Kritoboulos in which they, too, come to a conclusion quite similar to that of the young Cyrus. Utility should determine the ownership of property; a thing belongs to the one who knows how best to use it (1904, *Oeconomicus*, 1.5ff., 6.4). Not law or custom but knowledge turns out to determine just possession. This line of reasoning ultimately culminates in the claim that only a wise man can correctly determine who should have what in each particular case.[15] But such perfect wisdom appears unavailable, at least to human beings (1.6.46). Moreover, a life spent entering into others' troubles and sorting out their disputes in order to distribute everything correctly would be a life of thankless toil (cf. 8.2.27), that is, a most foolish life. For these reasons, and because the wise apparently need very little to live on (compare 1.3.17, with *Memorabilia*, 1.6.3), it becomes tolerable to respect and even to defend the equation of the just with the legal, although in no way as an "absolute obligation" (1904, *Oeconomicus*, 2.8; *Apology*, 28; Strauss 1970, 95–97).

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[13] Again, consider the case of Pheraulas (1904, 8.3.37ff.).

[14] "Xenophon insists on the character of absolute obligation which is attached to the principle of obedience to the laws" (Luccioni 1949, 65).

[15] These are essentially the same arguments about property that lie behind Socrates' conversation with Cephalus and Polemarchus in the *Republic*. There, Socrates pushes them to their extremes and institutes absolute communism under the rule of philosopher kings, a result not without its comic implications (cf. Aristophanes, *Assembly of Women*). Yet, this regime is ambiguously good, especially for the wise who must be "compelled" to rule. It seems that even the best men "prefer to be benefitted rather than take the trouble to benefit others" (Plato, *Republic*, 347d, 519d).

What the founder of the Persian laws would have thought of such arguments is difficult to say, but in Cyrus' day the Persian laws made no arguments whatsoever and depended instead upon whippings and threats of other punishment to obtain obedience. That the distinction between lawful possession and possession by force was itself maintained in Persia by dint of force is a lesson not likely to have been missed by the young Cyrus as he received a beating for having undertaken to benefit his fellows. One could even say that the republican claim to secure justice and the common good through obedience to law contains within it a certain predisposition toward absolute monarchy as a remedy to the defects caused by the necessary generality of the law. Cyrus ultimately becomes just such a monarch, "a seeing law" (1904, 8.2.22), although by that time he has adopted quite another standard for the proper distribution of cloaks.[16]

The inequities caused by the generality of law are not the only source of tensions within the republican regime that would seem to lead it toward absolute monarchy. The Persians' emphasis on virtue also pulls in this direction. Cyrus makes this clear in the course of a private conversation with his father that takes place as they travel toward the Persian border on the eve of the army's departure. The subject of their discussion turns to ruling. Cyrus maintains that while others ("beginning with our friends," i.e., the Medes) believe that a ruler should surpass his subjects in having better food, more money, and longer hours of sleep, he thinks a ruler should surpass the ruled not in easy living but in taking forethought and eager love of toil (1904, 1.6.8). Cyrus holds the apparently laudable republican view that virtue or merit is the highest claim to rule and should in turn be rewarded with its exercise. Yet, taken to its conclusion, this view becomes unsettling. If Cyrus surpasses all other rulers in the possession of the necessary virtues, in principle there is no reason he should not justly take their places. Accordingly, Cyrus considers it "shameful to cower before such inferior rulers rather than to go fight with them" (1.6.8). These other lesser rulers, of course, include the leaders of the enemy he has been sent to fight. But Cyrus makes clear he does not exclude the uncle he has been ordered by the Persian council to help. He may begin by referring to the Medes as "friends," but he soon admits, if only tacitly, that he counts them among the enemy.[17] Thus, for the first time the open-ended nature of his ambition stands revealed before his father, a father whose position is also threatened by these expansive claims.

Cambyses does not react to Cyrus' bold intention with anything like the outrage one might expect, especially given his son's implicit disregard of the instructions of the Persian council. We must remember, however, that Cyrus now heads the Persian army. Cambyses has no means but speeches to moderate his son's ambition; and as he himself admits, a sermon without a stick is likely to have little, if any, effect on those who are well armed (1904, 1.6.10, cf. 2.2.14). Indeed, the difficulty of the tasks involved (1.6.8), the need for allies who share a common cause, and the present weakness of the Persian army (1.6.10) all argue for cautious moderation but fail to dampen Cyrus' spirits. Yet, these arguments fail in a way that illuminates the difficult position of a wise advisor to a powerful man who is both the greatest hope and threat to the survival of the regime. Inasmuch as Cambyses wishes to moderate Cyrus' desire for greater conquests, he presents to him the almost infinite cares and difficulties this course entails; but as Cyrus is also at this moment the defender of the country against a dangerous enemy, Cambyses is compelled to share with him his experience and knowledge, to advise him as best he can on how to overcome such adversity. The necessity to maintain this balance, to ensure that Cyrus is equal to the given task while preventing his becoming excessively confident, governs Cambyses speech throughout. He must accordingly admit the prudence of Cyrus regarding the Medes as little better than potential enemies (1.6.9). But Cambyses tries to set at least one limit on his son's ardent desire to fight: Cyrus should attack only if he is going to gain some advantage by it (πλεῖον ἕξειν, 1.6.26). The cool calculation of "enlightened" self-interest or acquisitiveness proves to be the final hedge against unlimited ambition, but to make such an argument he must invoke the principle said to be most characteristic of tyranny (1.3.18). The ensuing discussion of "how to take advantage most of all" (1.6.27) lays bare not only the already questionable foundation of the alliance between the Persians and the Medes but also that of the Peers' friendship with one another.

According to Cambyses, to take advantage of the enemy is neither an easy nor "simple" (ἁπλοῦν, literally "single") task. One must be a plotter and a dissembler, treacherous and deceiving, a thief and a robber, and greedy to take advantage in all things (1904, 1.6.27). Although his father has already advised him in so many words to extort supplies from weaker neighbors (1.6.10), to lie to his men on occasion and at other times to mislead them by using others as his mouthpiece (1.6.19), even to cultivate their love by less than honest means (1.6.24–25), Cyrus seems genuinely surprised by the frank content of this speech: "O Heracles, father, what sort of man do you say I must become?" he asks with a laugh. Cambyses maintains that just this kind of man is "both most just and most lawful" (1.6.27).

Cyrus is puzzled. If this is true, why then as children were they taught just the opposite? Cambyses draws a distinction that saves Persian morality from complete self-contradiction, at least for the moment. Toward friends and citizens they should still abide by the rules given them in childhood; they should only take advantage against enemies. As for the actual instruction in how to harm enemies, this was not neglected but rather taught to them covertly. Just as they learned to shoot by aiming at a mark instead of one another, they also learned to take advantage and fight on unequal terms by hunting wild animals. In this way the boys avoided harming their friends but still became practiced in the skills necessary to harm enemies should this ever be required (1904, 1.6.28–29). Apparently, if men were not divided into hostile camps and there were only one peaceful, universal nation, lawful conduct would admit of no exceptions. Justice would again be something "simple."[18] At present, however, the constant threat of war demands two different standards of justice, one for friends, another for enemies.

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[16] See 8.3.6–8, where what seems best to Cyrus and his devious henchman, Pheraulas, replaces what is fitting for each recipient.

[17] At 1.6.9 Cyrus drops his posturing and asks his father for advice "while we are still in friendly country," that is, before they cross the border into Media.

This response does not fully answer his original question, and Cyrus remains perplexed. Even if it is necessary to distinguish between the treatment of friends and enemies, why was this not explained to the children in the beginning? Moreover, the actual practice of the teachers, as it now stands revealed, serves to undermine the distinction. To teach the necessary skills of war, they themselves practiced a kind of covert deception on the children, even if only to prevent them from harming one another. Thus, the original commandment not to deceive, which the need to prepare for war required be qualified by the distinction between friends and enemies, demands yet another qualification: Sometimes it is permitted to deceive friends. Cyrus immediately sees the inadequacy of the simple distinction between friends and enemies and, dropping it altogether, insists that "since it is useful to know how to benefit and how to harm men, both these things should have been taught against men as well" (1904, 1.6.30). Cyrus' intransigence prompts Cambyses to tell a story about a former teacher, an almost Socratic figure, who once taught justice in the very way Cyrus bids: not to lie and to lie, not to deceive and to deceive, not to slander and to slander, and not to take advantage and to take advantage. And he drew a line between what one must do to friends and what to enemies. Furthermore, he taught that it is just to deceive even friends for a good end (ἐπί γε ἀγαθῷ) and likewise to steal from them (cf. 1904, *Memorabilia*, 3.1.6, 4.2.11–20; Plato, *Republic*, 331c, 333a–334b). Now, to teach these things it was, of course, necessary to have the boys practice on one another. But some of them "being naturally suited to deceive well and take advantage well, and perhaps also being not unnaturally lovers of gain, they did not refrain from trying to take advantage even of their friends" (1904, 1.6.32). As a consequence of the ensuing disorder there came to be a decree still in use among them, to teach the children "simply," as they do with house slaves, to tell the truth, not to deceive, and not to take advantage. Those who disobey are punished and hence inured by habit to become tamer citizens. Only when they come to be about the age of Cyrus is it considered safe to reveal what is lawful toward enemies, since if they have grown up together in mutual respect they do not seem to break away and become wild citizens when presented with this supplementary teaching (1.6.33–34).

This story does, indeed, address Cyrus' concern about the apparently defective education of the children, although it points to more difficulties than it resolves, not the least of which is that Cyrus did much of his growing up far away in Media (1904, 1.4.1). Now, it appears, not so much the possibility of war but rather the elusive and shifting character of any particular or contingent good, as opposed to the general and conservative character of law, lies at the root of the inadequacy of any single or simple teaching about justice (cf. 1904, *Memorabilia*, 4.2.17, 3.8.1–3, 4.6.8). The exceptional stresses of war merely bring to the surface deficiencies in the established laws already present though less pressing in times of peace. If this teacher's desire to attempt such an experiment in the first place casts doubt on the ultimate respectability of the laws, and therefore on justice understood as obedience to law, its failure reveals that the Peers' friendship for one another, and by implication their hostility to foreigners as such, rests at bottom on habits inculcated by force and reinforced with shame. This, and not some shared common good, is what ultimately binds them together. Of course, one could point out that the Peers do share a common good or interest in providing for their mutual defense and keeping down the Commoners. Yet, as founded on a calculation of self-interest, like the justice of a band of thieves, it carries no permanent sense of duty or obligation.

Among the possible human responses to this new or supplementary teaching about justice, one is the reaction hoped for by the teachers and upon which the republican regime depends. The young man accepts the necessity to take advantage of enemies by any possible means, yet remains bound by law in his relations with his fellow citizens for whose sake he continues to fight without question.[19] Should it occur to him that his earlier education was founded on deception and the application of brute force, this only serves to deepen his sense of loyalty. The laws, like a loving parent, did this for his own good; he might even feel gratitude now for the beatings and tears inflicted in his youth. Such is the response of Aglaitadas, the sole Peer to object publicly to Cyrus' transformation of the army, after which, not too surprisingly, he quietly disappears (1904, 2.2.14). Another response is that the young initiate, struck by the conventional and therefore largely arbitrary character of the Persians' friendship for one another, might hope to find a basis for true friendship despite or outside the narrow boundaries of a particular community. Persian citizenship, after all, depends in most cases on an accident of birth, not the intrinsic worth of an individual.

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[18] See 3.1.32 for another situation where justice becomes something "simple/single."

[19] The difficulty of producing these two traits in a single individual, extreme cunning against enemies and absolute loyalty toward fellow citizens, is an important theme of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, in particular, his treatment there of the Spartan generals Lysander and Callicratidas. See Proietti 1987.

Such a man might then devote himself to the foundation of a world-state, cosmopolitan in character, in which distinctions between friends and enemies no longer dominate political life or in which, at the least, they are founded on true worth. Much of Cyrus' own project, aiming ultimately at the establishment of a world-wide meritocracy (1904, 1.1.4, 2.2.26), could be understood as a response to the injustice inherent in the narrow claims of patriotism, a grand attempt to reconcile the duties of citizenship with humanity.

Of course, the lack of true friendship among the Persians might lead others to doubt the possibility of sharing a true common good at all and hence to doubt the possibility of genuine friendship. The results of the experiment of teaching the children deception, in effect releasing them from the constraints of law, seem to indicate that nothing but habit and fear of punishment stand in the way of helping an enemy or harming a friend should this satisfy their natural love of gain. More than any condition of natural scarcity, this passion of unlimited scope lies at the heart of conflicts, not only between nations and civil factions but also among individuals as well (see 1904, *Hiero*, 4.6; *Memorabilia*, 2.6.21). This perpetual war of all against all makes any lasting or more than mercenary friendship impossible or foolish; while enemies are virtually infinite, the only true and constant "friend" is oneself. Attachment to Persia, a regime that admittedly treats its citizens like house slaves for much of their lives, becomes a question not of loyalty or duty but a mere calculation of its value as a means or tool to essentially individual if not private ends. This, too, would appear an apt description of Cyrus' response and subsequent career.

Whether Cyrus set out to found a universal government for the common good of humanity or to impose upon his subjects the biggest tyranny of all is perhaps impossible to know. To claim to speak with certainty of the hidden movements of his heart would be to imitate the folly of those Persian laws which seek to make ingratitude a punishable offense (1904, 1.2.7). True, Cyrus claims to take more pleasure in showing forth his works of philanthropy than those of his generalship (8.4.8). But on his death bed he also advises his children "to do good for your friends so as to be able to punish your enemies" (8.7.28) and at one point considers "striking down and killing" not the means to victory but rather its "reward" (7.1.13). The conversational or dramatic settings of these different and contradictory utterances make it difficult to judge which, if either, is genuine. What is clear, however, are the limits of justice imposed by the political necessities Cyrus must confront even within the universal empire he founds.

EMPIRE AND THE COMMON GOOD

Having defeated the enemy, taken Babylon, and had the Assyrian king dispatched, Cyrus sets about organizing his empire. He does at first divide the spoils according to merit as had been earlier agreed (1904, 7.5.35, 2.3.16), but there is one prominent man whom Cyrus fails to reward and even leaves without a proper house: himself. This is not entirely surprising. After all, many of his men were willing to submit to Cyrus' judgment of their worth because he appeared to take more pleasure in giving things away than keeping them (2.3.12, 5.1.28). But with the war at an end Cyrus apparently must take more thought for his own position. Indeed, he now desires to establish himself as he thinks becomes a king and to make his appearances rare and solemn so as to excite the least amount of envy. He must be wary of envy, especially that of the Peers. Other considerations also make the matter more delicate: From the point of view of Persian law his father is still the king (8.5.22). Accordingly, Cyrus must "contrive" some subterfuge to gain "the concurrence of his friends" (7.5.37). With the help of his usual mouthpiece (8.4.11), who accompanies his speech with thinly veiled threats of violence (7.5.55–56), Cyrus convinces his men to give him a home (ὀικία, 7.5.56). He then moves straight away into the royal palace (τ̓α βασίλεια) and in addition has the treasure taken in the war delivered there (7.5.57).

Because Babylon is "as hostile to him as a city could be to any man" (1904, 7.5.58), Cyrus must complete the organization of his court before he can enjoy the respose he claims to seek. His first concern is for his safety, especially at those most vulnerable times when eating, drinking, bathing, or sleeping. Cyrus held that no man could ever be trusted as a guard if he loved another more than his charge. He also thought that nature compels those who have children, agreeable wives, or youths to love them most of all. Therefore, he chooses those cut off from such natural affections and employs eunuchs to make up the inner circle of his bodyguard. Yet, what in fact makes the eunuchs so useful to Cyrus is not their alleged lack of natural attachments; they do, after all, remain attached to themselves. Rather, since "there is no man who would not think himself entitled to take advantage of a eunuch unless some stronger power were to prevent him," it turns out they need Cyrus' protection as much as he needs theirs. Given the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding guards who will love their charge more than themselves, Cyrus contrives to be surrounded by those whose survival or well-being is inextricably linked to his own. And while he may also give them money and other honors, their fidelity rests at bottom on his ability to protect them from further harm (1904, 7.5.59–61).

However useful, eunuchs cannot solve all of Cyrus' security problems. Their inferior strength may be redressed with better weapons (1904, 7.5.65), but their relatively small number still leaves them inadequate to face the multitude who bear ill will toward Cyrus (7.5.66). He must establish in addition a special corps of 10,000 Persian mercenaries to guard the palace day and night and to accompany him whenever he goes out. When selecting these next-most-trustworthy guards Cyrus does not call upon those who served him so well during the war. Instead, he takes these guards from among the Commoners left behind in Persia. Cyrus knows they lead miserable lives there and calculates that more than any others these men will be pleased with the kind of life he can offer them in Babylon and accordingly will be grateful. Indeed, their gratitude would seem to grow in proportion to their lack of any claim to excellence or good service (cf. 8.2.27). Perhaps this deviation from the strict rule of merit is justified by Cyrus' need to secure his personal safety. But again, as with the eunuchs, he places closest to him not those he can reward with some great good so much as those he can protect from inordinate harm (cf. p. 7.5.82).

The difficulty of finding a positive common good on which to found his empire explains Cyrus' reticence to rely on those who helped him win it. At the beginning of the campaign Cyrus convinced the Peers to abandon their traditional concern with virtue for its own sake and to apply themselves to the pursuit of wealth and honor (1904, 1.5ff.). Although the riches they now possess as subjects in the empire appear dazzling in comparison with their original austerity, the wealth of Cyrus' subjects is not entirely at their own disposal. Certain items can be held only at the king's pleasure as outward signs of his favor (8.2.8). And these explicit restrictions on a few items only mask the fact that all property is ultimately held at Cyrus' discretion. For example, anyone with sufficient wealth who fails to be in attendance at court is immediately investigated on suspicion of intemperance, injustice, or some neglect of duty. His presence there is further encouraged by the sight of Cyrus "giving the easiest and most profitable employments to those who do attend" (8.1.19). If these measures failed, Cyrus "would take away all that he had and give it to another whom he thought would present himself when wanted" (8.1.20). Thus, in principle, Cyrus owns everything (8.1.22, cf. 1.3.17); no one under Cyrus possesses independent means, something which was once the hallmark of a full Persian citizen (1.2.15, 2.1.15).

Moreover, the goods Cyrus does allow his subjects demand a certain amount of trouble and care to maintain. An overabundance can actually cause harm (1904, 8.3.40–42). This defect in material possessions, and hence their inability to keep pace with the limitless desire to have more, is what in part leads Cyrus to prefer the pursuit of "security and glory [εὔκλεια], things that do not decay or do injury by overabundance; rather the more one has of glory, the greater and more noble and the lighter to bear it becomes, and often it makes those who bear it lighter" (1904, 8.2.22). Yet, it is above all with regard to honor and glory that Cyrus' subjects must chaff the most. Indeed, there exist uneasy relations between Cyrus and those of his followers who, like him, desire something more than sensual satisfactions. Cyrus' fatherly rule, however philanthropic or benevolent its intent, weighs particularly heavy on others who wish and consider themselves worthy to rule. Although present throughout the work, the divisive implications of the pursuit of political honor are most clearly seen in an earlier episode, which took place in the midst of the campaign.

Gobryas, an older man of influence under the Assyrian king, defected to Cyrus' camp shortly after the first and inconclusive battle. In this fight the original Assyrian king was killed and the succession fell to his son. While Gobryas was a most devoted friend to the father, he could not bring himself to serve the new king, who out of envy had killed Gobryas' own son and left him without a male heir. He hoped to take vengeance for this injustice by helping Cyrus and declared himself willing to turn over his cavalry and fortress to the allies (1904, 4.6.2–7). Cyrus accepted this offer and led his men to the fortress, which, after many precautions, he entered and inspected to his satisfaction. Gobryas then displayed the mass of wealth and provisions he had horded up inside and turned it all over to Cyrus to make use of as he thought fit. Once Cyrus saw that Gobryas was true to his word he pledged to make good on his own promise to take vengeance on the Assyrian. He then returned all Gobryas' gifts, although not to him but to his daughter and her future husband, whoever that might prove to be (5.2.4–8).

Cyrus went on to say that there was one gift he would not return, a gift he valued more than all the wealth of Babylon, indeed, of all the world. Gobryas suspected that Cyrus had in mind his daughter, "a wonder of beauty and stature," but nothing could have been farther from Cyrus' mind (cf. 1904, 8.4.22, 8.5.28). Instead, he thanked Gobryas most of all for giving him the occasion to show his true colors, to make manifest that his real aims were above common reproach:

> I think there are many human beings who would not consent to be impious or commit injustice or lie, but they die before they make clear what sort of men they were because no one has ever seen fit to entrust them with great wealth, tyranny, fortified walls, or children worthy to be loved . . . but you have thus given me an opportunity of showing to all human beings that I would not do wickedness against a guest-friend or commit injustice for the sake of wealth or willingly prove wrong to a covenant. And so long as I seem to be a just man and am praised by human beings as such, I will never forget or fail to distinguish you with every honor (1904, 5.2.9–11).

One honor, however, he immediately denied Gobryas: the honor of being trusted in return. Rather than pass the night inside Gobryas' fort Cyrus camped outside with his troops and even refused to eat the food offered by his host (1904, 5.2.14–15). Gobryas accepted this treatment: As a traitor to his own country he could hardly complain of being shown so little faith; and at this time he had no choice but to acquiesce (5.2.24; cf. 4.2.13). Moreover, he looked forward to payment in the blood of his enemy; his highest good was someone else's harm. But there are others whom Cyrus failed to trust completely, others whom he kept from tyrannical power and hence denied the opportunity to win the highest honor, namely, his own men. Indeed, Cyrus considered himself to be surrounded by those "who are jealous [ζηλοῦσι[20]] of me and praying to the gods that they may one day prove that they are not less faithful to their friends than I" (5.2.12). But Cyrus' own love of praise stands in the way of their fulfillment. Of course, so long as they remain untested he is not without some justification for keeping them from power; and so long as they believe the success of the enterprise depends on Cyrus they are willing to acquiesce, at least in dangerous situations (cf. 3.3.10; although see 6.1.5). Still, this desire for honor, much encouraged by Cyrus as a goad to fight, must ultimately turn his men against him, especially in more peaceful times when it becomes more apparent that the satisfaction of one presupposes the disappointment of others (cf. 8.2.26; *Memorabilia*, 2.6.21; *Cynegeticus*, 13.10).

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[20] For the difference between jealousy (ζῆλος) and envy (φθόνος), see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1388a31–1388b30, especially the observation that "it is necessary that those who are jealous consider themselves worthy of those goods they do not possess."

If Cyrus has good reason to distrust and even fear the most capable men in his empire, he nevertheless knows it is impossible to do without them. His desire to maintain "a whole empire," that is, one containing men not much worse but much more numerous than his mercenaries, compels him to employ "those good men who with the gods had brought him victory" (1904, 7.5.70). But what makes those men so useful is precisely their possession of the kind of virtue inculcated by the Persian laws, the practice of which, we recall, Cyrus had once seemed to promise they could abandon if their venture proved successful (1.5ff.). He is therefore forced to demonstrate that what the Persian laws had previously prescribed is no less required by present circumstances or necessity. Cyrus first exhorts the Persians to practice virtue by appealing to a reasonable calculation of self-interest (7.5.78–86). Yet, like all arguments that present virtue not as a good in itself but as a means to other goods, this appeal will leave unpersuaded those who believe themselves to have found some easier path to the same ends (see 1904, *Memorabilia*, 2.1). True, if virtue could be shown to be the indispensable end or necessary means for each individual to achieve the greatest good, its practice could be counted on. Cyrus, however, presents virtue here as a means to avoid "the hardest thing," that is, the loss of empire; and as the empire is maintained through a collective effort, his argument will not touch those who think merely to feign a concern with virtue while profiting from the efforts of their fellows (2.2.25). In other words, Cyrus' appeal to self-interest will succeed only if the Persians are already just or genuinely devoted to one another.

Cyrus is aware of this difficulty and hence anxious that the Persians consider themselves just. Of course, justice can no longer be thought of as obedience to the Persian laws. These have been superseded by Cyrus' will or judgment (1904, 8.2.22). Yet, with regard to the justice by which they hold their new possessions, Cyrus claims their present title is no less legal than before. It even seems to rest upon a higher or at least more fundamental law: "For it is a law [established] among all men and for all time that when a city is taken in war, the persons and property of the inhabitants belong to the captors" (7.5.73). Despite first appearances, Cyrus does not intend this to be a simple appeal to brute force, to the principle that might makes right. He is careful to begin his speech by reminding the Persians to be grateful to the gods who have granted them all that they considered themselves to deserve and thereby confirmed their own judgment of their worth (7.5.72). To believe in the justice of the law of conquest is to believe, then, in the justice and efficacy of divine providence.[21] Too great a trust in providence, however, can lead to complacency, rash acts, and ultimately failure (1.6.5–6). Cyrus must accordingly make some qualifications. Although he had just evoked the Persians' victory as proof of their justice, he now admits that to win an empire "often falls to one who has shown nothing more than boldness." But to win and then maintain an empire, something which requires moderation, continence, and unflagging care, this would provide conclusive proof of the merit and hence justice of their cause (7.5.76). Thus, the Persians' sure conviction of their justice depends on their continued success, but that success depends in turn on their justice. To escape this circular argument Cyrus must once again have recourse to divine support. Now, however, this support depends less on their own (as yet untested) worth than it does on the transgressions or wickedness of their enemies: "We must believe the gods will be with us, for we have not unjustly come into empire by plotting against others, but plotted against we have avenged ourselves" (7.5.81).[22]

Justice understood as punishing wrongdoers would certainly encourage the military virtues necessary to maintain an empire. Given the character of Cyrus' rule over a large number of his subjects (1904, 1.1.5), there will be no lack of opportunities for their practice. Witness the case of "the Indian," a "wicked" and intriguing king whose conquest was apparently justified by the duplicitous, if useful, conduct of his emissaries: something which seems to outweigh the gratitude Cyrus would seem to owe him (1.1.4, 8.6.20, 3.2.28). Yet, nothing in this new understanding of justice guarantees the subjects' loyalty to or friendship for Cyrus; and he cannot help but still regard the most powerful as the most likely sources of danger. He finally considers disarming them or refusing them admission into his presence. The first he rejects since it would lead to the destruction of the empire, the second because he thought it would merely be the beginning of "open hostilities" between them (8.1.47). The only choice left for Cyrus is "to make them better friends to himself than they are to one another" (8.1.48); Xenophon devotes an entire chapter to his methods.

Cyrus initially tries to cultivate them by feeding them from his lavish table (1904, 8.2.4), giving extravagant gifts (8.2.7), and doing large favors in return for small ones (8.2.12), but these attentions turn out to have harmful effects. The rich food ruins their health and makes them dependent on the many doctors retained in Cyrus's pay (8.2.24–25); Cyrus' generous gifts weaken ties of blood and kinship (8.2.9); and for him to do great favors in return for small ones still requires that someone pay the difference in the end.[23] Moreover, Xenophon indicates that Cyrus fully intended these "ill effects.” For he includes in this list of methods by which he made his subjects “better friends to himself than they were to one another” an account of Cyrus’ widespread use of spies, something he thought would make his subjects suspicious and distrustful of one another (8.2.11). The list also mentions the blatant favoritism Cyrus exercised not out of whim but as a means to increase his subjects’ mutual envy and thereby discourage them from “working together for their own good” (8.2.28). “Making his followers better friends to himself than to one another” apparently does not preclude turning them against one another, just as it does not require the existence of any true or actual friendships.[24]

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[21] One should note, however, that Cyrus does not appear to share this view. See, for example, 7.1.11. His statement there is sufficient to refute Gera's claim that Cyrus is "consistently pious throughout the *Cyropaedia*" or that he practices "outstanding piety," if outstanding is taken to mean "exemplary" (Gera 1993, 58, 55).

[22] Compare the change in principle from 1.5.13.

[23] Machiavelli makes explicit the secret of Cyrus' generosity: "And of what is not yours or your subjects one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation but adds it to you; only spending your own is what hurts you" (Machiavelli 1983, 96). Cyrus had already learned this while still a young boy (see 1904, 1.3.7; cf. *Anabasis*, 7.3.29).

CONCLUSION

In order to maintain his empire Cyrus seeks to bind his subjects to one another and himself through a shared self-understanding of themselves as instruments of a just and divinely sanctioned retribution against their foes. But to secure his own position in that empire he is at the same time forced to undermine the devotion to or concern with one another that serves to make them dependable and effective subjects. The policy of continual expansion, which follows from their new understanding of justice, does indeed keep Cyrus’ treasury full and, more important, ensures the constant presence of a common enemy, two effective if limited means to promote political unity (cf. 1904, 8.1.5, 3.3.10). But with the inevitable conquest of the known world (8.6.20), an event which coincides with Cyrus’ death (8.7.6), the external threat disappears, and the empire fragments along its deep internal divisions and quickly falls into civil strife (8.8ff).

Many commentators who consider Xenophon’s Cyrus a perfect or ideal ruler and the work itself more or less a simple glorification of his rule have been so shocked by the description of the empire’s swift disintegration that they either deny the final chapter’s authenticity[25] or, like Tatum and Gera, posit elaborate psychological theories to account for Xenophon’s “incoherence.” By showing here that the seeds of the empire’s dissolution were contained in its foundations, above all in its failure to secure a positive common good transcending self-defense against external enemies, I hope to establish the essential unity and coherence of the book and, in particular, the appropriateness of the final chapter. Moreover, if we recall that the original impulse toward empire arose out of certain similar defects in the republican regime, we can begin to grasp Xenophon’s overall intention in the work.[26]

The *Education of Cyrus* does not present so much a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of republican and imperial politics as an elaboration of the contradictions and limitations of the attainment of justice and the common good in both regimes: in other words, a critique of politics and political life *tout court*. Certainly, Xenophon’s description of the short-lived and hollow splendor of the empire and the particularly dire consequences of its collapse is meant to provide a defense of the stable if austere politics of the republican regime (Bruell 1987, 101–2). But it is the kind of quiet or backhand defense that the regime itself would find objectionable. Xenophon may tempt us with the portrait of a virtuous republic devoted to producing good men or of a perfect prince capable of ruling the entire world, he may engage our deepest passions for justice and glory, but he then purges them by demonstrating the impossibility and even undesirability of their full realization. In short, he imitates the rhetorical strategy of his wise Cambyses, who suggests that sometimes men, inspired by great hopes, can be benefited by being led to something less than their complete fulfillment (1904, 1.6.49; cf. *Memorabilia*, 3.5, 3.6). Xenophon, by showing the political necessities that limit the attainment of justice in all regimes, prevents us from giving ourselves wholeheartedly to any one. Such is the subtle pedagogy of the *Education of Cyrus*.

Machiavelli calls attention to the political practice of antiquity and what can be learned of it from classical writers. In his influential work, *The Machiavellian Moment*, J. G. A. Pocock (1975, 74, 201, 324) claims that the central concept Machiavelli sought to revive from the classical tradition was that of a republican citizenship that allowed men to perfect their natures through devotion to the common good. Yet, in the only classical work mentioned by name in the *Prince* and written by the classical theorist most frequently cited by Machiavelli in the *Discourses*, we find an examination of the political common good that calls into question the very possibility of its existence, to say nothing of its power to perfect human nature. And while Pocock considers Machiavelli to have also contributed several important “innovations” to the tradition of republican theory, he identifies these as the praise of strife between nobles and plebs and the “militarization of citizenship” which leads to the “democratization” of the army (Pocock 1975, 194, 203, 213). Yet, as we have seen, these are among the most prominent themes of the *Education of Cyrus*, a work unmentioned in the *Machiavellian Moment* and which does not appear in its rather lengthy bibliography of primary sources. Even should one still accept Pocock's overall characterization of Machiavelli as an innovative republican, the presence of what he claims to be Machiavellian innovations in the classical source to which Machiavelli calls special attention, and which source is completely ignored by Pocock, makes it necessary to reexamine Machiavelli's relation to classical republican theory and reopen the question of his particular contribution to the history of political thought. One point of departure suggested by this reading of the *Education of Cyrus* would be the observation that nowhere in the thought of Machiavelli do we find an equivalent to the enormous distance opened up, by virtue of this radical critic of politics, between Xenophon's perspective and that of the great political actors he portrays. The basis for this important difference between the two can be traced, I believe, to Machiavelli's claim "to love his city more than his soul" (Machiavelli, 56), a claim which, however ironic or ambiguous given the dubious status of "soul" in Machiavelli's thought, was not and could not have been made by Xenophon, to say nothing of Plato or Aristotle. Yet, it is a claim that becomes more plausible if, as Machiavelli suggests, it is in fact possible to secure in politics that which Xenophon and the classical tradition so strongly doubt: "the common benefit of each" (Machiavelli, 127).

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[24] Consider the δοκεῖ in the last sentence of 8.1.48; cf. 3.1.31.

[25] The translator of the Loeb edition, Walter Miller, advises not to read the final chapter because “it spoils the *perfect unity* of the work up to this chapter: Cyrus is born, grows to manhood, completes his conquests, establishes his kingdom, organizes the various departments of his empire, dies. Some violent opponent of Medic influence in Athens could not leave all this glorification of Persian institutions unchallenged, and so in this appendix he has supplied an account of the degeneracy of the descendants of the virtuous Persians of the earlier day” (Xenophon 1983, 438–39, emphasis added). Even if one grants the doubtful premise that Xenophon was concerned with the “perfect unity of the work,” as “unity” is understood by Miller (see *Cynegeticus*, 13.6), this only strengthens the case for the chapter’s authenticity. For the *Education of Cyrus* does not begin with Cyrus’ birth but rather with Xenophon’s reflections on political instability and his wonder at Cyrus’ achievement. That Xenophon closes with his considered judgment of that achievement, giving particular regard to its stability, is hardly then a mark against its unity.

[26] To the best of my reckoning, in all of Xenophon’s writings the common good of any political community is constituted above all by the existence of hostile enemies. See Xenophon 1904, *Cyropaedia*, 1.2.2 with 1.6.27–30, 1.5.8, 3.3.10, 4.5.33, 4.5.46, 5.3.23, 5.5.19; *Agesilaus*, 7.7; *Lacedaemonian Republic* 11.1 with 13.6, 6.3; *Anabasis*, 3.1.46; *Oeconomicus*, 3.15, 7.12; *Hellenica*. 6.5.34. The “common good” mentioned in *Hiero* 11.1 should be considered in the light of the tyrant’s source of “private property” in *Hiero* 7.12. For the possibility of an essentially nonpolitical common good, see *Memorabilia*, 1.6.13–15.

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Liberty, Equality, Receptive Generosity: Neo-Nietzschean Reflections on the Ethics and Politics of Coalition

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Recently there has been a movement to embrace coalition politics both as an historically fundamental mode of action and as ethically desirable. Yet, as Bernice Johnson Reagon illustrates, coalition politics presents many profound difficulties, both in terms of its possible directions and the type of self capable of engaging in such activity. Laclau and Mouffe, embracing an open-ended development of equality and liberty, expand and clarify the possibilities that a radically democratic liberalism has available for envisioning and sustaining coalition politics. Yet, they illustrate the limits of such a project insofar as they are unable to address adequately the problems posed by Reagon. I argue that only by supplementing (and transfiguring) equality and liberty with an ethic of receptive generosity, suggested by an idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche's gift-giving virtue, would coalition politics likely be sustainable and ethically desirable. The gift-giving virtue allows us to formulate a vision of the possible grandness of plurality that is ethically more compelling than the logics of identity and difference offered by Laclau and Mouffe.

In some sense progressive politics has always concerned itself with the politics of difficult coalitions. Yet, these concerns often stemmed from perceived tactical and strategic exigencies: uneven contingent historical developments which, with increasing revolutionary praxis, would dissolve into an ever more unified, harmonious, and transparent collective subject. The necessity for coalitions is addressed in classics such as Lenin (1975). The praxis and telos of increasing unity is addressed most philosophically in two of Lukacs's (1971) essays, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" and "Towards a Methodology of the Problem of Organization." For numerous intermeshed reasons, concerning both concrete politics and theoretical shifts, the past few decades have witnessed a movement toward various theories of a more fragmented and contestational politics. Concretely, the issue of diverse coalitions among new social movements has gained greater visibility in the past two decades due to a wide range of political events and experiences that have sprung from the increasing heterogeneity which characterizes the progressive political terrain. From the "Rainbow Coalition"; to the efforts of the Industrial Areas Foundation to organize communities across boundaries of race, class, and ethnicity; to the challenges to the mainstream environmental movement on questions of race and class; to racial, sexual, and class differences among "the women's movement"; to questions and struggles concerning multiculturalism, issues concerning the relations among different groups have become increasingly central. While efforts at coalition building in these instances have met with varying degrees of success and failure, they have almost always had to face agonizing issues of difficult communication, charges of imperialism or assimilation made by some groups with respect to others, withdrawal, and so forth.

From a related theoretical angle, recent decades have seen a growing disenchantment with the practice and telos of Marxian politics and the increasing sway of neo-Nietzschean philosophical and political reflections on difference, both of which have contributed to the movement toward greater political fragmentation and contestation. Yet, the thematic of difference, when articulated in narratives that singularly emphasize incommensurability and indifference (see Lyotard 1984, 1985), has given rise to a growing sense of dissatisfaction concerning its own ethical inadequacies and political weaknesses and dangers. This concern has a more Habermasian accent in such writers as McCarthy (1991) and White (1991) and a more Heideggerian/Adornian accent in Dallmayr (1991). In response to these problems, many are moving toward positions that embrace coalition politics not simply as a transitory "best of a bad situation" phenomenon but, rather, as somehow historically more fundamental, ethically more desirable, and politically more tenable. Bowles and Gintis (1986), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), and Young (1990) are among those on the left who exemplify this move.

Yet, the move toward coalition politics is not so much a "solution" to the alternatives of totalization, incommensurable difference, or the weaknesses and blindnesses of isolation as it is a problem, the site of a fresh set of questions. How might we understand the ethical and political directions that ought to animate coalition politics and the relations between diverse groups constituting a coalition? What sort of self, what type of ethical opening to oneself and to others, might be more capable of partaking in, animating, and sustaining such politics? These are the questions addressed in this essay.[1]

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[1] By pursuing *these* questions, I do not mean to reduce or downplay a whole host of other important issues that arise in this context, such as procedures that might help facilitate more frequent or desirable interactions, adjustments in power, institutions for group representation, practices that cultivate cooperation and agonistic solidarity, and so forth. History—from the reforms in ancient Athens (that deconstructed politics based on class, tribe, and occupation and reconstructed a politics based on less rigid boundaries and a greater interweaving of different groups) to present debates on race and political districting and representation—illustrates the salience of questions concerning diverse groups that exceed the ethical realm. Yet, the formulations of these questions and responses concerning institu-

I begin with a presentation of Bernice Johnson Reagon's (1983) discussion of her thirty-year experience with coalition politics because she brilliantly illuminates the problems, dangers, and possibilities involved. The issues raised serve as a reference point in relation to which I interrogate, articulate, and develop two possibilities for formulating ethical openings that might at once broadly guide coalition politics and contribute to a cultivation of selves more capable of negotiating its difficulties in desirable ways. The first position is that of Laclau and Mouffe, who offer perhaps the most provocative and affirmative discussion of coalition politics in recent political theory.[2] I dwell on them at some length not only because I think they expand and clarify the *possibilities* and resources that a radical and democratic liberalism has available for envisioning and sustaining coalition politics but also because the *limits* and *difficulties* of such a position come into focus when juxtaposed with the problems Reagon identifies and the alternative directions to which she alludes. Although they use neo-Nietzschean ontological insights in theoretically and strategically helpful ways,[3] I argue that their reflections are insufficiently transfigurative at an ethical level. This shortcoming is manifested both in the likely failure of their ethical position to sustain the politics they endorse and in the extent to which their ethic does not reach high enough in imagining what is possible, desirable, and necessary for a thriving diverse society.

Next, I suggest that only when significantly animated by a "gift-giving virtue" is coalition politics likely to be tenable and desirable.[4] Except when situated in an ethical constellation with receptive generosity, Laclau and Mouffe's favored virtues of equality and liberty are unlikely to be sufficient to sustain the tensions of coalition politics and, more generally, a desirable ethics and politics of a multicultural society.[5] I develop an ethic of receptive generosity (not meant to supplant, but to supplement and refigure liberty and equality) through a reading of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that is explicitly idiosyncratic but, I argue, ethically compelling.[6]

This reading of Nietzsche is by no means the only effort to address questions of ethics and otherness. Proximate attempts in U.S. political theory include Connolly (1991), Corlett (1989), Dallmayr (1991), Honig (1993), and White (1991). Overlapping concerns are articulated in prominent interpretations of such theorists as Adorno (1973), Arendt (1958), Derrida (1978), Foucault (1973), Horkheimer (with Adorno 1972), Levinas (1969), Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968) and others. Occasionally I draw attention to proximities with some of these theorists in passing references, but it is far beyond the scope of this essay to try to delineate a precise location with respect to them all, especially since each represents an extremely contested terrain. With the exception of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, the thinking of the others takes form through a careful engagement with Nietzsche. One element offered by Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* with respect to the issue at hand and not as powerfully present in most of his twentieth-century interlocutors is the articulation of ethics in a narrative form. This form is tightly entwined with its power of illumination, and I hope to evoke some of it below.

REAGON AND THE AGONIES OF COALITION POLITICS

Bernice Johnson Reagon's (1983) essay "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century" helps us grasp the questions, challenges, and dangers of grassroots political activity among groups of people with extremely different backgrounds, identities, experiences, understandings, problems, relations to power, and aesthetic sensibilities. A black woman (and member of the singing group Sweet Honey in the Rock) addressing an audience of mostly white women at a women's music festival significantly animated by the theme "woman identified women," which many see realized only in lesbian relationships, she discusses the difficulties of her presence at the festival—a site of coalition. For the idea that gender is *the* fundamental oppression demanding women-only solidarity does not resonate well with the experiences and outlooks of many black women on sex with men, the importance to many of them of solidarities with black

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tions and practices are always deeply entwined with and partly constituted by numerous ethical and ontological assumptions. Thus, efforts to thematize and explore the latter, precisely because they do not exhaust yet thoroughly infuse the phenomena in question, have potentially wide-ranging significance.

[2] I refer to their works, written individually or co-authored, referenced below. Each of these works develops their theory of "radical and plural democracy." Whatever differences they manifest seem to me to be insignificant with respect to the issues explored here.

[3] Of course, the influence of Husserl and Wittgenstein is also very visible, but their emphasis on difference, discourse, antagonism, and so forth, casts their synthesis in a predominantly neo-Nietzschean hue.

[4] This is not to deny the necessity of strategic action in political life. Yet, in the context of the ethical position I am sketching here, it is viewed as a privative mode of action, to be avoided whenever possible and never engaged in without caution and a tragic sensibility.

[5] Of course, politics itself is not simply "based on" ethical positions but is partly *about* contesting and determining ethical issues. By addressing ethical questions and soliciting certain comportments, I am not trying to truncate politics with an ethical ground. Far from this: To write of ethics is to be engaged in a field of political contestation, a field which includes those who think it is variously neither necessary, nor desirable, nor perhaps even possible to speak of ethics. It is to grab a corner of this infinitely tangled web of human history and explore in a small way possibilities for transfiguring the current order of things. It would be a mistake to infer, from the idea that politics ought not be bound by a single ethical position, that we ought no longer seriously concern ourselves with debates about the ethics of our politics, as if we could somehow escape having an ethics of our politics.

[6] One caveat should be noted before beginning. Throughout this essay, on questions of equality, liberty, gift-giving, desire for otherness, and receptivity, I am quite simply appealing to everyone. I do not mean by this to imply, however, that things are simple: that, for example, it means the same thing for a black woman to be acted upon and changed by a white man as the reverse; that advice favoring such susceptibility is the same whether from Bernice Reagon, or Zarathustra, or myself (neither a black, nor a woman, nor one who has spent many years living with animals in a cave); or that efforts at receptive generosity mean the same thing in these diverse situations. In being offered to a general readership, this ethic takes a form less attentive to the important specificities and questions central to consideration when one is engaged with any number of more defined subject positions or, for that matter, distinct selves. Although the general ethical vision presented here refracts differently depending upon who is speaking and who is listening, in all those refractions there are important similitudes that I explore below. There are risks to this approach, and I assume them.

men, issues of race and class as they disrupt the homogeneity of woman-identification, their appreciation of music made by black men, and so forth. There are profound disruptions at the edges of the encounters at the festival.

With playful seriousness Reagon says: "I feel as if I'm going to keel over any minute and die" (1983, 356). The effort to engage and work with others very different from those with whom one has most in common are usually wrought with serious difficulties, anxieties, dangers to one's identity, and so on. "That is often what it feels like if you're *really* doing coalition work. Most of the time you feel threatened to the core and if you don't, you're not really doing no coalescing" (p. 356). Working to build coalitions of diverse groups is often fundamentally threatening because many of the perspectives and practices that we take to be essentially constitutive and unquestionable aspects of our identity are challenged by others, who explicitly or tacitly suggest that what we hold dear is in fact trivial, illusory, oppressive, obnoxious, slave-like, unhealthy, and on and on. The limits and contingencies of our personal and group identities as well as the recalcitrance of others even to consider us seriously, let alone embrace our visions and ideals, are placed before us with a depth and frequency that can take one's breath away. If it does not, Reagon suggests, the kind of encounter in and from which a meaningful and rich coalition politics might develop is probably being avoided.

Because the agonistic and agonizing character of coalition politics make it such that "you don't go into coalition because you just *like* it" (1983, 56), and because what people most often *do* like is the comfort of their established identities, the encounters with otherness involved in coalition building are often obfuscated, along with the entire coalition effort. Engaging others in these situations involves grappling with differences that at once attract and repulse, differences that can turn a person inside out. Furthermore, the "and" of "attract and repulse" is an extremely precarious place: Under the burden of this existential stress, it is easy to fall so heavily on the side of "repulse" that it hardens into "against." From there a variety of strategies can be deployed (with varying levels of consciousness) to avoid encountering differences and to secure one's identity. The most obvious are direct efforts to subjugate others. Or a group may declare its own struggle and identity have the privileged location in history. Or, in a more subterranean fashion, very often a self or a movement may (as Reagon suggests is partly the case at the festival) have a rigidly secured identity combined with an understanding of itself as open to difference. In this case, the group opens its doors with a posture of expansive inclusiveness.

Yet, the superficiality of this posture is often readily apparent to those who are "included." Reagon taunts: "You don't really want Black folks, you are just looking for yourself with a little color to it" (p. 359). With a lot of luck and careful control over who gets included, perhaps the group can recruit lots of "themselves with a little color to it," avoid the "Black folks," and maintain its posture of openness for a time, while in fact being closed, unaltered, learning little. More likely, Black folks are bound to find their way into the formerly barred room of comforting, nurturing identity. Then, "the first thing that happens is that the room don't feel like the room anymore. (Laughter) And it ain't home no more" (p. 359). At this point one can begin the agonizing and infinite work of trying to encounter and partially come to terms with differences or retreat into another strategy of identity securement. Because leaving home is painful, burn-out and indifference continually threaten to provoke an apolitical retreat. Reagon fully recognizes that one cannot stay long in the midst of these threatening encounters. Coalition politics is at best an intermittent activity which necessitates retreat to more comfortable relations that provide types of strength and nurture mostly absent from coalition activity. Nevertheless, she enjoins us to return to this activity repeatedly with an attentive and wary eye to those strategies likely to subvert it.

In part, Reagon's position rests upon a strong strategic sense she shares with Laclau and Mouffe that peoples subjugated in diverse ways need each other in order to survive. But the issue is clearly deeper and higher than mere survival for her. Rather, it is a question of "turning the century with our principles intact" (1983, 363). "The thing that must survive you is . . . the principles that are the basis of your practice" (p. 366). Most important to the possibility and event of coalition politics, as well as the most important outcome of it, is an ethical survival that exceeds mere survival. My contention is that the principles to which Reagon refers are absolutely vital both in drawing her in the direction of encountering others as other and in sustaining her commitments to this direction even in the midst of great difficulties and dangers. The liberal ideas of equality and liberty repeatedly animate her text and life. They infuse her sense of the importance of all people's struggles against subjugation as well as her gestures toward "letting be" other groups and individuals. Yet, liberty and equality are radicalized in her text, in the sense that they are freed from fixed essentialist articulations and instead are grasped as essentially open-ended and expansive. Thus, referring to a song she had written years before that had tried to expand the content of liberty and equality but, of necessity, failed to go far enough, she says: "If in the future, somebody is gonna use that song I sang, they're gonna have to strip it or at least shift it. I'm glad the principle is there for others to build on" (p. 366).

I turn to Laclau and Mouffe next because their work on the horizontal character of equality and liberty sharply articulates principles suggested but left undeveloped in Reagon's brief address at the festival. They formulate and tensionally juxtapose these ideas in a manner that has vital implications for coalition politics. Still, they do not go far enough. And their failure exposes the limits of their vision of a radical and plural democracy, as well as any radical liberalism that fails to supplement and resituate the principles of liberty and equality with an ethic of receptive generosity. This last, as we shall see, is the vibrant atmosphere that fills Bernice Reagon's lungs and ears for a life of powerful singing, talking, listening.

IDEALS, HEGEMONY, AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY

Through extensive elaborations of the ontological radical contingency, multiplicity, antagonisms, and openness in all societal phenomena, Laclau and Mouffe argue for a "new logic of the social." They hope this will greatly enhance the left's theoretical capacity (dulled by its focus on unity and necessity) to illuminate the contemporary world in ways likely to lead to more effective and desirable changes that eschew totalitarian impulses for a radical and plural democratic formation around which diverse social movements might coalesce. They seek to hegemonize (gather together and transfigure) new social movements around a deepening agonistic embrace of the norms of liberty and equality, which have significantly and effectively animated historical movements for more than two hundred years.

Their sense that these norms are sufficient and not in need of substantial supplementation in light of their ontological reflections is exemplified by Mouffe, who writes that "the problem . . . is not the ideals of modern democracy, but the fact that its political principles are a long way from being implemented" (1992, 1). In the ethico-practical dimension, the engagement of Laclau and Mouffe with ontology aims to deconstruct all essentialist efforts to restrain the wild proliferation of sites where the ideals of equality and liberty are brought to bear, but it goes no farther.

Yet, if modern ideals remain, the *status* of these norms is entirely transformed in light of Laclau and Mouffe's rejection of metaphysical foundations, such as transparent self-grounding subjectivity, reason, and history. Henceforth, we must understand—and with a tragic heroism embrace—these values as utterly "*contingent* historical projects," products of struggles which have generated the particular traditions and practices that precariously make and unmake our identities. Laclau radically expresses this stance in phrases such as "we happen to believe in those values" (1991, 97).[7] To those who rejoin that this is unlikely to convince anyone who does not already "happen to believe," Laclau and Mouffe respond with a skepticism toward the persuasive efficacy of rationalist arguments and, indeed, toward the rhetoric of persuasion itself insofar as "persuasion . . . structurally involves force," "persuasion is one form of force" (p. 90). Henceforth, the normative task is subsumed under political struggles that seek a hegemony involving "the construction of a new 'common sense' which changes the identity of the different groups, in such a way that the demands of each group are articulated equivalentially with those of others" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 183) around the ideals of liberty and equality.

This change in the status of the norms of liberty and equality, and their subsumption under political struggles, is not without its effects on the substantive meaning, function, and articulation of these values. The erosion of foundations, "far from being a negative phenomenon, represents an enormous amplification of the content and operability of the values of modernity" (Laclau 1988, 66). This is elucidated in terms of the distinction between a *foundation*, which has an internally "determining and delimiting" relation to what it founds that fixes and constrains the content and function of the founded, and a *horizon*, which is "an empty locus" that has an essentially "open-ended" character. A horizon is a soliciting yet essentially inexhaustible reference by means of which a formation "constitutes itself as a unity only as it delimits itself from that which it negates" (p. 81). For example, groups can gather around the horizons of equality and liberty by articulating the numerous open-ended struggles against inequality and subjugation through which the meanings of equality and liberty take form, not as "essences" but as developing "social logics" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 183). Reagon expresses this idea when she states that the civil rights movement "just rolled around hitting various issues" (1983, 363): antiwar, women's rights, sexual freedom, Native American rights, ecology, and so forth. By appropriating equality and liberty as social logics, Laclau and Mouffe believe we can carry into the future and intensify the best aspects of the Enlightenment.

Equality and liberty are to some extent entwined in relations of reciprocal definition and reinforcement. Equality is significantly equality of liberty, and liberty has an egalitarian structure. Yet, insofar as their ontology precludes essentialist metaphysical understandings of these values and instead views them as correlates of an antagonistic ensemble of social forces and practices, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that equality must mean more than just equality of liberty, and this "more" disrupts the reciprocally supportive relationship between the two values. For the very identity and existence of equality and liberty hinge upon a certain solidarity with the common project of radical democracy through which these values can be maintained and can proliferate. In this sense equality, more thickly interpreted as an identificational belonging to *the same* project, which Laclau and Mouffe call the "chain of democratic equivalence," is the condition of possibility for constituting the "we" through and by which equality of liberty can exist. Granted, the chain of democratic equivalence necessary for hegemony is bound to this pair of very *formal* and negatively defined values rather than to definite substantive notions of the good life. Still, insofar as this equivalence is the condition of possibility for the formal egalitarian spaces for difference, it would appear that difference and liberty are subordinated to equality, approximating the very type of systemic totality they seek to avoid. The potentially dangerous aspect of this idea is striking in Mouffe's claim that, "to construct a 'we', it must be distinguished from a 'they' and that means establishing a frontier, defining an 'enemy' . . . consensus is by necessity based upon acts of exclusion" (1991, 78).

Aware of the concerns raised here, yet believing we can never entirely escape the problem, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the totalizing requirements of public life (equality as equivalential chain) can be juxtaposed with other values (liberty as autonomy) such that we check totalization and proliferate multiplicitous emancipations. In this sense, what gives life to radical and plural democracy is not simply the reciprocally supportive relation between equality and liberty but, moreover and especially, the *tensional* juxtaposition, the reciprocally limiting and antagonistic relation between these two social logics (Mouffe 1991, 79–82; Laclau 1992).

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[7] On this point they are in explicit agreement with Richard Rorty (1989), though they disagree with much of his politics.

The freedom and power of diverse social movements almost always hinge upon their ability to join with other struggles, and Laclau and Mouffe view the principles of radical democracy as precisely the identity-modifying focus around which the chains of equivalence necessary for such hegemony can be established. Yet, given their ontology of difference, antagonism, and contingency, they maintain that "this total equivalence never exists: every equivalence is penetrated by a constitutive precariousness." Since total equivalence is never extant and always horizonal, all hegemonic projects established on totalizing claims will be based on the erroneous idea of an achieved identificational equality which various social groups will find inadequate and transgressive of important aspects of their identity, problems, and aspirations. A movement that explicitly recognizes this ontological and political situation and, at the same time, embraces the ideal of egalitarian liberty will allow and even encourage the logic of autonomy to transfigure and limit the logic of hegemonic equivalence. "To this extent, the precariousness of every equivalence demands that it be complemented/limited by the logic of autonomy. It is for this reason that the demand for *equality* is not sufficient, but needs to be balanced by the demand for *liberty* . . . the irreducible moment of the plurality of spaces" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 184). This plurality of spaces in which to contest the democratic equivalence makes possible an open-ended renegotiation of the terms at the heart of radical democratic hegemony: equality and liberty. This is partly a strategic move, insofar as Laclau and Mouffe believe that it is precisely such an open and plural ideal which can unite diverse movements in collective action. Yet, it is also an ethical move based on a recognition that the horizonal character of their ideals solicits a deepening and broadening of ethics which requires plural reformulations.

In short, Laclau and Mouffe are seeking to transfigure radically the type of hegemony to be sought: hegemony as a regulative idea—as a horizon—must be reformulated to embrace and embody its essence as *horizonal*, that is, indeterminate and open. "Radical democracy makes this openness and incompletion the very horizon on which all social identity is constituted" (Laclau 1990, 233). "The fullness of the social . . . manifests itself . . . in the possibility of representing its radical indeterminacy" (Laclau 1990, 79). What this means politically, as the project of radical democracy multiplies spaces, diversifies its struggles, solicits subjugated voices, and gathers them in a growing hegemonic formation, is that "through the irreducible character of this diversity and plurality, society constructs the image and the management of its own impossibility" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 191). Workers, blacks, women, ecologists, gays and lesbians, consumers, anti-imperialists, and others are transfigured by the discursive practice of radical democracy and thereby come to participate in a coalition that both draws them toward a new "common sense" and simultaneously (as a part of this sense) guarantees autonomous spaces for contesting, reformulating, marking irreducible specificity, and so forth. In the process, a precarious and renegotiable balancing act between identity and difference is instantiated that offers, Laclau and Mouffe claim, the greatest possibilities for human emancipation.

But does this position push as far and high as it ought to, given their philosophical embrace of contingency, lack of transparency, and agonistic entwinement of differences? And does their construal of equality and liberty provide an ethical standpoint sufficient for the coalition politics they seek to embrace? Laclau and Mouffe envision radical and plural democracy as a transfigurative gathering together of diverse peoples. But precisely how are we to imagine this gathering, this community of impossibility, these relations between selves and others? How are we to characterize ethically the exchanges and movements between people? What ought to animate these exchanges and movements?

As we can see from the above reflections, Laclau and Mouffe offer us two indeterminate logics and, finally, a transfiguring mixture of them. The first is a logic of hegemony, equivalence, equality. Here the dimension of "being with" others is imagined as a movement in the direction of subsumption under a singular identity. Difference is not necessarily to be eradicated but transfiguratively assimilated within a totality. Community, relations that take shape between ourselves and others, are in this instance imagined as movements aimed at seducing and trapping into the whole. The animating principle of these exchanges is the desire to be with the other as a part of the One. The second logic is that of autonomy, plurality, liberty. Here the dimension of "being with" others is imagined as a movement in the direction of absolute difference. Each group (or, more radically, each self, each subself) would tend toward the horizon of "auto-constitutivity," incommensurability, absolutely particular identities that would be "unable to communicate with each other" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 182). A retraction and dissolution of exchange is envisioned, a deepening vacuum-like void of impassability. The animating desire is undisturbed, isolated, transparent atomism.

Of course, Laclau and Mouffe dismiss both modes when conceived of as foundations or achievable endpoints. They embrace them only as indeterminate antagonistic horizontal logics, mutually transfiguring, reciprocally limiting. In a precarious middle ground these logics are said to do battle in a manner most conducive to openness and a freedom that escapes the tyranny of identity, whether of the whole or of the part.

Laclau and Mouffe are correct to identify the continued importance of the liberal ideas of equality and liberty for progressive coalition politics. Furthermore, their reconstrual of these principles as horizonal social logics radicalizes them in a manner which both facilitates and articulates the desirability of a proliferation of these ideals. And their tensional juxtaposition illuminates and might help check the dangers that accompany the project of a radicalized liberalism. Yet, what is painfully lacking in their formulation is a promising ethical account of the possibilities, desirabilities, and heights of the dimension of "being with" others *as others*: striving to engage, move toward, their otherness. Coexistence in this sense constantly disappears into the singularity of the whole or the part.[8] Mutual limitation is to prevent these logics from accomplishing total disappearance, but the opening that forms in what is left of differential coexistence does not come close to an adequate and desirable ethical account of "being with" others—the possible agonizing grandness of plurality. Lacking an ethic that solicits a more receptive and generous effort to engage otherness, might we not simply oscillate between relations of assimilation and indifference? I am not implying that an ethic of generous receptivity could or should simply *replace* the twin logics offered by Laclau and Mouffe (although it can bestow upon them a status more compelling than "I happen to believe"). Rather, I am arguing that a soliciting description of the desire for the other as other must enter into a constellation with the former two ideals, such that equivalence and autonomy come to be significantly redrawn by an imagining of community animated by a desire for the others' otherness, with all the cooperation and agonism this implies.

Related to the shortcomings of their project in a strictly ethical sense is a question concerning the inadequacies of their ethical stance for supporting the politics they endorse. Leaving aside for now the likely corrosive effects of the explicit status of their project, without a seductive account of the agonizing grandness of plurality, we may well lack the ethico-existential comportment and resources necessary to sustain the kind of political tensions and ambiguity sought by radical and plural democracy and demanded by coalition politics. Bringing to mind again Reagon's account of the dangerous, threatening, disruptive, frightening character of coalition politics, dramatically evoked by "I feel as if I'm going to keel over any minute and die," we must truly wonder whether the difficult engagements with others that she describes could likely be sustained simply by an openness which is to emerge through this juxtaposition of two logics of closure. Coalition politics has little to do with the relative tranquility of a study, and what is conceivable in the latter may collapse in the former. When the immense pressures of coalition politics come to bear, do Laclau and Mouffe finally have a compelling ethical response to these questions (provided that these options are strategically plausible in a given instance): Why not seek to assimilate the other? Why not seek to separate entirely? There is little reason to be hopeful here. On the one hand, they have no ethical account that would draw us toward and animate our engagements with these difficult others; on the other hand, their own project contains the seeds of other-assimilation and other-oblivion.

Reagon powerfully develops ways in which liberty and equality can be incorporated into strategies of assimilation and denial, but she does not critique the principles as such, and they are clearly important to her. Yet, I think their meaning is refigured in her address in relation to an ethic of receptive generosity in such a manner that they take a greater turn toward otherness. At any rate, it is extremely significant that when she explicitly reflects upon the ethical direction which ought to guide our lives and "turn the century," it appears that her highest virtue, the one that keeps drawing her to others as other, is *giving*: "But most of the things you do, if you do them right, are for people who live long after you are long forgotten. That will only happen if you give it away. Whatever it is that you know, give it away, and don't just give it on the horizontal . . . give it away *that* way (up and down)" (1983, 365). Without a *generosity* born in our efforts to receive the other *as other*, our gifts wither, and equality and liberty will likely take up strategic positions within imperialist identities that assimilate, smother, or explicitly deny otherness. Generosity, as practiced in the efforts to receive and grapple with core-threatening differences in coalition politics, is not sufficient to sustain one's life in this work in an uninterrupted manner. Reagon states: "You don't get fed a lot in a coalition. In a coalition you have to give, and it is different from your home. You can't stay there all the time. You go to coalition for a few hours and then you go back and take your bottle wherever it is, and then you go back and coalesce" (p. 359).

You cannot stay there, in the midst of the most agonistic difference. But generosity is one of the key virtues that keeps one coming back for more. This is so not only because in the absence of giving and receiving we cannot remain beings worthy of this life, as we sink into mindless mediocrity and subjections, but also because when the grandness of giving and receiving a gift occurs, "that's all you pay attention to: when that great day happen. You go wishing everyday was like that" (1983, 368). Every day is not like that, but the experience and the wish illuminate and call us toward future paths of giving and receiving. Nietzsche, too, configured gift-giving as the highest virtue, the highest virtue of post-metaphysical earth.[9] In turning to Nietzsche, I do not wish to imply a point by point identity between his view of generosity and that of Reagon. Rather, Reagon's brief remarks on giving raise a directional question, and Nietzsche can be read as a thoughtful response.

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[8] Dallmayr expresses some of these reservations concerning radical equivalence and war in his review of Laclau and Mouffe, although he emphasizes the undeveloped ethical potential in their understanding of relational identities. His gestures toward a greater degree of "ethical permeation" than they offer, an ethics soliciting "a struggle for mutual recognition [of differences]" (1987, 294), are largely consonant with my effort to articulate such an ethic in the section on Nietzsche below.

[9] The following analysis of the gift-giving virtue has some significant parallels with Corlett's (1989) insights. Yet, my account places far more emphasis on the difficulties, distances, and recalcitrances that frequently permeate the terrain of gift-giving. This situation leads to a continual interrogative relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy in receptive generosity. My emphasis on recalcitrance is due not only to ontological considerations but also to numerous political experiences in which the extravagant gift of one person or group is interpreted as so much imperialism, irrelevance, and so forth, by the intended recipients. An encounter between my analysis and the gift as it figures in Derrida (1992) and Levinas (1969) would be highly illuminating; a project that is under way.

ZARATHUSTRA AND THE GIFT-GIVING VIRTUE

I do not think Nietzsche was secretly a radical and plural democratic, nor do I know anyone who does. I do not even claim that the sum of his epistemological, ontological, and ethical reflections lead, when contemplated politically with more skill than he himself exhibited, toward a democratic community of receptive generosity.[10] There is much in Nietzsche's pondering that runs directly against the grain of the insights I seek to draw from him. Yet, from among his many discrepant expressions I find the following account of the gift-giving virtue to be one of his most compelling ideas and directly relevant to the present discussion. By accenting this voice, I obviously "pick and choose." But all interpretations engage in this vertiginous task (Nietzsche taught us this), especially when the corpus is as manifold as Nietzsche's.[11] Outside the field of intellectual history, the charge that one picks and chooses is interesting only insofar as it is relevant to the truth of the matter at hand.[12] The latter, as it bears upon the question of ethics and coalition politics, is my concern here. Finally, it is the sense of the narrative and argument that should be judged here, not the proper name. As a friend of Nietzsche, he is my "best enemy," and I am "closest to him when resisting him" (Nietzsche 1954, 56). It is thus that I learn from him.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra can be read as a narrative that explores the possibilities and dangers of various ways of formulating the gift-giving virtue, the "highest virtue" (1954, 74).[13] What gift-giving is and how it can be are as much questions as answers. The difficulty is not simply that the "others," the people, "the rabble" are not very receptive these days, as the reclusive saint who has retired from giving reveals early in the "Prologue" when he tells Zarathustra that "they are suspicious of hermits and do not believe that we come with gifts" (p. 11). Although this is a monumental problem, it is enmeshed more profoundly with something of which the old saint "has not yet heard . . . that *God is dead*" (p. 12).

This poses incredible problems, because God had been the very movement of giving; it was His word, His command; all His creation was His gift. We, of His loving gift, had been given His Son, who exemplified the incarnation of *caritas* and taught us how to receive and proliferate its movement and thus to belong to Being instead of Nothingness. At least with William of Ockham this begins to come undone. God's radical omnipotence begins to rip free of its essential inscription in the constellation of love and charity; His will becomes potentially deceitful and malevolent, so contingent that He could change the past. Uncharitable *in potentia*, God and His creation become increasingly difficult to receive. From Descartes forward, a skepticism is radicalized concerning receptivity as the ground of truth, and simultaneously the project of establishing the subject as the pure self-giving ground intensifies in its stead. Thus, in Kant, we "give the law to nature" and "give the moral law." But contingency and power come to be just as disruptive of the effort to make the self the giving-ground of the world, truth, and value as they were of God. History, accident, economy, error, habit, and power relations increasingly appear to invade, in the eyes of so many of Kant's successors, the deepest reaches of Kant's necessity and universality. Radically separated from—unable to receive—things and others in themselves, giving, in its ontological, epistemological, and ethical senses, appears radically arbitrary and draws skeptical glances. It is here, in this relative chaos, well known to Laclau and Mouffe (and certainly to Reagon as well, as she confronts radical contingency and difference practically in the crucible of coalition politics), that Nietzsche explores and seeks to affirm the gift-giving virtue.[14] But what a place!

In part, Zarathustra journeys the harrowing paths of the gift-giving virtue because of his strong sense of the degrading and annihilating relations between selves that come to predominate where it is lacking. This negative motivation is nourished through countless genealogical critiques aimed at exposing the illnesses that spawn and are spawned by various modalities of "sick-selfish" will to power: pity, selfish egoism, the state, equality mongering, neighborliness, last men, the marketplace, material acquisitiveness, ascetic selflessness, the jealous god of monotheism, the spirit of revenge and resentment. In each instance, Zarathustra perceives a weakening associated with the eclipse of generosity. He summarizes: "Tell me my brothers: what do we consider bad and worst of all? Is it not *degeneration*? And it is degeneration that we always infer where the gift-giving soul is lacking" (1954, 75).[15]

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[10] Warren (1988), while recognizing the diversity of insights within Nietzsche's work, tends to view Nietzsche's philosophical positions as largely consonant with a democratic politics at once pluralist and egalitarian. This consonance is concealed from Nietzsche due to the "narrowness" of his political assumptions. Much of Warren's analysis is helpful and provocative, but I see far more diversity and (sometimes nonilluminating and apparently unintended?) contradictions among Nietzsche's philosophical reflections. Honig (1993) also fails to acknowledge sufficiently the multiple ethical voices in Nietzsche at odds with her project (which has substantial affinities with my own).

[11] Almost all the secondary works claim, to "get Nietzsche right," a claim made dubious when reading each in light of the others. Each illuminates aspects of Nietzsche that other interpretations attempt to conceal. Derrida (1979) illuminates the problematic assumptions that would reduce Nietzsche's writings to a totalizing context of meaning. It does not follow, however, that we must read Nietzsche in as indeterminate and potentially disintegrative a manner as one might draw from (and thereby reduce?) Derrida's text. The degrees of unity and multiplicity must be substantively argued.

[12] That is, only if what I did *not* "pick" is compelling, necessarily entwined with what I did choose, and entwined in such a way as to undermine fundamentally the initial plausibility of the latter. Thus, for example, I do not bring out the voice in Nietzsche that Heidegger identifies as the culmination of metaphysical forgetfulness of being, which leads to homelessness, and an endless technological mastery imperative, which reduces others and the earth to "standing reserve" for exploitation (see Heidegger 1977a, 1977b, 1982). Unlike most who seek to draw out something more admirable in Nietzsche, I do not accuse Heidegger of giving us a "lame reading" (Lampert 1986). He perceptively criticizes an important strand of Nietzsche's writing. Yet, that strand is not compelling (as Heidegger shows) and is not necessarily entwined with the strand I develop, as I show below.

[13] Many commentators miss the centrality of this theme in Nietzsche's work (see Higgins 1987; Nehamas 1985). Lampert's (1986) frequently insightful commentary makes questions concerning gift-giving central. The theme of generosity is present in Honig (1993) and Kaufmann (1950), but it is insufficiently developed in the former and poorly developed (through too close an association with Aristotle, pp. 382–83) in the latter. While Beatty focuses his analysis (1970) on giving, he misses most of the profundity of the text by concentrating on the themes of radicalized independence and innocence. He tries to be more solar than Zarathustra. My development of the gift-giving virtue takes seriously Gadamer's (1988) emphasis on the importance of the narrative for interpreting the text.

[14] Many commentators contend that Nietzsche responds to this situation by embracing a thorough-going perspectivism (see Danto 1965) or a project of difference affirming deconstruction without construction (see Deleuze 1983). These readings fail to account for the many affirmative-constructive moments in Nietzsche's works. In the case of Deleuze, his brilliant but very one-sided reading (1983) is entwined with an excessively disintegrative politics and ethics in Deleuze and Guattari (1983), a problem acknowledged, although insufficiently transcended, in discussions of "re-territorialization" in Deleuze and Guattari (1987).

But what summons Zarathustra *toward* the gift-giving virtue as the condition of possibility of well being? Would it be too facile to mention the sun? The solar summons in the "Prologue" is borne upon a powerful historical wave stemming at least from Plato's solar analogy used to gesture toward Agathon, the Good (transfigured into God by Christian neo-Platonists), that which *gives* all beings being and perceptibility (Plato 1974, Book VII). Entwined with this is Zarathustra's experience of the sun as that which eternally overflows with a generous luminosity so graciously accepted by its earthy recipients.[16] His experience of this solar generosity gives rise to the seductive exemplary solarity which animates his often stumbling journey toward the gift-giving virtue: "You great star, what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine?" (1954, 9–10). Yet, if the solicitous image of self-giving solarity repeatedly *misleads* as well as leads Zarathustra, as we shall see, nevertheless his initial understanding of solar generosity contains a fissure in the idea of autonomous giving (shared by the Good, and many accounts of God and modern subjectivity) through which Zarathustra's reflections move with widening disruptive effects. For the sun that awakens Zarathustra is not a fundamentally separate condition of possibility; it is rather essentially entwined with those who receive its light. When he exclaims, "what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine?" we should recall that in *Will to Power* Nietzsche defines happiness (pleasure) as the feeling of increasing strength and power (1967, 232, 238). In some sense the power of the sun, its overflowing giving, is connected with others. This intertwining of giving and receiving as a condition of strength, being, and gift is explicitly drawn in the next paragraph, when Zarathustra says: "You would have tired of your light and of the journey had it not been for me and my eagle and my serpent" (1954, 9).

This essential reception pierces the self-same giving-ground with contingencies of possibility and danger, and it draws Zarathustra down from his cave toward recipients and tremendously difficult questions. For despite his inability to receive the reclusive saint's warning concerning the extreme difficulties of being received (an inability that exemplifies the relative weakness of receptivity in his sense of giving early in the text, and the oblivion that results from such weakness), Zarathustra soon repeatedly discovers the recalcitrance that meets his giving. And at the deepest and highest levels of the text this challenges him to question not only his understanding of the recipients but also what gift-giving means in the face of such recalcitrance. This in turn forces him to radicalize the entwinement of giving and receiving, ultimately pushing him beyond his opening formulations of solarity. A theory of receptive generosity as the wellspring of intelligence and power gradually emerges through the relatively small fissure of receptivity in the "Prologue."[17]

Zarathustra's first encounters with people in the marketplace go exactly as the old saint predicted: His efforts to give are smashed upon the shores of those unwilling to receive him. He in turn receives not receivers but a corpse. But does the herd-like stream of humanity, with its tenacious stupidity, bear sole responsibility for these disastrous encounters? Or is it also the blindness of the solarity that governs Zarathustra's giving? If the latter, then he seems to have little clue. For if he can say, as he closes Part I with his speech on the "gift-giving virtue," that "golden splendor makes peace between moon [emblem of receptivity and passiveness] and sun" (1954, 74), he still resists advancing to the question of the other *as other*. Zarathustra still locates the origin of gift-giving virtue in being "above praise and blame," where "your will wants to command all things" (p. 76).

Yet, Nietzsche traces Zarathustra's solar wanderings in Part II in parables that "do not define, they merely hint" (1954, 75), and in ways which increasingly bring to the fore the mounting ironies, tragedies, and weaknesses accompanying this position. Significantly, Zarathustra himself, blinded by the sun he seeks to emulate, is incapable of such self-reflection until near the end. As Part II opens he is startled awake by a dream in which a child holds a mirror before him; "it was not myself I saw, but a devil's grimace and scornful laughter" (p. 83). He takes this as a sign that his teaching is endangered, his gifts are giftless, failing. They are. But whereas one might expect him to pause in a moment of self-reflection before such an image and question how he might be implicated in these dangers and failures, the solar blindness which rots the very giving it guides simultaneously blinds him to possible self-reflection, and he instantly externalizes the problem: "My enemies have grown powerful and distorted my teaching till those dearest to me must be ashamed of the gifts I gave them" (p. 83).

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[15] Love and gift-giving distinguish his own teachings from those of his impostures. See "Zarathustra's Ape" (1954, 175–78).

[16] On the theme of solarity, metaphysics of presence, and Zarathustra, see Derrida (1981). A significant stream in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* struggles with the problems Derrida identifies.

[17] Thiele (1990) seems to read Zarathustra as embracing a thoroughgoing solarity from beginning to end. This, as I argue below, is to miss some of Nietzsche's most provocative insights, especially concerning relations with others, which Thiele's work does not adequately explore. Strong (1975) is absolutely right when he writes, in contrast to the dominant bent of Thiele and Nehamas (1985), of "the great weight Nietzsche lays on the interaction between individuals and their world." Yet, his individualistic figurations of skiing and biking in the conclusion do not go very far toward helping us consider relations between selves.

Secured with this account, he leaps up and "like dawn" proclaims that he will once again go down to his friends and enemies, giving, a plunging river of love: "Mouth have I become through and through" (p. 84). But is this not precisely an "inverse cripple," having developed one organ to the detriment of all else (p. 138)? Mouth he is! But can he see, hear, touch? Can a mouth alone be radiant? Giving?

Bernice Reagon does not think so. I can hear her taunting: "Most people who are up on this stage take themselves too seriously—its true. You think that what you've got to say is special and that somebody needs to hear it. That is arrogance. . . . Most of us think that the space we live in is the most important space there is" (1983, 365). She challenges us (and Zarathustra) to receive others, the future, the past, as we cultivate our giving. "The only way you can take yourself seriously is if you can throw yourself into the next period beyond your little meager human-body-mouth-talking all the time" (p. 365). Those who are all mouth bear giftless gifts; like a "mouth-talking all the time" about "woman identified" in ways which obliterate *a priori* the specificities of many women; like the "mouth-talking all the time" Virginia Supreme Court which recently separated a child from his lesbian mother, as a gift to the child. And when the recipients are ungrateful, they are defined out of existence.

It is not long before Zarathustra turns his mouth upon "the rabble." Here Nietzsche has him speak about those he finds most nauseating in terms remarkably similar to those he uses to describe the image of *himself* that he finds in the mirror, and once again he so proclaims without a moment's reflection upon the semblance. Echoing the "devil's grimace and scornful laughter" of his own image, he speaks of the image of the rabble mirrored in the well they poison: "grinning snouts," "revolting smiles" (1954, 96). Is "the rabble" closer than he thinks, peering from out of his own sun? He rages and fumes against the rabble, closing his speech with: "Like a wind I yet want to blow among them one day, and with my spirit take the breath of their spirit" (p. 99). Is it radiance, power, giving we hear here? Or something else?

Again with pointed irony, Nietzsche opens the section that follows Zarathustra's wind fantasy with a parable on storm-provoking tarantulas, whose "poison makes the soul *whirl* with revenge" (1954, 99). Of course, Zarathustra immediately construes these spiders in a wholly external way; they are the type exemplified by punishing equality police and courts. He lets them close enough to admit that he has been bitten, but he leaves us with a strong sense he has risen above the poison, for "Zarathustra is no cyclone or whirlwind" (p. 102).

But, once again, the question concerning whether he has been bitten is very concealing. For lurking in the nagging ironic background Nietzsche provides for Zarathustra are deeper questions the latter avoids: Is there a tarantula hiding in his sun? Has he bitten himself? Is the rabble poisoning the well partly a manifestation of his own "sun-poisoning"—in addition to all he identifies? And what might it be about solarity that could make it so? The "Night Song" parable that soon follows revolves around these questions.[18]

From the depths of darkness, Zarathustra exclaims: "Light am I; ah, that I were night!" (1954, 105). As a ceaseless self-originating giver of light, he is—unlike darkness—unable to receive anything. "Many suns revolve in the void: to all that is dark they speak with their light—to me they are silent. Oh, the enmity of light against what shines: merciless it moves in its orbit" (p. 106–7). Significantly, he says: "I do not know the happiness of those who receive" (p. 106). Recalling here Nietzsche's understanding of happiness as a feeling of increasing power, his exclamation, "Oh, darkening of my sun!," gestures toward the self-defeating character of solarity. Receiving the *other-solely-as-a-receiver* seems to be insufficient (and perhaps impossible, as we shall see, for unreceptive generosity seems to be mostly unreceivable and thus fails to engender "receivers"). What is yearned for here, what seems necessary for radiant generosity and power itself, seems to be the capacity to receive partially the other *as other*, as another light, another voice. In absence of this: "My happiness in giving died in giving; my virtue tired of itself" (p. 106).

But why this weakening, tiring, and darkening? Could it be that the unreceptive giver, no longer either the origin or the recipient of stable ontological ground that sufficiently guides one's relations toward others, but instead drawn together and pulled apart in the context of agonistic incomplete identities, becomes incapable of cultivating a gift, devoid of the wild yet more receptive and *discerning* dialogical encounters with the often chaotic otherness of the world that are necessary for the birth of intelligence, let alone a "dancing star"?[19] Could it be, in a world wrought with powerful contingencies, haunting indeterminacies, and difficult distances, that isolated oblivious atoms—even big overflowing ones—are simply too small, monotonic, weak, coarse, to offer much in absence of some sort of receptive, interrogative entwinement with the world and others around them? Could it be that the height of the highest virtue is only attainable through agonistic and yet more powerfully receptive relations with others *as others*? How could Zarathustra hope to give to those of whom he knows nothing, those from whom he has received so little? "They receive from me, but do I touch their souls? There is a cleft between giving and receiving; and the narrowest cleft is the last to be bridged." "The heart and hand of those who always mete out become callous from always meting out" (1954, 106). They lose all sense of the other, *all* orientation concerning what might be empowering, what might shame the other.

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[18] On the one hand, Higgins obscures the importance of "Night Song" when she reduces it to a "lament about the emotional strain" of appearing as a "bottomless well of insight and generosity" (1987, 136). On the other hand, her fascinating analysis (1985) of Dionysus, Apollo, and Ariadne with regard to the themes of unity, difference, transfiguration, and love suggests a very fruitful path that might be explored both to illuminate Nietzsche's sense of Dionysus and to deepen an analysis of receptive generosity. Lampert correctly reads the section as pivotal, the location of "a great shift" (1986, 102–5), but the shift involves not only a move toward the problem of receiving the gift of the doctrine of eternal return but also, entwined with the former, toward the problem of receiving others. Lampert's focus on the growing distance between the philosopher-ruler and other people in *Zarathustra* obscures the numerous, diverse, and important *relations* Zarathustra both seeks and discovers. See also Nietzsche (1979, 108–10).

[19] The centrality of receptivity to giving is insufficiently developed by some of those mentioned above for whom gift-giving is important (Honig 1993; Kaufmann 1950). For Lampert (1986), receptivity is central, but he ends up conceptualizing it as "letting be," which overlooks the very important reciprocally transfigurative and agonistic characteristics of giving and receiving between people in Zarathustra's thinking, developed below.

The significance of Zarathustra's reflections here are broad and deep. Yet, once again, Reagon's reflections can help us articulate some of their importance for considering an ethical possibility and trajectory for coalition politics. As is Zarathustra, she is concerned about cultivating a generosity that does not "tire of itself." She calls us "to have an old age perspective," such that we can remain vitally engaged with others far into the future. Part of this involves "pulling back" from coalition politics, and part of it involves the way one engages others in such a politics (1983, 361). It is clear that Reagon recognizes the cleft between monological giving and the possibility of receiving. "Watch those mono-issue people. They ain't gonna do you no good" (p. 363). Moreover, this unreceptive effort is not only tiring in an unhelpful manner to the supposed recipients but also tends to tire of itself. In learning nothing from one's encounters, one remains untransfigured and untransfiguring. In this reified void which characterizes the relations of such a self (or group) with others, an overwhelming sense of futility and weakness is most likely to emerge ("Oh, darkening of my sun!"), leading to withdrawal, resentment, or both. Reagon calls us instead to agonistic dialogues with others, in an endless effort to grapple discerningly with what is foreign, to recognize and create the possibilities that the contingencies and indeterminacies infusing our own and others' identity afford. She notes that those who tend not to tire, who remain active across decades, frequently demonstrate a capacity to engage receptively a wide range of difficult issues and perspectives. It is they, she argues, who "hold the key to turning the century," not just because they are more likely to remain vibrant, but because they are most likely to have something to give: perhaps most important, a sense of receptive generosity itself as a way of being. "They can teach you how to cross cultures and not kill yourself" (p. 363).

Yet, if Zarathustra's agony in "Night Song" brilliantly opens onto this wisdom, it soon disappears again in blinding flashes of the solarity by which he is seized. Unable to receive, unable to give, Zarathustra's giving turns unpalatably sour. And a giving whose fundamental structure dooms it to failure leads to resentment. "I should like to hurt those for whom I shine . . . rob those to whom I give. . . . Such revenge my fullness plots: such spite wells out of my loneliness" (1954, 106). But has he not, then, produced himself, become himself, the revengeful tarantula he so despises, this spider who dwells where the sun shines brightest and hottest?

Zarathustra's most suggestive efforts to address the problem of receptivity can be traced in his discussions of the way time pierces the active will with a passivity it must receive despite itself and of the manner in which the latter inextricably entwines all selves with rabblishness. Receptive generosity as a response to this situation emerges in my reading of the doctrine of eternal return.

The section "On Redemption" offers much on the difficulties of embracing receptivity as vital, as life-giving. Zarathustra's concern here is to try somehow to embrace *difficult* reception, like the kind he suggests that the hunchback who would rather be "cured" ought to embrace: "When one takes away the hump from the hunchback one takes away his spirit" (1954, 137). Yet, Zarathustra recognizes a problem within the solar will that makes reception itself difficult, nay, impossible to embrace. For he realizes that the passive aspect of our relation to time is ineliminable and gives the lie to the will's claims to be self-originary giving. The present moment of the will receives, is carried along by, an intractable past that is more than its will and cannot be changed "at will." "The now and the past on earth—alas, my friends, that is what *I* find most unendurable" (p. 138). Before the past the self-proclaimed unreceptive will seems impotent and mythical. "The will is still a prisoner. . . . It was—that is the name of the will's gnashing of teeth and most secret melancholy. Powerless against all that has been done, he is an angry spectator of all that is past" (p. 139). Angry at that which the will must unwillingly receive, the will becomes a destructive force and "wreaks revenge," which Zarathustra defines precisely as "the will's ill will against time and its 'it was.'" Unless the will can receive otherness in the fundamental form of temporality, "cloud upon cloud rolls over the spirit," the sun extinguishes itself (p. 140).

But how to receive time, through which the other and otherness have come and always are already coming? Somehow the will must receive time, gather together the "fragment, riddle, dreadful accident" that temporality appears to be, and say "thus I will it." But how to do this when what has come and is coming is permeated by so much rabblishness (and also the highest profundities of others that one "girt with light" finds difficult to perceive/receive)?

Nietzsche seeks a sort of redemption in the face of recalcitrant time and rabblishness through the doctrine of the "eternal return." Whether or not he really thought this doctrine had literal ontological merit, clearly he viewed it as a practical regulative idea (an idea he called "the greatest weight") (1974, 273–74).[20] I will only sketch a possible sense of the latter as it emerges in the context of and engages the questions we have been pressing and the directions we have been pursuing.

Zarathustra's animals capture the most important core of the idea: "All things recur eternally, and we ourselves too. . . . You teach that there is a great year of becoming, a monster of a year, which must like an hour glass turn over again and again . . . all these years are alike in what is greatest and what is smallest; and we ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is smallest . . . the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create me again" (1954, 228). Much of Zarathustra's effort focuses upon coming to terms with the implications of this thought: "the eternal recurrence even of the smallest . . . that was my disgust with all existence" (p. 219).

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[20] There are endless debates on the ontological status of the eternal return in Nietzsche's thought. Danto (1965), Kaufmann (1968), and Zuboff (1973), among others, provide an ontological reading. Lampert (1986) views it primarily as a practical regulative idea, as does Nehamas (1985), who provides a compelling discussion of the issue in chapter 5. Nehamas, however, interprets eternal return solely as "a view of the self" (p. 150), a view I wish to decenter through a discussion of receiving otherness "within" and "without," recognizing the real limits of these categories.

One cannot escape the smallest in others and oneself; one cannot simply will it away anymore than one can will away the past. The *question* then, which is pressed into being and opened under the weight of this highly pressurized thought of passive receptivity, is how to receive this smallness (and grandness) in such a way that radiance and giving do not darken but, instead are, made possible in part precisely through this reception. There is no singularly triumphant answer to this question, despite moments in the text when joyful triumph seems absolute. For the distance, opacity, difference, and rabblishness which are in part the space of giving's possibility, simultaneously permeate it with tragic dimensions of erring. Instead, eternal recurrence, this thought of unending *closed* time, hangs over Zarathustra in an essentially interrogative hue, as a question through which the *opening* of time as a site of possibility for the creation/coming of the higher emerges. The interrogative overture (a word capturing the essential connection between opening and height) is endlessly renewed in the question of how one might receive the rabblishness (and grandness) within and without in order that it might be gathered together into a giving and a gift high enough to redeem it, high enough to say "yes" to the eternal return of this moment. This question involves the partly agonistic, partly cooperative, always transfiguring dialogical effort with others to discern what is lower and what is higher; to discern how these differences and distances might be brought together and held apart such that we might become more receptive of their gifts, more capable of giving, less resentful and revenge seeking. Finally, the possibility of radiance seems to hinge precisely upon the agonistic dialogue between others, the entwinement of giving and receiving which, although never free of all doubt in the manner Descartes yearned for, is nevertheless the precarious elaborating foundation of well-being and sense. (For discussions of agonistic dialogical ethics, see Coles 1992a, 1992b, and 1995.)

The gift-giving virtue is what is highest, but it is incapable of manifesting itself as that which comes from on high. Rather, its greatest possibility for emergence "arises," Nietzsche thinks, paradoxically, underneath "the greatest weight"—the thought of eternal return (which is hence the greatest gift?). The greatest weight presses us generously into the *depths* of our surroundings as the oblique path of ascension. Zarathustra says to himself that, in contrast to those who are "obtrusive with [their] eyes" and are stuck in the "foreground" surface of things, "you, O Zarathustra, wanted to see the ground and background of all things," wanted to plunge into the depths of beings, those aspects and possibilities that are concealed beneath immediate appearances. He exclaims that "hence you must climb over yourself," but, again, this climb is not direct; rather, it is a journey through depth toward height, as is implied when he says that "one must look away from oneself [and one's foreground] in order to see *much*" (1954, 153). One looks up to the highest virtue and is pressed into the pregnant depths by its midwife. Ironically, one of Zarathustra's clearest articulations of this relation is given early in the text: "It is with man as it is with the tree. The more he aspires to the height and light, the more strongly do his roots strive earthward, downward, into the dark, the deep—into evil" (p. 42); into evil because the background depth of beings is barred from generous approach by the taboos of evil (races, sexualities, classes, practices, desires, thoughts, bodily expressions, and so forth). Yet, in the stream of Nietzsche's thinking that I am tracing here, the striving into evil is to be animated and circumscribed by the generous respect for otherness solicited by the highest virtue. It is through this agonistic giving and receiving in depth that one can best affirm life and might rise *toward* a joy capable of dancing in the face of the eternal question of the eternal return.

These are pregnant thoughts; a dimension of their significance can be further clarified by returning to Reagon's reflections on coalition politics. Reagon describes the engagement in such politics in terms of overwhelming pressures which threaten to the core. Under these pressures generous receptive agonism can easily dissolve into strategies of assimilation, withdrawal, or outright subjugation. I have argued that the radical democratic liberalism of Laclau and Mouffe offers little to resist such pressures. Nietzsche, having graphically portrayed these dangers in the narrative of Zarathustra, responds in two ways. On the one hand, he evokes the seductive possibility of buoyant empowerment and joyful wisdom that might accompany receptive and generous engagements. On the other hand, and more important because he recognizes the fleeting character of the first moment, he offers us "the greatest weight" of the eternal return as a kind of interrogative *counterpressure* to those Reagon describes, in order to keep us returning to those most difficult and dangerous spaces with others, checking assimilation and indifference, questioning the possible and desirable.

My claim here is not that the idea of the eternal return is the *only* interrogative counterpressure which might be cultivated with an eye toward a more desirable form of coalition politics and ethics of receptive generosity more generally, simply that it is one very potent articulation of such a pressure. Reagon cultivates another very potent articulation in her distinctive relation to the tradition of gospel music. Not only the group of themes she emphasizes (although these are often powerful) but also the rhythms, harmonies, and textures of voices singing, writhing, bubbling, and wailing at once lift one up and press one down into explorations of violence and possibility. One might say that a key task of coalition politics would be the cultivation of diverse philosophies, narratives, musics, and practices that tend to engender such questioning, being questioned, and action.

Questions of the "greatest weight" often seem to solicit Zarathustra in Book IV, and his encounters there frequently distinguish themselves from many others in the text insofar as he often seems to listen more, ask more questions, experience more joy in his relations with others, offer something of receivable worth to his interlocutors, and receive something of value from them even as he yearns for much more; he tames his nausea, pity, revenge. Yet, these encounters manifest a rather pale and discontinuous image of the more radiant possibilities of entwined giving and receiving that the text at times seems to conjure as a soliciting ideal. Perhaps this is to some degree a weakness, partly due to continued interference of Nietzsche's devitalized sense of the transfigurative possibilities of politics and his unending attraction to the monological solar idea.[21] In these respects Zarathustra's encounters might be judged at least to some degree to be a weakness.

But perhaps it is also a strength that giving and receiving should appear pale and fragile in Zarathustra's closing pages: a powerful and necessary warning to the "beautiful soul" that might emerge from such an ethic unless thus chastened. Political life is difficult! As Bernice Reagon says, "We've got to do it with some folk we don't care too much about. And we got to vomit over that a little while" (1983, 368). Receptive generosity calls us to these difficult relations of giving and receiving in a manner most likely to avoid the dynamic of darkening suns and revenge seeking; most likely to redeem the rabblishness that keeps on coming through us and from others. But insofar as it throws us into wrenching situations, it risks and provokes its own weakening. "We cannot stay there," in these most agonistic spaces, for too long before we must leave, a bit broken and exhausted, for places where our passions, ideals, and visions can relax a bit, reform, revitalize in a different way. The ideal always partly suffers in its incarnation. Finally, therefore, receptive generosity remains a soliciting ideal whose realization is "not yet." It is a direction toward which we bring forth children, a direction from which they are coming—like Zarathustra's, who shall be "taciturn even when [they] speak, and yielding so that in giving [they] receive"—capable of friendship (1954, 161). These children are still coming on the final page, near, but not yet here.

CONCLUSION

My elaboration of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* gestures toward a narrative argument—fallible but quite compelling—concerning why and how receptive generosity is desirable as an ideal animating our relations with others. By illuminating the poisoning and life-denying decadence that proliferates in its absence, and by gesturing toward the possibilities of vitalization, empowerment, and intelligence that can more likely emerge in relations animated by a more dialogical rendering of the gift-giving virtue, my argument seeks to move beyond Laclau and Mouffe's "I just happen to believe" response to the thought of contingency, indeterminacy, and finitude. It attempts to draw an ethics precisely *from* this thought, to wrestle with it, to give an account of how we are and ought to be called, by the erring finitude of all monological accounts, beyond ourselves to others' otherness. Contingency need not lead us simply to the ethical silence of "I just happen," it is rather (or in addition and more powerfully) a central and compelling dimension of a reformulated ethic.

If we now reposition Laclau and Mouffe's, and more generally liberalism's, favored ideals of equality and liberty in a constellation where receptive generosity is the slightly brighter star,[22] they might acquire a meaning more colored by the solicitation to give to and receive from others *as others*. They become preconditions of postsecular *caritas* as well as ends in themselves that protect more private and autonomous sites of identity formation. Perhaps in this context they will be less likely to engender the diverse imperialisms of identity they have sometimes fostered.

To sketch very briefly a direction in which such formulations might move, we could begin by rooting the ideal of equality of liberty in the indeterminacy of giving and receiving. For such indeterminacy is radically disruptive of all efforts to legitimize coercive impositions of inequality on the basis of claims to be more "gifted." Others are simply too opaque to us and too protean to be excluded or demoted in the politics of giving and receiving. Moreover, equality of liberty is a precondition for protecting the indeterminate dialogical relations through which the gift-giving virtue is most likely to thrive. In a very powerful passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes: "Could it be that in the realm of the spirit Raphael without hands, taking this phrase in the widest sense, is perhaps not the exception but the rule? Genius is perhaps not so rare after all—but the five hundred *hands* it requires to tyrannize the *kairos*, "the right time," seizing chance by its forelock" (1966, 222–23). If genius, a brilliance of what might be received and given, indeterminately lurks as a possibility that is "perhaps not so rare after all," even if usually hidden like a brilliant painter without hands is usually concealed (and, if we were to think this through "in the widest sense," perhaps even the absence of hands becomes part of the gift, as is the case with a famous Chinese artist who holds the brush in her mouth, analogous in certain respects to the gift of the hunchback that might emerge precisely through the hump itself), then the task solicited by the gift-giving virtue is receptively to search the depths of others and oneself for such pregnant possibilities, needing only to be gathered, redrawn, seized by the "forelock." And it is necessary to allow, indeed encourage, others to search oneself thus. This task, even and especially if often agonistic, requires an equality of liberty to protect the indeterminacies of dialogue (between and among selves and groups) through which it might manifest its highest possibility.[23] (It is far too wild to be likely to emerge from the relatively monological work of philosopher-kings.) Moreover, such equality of liberty, to be more than substanceless formalism, calls us to proliferate radical and plural democratic spaces for generous and receptive participation. It is precisely this sensibility, I believe, which animates Sheldon Wolin's eloquent statement concerning political power: "True political power involves not only acting so as to effect decisive changes; it also means the capacity to receive power, to be acted upon, to change, and be changed. From a democratic perspective, power is not simply force that is generated; it is experience, sensibility, wisdom, even melancholy distilled from the diverse relations and circles we move within" (1992, 252–53).

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[21] For one of the most provocative historical discussions of Nietzsche's life and thought concerning his relation to politics, see Bergmann (1987).

[22] Warren (1988, 69–74, 247–48) offers some very suggestive comments on a theory of equality that can be drawn out of passages from Nietzsche's middle period. His remarks on "agonistic" equality have some affinity with my discussion below.

Perhaps here we might be able to begin partially to refigure the meaning of liberty in a significant manner, for it now seems to have as both its condition of possibility and its desire an essential relation to generous receptivity. If freedom is substantially an opening, exploration, articulation, and intelligence with respect to higher possibilities, then we have seen that such events are most probable in the differential relations engendered by the gift-giving virtue. Similarly, freedom is initially solicited and borne by generous desire.

Relations animated by these ideals are, as Reagon and Nietzsche illustrate in different ways, likely a precondition for the coalition politics sought (albeit in a problematic way) by Laclau and Mouffe. In absence of an ethic of receptive generosity, it is easy to imagine the politics of democratization continuing to oscillate between totalizing impulses that are solidly rejected, on the one hand, and disintegrative social movements that are equally impotent, on the other, as radical right-wing movements coalesce and grow stronger around numerous essentialist foundations. Postsecular *caritas* offers a very broad vision of a soliciting height that might rise above this—politically, economically, and, just as important, ethically.[24]

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[23] I enjoy a proximate distance with Kateb's (1992) discussion of Whitman's understanding of the infinite potentialities of the soul. But my claim that equality of liberty is a precondition for protecting the radical indeterminacies of giving and receiving through which these potentialities develop should not be confused with what I consider to be an implausible claim, namely, in terms of the "reservoir of potentialities," "in all persons the given is the same: the same desires, inclinations, and passions as well as aptitudes and incipient talents" (Kateb 1992, 245).

[24] I further explore this theme in Coles (forthcoming).

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Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*

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Political scientists are becoming more self-conscious about how they connect quantitative and qualitative data in social science and about the role of systematic country studies in comparative research. As the most striking example of both practices in recent years, Robert Putnam and his collaborators' Making Democracy Work *deserves more serious criticism than it has received. While Putnam's original project aimed at a precise goal—studying how a new administrative reform is institutionalized—his ultimate project aimed at nothing less than examining how differently democracy works in different sociopolitical contexts, operationalized cross-sectionally in southern and northern Italy. The sources of these differences he found in the two regions' histories, which led him to employ the quantitative interregional data he had collected for one purpose to support a model of historical development of North and South. This historical reconstruction rests largely on qualitative data; but it also rests on a set of comparative inferences about individual values and community cohesiveness in the two regions that is of questionable historical validity and innocent of structural grounding. This article applauds Putnam's joining qualitative and quantitative data but attacks his reconstruction of Italian history to fit his model of social capital.*

All self-respecting political scientists like to think of themselves as intrigued with what makes democracy work. But what brings a reviewer to risk a critical reflection on one of the most acclaimed recent works in the field?[1] That author and reviewer learned their trade in the same school and have both carried out research in Italy is part of the explanation, but only a small part.[2] A second reason is that we are becoming more self-conscious about the use of quantitative and qualitative data in social science and about the role of systematic country studies in comparative research.[3] And the third is the fact that the study on which Robert Putnam's book was based, which has caused a sensation outside academic circles, was first reported in this *Review* (Putnam and others 1983), a rare linkage between scientific effort and popular success.[4] Moreover, while Putnam's *American Political Science Review* article made modest claims, defining the problem as "institutional success," *Making Democracy Work* aims at a broader target—nothing less than the correlates of democracy.

In his book, Putnam (1993a) attacks two enduring problems in social science: how to marry directly collected quantitative data with historical information from external sources, and how to connect political culture to democracy. The first problem is particularly thorny when the logic of inference from primary data is cross-sectional while the external data are historical; the second is even tougher when political culture is specified and operationalized through past political traditions, while the indicators of democracy are lodged in the present. Since Putnam attempts both of these things, examining *Making Democracy Work* will help understand the problems we face both in joining history to systematic empirical data and in linking political culture to democracy.

MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE WORK: THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF PUTNAM

It is worth underscoring the strategy and main successes of *Making Democracy Work*. Putnam's achievements are three. First, both the *APSR* article (Putnam and others 1983) and the book demonstrate how—and how unevenly!—institutional innovations are translated into practice. Second, Putnam shows that institutional performance is not policy-specific or idiosyncratic but is

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[1] The immediate assessments in the United States were ebullient. See, for example, David Laitin's commentary in this *Review* (1995) and Joseph LaPalombara's praise-filled review (1993). Professional reviewers in Italy have not, for the most part, shared this enthusiasm. Representative examples are Bagnasco (1994), Cohn (1994), Feltrin (1994), Pasquino (1994), Ramella (1995), and Trigilia (1994). More critical assessments began to appear in English in 1995. See the set of brief reviews by Arnaldo Bagnasco, Antonio Mutti, and Gianfranco Pasquino in APSA-CP, the newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics, June 1995, and the more probing analyses by Ellis Goldberg, Margaret Levi, and Filippo Sabetti in *Politics and Society*, forthcoming in 1996.

[2] See Tarrow (1967a, b) for two deeply out-of-date efforts to compare northern and southern Italy, about which Putnam has kind words to say in his book. More up-to-date works on the South that touch on some of the same bases as *Making Democracy Work* are by Trigilia (1992, 1995).

[3] On qualitative and quantitative methods, see the path-breaking volume by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and the symposium on that book in *American Political Science Review* (1995). For an alternative qualitative approach to similar issues as raised by Putnam, carried out in the same country, see Sabetti 1996.

[4] Among the press reviews that this author has scanned, the most enthusiastic were found in the *Times Literary Supplement*, February 1993, followed by *The Economist* in October 1993, *The Nation* in November 1993, and the *New York Times Book Review* in January 1995. The Italian media have been wildly enthusiastic over the book, but the tone of many of these reactions leads one to suspect an unfortunate attempt to enlist Putnam as an ally in the game of trashing the South, a game which became fashionable with the rise of the separatist Northern League in the early 1990s. For a reflection on this unfortunate coincidence, see Trigilia (1994).

coherent among policy sectors and stable over time. Third, he shows how the same seeds of institutional innovation grow differently in different socioeconomic and cultural soils to produce different kinds of institutional plants.[5] Let us examine each of these claims before turning to the problems of explanation sketched above.

Institutional Change and Democratic Politics

"Those who build new institutions," writes Robert Putnam in chapter 2 of his book, "and those who would evaluate them need patience" (1993a, 60). Not the least virtue of Putnam and his collaborators was to have the endurance and creativity to carry out research tasks in the Italian regions since they were created more than twenty years ago.[6] Given the growing tendency in parts of our discipline to substitute affirmations of revealed preferences for observation of behavior, this was no mean feat. But still more impressive is that, without suffering visibly from discontinuity, *Making Democracy Work* reads like a stratified rock formation of U.S. political science over the last three decades: from the behavioral methods and political culture theories of the 1960s to the policy-oriented studies of the 1970s, to the game theoretical perspectives and historical turn of the 1980s and early 1990s.

Putnam's central problem is a classical political culture dilemma:[7] How do traditions of association and civic engagement affect political behavior? He first examines how the regional governments created in Rome in 1970 and implanted over the next two decades in Italy's regions compare in terms of various measures of policy performance that he has constructed. He finds dramatic differences between the regions in North and South, differences that associate with different levels of civic involvement. Next he turns to the histories of each region to seek the sources of these differences in performance. Finally, he interprets the results in terms of the category of "social capital," a property that he finds lacking in southern Italy but flourishing in the North. This he broadens to the problem of democracy anywhere in the world, including the United States (1993a, chapter 6; also see Putnam 1994 and 1995), for where there is no social capital, he argues, democracy cannot flourish.

The first and uncontested success of these decades of research was to provide a magnificent profile of the birth, growth, and institutionalization of new representative institutions (Putnam 1993a, 17). But as the imperfect progress of the Italian regions shows, "that institutional reforms alter behavior is an hypothesis, not an axiom" (p. 18), and the hypothesis was only partially supported by the results of the regional reform. For while the first two decades in the life of the new institutions "transformed elite political culture" (p. 28), the greater efficiency that reformers anticipated from it did not materialize, and some of the classical dysfunctions of Italian public life even appear to have been exacerbated by it (p. 61).[8]

Measuring Political Performance

That some units of government will perform better than others is true by definition; and that Italy's regions are diverse and unevenly endowed is the first law that any student of Italian politics learns.[9] But without systematic measurement and comparison of policy areas, two possibilities follow. First, the aphorism "The South is different" may prove no more than a piece of political folklore. Second, as Theodore Lowi argues, each policy area may have a distinct politics, leading to the inference that it is the politics of the particular policy regime and not the character of the political unit that is responsible for the outcomes observed (Lowi 1985, 67–68).

Putnam's analysis shows that neither of these is the case for the Italian regional governments. His book documents and quantifies the regional governments' policy performance in twelve distinct policy areas and dimensions, finding the South consistently performing worse in each area and over time (Putnam 1993a, 65–76).

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[5] The botanic metaphor is no accident; it was even more explicit in another report on the work in Italian by Putnam and others (1985).

[6] Almost from the beginning, Putnam was associated in the study with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti, who had primary responsibility for the field research, collaboratively authored several publications with him, and produced several books of their own. See, in particular, Leonardi and Nanetti (1990), Nanetti (1988), and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1981, 1983, 1985). For fuller citations of the products of their research by the three authors, see notes 1 and 2 in Putnam (1993a, 207).

To summarize briefly, they carried out four waves of interviews with regional councilors in six regions of Italy; three waves of interviews in these same regions and a nationwide mail survey with community leaders; six nationwide surveys of voters; extended regional statistical analysis; a "unique experiment" that tested the responsiveness of regional governments to citizen inquiries; and case studies of institutional politics which helped them "marinate" themselves (their term) in Italy's diverse regional realities. See Putnam (1993a, 12–14 and Appendix A).

[7] It is only fair to remark that Robert Putnam, in commenting on a draft version of this article, asserts that his book is not a political cultural interpretation of the Italian regions. He points out that virtually all his indicators of "civicness" are behavioral or structural, not attitudinal or cultural. Putnam and his collaborators certainly do not engage in symbolic or ritualistic forms of cultural analysis or use the "thick" description that some culturalists favor (Laitin 1995, 173). Reading their article in this *Review* (1983, 63–67), however, argues otherwise. The model of causation, which goes from civic capacity to political behavior, is in the main line of political culture research from the pioneering studies of Almond and Verba onward (Putnam 1993a, 11) and picks up on crucial arguments of that superb culturalist, Alexis de Tocqueville (Putnam 1993a, 89–91, 182, and 221, note 28). I can only say that, if *Making Democracy Work* is not a cultural interpretation, then Putnam and his collaborators fooled not only this critic but also many of their admirers, one of whom considers it "a stunning breakthrough in political culture research" (Laitin 1995, 171).

[8] For example, Putnam and his collaborators (1993a) found that the regional governments' procedures were often reminiscent of the practices of the central administration (p. 49); that in many cases, clientelism and party affiliation, rather than expertise and experience, were the main criteria for recruitment (p. 50); and that by the late 1980s the initial euphoria of the regional councilors had been replaced by "a grimly realistic assessment of the practical challenges of making the new government work" (p. 57).

[9] The first aphorism this reviewer ever heard (from a northerner) about the Italian Communist Party that he studied in southern Italy was that it resembled Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author*. For a more scholarly synthesis on southern and northern political cultures on which many students of Italy cut their teeth, see LaPalombara (1965).

Not only that: The "objective" measures of policy performance that he developed correlate significantly with the assessments made by citizens and community elites of their own region's effectiveness (pp. 76–80). In every respect, what we suspected is true after all: The South is different, and this difference is so profound that even the new and formally standardized institutions simultaneously created in North and South were penetrated by it, affecting every aspect of policy performance. But does this difference, and the variations in institutional capacity that it produces, predict democracy? There is a long row to hoe until we get there.

Making Direct Inferences from Paired Comparisons

Although Putnam first set out to study the effects of a new institution on political socialization and recruitment over time (1993a, xiv; Putnam and others 1981), the cross-sectional differences he found led him away from his initial time-series design to a cross-sectional one. Using the North-South cleavage as an analytical lever, he began to ask: What it is about the South that is different (1993a, 83), and can it be linked to deficiencies observed in its regional governments' performance? And what is it about the Center-North in Italy that helped its regions turn the same new institutions to effective use? After a brief consideration of socioeconomic modernity, which Putnam argues does not explain the differences between North and South,[10] he centers on a construct he calls "the civic community" (enter political culture). This he links intellectually to the tradition of civic humanism (p. 87), which he specifies through four theoretical dimensions: (1) civic engagement, (2) political equality, (3) solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and (4) the social structures of cooperation (pp. 87–91).

Putnam spends a good deal of effort fleshing out the political and social correlates of these indicators (pp. 96–116) before building his measure of civic community on the first and the fourth: civic engagement, which he measures through newspaper readership and voting in referenda, and associational structures, which he measures through the density of sports clubs and other associations. He then adds another measure whose relation to civic humanism is not so obvious, the voters' use of individual preference voting, which he sees as a surrogate for clientelism and thus for the noncivic community.[11]

FIGURE 1. The Civic Community and Institutional Performance



Note: Southern regions are in the lower left quadrant.
Source: Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, p. 98. Copyright © 1993 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

Although these measures bring into the analysis data from outside Putnam's primary data set, they were collected in standard form across the regions and are ordinal in form, and thus they can reasonably be associated with the indicators Putnam developed to measure institutional performance.[12] When combined, Putnam's composite index of civic capacity correlates impressively with the institutional performance of the regional governments. Figure 1, which reproduces Putnam's scattergram of the regions, tells the dramatic story. *All* the regions with high institutional performance and high scores on the civic community index are from the Center-North; *all* those that score low on both these measures are in the South. The North is the home of civic competence and institutional performance;[13] the South is the site of neither.[14] "Happiness," concludes Putnam, "is living in a civic community" (p. 113).

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[10] Jonas Pontusson, in a personal communication to the author, finds the following contradiction in Putnam's treatment of economic development. In his discussion of the North in the fifteenth century, Putnam points out that "the prosperity of the communal republics was arguably the consequence, as much as the cause, of ... civic engagement" (1993a, 152). But subsequently Putnam observes that levels of economic development were not significantly different in the nineteenth century from the fifteenth. If northern Italian civicness produced economic development—and was produced by it—in the fifteenth century and again in the twentieth, why did it not have similar effects in the intervening period? I am grateful to Pontusson for pointing this out to me and regret that I have been unable to give sufficient attention to the relations between economic development, civicness, and institutional performance in this essay.

[11] Those who follow Italian politics will understand empirically how preference voting can be used as a measure of clientelism, but this does not help explain how it relates to the civic virtues that Putnam elucidates theoretically. One might argue intuitively, contra Putnam, that since preference voting is based on knowing the individual candidates, it is a *positive* element in civic involvement. Putnam points out that the preference vote is used in Italy to assure individual benefits, not to anchor a policy preference, and in that sense "preference voting can be taken as an indicator for the absence of a civic community" (1993a, 94). I do not find the justification convincing because the absence of personal ties between voters and officials is not an obvious element of civic virtue. It is what usually accompanies preference voting in southern Italy—corruption and clientelism—that makes it inimical to what Putnam sees in the civic community. If so, then it would have been more correct to use these factors as (negative) indicators of civic virtue.

[12] It should be noted that the four measures are also highly intercorrelated (Putnam 1993a, 96, Table 4.4). The problem with these measures is that they are also highly correlated with the size of the Communist vote, a party which was particularly anxious to have its supporters turn out, as Alan Zuckerman reminded me in a comment on the first draft of this essay.

It should be noted that in making the case for the North's civic capacity and for the South's civic weakness, Putnam's eye perhaps swept a bit too broadly across the Italian landscape to allow him to catch sight of a few jagged outcroppings which might have given him pause. On the one hand, recent research directed by Carlo Trigilia shows a growth in associational activity in the South, "in part political, but above all cultural, which is shaping new possibilities on the level of democratic growth and the positive use of civic resources" (Ramella 1995, 471).[15] On the other hand, it would have been interesting to learn what Putnam would make of the successive explosions in northern Italian public life that were erupting as *Making Democracy Work* was going to press: of corruption scandals on top of separatism; of mafia infestation on top of years of terrorism and political kidnappings; of the collapse of the Marxist and Catholic subcultures with their panoply of mass organizations, giving way to a party system whose capillary structures have all but disappeared.

Do Trigilia's findings on associational capacity question Putnam's image of the South? And do the symptoms of crime, separatism, and corruption mark a collapse of the North's vaunted civic capacity? Or does civic capacity have another face, one with less positive implications for democracy (Levi 1996)? Before turning to the democratic implications of civic capacity, let us follow Putnam in searching for its origins.

THE PATHWAYS OF PUTNAM: REACHING BEYOND DIRECT INFERENCE INTO HISTORY

For some social scientists, the internal inferences reported above and the startlingly high correlations they produced would have satisfied their urge for viable generalizations. But Putnam wanted to go farther.[16] He thought the differences he had found through cross-sectional analysis of his data transcended his study's initial focus on institutional growth—and on Italy. In fact, he argues, they "had astonishingly deep historical roots" (1993a, xiv). So, from an empirical focus on the cross-sectional variations within the twenty-year period of the Italian regional experience, his analytical lens shifted boldly to interpreting the differences among the regions in terms of longer historical differences. Much longer.

From City-State to Civic Competence

Leaving behind his familiar terrain of quantitative, cross-sectional statistical analysis, Putnam traveled back to the late-medieval origins of north-central Italy's city-state governments and to the simultaneous development of the autocratic Norman regime in the South during the same period. In both cases, he found analogues to the divergent civic capacities he identified in his contemporary data, analogues that he interpreted as their indirect causes. In the history of the South from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, he found a steep social hierarchy that was ever more dominated by a landed aristocracy endowed with feudal powers, while at the bottom of the social pyramid masses of peasants struggled wretchedly close to the limits of physical survival (pp. 123–24). Meanwhile, in the North, the solution created in these early times was quite different, "relying less on vertical hierarchy and more on horizontal collaboration" (p. 124). By the beginning of the fourteenth century, Putnam argues, Italy had produced not one but two patterns of governance with their associated social and cultural features (p. 130). These syndromes had crucial outcomes for the civic capacity of each region:

> Collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and even trust . . . were the distinguishing features in the North. The chief virtue in the South, by contrast, was the imposition of hierarchy and order on latent anarchy" (p. 130).

I cannot deal fairly here with the historiographic aspects of Putnam's analysis of southern Italy since the Norman conquest or with the criticisms they have raised.[17] But it is worth pointing out that his image of the late-medieval northern city-state as a paragon of civic republicanism is telescopic, to say the least.[18] That the early Italian city-states had associational origins did not make them inherently civic, or even "horizontal." After a short period as voluntary associations, most of them produced closed urban oligarchies, fought constantly over territory and markets, and left the urban poor vertically compromised.

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[13] Putnam's correlations are dramatic enough, but his verbal inferences about Italy's civic Center-North verge on chamber-of-commerce enthusiasm. "Some regions of Italy," he writes, "have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read eagerly about community affairs in the daily press. They are engaged by public issues, but not by personalistic or patron-client politics. Inhabitants trust one another to act fairly and to obey the law. Leaders in these regions are relatively honest. They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compromise with their political adversaries" (1993a, 115).

[14] Putnam's prose in describing the South is as bleak as his language about the Center-North was elegiac: "Public life in these regions is organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally. . . . Few people aspire to partake in deliberations about the commonweal, and few such opportunities present themselves. Political participation is triggered by personal dependency or private greed, not by collective purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is meager. Private piety stands in for public purpose. Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about democratic principles. . . . Trapped in these interlocking vicious circles, nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy" (p. 115).

[15] Working with organizational registers in the early 1990s, Trigilia and his collaborators found an impressive total of 6,400 cultural associations in the South, three for every 10,000 inhabitants, and more than two-thirds of them created since 1980 (Ramella 1995, 473). "There emerges," in their view, "a picture that differs in many ways from the opaque and static image of associational phenomena in the South" (pp. 473–74). See Trigilia (1995) for the full report of these findings.

[16] It is only fair to point out that Putnam devotes only nineteen pages to the historical roots of civic capacity in the North and to civic incapacity in the South. For some of his critics, this is evidence of scholarly superficiality (see, for example, Cohn 1994, 315), while Putnam, responding to Cohn, writes that if he "had known that the reviewers of [his] book would have applied themselves so devotedly to the nineteen pages . . . [he] dedicated to the history of Italy before unification, [he] would have perhaps lost twenty years frequenting the historians to understand the intricate mechanisms that govern their shifting professional agreements and disagreements" (1994, 325).

[17] Cohn (1994, 318) writes: "Although Putnam admits that, moving from place to place within a single southern region, great differences in civic virtue can be found . . . he abandons every restraint when he looks at the period before unification. The South of Putnam is an undifferentiated whole, from the Arab-settled western coast of Sicily up to the region of Rome, despite the fact that the southern regions presented very different situations in terms of the level of urbanization, agrarian

Moreover, Putnam places within the same general category of civic republicanism some northern regions whose experiences with communal democracy were long, others that were brief, and still others that were subject to continued feudal control or to the extended authority of the pope (Cohn 1994, 317).[19] Finally, in focusing on the golden age of the city-state, he treats the five or six centuries that followed somewhat cavalierly, trolling rapidly through a long and turbulent stretch of history for analogues of the cultural patterns he found in the earlier period without specifying the links either theoretically or empirically.

This is the feature of Putnam's evidentiary structure that has caused the greatest perplexity among historians and others (for example, see Cohn 1994, 319).[20] It would have been interesting to know by what rules of inference he chose the late-medieval period as the place to look for the source of northern Italy's twentieth-century civic superiority.[21] Why not look to the region's sixteenth-century collapse at the hands of more robust European monarchies; at its nineteenth-century conquest of the South (see below); at its 1919–21 generation of fascism; or at its 1980s corruption-fed economic growth?[22] None of these phenomena were exactly "civic"; by what rules of evidence are they less relevant in "explaining" the northern regions' civic superiority over the South than the period 800 years ago when republican governments briefly appeared in (some of) its cities?

But let us not exaggerate the importance of Putnam's speculations on distant historical times. Ever the empiricist, when his quest reached the nineteenth century, for which regional statistical data begin to be available, he developed a statistical index of "civic involvement" for each region which reinforced his image of the two regions. He found that "the same [north-central] Italian regions that sustained cooperatives and choral societies also provided the most support for mutual aid societies and mass parties" and that "citizens in those same regions were the most eager to make use of their newly granted electoral rights" (p. 149). In the South, in contrast, "apathy and ancient vertical bonds of clientelism restrained civic involvement and inhibited voluntary, horizontally organized manifestations of social solidarity" (p. 149).

The index of civic participation that Putnam developed for 1860–1920 correlates strongly with his directly observed contemporary indices of civic capacity ($r = .93$) and with the institutional performance of the regional governments ($r = .86$). So, on top of the other achievements in his book, Putnam appears to have demonstrated a correlation and a putative causal link from the communal associations of the early medieval city-state, to the growth of civic capacity in the nineteenth century, to contemporary civic politics and institutional performance. But there are problems with these sequential historical adumbrations of civic capacity.

First, looking backward from the nineteenth century, the fact that associations appear in different periods of a society's history does not give them each a similar function in that society or even make them "horizontal." Here, Putnam makes the same analogical error across time as did his great teacher, Tocqueville, across space, when he saw American voluntary associations as the analogue to the lost world of the French estates. When we look carefully at the intermediate structures that Tocqueville saw as buffers against an overweening Old Regime, they turn out to have been far less "horizontal" and certainly less nurturing of democracy than were the town meetings and local civic associations he found in America. Putnam makes a similar assumption about associations in different periods of Italian history.

Second, looking forward, although Putnam's nineteenth-century statistical measures of civic competence are ingenious and correlate strongly with his findings about contemporary performance and civic competence, it is not clear what these measures signify. To the naked eye, all the elements in this index (mutual aid societies, cooperatives, voting turnout, and unionization) support the thesis of "civic" competence. But why are they

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systems, industrial development, the diffusion of banditism and the formation of the first mafias."

It would have been interesting to know, as Ellis Goldberg asks in his review of the book, whether Norman kingdoms established elsewhere in Europe left a similar heritage. Based on the regimes that followed the Norman conquest of England, he finds reason for skepticism. See Goldberg (1996) for this and other arguments that are not taken up in this essay.

[18] For one thing, Putnam has the merchants and bankers of these early northern communes supplanting the power of the church (1993a, 148), when recent research (for example, Bizzocchi 1987) shows that "an important dimension of the power base of the Medici in republican Florence came from . . . the church hierarchy" (Cohn 1994, 326). For another, contrary to Putnam's paean to their relative social equality, early capitalist cities such as Florence and Venice produced enormous differences in stratification (see Ventura 1964; Molho 1994). This is no more than saying that the birth period of "civic society" was at the same time the birth period of bourgeois society, with all the patterned inequalities that capitalism produced.

[19] Putnam does not ignore the "uncivic" features of the city-states (see, for example, 1993a, 129). In a personal communication to the author, he argues that, "however uncivic they were in absolute terms, they were still more civic than the Norman kingdom." By Putnam's reasoning, two things should follow. First, intraregional differences in the independent variable should correlate significantly with intraregional differences in the outcomes he predicts (see Goldberg 1996 for this line of argument). Second, consistent differences in civicness can be traced over time for all the regions. On the scant evidence presented in the book, I do not find sufficient support for either test.

[20] And not only historians: As political scientist Gianfranco Pasquino writes, it is one thing to identify the political origins of contemporary political patterns in a period eight centuries ago, but it is quite another to skim through most features of the politics of the next 500 years (Pasquino 1994, 309). For Putnam's reply, see Putnam (1994).

[21] I am grateful to Suzanne Berger for this observation, which she first made at a panel dedicated to Putnam's book at the 1994 American Political Science Association meeting.

[22] Contra Putnam on the greater corruption of the South and the clean government of the Center-North, the spectacular corruption scandals that have shaken the Italian First Republic since 1990 began and were centered in the North. On corruption in Italy, see della Porta 1992.

strongest in the areas of the Po Valley in which popular politics, both socialist and Catholic, took hold in the late nineteenth century—what today we would call "the Third Italy" (Bagnasco 1994; Trigilia 1986)? This is no accident: Both socialist and Catholic parties rooted themselves in this soil by a deliberate strategy of creating just the kind of secondary associations that make up Putnam's measures of civic capacity. And these regions happen, for the most part, to be the areas of both effective regional government and progressive politics today.

Thus, the impressive correlations that Putnam displays in chapter 5 (figures 5.3 and 5.4), which he interprets as evidence of a causal link between past civic competence and present regional performance, can also be interpreted as a correlation between progressive politics then and now and between progressive political traditions and civic capacity. In both periods, electorates were deliberately mobilized on the basis of networks of mass organizations and social and recreational associations; and in both, civic competence was deliberately developed after World War II as a symbol of the left-wing parties' governing capacity (Putnam 1993a, 149, Table 5.1; p. 119). Both progressive politics and civic capacity were correspondingly weak in the South (Tarrow 1967a: chapters 3 and 8).

To some, these may seem like methodological niceties, but they begin to indicate an alternative model: The operative cause of the performance of the regional institutions in both North and South is neither cultural nor associational but political (Pasquino 1994). Expressed in the form of a hypothesis, the historical evidence can be read as support for the idea that the nineteenth-century popular politics of north-central Italy are themselves the source of both the civic community and the positive political performance of its regional governments. But something more than party building was occurring in nineteenth-century Italy—there was also state building and the differential structuring of a public culture.

THE PERILS OF PUTNAM: STATE BUILDING, STATE STRATEGY, AND DEMOCRACY

This takes us to the causes of the civic incapacity that Putnam identifies in the South and to the causes and remedies of the lack of social capital in general. Even agreeing with his depiction of the lack of institutional performance in the Italian South, I wish to raise two sorts of questions about its causes: the role of state structures in making causal inferences about civic capacity and the relations between social capital and democracy.

States as Independent Variables

This is not the place to speculate about the manifold mediations that could have helped explain the correlations Putnam found between civic vitality and regional policy performance. But there is one alternative or complementary explanation for Putnam's findings that he never considers: the effect of the pattern of state building on indigenous civic capacity.[23] The best way to suggest this is with a datum Putnam provides but passes over very quickly: Every regime that governed southern Italy from the Norman establishment of a centralized monarchy in the twelfth century to the unified government which took over there in 1861 was foreign and governed with a logic of colonial exploitation. Indeed, as he remarks, the last two regimes in the region before it was unified with the North in 1861 followed a strategy of promoting "mutual distrust and conflict among their subjects, destroying horizontal ties of solidarity in order to maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation" (p. 136).

Nor did southern Italy's semicolonial status suddenly disappear with unification. The region was joined to the North by a process of royal conquest, its fragile commercial sector brutally merged with the North's more flourishing economy, a uniform tax system and customs union imposed on its vulnerable industries, and brigandage rooted out by a full-scale military campaign. Politically, the South's communes and provinces were governed by northern administrators who regarded the region as a *terra di missione*, and its economy was penetrated by carpetbaggers in search of new markets and raw materials.

Putnam does not neglect to describe the *trasformismo* that linked the South to national politics after unification.[24] But he says much less about how the region was actually governed: about prefects who bought elections for the government's candidates; about how they often arrested unfriendly candidates and closed down local governments which displeased them; and about the cooptation of the local elite into patron-client chains that began with the day worker standing hat in hand in the daily labor market in the village piazza and ended in the ministries in Rome (p. 124).[25] Like the merger of West and East Germany 130 years later, a stronger, richer, more legitimate regime conquered a weaker, poorer, more marginal one, inducting its residents into political life through the tools of patronage, paternalism, and the power of money—and rubbing it in by sending in commissions of experts to shake their heads over their backwardness.

Nor did the differences in state intervention in northern and southern Italy end when the "liberal" state gave way to the corporate and republican ones in the next century. Leaving fascism aside, since the end of World

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[23] Putnam does entertain a state-centric model, but the states in question emerged and disappeared many centuries ago. As David Laitin (1994) notes, this is a "big bang" interpretation of history. Putnam is right to point out, in a personal communication to the author, that his focus on early states is consistent with his path-dependent model and does not ignore state building; rather, the criticism is that—once states were formed in northern and southern Italy—there were crucial changes in state building and in state strategy that find no place in his account.

[24] Strictly speaking, since the elections of 1876, the term *trasformismo* has meant the shift of opposition deputies to support of the government in return for favors, but it has become a general catch-phrase for corruption, clientelism, and the politics of exchange.

[25] The sources on the forced economic integration and on prefectoral interference in local elections are legion. See Fried (1963); Salvemini (1955, 73–74); and Tarrow (1967a, 21–28).

War II, the Italian state has continued to intervene in the South with "extraordinary" initiatives and institutions, interacting with the local elite in ways that are far different from its interactions with north-central Italy (for example, see Trigilia 1992). Putnam gives us a great deal of information about the development of the Italian regions after 1970, but he says much less about the system of center/periphery ties into which the new institutions were inserted.

How could Robert Putnam, who knows the history of Italian unification well, have missed the penetration of southern Italian society by the northern state and the effect this had on the region's level of civic competence? The reason seems to lie in the model with which he turned to history, a model that conceived of civic capacity as a native soil in which state structures grow rather than one shaped by patterns of state building and state strategy. In a comparison between the nineteenth-century unification of Italy and the twentieth-century installation of the regions, Putnam reveals this "bottom-up" model of causation very clearly. He writes:

> The new institutions of the unified nation-state, far from homogenizing traditional patterns of politics, were themselves *pulled* ineluctably into conformity with those contrasting traditions, just as the regional governments after 1970 would be *remolded* by these same social and cultural contexts (p. 145, emphasis added).

"Pulled?" "Remolded?" Who are the agents doing this pulling and remolding? Putnam does not say, and the lack of state agency in the book is one of the major flaws of his explanatory model.

More than thirty years ago, Edward Banfield (1958) went to a village in southern Italy and found a lack of associational activity, which led him to posit a lack of civic capacity, too.[26] With far more theoretical sophistication and more systematic data, Putnam's treatment of the relations between state and civic capacity in the South resembles Banfield's logic. For him, as for Banfield, the character of the state is external to the model, suffering the results of the region's associational incapacity but with no responsibility for producing it. But as Alessandro Pizzorno (1971; 87–98) asked, in the context of a centralized state with a system of Roman law and a history of marginality, can we be satisfied interpreting civic capacity as a home-grown product in which the state has played no role? The new Italian regions were certainly installed in different soils in northern and southern Italy. But an important part of that difference was a public culture shaped by more than a century of political and administrative dependency.

Political Culture and Democracy

This takes us to my final argument with Putnam's interpretation of his findings. His key causal inference, that a history of vibrant communal government has produced present civic capacity in the North, while autocratic monarchism was the source of the South's lack of civism, is a plausible one that may apply to other countries as well. In fact, Putnam himself is leading an initiative in this direction in the United States.[27] But does this mean we should expect to find a history of communal autonomy and flowering mercantile life everywhere that we encounter contemporary civic competence? And a history of communal weakness and centralized autocracy wherever we find civic incapacity? Putnam at one point quotes Maurice Agulhon's work on sociability in the villages of southern France as a parallel to the associational capacity Putnam found in northern Italy (Putnam 1993a, 137–38; Agulhon 1982). But he is surely aware that the Provençal villagers Agulhon studied organized their *cercles* and *chambrées* in the context of a state which was militantly centralizing and intruded heavily on local life.[28] If associational capacity co-occurs with state centralization in southern France and with local communal traditions in northern Italy, then either the link between communal traditions and civic competence is problematic, or it must be much more mediated than what Putnam describes.

This leads to my final point: How does the chain of causation that Putnam posits relate to the practice of democracy—which, after all, is in the title of his book? Let us summarize Putnam's argument. At the beginning of his causal chain depicting northern Italy's civic virtues are the horizontal associations of the late-medieval city-states; this civic capacity reappears in different form in nineteenth-century mutual aid societies, cooperatives, unions, and voting behavior and, in broader form, in the civic competence of today. This in turn produces the relative success of the regional institutions in the North, the ultimate outcome of which is to make democracy work, and the weak institutional performance of the South. "Tocqueville was right," concludes Putnam: "Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society" (p. 182).

Putnam marshals a good deal of evidence that northern Italy, with greater civic competence, has higher institutional performance and that the citizens in the higher performance regions get results that they like. He regards this finding as a surrogate for democratic government. But is the causal link between the political culture of association and the practice of democracy really as straightforward as this? In the first place, Putnam's operational dependent variable is not democratic practice but policy *performance*, and performance is as likely to be positive in nondemocratic as in democratic states. There is good evidence that the administrative structures of southern and northern Italy worked as differently under fascism as they do today: Would that make fascist northern Italy more democratic than the South in Mussolini's heyday?

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[26] But see the critiques of method and conception in Pizzorno (1971) and Sabetti (1996). It would appear from Sabetti's account of the village in which Banfield worked that, even in the early 1950s, there were forms of associational capacity which are remembered even today.

[27] See Putnam (1993b, 1995) for his thinking about the weakening of social capital in the United States. But here, beginning at the other extreme of associational capacity, he sees a decline in sociability with a resulting weakening of social capital remarkably resembling what he found in southern Italy. For recent data on U.S. associational life and a skeptical view of Putnam's interpretation, see Lipset (1995, 13–14).

[28] Indeed, much of what we know about the Provençal *chambrées* comes from the secret reports of the central government's powerful prefects.

Finally, if we define democracy as effective policy performance, we run the risk of falling into an elitist definition of democracy. But if, as this reviewer is inclined to do, we follow the classics and define it as popular sovereignty and individual rights, I am afraid that history gives us little reason to expect a strong association with institutional performance. Putnam's book is good social science across space; its evidence about the historical and political-cultural sources of policy performance, although it can be challenged, is intriguing; but the book has little to say about democracy.

MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE WORK ACROSS SPACE AND TIME

If the above observations are read as counseling students to stick to their own turf and never try to marry qualitative and historical information to quantitative data, this review will have been seriously misread (Tarrow 1995, reviewing King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). On the contrary, Putnam's achievement is to have gone considerably beyond the statistical model of cross-sectional comparison with which he began and to have integrated both quantitative and qualitative historical sources with his findings on contemporary institutional performance. I want to argue a somewhat different case.

Making History Work Better

History is not a neutral reservoir of facts out of which viable generalizations are drawn. The social scientist looking for validation of research findings goes to history with a theory, or at least with a set of theoretical hunches. Putnam's hunches came from his admiration of civic competence, specified and operationalized mainly through association. From the original twenty-year time frame of the study and the expectation that explanation would come from direct inference on behavioral variables, his focus shifted to a much longer time frame in order to interpret and explain what he had observed. The key to that door became historically developed traditions of civic competence.

But how can a concept that is derived from contemporary democratic politics be transposed to other periods of history and to other political systems? In the course of his search through history, Putnam's key variable intersected with a wide variety of institutional and sociological contexts. I have pointed to the effect of the national state in the South; another was the rise of popular political traditions in the Po Valley. Social scientists ignore history at their peril; but when we go to history, we must be aware that our models affect what we look for, how we interpret it, and how we conjoin it to our own data. The strength of Putnam's achievement was to go outside the comfort of his data into the less certain terrain of narrative and quantitative history; its main weakness was in the lack of a structural perspective with which to interpret what he found there.

Extending "Social Capital" Carefully

A final note: Some of my readers have found the above arguments so persuasive that they wonder why a reviewer would give the book such extended attention. This is a mistake. Putnam's bold hypothesis about the Italian South's civic incompetence—translated into his broader theory of social capital in chapter 6 and in subsequent publications (Putnam 1993b, 1995)—goes well beyond southern Italy. It parallels both arguments made about the causes of the urban malaise in U.S. society today and the developmental problems of the Third World. According to these arguments, the source of the personal anomie and social disintegration in U.S. urban ghettos and the weakness of development in parts of the Third World is a lack of social capital. This leads to a Tocquevillian policy prescription to policy makers: Work to develop networks of social capital in the cities and cooperative arrangements among Third World small farmers.

But if this reviewer is correct, and if the absence of civic capacity is the by-product of politics, state building, and social structure, then the causes of the malaise in U.S. cities or in Third World agriculture are more likely to be found in such structural factors as the flight of real capital, in the first case, and the instability of commodity prices and the presence of exploitative governments, in the second. In north Philadelphia and the Sahel, as in southern Italy, while the indicators of malaise may be civic, the causes are structural. If my critique of Putnam in southern Italy can be extended as far as his theory, then policy makers who attack the lack of social capital by encouraging association would be attacking the symptoms and not the causes of the problem.

But the achievements of *Making Democracy Work* are as impressive as its problems. After years in which the country was regarded as a kind of Potemkin democracy, Putnam has placed Italy squarely back among the industrial democracies of the West with important lessons to teach students of comparative politics. Through an ingenious strategy of controlled paired comparison, he demonstrated how institutional reform intersects with different contextual styles of politics to produce different plants from the same seeds. He has interpreted his results in such catholic terms that students of cultural interpretation and public choice—who differ in so many ways—can find common ground in the outcome. Scholars coming from a structuralist persuasion, like this reviewer, will be less easily convinced, but even they receive satisfaction from the fact that Putnam's concept of social capital has a structural as well as a normative dimension. If the results can be criticized, it is because Putnam dared to traverse the gap between the presentism of much social science work and the less certain terrain of history and culture. *Making Democracy Work* is a milestone in the marriage of quantitative and qualitative cultural and policy research and should inspire researchers for years to come.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory

Cross-Level Inference. By Christopher H. Achen and W. Phillips Shively. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 248p. $55.00

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The secret ballot no doubt has been a boon for democracy, but it has been the bane of social science researchers who must contend with voting data aggregated by precincts, constituencies, or provinces. Even the most basic questions about voting are hard to answer with these kind of data. Was the German Social Democratic Party in the period before World War I, for example, a party of just the working class or did it also appeal to the middle class? The fact that provinces in Germany in 1912 with large middle-class populations reported a substantial vote for the Social Democratic Party suggests that the SDP was not just a working-class party, but it is only suggestive. Most provinces had more than enough workers to account fully for the SDP vote; there is no need to suppose that middle-class voters supported the SDP. Yet it seems unlikely that all workers supported the SDP. And if only half of them did, then about one-sixth of the middle class must have supported the SDP and there was significant middle-class support for the party. Aggregate data alone do not allow us to distinguish between these quite different conclusions.

With a sample survey we can of course immediately determine whether the support for a party is working or middle class by simply computing the fraction of each group that voted for the party, but with aggregate data we do not have the necessary linkage between vote and class. This is the problem of cross-level inference. At its most basic statistical level, the problem is that we know the fraction of a constituency that voted for each party (from voting data), and we know the fraction of the constituency that is in each class (usually from census data), but we do not know the interior entries in a table of vote versus class. In the example described above, the best we can do with the data alone is to develop upper and lower bounds—often too wide to be useful—on the fraction of each class that voted for each party.

Modern surveys, we might suppose, have made this problem a mere curiosity, but aggregate data are still the only recourse for political scientists and historians studying elections before the advent of modern polling, for those studying countries (often the newly democratizing countries) or regions without a polling tradition, and for those interested in voting behavior in small areas where no polls have been done. Most disconcerting for those aware of the defects of existing methods of aggregate data analysis, the American courts have increasingly relied on the results of aggregate data analysis to decide when and how to construct new *majority-minority* districts. Survey research could not and has not rescued these fields of research. Moreover, with the rise of computerized voting and census data, we now have massive collections of voting data, often down to the precinct level, that cry out for analysis, if only we knew how to conduct it.

Cross-Level Inference by two preeminent methodologists, Christopher Achen and W. Phillips Shively, does a brilliant job of demonstrating how aggregate data can mislead and what can be done about it. Achen and Shively begin by discussing the major tool—Goodman ecological regression—employed by most researchers who have data on an aggregate dependent variable, say SDP vote share in voting districts, and an aggregate independent variable, say the proportion of the working class in these districts, and who want to determine what proportion of the workers have voted for the SDP. Goodman ecological regression takes an accounting identity and turns it into a regression model. The model is simple. SDP vote share must equal the sum of two terms: the fraction of the working class in the district who voted for the SDP times the working-class share of the population in the district and the fraction of non-working class in the district who voted SDP times the proportion of the population in the district that is not working class. This accounting identity is true for each district as long as we assume that each district has its own transition rate (i.e., the fraction of the working class *in the district* who voted SDP). Because we know the fraction who voted for the SDP and the fraction of the working class (and non-working class) in each district, the only unknowns are the transition rates. With two such rates per district (one for the fraction of the working class who voted for the SDP and the other for the fraction of non-working class who voted for the SDP) and one observation of the vote share and the fraction of the working class, this model cannot yield an answer (except in rare cases where nobody votes SDP or everybody votes SDP). The solution of the *simple* Goodman model is to assume that transition rates are constant across districts. Then there are only two transition rates across all districts, and a simple approach is to regress SDP vote share on proportion of the working class. It is not hard to show that the intercept and slope terms in this regression are simply related to the two transition rates, and the ecological inference problem is solved.

This solution to the problem, however, has been a chimera. Transition rates are often estimated to be greater than zero or one hundred, and transition rates from aggregate data are often grossly different from those estimated from corresponding individual level data. Yet having nothing better to use, researchers have gone ahead and estimated Goodman ecological regressions—and, one suspects, often chosen only to present those results that make some sense. In chapter 4 of their book, Achen and Shively show us exactly what must be going wrong: "Different constituencies will exhibit different loyalty and defection [transition] rates, and it is only by quirk that these differences will fail to correlate with the aggregate independent variable." The simple Goodman model, then, first goes wrong by assuming that transition rates are constant across districts. But even a sophisticated model that assumes varying transition rates and absorbs their deviations from the average transition rates across all districts into the error term (in a *varying coefficient model*) will fail, because these deviations are usually correlated with the independent variables to produce a classic case of specification bias in which the error term is correlated with the included independent variables. Chapter 4 demonstrates exactly how Goodman ecological regressions often fail to be properly specified and how a properly specified individual-level equation may still produce biased results in an aggregate equation if the aggregation process tends to put individuals with, say, high transition rates of one type together in districts characterized by certain values of the independent variables and individuals with low transition rates of the same type in districts characterized by other values of the independent variables.

This exposition suggests that the problem of cross-level inference is the failure of proper specification, but the problem really goes much deeper:

> Cross-level inference is a problem of statistical underidentification, that is, a problem of insufficient information. Data gathered at the macrolevel do not allow us to definitely determine the process at work among the same variables at the microlevel unless—as is almost never the case—we have complete knowledge of the process of aggregation itself. As is usual in the cases of underidentification, the solution is to add additional assumptions or external information to effect closure. (pp. 3–4)

Goodman ecological regression solves this problem of underidentification by making the very strong assumption that transition rates vary randomly across districts around their true values or the even stronger assumption that transition rates are constant across districts. If this assumption fails, then the regression is misspecified and biased estimates result. Typically, we think of specification as a different problem from identification, but we should know better by now. Identification in simultaneous equations is often purchased at the cost of misspecification. More generally, Charles Manski has recently shown us in *Identification Problems in the Social Sciences* that for many problems it is better to make weaker assumptions and to suffer from an identification problem allowing us only to bound our estimates than to make stronger assumptions that produce biased point estimates. In fact, the costs are often not that great because, as Achen and Shively note, "the investigator loses the neat identification of inference from regression, but is freed from adherence to restrictive and sometimes ill-examined assumptions. Instead the investigator must create explicit assumptions to achieve reasonable results. This places the emphasis on investigative creativity and on the acquisition of contextual knowledge—squarely where the emphasis should be" (p. 216).

In chapters 5 through 8, the authors explore a number of solutions to the ecological inference problem that follow one of three strategies for bringing in additional information: (1) extending the Goodman specification to allow for transition rates that vary across districts (chapters 5 and 6), (2) deemphasizing the study of voter transition rates in favor of party identification transition rates (chapter 7), and (3) using much weaker assumptions than Goodman and developing bounds on transition rates, as in the SDP example above (chapter 8). The great strength of these chapters is that the authors show the reader exactly how the methods can be used, and they provide many useful examples. They also provide copious commentary and even some proofs on how these methods are related to the basic Goodman model, to one another, and to various assumptions. Perhaps the most exciting line of inquiry is the development of party identification models in chapter 7 that employ our theoretical understanding of voting to solve the problem of cross-level inference. This chapter, along with 5, 6, and 8, is the most important part of the book because it provides a number of easy-to-use methods for dealing with cross-level inference.

This is a wonderful book, filled with sage observations about how to think about inference. It has a strong point of view and it clears away a great deal of accumulated underbrush. It is very well written and it presents a passel of useful new methods. Partly because there is still much to be done in this area, but mostly because this is such a finely constructed book, I finished reading it with a desire to read more from these authors. In a 1983 article, "The State of Political Methodology," Chris Achen lamented that "political methodologists as a class have largely avoided theoretical thinking" and they "shop for hand-me-down techniques." This cannot be said of Achen and Shively. They have made genuine and substantial contributions to methodology that should impress social scientists of all stripes.

Economic Democracy: The Politics of Feasible Socialism. By Robin Archer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 263p. $49.95.

Peter Bachrach, *Temple University*

This book is unusual in two major respects. First, the distinction between advanced capitalism and socialism does not turn, as traditional-minded socialists argue, on who owns the means of production. Second, unlike most political analysts, who focus on the causes and cures of societal ills and then give short shrift to the problem of how to get from here to there, Archer devotes eight of his ten chapters in defense of a feasible strategy to achieve socialism.

Archer defines economic democracy as a system in which firms are governed by their workers. In other words, worker control, not a system of ownership, characterizes economic democracy. It is morally justified, he claims, as an effective means to maximize individual freedom that does not conflict with equal freedom of others (p. 12). Worker control is a principle that underscores the importance of *availability of means* to individual freedom of choice and action.

The transformation in decision-making in the workplace, albeit gradually, from owners to workers is grounded, Archer argues, on a fundamental democratic principle that "all those, and only those, who are subject to the authority of an association should exercise direct decision-making control over that association" (p. 9). It follows that workers who are subject to the rules of the firm should be the exclusive decision makers for the firm. Conversely, owners should be stripped completely of their decision-making power in the firm since they are not directly affected by its authority. However, since their interests are indirectly affected—as are the interests of consumers and suppliers of the firm—they should be able to exercise their power of exit. Owners can do so by selling their stock in the firm.

The application of Hirschman's concept of exit in this context is an ingenious way of protecting private investors in a socialist system. (It is socialist since it is an economic democracy.) Thus, their right to exit may be exercised as a veto power over worker decision makers. In effect, sustaining the traditional function of private capital in a free market system—even if socialist—is bound to maintain the profit motive, even though workers are the decision makers of the firm. It would be doubtful, for example, if workers as decision makers would want to invite the wrath of investors by forgoing substantial profits in order to reduce the workweek to 25 hours or by extending their vacations to three months. Especially within the context of a global economy, it is extremely unlikely that any group of corporate decision makers—workers or owners—would depart from a strategy of profit maximization.

Although Archer's conception of *socialism* would be fundamentally constrained by capital's values and institutions, it does not diminish the importance of the case for economic democracy under advanced capitalism. For even under the constraints of capitalism, workers, as the firm's decision makers, could humanize the workplace and increase productivity, among other things. More important, their empowerment as decision makers would enhance their self-esteem and dignity. It would serve as a valuable educational experience toward their acquiring political interest and voice. This of course presupposes that economic democracy under capitalism (or Archer's *socialism*) is politically feasible.

Archer claims that it is. To be more exact, he holds that by gradual incremental reform trade-offs, initiated by a centralized labor movement and supported by a pro-labor government, economic democracy is feasible in a corporatist industrial relations system (p. 107). (His focus is western Europe and Australia.) In considerable detail, he shows that these trade-offs have been successful in combating stagflation and, in a later period, have generated a more flexible and high-wage economy.

Archer fully recognizes the seamy side of corporatism, that it has the potential to foster class collabration, union oligarchy, and other dangers to democracy. But he believes these risks can be controlled and, in any event, are overbalanced by the crucial role of corporatism in the growth toward economic democracy. Primarily, it performs this function by providing labor a structure by which it can combine its industrial power with the political power of government. By providing a centralized bargaining arena, corporatism also enables labor to use its bargaining power to achieve goals over which it does not have direct leverage. In effect, it serves as an essential framework in the promotion and implementation of a series of trade-offs in which labor agrees to help generate profits in exchange for an increased share in decision making (p. 231).

Archer limits the question of feasibility by assuming that the labor movement wants to achieve economic democracy. If it wants to achieve this goal, he argues, it can do so (p. 65). His claim is based on the proposition that workers who have demonstrated their ability to gain partial control of the lower level of a firm's hiarachy will be able to "accumulate greater and greater control until they finally achieve full economic democracy" (p. 133). He concedes that to attain this goal may take 50 or 100 years.

Archer's *corporatist trade-off strategy* is flawed, however, since it does not recognize that the final incremental trade-off—the one that transfers complete decision-making authority from owners to workers—is a major, if not a revolutionary, change, hardly compatible with other incremental trade-offs that preceded it. Again, he overlooks the impact of the global economy on corporate decision making. Given the increasing global mobility of capital, it is extremely doubtful that in the foreseeable future a proposed trade-off of this nature would see the light of day, much less prevail.

It is true that in 1976 the powerful and centralized trade union movements in Germany and Sweden were successful, in alliance with pro-labor governments, in enactmenting a co-determination system, a system that empowered workers with a participatory share, although unequal, in decision making on all levels of a firm. Subsequently, both labor movements failed to gain parity, much less dominance, in corporate decision making. Today they remain subordinate partners.

Archer's feasibility strategy is an imaginative and tightly reasoned position. With a future decline of capitalist domination in the world economy, it is likely that his position will gain influence among proponents of economic democracy.

Households: On the Moral Architecture of the Economy. By William James Booth. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993. 305 p. $34.50.

Scott Meikle, *University of Glasgow*

Booth aims to get to the heart of the debate between "the household and market models" of society (p. 3), which, under the more familiar billing of *socialism* and *capitalism*, have dominated the politics of the twentieth century. The heart of this debate should be pretty clear by now, you might think, so that the book must either be very ambitious or not ambitious enough. But the confusions sown by the Soviet's apologetic use of Marx make it still a worthwhile task, and Booth does a good job in introducing what is most important in Marx while staying clear of the early-Edwardian interpretation the Soviets built on, according to which Marx offers above all a general theory of institutional change. The household model is represented by Aristotle and Marx (parts 1 and 3), a conjunction suggested to him by Nussbaum, and the liberal contractarian one by Locke (Part 2). The liberal and Aristotelian-Marxist traditions are probed and contrasted interestingly and ingeniously in well-researched considerations chiefly of the secondary literatures, and the result makes a serious contribution to the growing genre on Marx's debt to Aristotle.

The main idea, taken initially from Aristotle, standard to sympathizers of Marx and anathema to sympathizers of economics, is that human productive activity can serve noneconomic ends that embody a conception of human good drawn up independently of economics and has done so for most of history. Booth conveys imaginatively how strange an episode in our history the last three hundred years of market economy have been, in somehow suppressing our capacities to choose the ends we pursue cooperatively and to deploy social wealth toward such ends. But he does not connect this clearly enough with the advent of economics, which one might have expected to be at the forefront of his considerations. Booth gives surprisingly little attention to defining *economics*, taking it too much at its own valuation as a universal science, which has been done in all periods of history, rather than as a peculiarly modern science of market economy. This creates avoidable problems for him and it has ramifications throughout the book.

Following Hasebroek and Weber, Finley, the crucial author in considering Aristotle on matters that today would be called *economic*, established a powerful case that antiquity had nothing like what we mean by an economy, that ancient statesmen did nothing like *economic policy*, and ancient thinkers did only *ethikê* and *politikê* and nothing that could be called *economic analysis*. Booth neglects this case almost entirely, and holds that although the ancients had no market economy, they nonetheless managed to engage in "economic thought" and "economic policy," even though he seems to be aware that the phenomena those things deal with were unknown to them. He tries to hold things together by suggesting that they did a funny sort of economics, "normative political economy" (pp. 61, 76, 147), but this is unconvincing. This failure to consider sufficiently the nature of economics and its relation to ethics leads him into some of the familiar modernist confusions about ancient *economic activity*, weakens his accounts of Aristotle and Marx, and saps the main conclusions of the book. The problem comes home to roost in the claims both that Marx did *economics* in Aristotle's way and that he did it in "the modern theoretical discourse" of economics. Booth does little to ease this tension, and he hedges on the underlying problem of how far Marx is to be counted an author of modernity at all.

The history of the USSR, he claims, suggests that Marx's desiderata of freedom and nonmarket economies cannot be jointly met and that critics of markets must be content with regulation of market excesses. How permanent a solution this can be he does not say, nor does he consider the history of Keynesian regulation, what led to it, and the deregulation that followed it. Our best hope for the future is to make economics more ethical, as Aristotle's *economics* supposedly was, and market economy better geared to attaining human requirements instead of frustrating them.

But Aristotle had argued that use-value and exchange-value are metaphysically distinct as quality and quantity (in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5, which Booth does not consider in any detail), and that the pursuit of one is incompatible with the pursuit of the other (which Booth largely ignores in his account of *Politics* 1). Marx founded his theory of market economy on this analysis, which he took directly from Aristotle, arguing that market economy of its nature pursues exchange-value primarily and that this is the reason for all its failures in respect of use-value. These are ends that can be combined to a limited degree, but not sufficiently for human flourishing, so that we have to choose between them. Aristotle and Marx could have been wrong, of course, but this is what they said. In preparing the ground for his view that the two pursuits can be made compatible, Booth does not argue that they were wrong or that they did not say this at all; he simply does not consider the case. Aristotle and Marx based their accounts on the analysis of *wealth*, showing it to be ambiguous between use-value and exchange-value or money. Booth does not go into this either and instead distinguishes the two pursuits by resorting to an unilluminating spatial metaphor: the two types of economy have different *locations* in society.

If economics had been around in the fourth century B.C., Aristotle would have thought it incompatible with ethics, as Marx did. Economics is nonethical, and that is how economists like it. The tendency in this century has been toward conceiving it as a science every bit as independent of ethics as physics is. When Robbins suggested this in 1932 few economists were bold enough to follow him, but now most do. This is not only hard-headed posturing, but a recognition that the end of market economy is exchange-value, with use-value serving merely as a means. Economics did not become the nonethical science of exchange-value by accident; it simply became clearer about itself, and ethical recommendations to reverse this are unlikely to get far.

Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History. By Alex Callinicos. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995. 252p. $45.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Joshua Foa Dienstag, *University of Virginia*

The last fifteen years have seen a revival of interest in the topic of narrative across many disciplines in both the social sciences and the humanities. While in many ways this interest has the appearance of a unified movement, in fact the different fields have had rather varied attitudes toward narrative. While some historians (e.g., Simon Schama) have taken to defending narrative as the most appropriate form of writing for their studies, other literary and political theorists (e.g., Hayden White and Jean-François Lyotard) have taken to criticizing narrative expression itself as implicitly bound up with power and authority. At the same time, philosophers have hotly debated the proposition advanced by, e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre and Martin Heidegger that narrative plays a crucial role in human life in general.

While the title of this book overstates its scope, its author is nonetheless well aware of these debates. Callinicos's main purpose here is a defense of the feasibility and value of Marxist historiography. In this sense, it is a continuation of his previous efforts in *Making History* (1988), *Against Postmodernism* (1989), and *The Revenge of History* (1991). But the opponents he identifies here are not merely other historians and social theorists. Recognizing the wide-ranging character of his project, he attempts to address the broader literature on narrative itself, particularly the critiques of it by postmodernists. At the same time, Callinicos aims to lay out a Marxist approach to the past that is both philosophically rigorous and yet revolutionary.

To this end, he develops a distinction first made by G. A. Cohen between *philosophies of history* and *theories of history*, where the latter (which he defends) forswear the search for "the meaning of the historical process" and "rely on straightforward causal and intentional explanations" while sharing with the former (which he does not defend) a desire to apply these explanations to the human past as a whole (pp. 41–42). While admitting the "theory-ladenness of facts," Callinicos argues that Lakatos's idea of a scientific research program surmounts the difficulty this poses in analysis without invalidating the correspondence theory of truth or the doctrine of *realism* (pp. 78–80). In Callinicos's judgment, "Almost all that is interesting and controversial in historical materialism is capable of being stated in a philosophically defensible form that is open to empirical corroboration" (p. 165). The book is aimed not so much at providing that corroboration as to establishing the legitimacy of the task itself. (In this sense, the book might be compared with Jon Elster's *Making Sense of Marx*, though Callinicos does not share Elster's insistence on methodological individualism.) While these pages seem to me to achieve their purpose, it is not clear who would dispute the claim that Marxism is *capable* of being framed as a set of testable hypotheses. Callinicos has also covered this ground before, and much more systematically, in *Making History*. It is, nonetheless, provocative to see this conservative defense of social science methodology paired with the judgments that Lenin's approach to imperialism "seems basically sound" (p. 135) and that Trotsky was a great historian (p. 210).

A great deal of the text, however, is taken up with a critique of those whom Callinicos considers the principal opponents of this view: postmodernists such as Hayden White, "Weberian" theorists of history (e.g., Ernest Gellner and Anthony Giddens), and Francis Fukuyama. The problem with the first group is that they question all attempts to impose a single grand narrative on history, while the latter two suggest that history has a very different narrative from the one proposed by Marxism. In Callinicos's view, however, they all have something else in common: they have all been decisively influenced by Nietzsche, who lurks here like an intellectual bogeyman, repeatedly invoked as a danger but never directly engaged.

In these sections, it seems to me, the book is less successful. The connections to Nietzsche are more asserted than established; the link to the Weberian historians seems especially thin. Even in the cases where the charge sticks better, however, it is weakened by Callinicos's declining to deal with the man identified as the principal culprit. Rather than being examined, Nietzsche's influence is simply assumed to be pernicious.

The irony is that here Callinicos sounds less like a radical Marxist and much more like a traditional moralist. Rather than confront White's skepticism epistemologically (which would be difficult since Callinicos concedes that history "is theory all the way down" [p. 76]), he denounces it as "simply outrageous" in the light of such unquestionable historical horrors as the Holocaust (p. 66). White's skepticism, it is argued, leaves him powerless in the face of those who would redescribe the Third Reich in less odious terms (p. 72). This familiar *reductio ad nazium* will, I imagine, not be very convincing either to friends or enemies of postmodernism. Not only does a moral response to an epistemological claim seem inapposite, but the implied position that adherence to *realism* will somehow block morally dubious judgments appears terribly unlikely. Callinicos himself provides fresh evidence for this. While he is not exactly an apologist for Soviet communism, his insistence on seeing Marxism as a world-historical movement, both theoretically and practically, leads him to some questionable conclusions. Anyone who can bring himself to criticize another Marxist historian on the grounds that his analysis "seems to me greatly to exaggerate the role played by coercion in the Stalinist economy" (p. 136) may leave his readers reluctant to trust his leaps to moral judgment in other areas.

Generally, I fear, Callinicos has a tin ear for the postmodernist position. This is confirmed toward the end of the book when he takes up the charge that Marxism is Eurocentric. His grounds for rejecting this are that Marxism is an inheritor of the Greek notion of *theoria*(!) and that this notion *also* influenced Islamic culture (pp. 183–84). Though I personally find charges of Eurocentrism a little silly, in this case Callinicos seems to be making his opponents' points for him.

Ultimately, for Callinicos, it is the success of modern science in creating powerful technologies that defeats all theoretical alternatives to *scientific realism* (p. 186). The book adds little, however, to Lakatos's or Charles Taylor's defenses of such positions; it merely repeats them. For those who find such arguments convincing, the book will probably succeed in its claim that this position does not a priori rule out all forms of Marxism. For those who do not, it will form another volume in an ever-growing series in which the old left admonishes the new with ever-increasing stridency.

The New Ecological Order. By Luc Ferry. Translated by Carol Volk. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 188p. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Joseph R. DesJardins, *College of St. Benedict*

Two major shifts characterize much recent philosophical thinking about nature. The first involves a shift from an anthropocentric to a nonanthropocentric ethics. The former view holds that only humans have moral standing and that, while we may have duties *regarding* natural objects, we have no direct duties to natural objects. The latter view does attribute moral standing to nonhumans and concludes that humans can have direct moral responsibilities to natural objects.

The second shift involves a move from individualism to holism. Inspired by ecology, this shift includes metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical components. For example, a typical holist might claim that ecosystems are ontologically prior to the individual plants and animals that comprise them (metaphysics); that we cannot fully understand individual plants and animals until we have understood their relationships to other members of their ecosystem (epistemology); and that ecosystems deserve moral consideration (ethics).

The public policy implications of these shifts can be enormous. Luc Ferry's *The New Ecological Order* is a warning against the antihuman and antidemocratic implications of these changes. Ferry, professor of political philosophy at the Sorbonne, is an unapologetic anthropocentric individualist. He sees these shifts, identified throughout this book with "deep ecology," as posing real threats to democratic freedoms. The "radical antimodernism" that Ferry finds in deep ecology "leads to a fascination with authoritarian political models" (p. 130). Ferry judges the holism of deep ecology as too reminiscent of fascism, its critique of consumerist materialism too nostalgic for communism. Thus, this book sets out to demonstrate both the errors of deep ecology and the policy alternatives that "democratic ecology" has to offer.

Ferry's own democratic humanism has its roots in Rousseau and Kant. As Ferry reads these philosophers, freedom is the criterion that separates humans from animals and other natural objects, the criterion "that defines dignity and makes the human being alone a legal subject" (p. 32). This freedom is "understood as the ability to break away from the animal in us . . . [and] is, as Rousseau believed, the cultural faculty par excellence" (p. 17). Thus, humans, and humans alone, have rights (Ferry seems to refer to legal rights and moral rights interchangeably). Furthermore, since freedom characterizes only individual humans, holism is both philosophically erroneous and politically dangerous.

Ferry's alternative is admittedly reformist rather than revolutionary, and pragmatic rather than ideological. Here he aligns himself with the "average" ecological sensibility of the "man on the street," which is derived from an "ethics of authenticity, from a concern for the self" and from a concern for a certain "quality of life." (p. xxi). To that end, ecological concerns must be integrated within a democratic framework. Unfortunately, Ferry does not break away from his critique long enough to say much more about this alternative. Ultimately, we are told little more than it is "neither Cartesian nor utilitarian anthropocentrism nor deep ecology" (p. 130).

The language of "deep" and "shallow" ecology is traced to a 1973 essay by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. Naess contrasts the "shallow" environmental concerns of pollution, recycling, and resource depletion with a "deeper" ecological perspective that looks to the underlying causes of environmental woes. Only by undergoing radical transformations in personal, economic, social, and ideological structures can we hope to address these deeper causes of environmental problems.

No doubt one can find misanthropic and antidemocratic tendencies among some deep ecologists. This is particularly true of its more radical activist followers such as Earth First! and other defenders of so-called ecosabotage or ecoterrorism. So perhaps it would be useful to have a well-reasoned, moderate, humanistic, and democratic voice raised in opposition to these views. Unfortunately, Ferry's book is not the one. Instead, the book is full of rhetorical excesses and unfair (and, I think, deliberate) misrepresentations.

First, even in Europe, where the Greens (at least in Germany) are a viable political force, deep ecology represents little more than a small minority view. Its more misanthropic versions are smaller still. Its radical tendencies have already been harshly challenged by conservatives, moderates, and leftists (one thinks of Murray Bookchin's social ecology here) alike. But Ferry's book is much more alarmist, warning that the legitimate "ecological sensibilities" prevalent today in all industrial societies are "being claimed by the extremist tendencies of deep ecology" (p. 143). Thus, our risk is that ecology will become (in the words—presumably of the publisher—of the book's cover) "the object of our contemporary passions, in the same way that Fascism was in the '30s, or Communism under Stalin."

Ferry can make such claims plausible only by making the boundaries of deep ecology far broader than in ordinary usage. Virtually everyone who rejects a narrow anthropocentrism, from Peter Singer to Aldo Leopold to Greenpeace are labeled "deep ecologists." Worse, they are all painted with the same broad brush, equally likely to lead us to the dangers of granting animals "equal, even superior, rights to those granted human beings" (p. 129). No matter that not a single author among Ferry's targets—Singer, Christopher Stone, Tom Regan, Aldo Leopold, Mary Midgley, Baird Callicott—ever claim that animals, plants, or ecosystems have equal or superior rights to humans. They are all part of the "new fundamentalism," all "zealots" for a point of view in which man is the "least sympathetic" member of nature.

Ferry's misrepresentation is suspect since on more than one occasion he acknowledges differences among the people he examines and qualifications within their views. Most of the thinkers he considers thus do not subscribe to the radical views he critiques. Nevertheless, only these more mainstream thinkers are considered in depth, and he never hesitates to connect them (if only rhetorically) to more dangerous, typically unnamed, radicals.

The rhetorical excesses are too many to mention. That chapters on Leopold's land ethic and on ecofeminism envelop a chapter on Nazi ecology should tell us a lot. Ecofeminism is "omnipresent in [American] universities, where it strongly contributes to the reign of intellectual terror exercised in the name of political correctness" (p. 118). Throughout, the language is often belligerent and insulting. If deep ecologists are not always "Nazis" or "Stalinists," they are always "fundamentalists," "zealots," and "dangerous."

This book does not contribute much to the scholarly debate. People who already know this literature will find in it an overstated and inaccurate portrait of the contemporary scene. It is more likely to find a readership among the skeptics who will find their most extreme prejudices confirmed.

The Greening of Protestant Thought. By Robert Booth Fowler. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 242p. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

John F. Haught, *Georgetown University*

The relationship between Christianity and the environmental movement is one of the most curious cultural developments to have occurred during the last quarter century. It is also one of the most important, since what is at stake in this sometimes tempestuous but increasingly amicable affair is nothing less than the survival of the planet. And since the ecological crisis promises to be a dominant public issue during the next hundred years, the past two and a half decades of exchange between Christians and environmentalists may eventually be seen as a major transitional epoch in the history of Christianity and perhaps the planet as well. Surveys such as the one undertaken in this book will provide helpful information to future scholars who may wish to learn about the often-confusing early days of the greening of religion now occurring in many regions of the globe.

Robert Booth Fowler, who has previously published extensively in the area of religion and politics, provides here a lively, if at times somewhat ragged, chronicle of the transformations now taking place in many branches of Protestantism as a result of the latter's encounter with recently emergent ecological sensitivity. While Fowler thinks that Protestants need to become much more philosophically rigorous and politically expert in their association with environmentalists, he is quite tolerant of the ferment and confusion that now accompanies the greening of Protestant thought and life. He has no strong argument to make, being content mainly to describe the wide variety of Protestant approaches to environmentalism. He does believe, however, that Protestant Christianity, even with all the internal disputes among fundamentalists, evangelicals, and liberals over the meaning and value of nature, can make a serious contribution to our common human striving for ecological responsibility. Even though environmental Protestantism is often "derivative and analytically soft," it conveys a promise and hope that is sorely lacking in its secular counterpart.

Generally speaking, the book is an informative primer, and the hopeful spirit that pervades it will prove inspirational to many readers. The author has dipped into an enormously wide range of writings on Christian faith and ecology. The breadth of his scholarship is impressive, and the bibliography he provides is voluminous.

Unfortunately, however, the book is blemished by a number of inaccuracies and caricatures of theological positions. Though Fowler may have expertise in the area of religion and politics, he is much less skilled in presenting the nuances of theology. A major point of confusion is the arbitrary labeling as "Protestant" of several very influential religious ecologists who are quite distinctively Roman Catholic. Although it may be the case that Thomas Berry, a Passionist priest, and Matthew Fox, a former Dominican, have had some influence on Protestant environmentalists, they would be surprised at how facilely Fowler has assimilated them into the Protestant communion. Such conflation, however, is only symptomatic of a much deeper limitation in Fowler's presentation. He writes about the greening of Protestant thought almost as though it has made no significant contact with Catholic environmental theology. For example, he treats the Protestant flirtation with *creation-centered theology* (which he carelessly misnames "creation theology") without even mentioning the obviously Roman Catholic roots of this controversial theological vision. Uninitiated readers are given the false impression that creation-centered ecological theology is an indigenously Protestant development. In fact, creation-centered theology and ecological spirituality emerged from a tradition that highlights the intrinsic goodness and *sacramental* character of nature much more explicitly than Protestantism has done. Fowler does not seem to have noticed the deep irony of associating some of the most Catholic and sacramental ecological thought of our time with "Protestant" environmentalism. In view of the actual cross-fertilization involving a wide variety of current Christian ecological theologies, the book's attempt to focus so exclusively on Protestant environmentalism appears rather contrived.

An abundance of lesser but still annoying defects also tarnish Fowler's otherwise resourceful treatment. When referring to the accusation by environmentalists that too much focus on humans drains value from the rest of nature, he uses the term "anthropomorphic" when he means "anthropocentric." And on a more serious note, he curiously insists that creation-centered theology is antiscience, even though its major proponent, Thomas Berry, has teamed up with physicist Brian Swimme to write *The Universe Story*, and contemporary astrophysics has thoroughly infiltrated much ecological writings about creation today.

In addition, the summaries of Teilhard de Chardin and *process theology* are disappointingly inexact. Fowler acknowledges the ecological promise in Alfred North Whitehead's organismic philosophy of nature, but he uncritically embraces shallow conservative Christian judgments about process thought. No matter how defective process thought may be, it does not help to suggest, for example, that the pan-en-theistic ideas of Charles Hartshorne (who incidentally is not a "theologian") are a form of pantheism, when in fact he and other process philosophers consistently and emphatically reject any Spinozist idea that God and the world are the same.

Furthermore, it is erroneous to say that process thought ignores evil. For in *Adventures of Ideas* and other works Whitehead considerably expands our understanding of evil, which he insists, is a term applicable not only to instances of discord or chaos, but also to unnecessary triviality. In a processive universe that has reached the human phase of its evolution, our clinging to listless order and superficial harmony (especially in political and religious life), when it is relevant to move toward richer and more adventurous syntheses, may also be called "evil," the evil of monotony. We need redemption from the latter, Whitehead argues, as much as from the former.

In spite of many such imperfections, however, Fowler's book deserves to be read. It is especially insightful in addressing the problem of how to translate environmental Christianity into effective action where it can make a real difference to the planet and its future. Unless such translation occurs, there is little point in any ecological reflection, religious or otherwise.

Political Style: The Artistry of Power. By Robert Hariman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 281p. $42.50 cloth, $14.95 paper.

John S. Nelson, *University of Iowa*

Studies of politics are ripe for renewed appreciations of style. From diplomacy to everyday life, different politics cohere as embodied styles of action more pervasively than they form abstracted ideologies or institutionalized rules. Recent turns to identity politics augment our reasons for attunement to style. As Robert Frost put it in times less politically correct, "The style is the man." Does any academician doubt that college administrators are prized or deplored centrally for their styles? The candidates who attract votes more by their characters than their issue positions know that voters are judging their styles of conduct more than their pronouncements of conviction. "Style is the physiognomy of the mind," instructed Schopenhauer, "and a safer index to character than the face." That is why Oscar Wilde once had a character observe, "In matters of grave importance, style, not sincerity, is the vital thing." Thus we may even define *politics* as "styles-in-action."

Robert Hariman's superb study of *Political Style* as *The Artistry of Power* helps us to appreciate the power of style in politics. Hariman treats political style as "a set of rules for speech and conduct guiding the alignment of signs and situations, or texts and acts, or behavior and place" (p. 187). Focusing on four, he explains how political styles work "through a repertoire of rhetorical conventions" to evoke "aesthetic reactions" that inform "practices of communication and display" (p. 187). Hariman catches his four styles in the act of "determining individual identity, providing social cohesion, and distributing power" (p. 187).

In a manner reminiscent of Roland Barthes, Hariman attends to the political semiotics of gestures both physical and verbal. If anything, however, his readings are more astute and sustained in their theoretical significance. First, Hariman traces the telling details of realist style in the invention of modernity by Niccolo Machiavelli, who paved the way for later scientists and practitioners of politics to dismiss style as empty and distracting in contrast to forceful deeds, material interests, and rational decisions. He shows how Machiavelli's words make paradoxes for themselves at every turn, even as they create the "abstracted world and sovereign self that have become key categories of modern" life (p. 40). Especially revealing is Hariman's demonstration of how realists beat the romantics by centuries to the politics that make individual originality the one true source of communal authority.

Next Hariman analyzes the courtly politics of high decorum. He begins with the style of Haile Selassie as seen by Ryszard Kapuscinski, the Polish journalist. The figures of courtly politics are hierarchy, bodily display and partition, the displacement of speech by gesture and silence, along with the aestheticizing of selves and morals. From the pee lackey to the cult of laughter, Hariman explores the operation of these tropes in imperial regimes with an insight that helps readers see their working on many other levels of politics. The book's best moments are these surging cascades of sparkling connections. Want to understand the spectacular politics of mass media? Recognize how Madonna and Oprah feminize the courtly style to command the concert hall and the cable. Then take Hariman's quick tour of the politics in televised advertising that persuades through bodily displays of men and especially women. And culminate this introduction to courtly style by following his account of how televisual politics in Ronald Reagan's time made "the disposition of the president's body . . . stand for executive action" (p. 92). Hariman's arguments offer great fun, as well as wonderful information.

The third focus is republican style as epitomized by Cicero. Here Hariman makes another move at once clever and indispensable. He plumbs the stylistic politics, not of the overtly public works of political and rhetorical theory composed by Cicero, but rather of the more private and personal letters that Cicero wrote to reflect on his public life. At a time when political theorists are recovering the republican-rhetorical tradition, this chapter is must reading for many of us. It explores how public and private inform each other in the incessant republican concern with character and decorum. It also hints at why recuperations of style and republicanism are apt to go hand in skin. Hariman shows how the old republican proclivity for appeals to consensus and human nature promote politics of alliances, elites, and public relations that work awkwardly in relationship to ideals of liberal democracy. Again ending with our mass-mediated conditions, he considers the implications of how "reporting on public officials has become the job of tarnishing reputations, usually by pointing to the inconsistency between public authority and personal conduct" (p. 138). Though Hariman's own arguments seem mostly republican, they make the outlook for republican politics seem bleak—somewhat after the fashion of Hannah Arendt, although on very different levels.

Also like Arendt, Hariman invokes Franz Kafka in coming to terms with bureaucracies as too important in current politics. Where Arendt featured the organizational dynamics of bureaucracy, however, Hariman emphasizes the bureaucratic style of "following correct (written) form" (p. 165) and learning "how to read between the lines" by distinguishing official from unofficial meanings, literal from interpretive senses, and text from context (pp. 166–67). More like Derrida than Arendt, Hariman has bureaucracies work by assimilation and supplementation. To resist their Weberian logic, he recommends playful politics that democratizes wherever possible. This is the main argument that leaves me unpersuaded, perhaps because I suspect that Hariman's own appreciation of bureaucratic style tends to disperse Weber's iron cage of rationalization. Or maybe it is because Hariman's prose style seldom enacts the play that he commends.

Hariman knows that these are not the only four styles significant for our politics. Yet his selection of targets is so telling that it is easy to forget he is not covering the waterfront so much as provoking a sorely needed attention to aesthetics in politics. Hariman's stylistic concept of "the composition of power" offers a decisive advance over the perplexities that trouble discourses of power from Hobbes to Foucault. Appreciating its aesthetics enables Hariman to sidestep the perplexities that arise from configuring power only as mechanical leverage or mainly as conceptual knowledge. Hence Hariman speaks persuasively to issues now at the forefront of political analysis and rhetorical theory: How do we form judgments, and how do they inform actions? With compelling examples, Hariman updates the ancient tradition of rhetorical analysis to make invaluable contributions for politics in our electronic times.

Political Style is a delight to read. It dances with insights into the symbols and gestures that help political styles work (when they do) or fall into confusion and failure (as happens on occasion). This is an extraordinary work of political scholarship and well worth reading!

Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory. By Susan J. Hekman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 188p. $40.00 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Sara Weir, *Western Washington University*

Susan J. Hekman begins *Moral Voices, Moral Selves* with the background of the book's subtitle, "Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory." She details the story of the 1982 publication of *In a Different Voice*, psychologist Carol Gilligan's critique of the influential approach of moral development theorist Lawrence Kolberg, a book that is now acknowledged as one of the most controversial and important of the 1980s. The "different voice" in Gilligan's title represented a "relational self" formed "through relational patterns with others, particularly in early childhood" (Hekman, p. 6). Most often expressed by women and girls, this relational, contextual conception of morality is, according to Gilligan, different from (but equal to) the traditional, modernist conception of morality; one based on rights and an autonomous self.

Hekman gives *In a Different Voice* and Gilligan's later works her undivided attention in this volume—her detailed interpretation of these works serves as a vehicle for her readers to navigate the rough terrain of new thinking about morals and ethics. The journey Hekman proposes with this book is by no means straightforward, but it is masterfully argued and carefully presented at each stage. It is the deliberate care with which Hekman presents her work that sets *Moral Voices, Moral Selves* apart from other contemporary postmodern works. Hekman argues that a "paradigm shift" is occurring in "theories of subjectivity" (p. 109) and her work details this shift away from modernist moral theory—it examines, critiques, and borrows from conceptions of the relational self, the postmodern subject, feminist theories of subjectivity, and theories of race and ethnicity to offer an alternative vision of subjectivity and morality.

Hekman outlines two separate readings of Gilligan's work. The first reading—drawn primarily from Gilligan's early work—is innovative, but not what one would term a radical departure from her modernist roots. The second reading, however, is (according to Hekman) much more radical—it moves beyond the relational self or different voice in order to make room for multiple voices. Hekman spends substantial time developing and grounding this alternative interpretation of Gilligan's work, and it is in this second, more radical interpretation of Gilligan that Hekman issues a powerful challenge to modernist conceptions of morality, using this second reading of Gilligan to deconstruct the "epistemological foundations of the tradition itself" (p. 13).

Moral Voices, Moral Selves is, however, infinitely more complex than a simple rereading of Gilligan. Hekman ultimately advances her own approach, which she calls a "discursive reconstruction of morality" (p. 159). This approach is both contextual and local, acknowledging many voices. It is "neither relational, feminist, postmodern, nor a product of theories of race and ethnicity, yet it borrows from each of these discourses" (p. 109).

In the book's final chapter ("Back to the Rough Ground: Theorizing the Moral Subject"), Hekman anticipates any number of challenges to the alternative approach she has put forward. Her discussion of "moral language games" (drawn primarily from Wittgenstein's later philosophy), while a necessary response to potential critics, is difficult to interpret. This difficulty is in part because the body of literature is both complex and abstract, and it emerges late in the book with less grounding and development than the other literature described in previous chapters.

In *Moral Voices, Moral Selves*, Hekman argues that a paradigm shift is taking place—the concept of a morality that acknowledges multiple voices is not new, but there are several elements in the arguments presented in her work that help set this book apart from other books with similar aims.

First, Hekman's rereading of Gilligan's work is unique. She is careful with the material, employing extensive textual analysis of the complete body of Gilligan's writings. She engages Gilligan in a dialogue and uses her thinking to model and shape her analysis. Some readers will accept her radical reading of Gilligan's work; others will not. But she gives each reader a basis for making an independent judgment—this has the effect of involving the reader in the ongoing discussion about changing understandings of moral theory and about Gilligan's place in these changes.

Second, the relevant literature reviews Hekman has included in the book are thoroughly prepared and quite valuable in their own right—in order to draw from the various bodies of literature that provide a grounding for the discursive subject, Hekman meticulously reviews the primary works in each field. She draws upon some lesser-known works, finding unique qualities in method or content, and uses these works as further grounding for her alternative position.

Lastly, Hekman anticipates the challenges and hard questions that her reading of Gilligan and the discursive subject she theorizes will face—her responses to these concerns will not satisfy all critics, but she seems to invite and perhaps even welcome debate.

The book's conclusion focuses on the implications of the discursive self for feminist theory—Hekman's most important contribution to the continuing debate about moral theory is the development of a discursive subjectivity that is not absolutist but is also not relativist. She argues that "just as there are multiple voices, so there are multiple moralities" (p. 160). Here is not an argument for the absence of ethics and standards, but rather a call for judgments that are contextual and local. With the publication of *Moral Voices, Moral Selves*, Hekman makes a strong case for this position and may in fact elevate the debate about moral subjectivity to a new level.

Conceptual Foundations for Multidisciplinary Thinking. By Stephen Jay Kline. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 337p. $45.

Courtney Brown, *Emory University*

Stephen Jay Kline undertakes an ambitious task with his book *Conceptual Foundations for Multidisciplinary Thinking*. His goal is to offer a schema, a philosophical template, within which the next generation of thinkers—all thinkers—can find an intellectual connectedness. This is the idea behind his focus on "multidisciplinary thinking." Thinkers in all disciplines, in his view, will need to decompartmentalize their way of thinking and face the new intellectual horizons with a more catholic, wide-angle perspective.

At its core, Kline's argument rests on the understanding that nearly all phenomena affecting humans involve numerous inputs, outputs, and feedback channels that together constitute variously complicated systems. He views single disciplines as having too narrow a perspective regarding many phenomena. The cause of this narrowness is not intellectual incompetence; rather, it results from the evolution of intellectualism characteristic of disciplines. Kline outlines a general model of this evolution and, in a sense, posits an explanatory theory of the historical development of human thought. The idea of systems is crucial here, because disciplines develop their own view of the components and processes associated with phenomena of interest to them. These views are incomplete system overviews that lead to what Kline calls "truth assertions." Truth assertions are statements or conclusions about phenomena that are based on these incomplete views, and a circular catch-22 situation develops in all disciplines in which modifications of the incomplete views are made based on previously declared truth assertions, which leads to new truth assertions, and so on.

While Kline does not make the connection, his analysis finds considerable correspondence with the language games described by Wittgenstein. These games are incomplete representations of systems of things (read in this, inputs, outputs, and feedback channels), and the systems have an internal logic that is not entirely understandable from outside the system. Truth assertions arising from these incomplete systems are generally overly simplistic and ultimately false, at least partially. Cross-fertilization with ideas originating from outside these systems (i.e., from many other disciplines) is the solution to this myopic dilemma.

Kline's criticism of this state of affairs is enhanced by his second primary observation, that of complexity. Both human thought—as it has evolved in separated disciplines—and the physical systems within which we live exhibit a level of complexity across and within systems that makes it impossible to understand the important phenomena that are affecting humans today from the perspective of any single incomplete system of thought (i.e., any one discipline). Thus, in brief, interconnected systems and high levels of complexity yield a situation in which multidisciplinary approaches to understanding and problem solving will produce the real growth industry in the next generation of scholarly thought.

It is important to note that Kline's concept of multidisciplinary thought is distinct from what he labels "interdisciplinary." Interdisciplinary approaches typically involve the combination of a minimal number (say, two) of intellectual schema from separate disciplines. However, Kline finds that contemporary situations require the inclusion of areas of thought originating from much more than this minimal set of corresponding disciplines. He lists three examples (in chapter 14) in which comprehensive solutions to scientific puzzles involved interrelated components addressing—among other areas—genetics, technological development, social learning, cultures, and primate evolution. Thus, Kline likes theories that are as ecumenical as possible, and he finds problematic any theories that are narrowly limited by the intellectual shortsightedness that he finds typical of single disciplines.

Kline's argument has significant merit. He is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that disciplines develop their own internal ways of looking at the phenomena that interest them. This includes the development of language (jargon) as well as explanatory theories. It is also true that most theories would be better if they included greater descriptions of the cross-system complexity to which Kline has drawn our attention. Many of us probably do look at the world in too simplistic a fashion, and I find no fault in Kline's observation if this.

The trouble with Kline's approach rests in his solution. It is often easier to discover a problem than it is to solve it, and this situation is typical in this regard. Kline offers no clear blueprint for knowing from which disciplines one needs to borrow in order to construct a satisfactory theory. His call is for scientists to be as broadly knowledgeable about any particular phenomenon as possible before constructing theories and declaring truth assertions. This appeal is sensible enough; but are his standards so high that only rare individuals who are clearly in the class of paradigm busters can achieve them? What is to become of the remainder of science that evolves incrementally, with each new development being built on a foundation of previous research? One gets the sense from Kline that this incrementally evolving component of science is somehow inferior, or even faulty, because of the narrowness of its scope. I have trouble with this conclusion that I draw from Kline's argument, even though I find great truth in his basic characterization of the scientific enterprise as being too compartmentalized into narrow disciplines that do not sufficiently well communicate between themselves. It is unfortunate that Kline does not have a more sympathetic understanding of the need for specialization once intellectual leaders establish a new terrain. Nonetheless, his criticism of the current situation of compartmentalization in the absence of cross-communication is well stated, and many readers will find his approach to be both refreshing and enlightening.

Multicultural Citizenship. By Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 280p. $29.95.

Charles Taylor, *McGill University*

This is a very important book, one that is indispensable for the present discussion of multiculturalism. There are two crucial facts about this discussion. First, it is cropping up in some variant in a host of different places—being more than an intellectual fad sweeping across international frontiers—because the problems of difference and how to live with it are forcing themselves onto the political agenda just about everywhere. Future historians will probably identify the sixties as the moment when things started to change, in this as in other domains. Formerly, a great many minorities accepted the *conformity* formula for democratic states. This was the idea that the public and political culture of the state—i.e., what it meant to be a citizen—was laid down once and for all by the hegemonic majority or the founding generation. The job of subsequent generations, cultural minorities, or more recent immigrants was to conform to this definition without trying to change it. In the last 30 years, however, the rules of citizenship are being progressively rewritten. Not just cultural minorities in the traditional sense, but also groups who feel that the reigning formula does not reflect them, like women and gays, have demanded some adjustments. And even voluntary immigrants no longer accept the formula as an unchallengeable given.

The most spectacular place to observe the contrast is perhaps France. With a political culture firmly in the grip of a *Jacobin* formula, France was extremely successful in integrating immigrants (e.g., from Poland) between the wars, so much so that one in four Frenchmen has at least one grandparent born abroad. Even earlier waves of immigrants from North Africa were substantially integrated. But the more recent arrivals from the Maghreb have a different attitude, and the result is social trauma.

The second major fact about this wave of multicultural challenges is that the problems tend to be different in each society. They evoke enough common themes that one is tempted to think there is a single issue being played out in different places. People can be led to seek some general formula to solve the problem, but this is a terrible mistake. The situations are often similar enough that we can learn from each other. Yet there is not a single problem, but rather a family of them.

One of the great strengths of Will Kymlicka's book is that it attempts to articulate these differences. It is one of that too-rare kind, a book written by a philosopher who also sees the need to integrate a lot of politics and history in his discourse, and this is in fact the only way such a question can be tackled.

One crucial distinction made at the beginning runs through the discussion of the book. It demarcates *multinational* from *polyethnic* situations. In one context, a state is the home of more than one nation, by which is meant an historical community, "more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language or culture" (p. 11). In another, various immigrant groups have entered a society, without either the intention or the possibility of forming nations in the above sense, but they seek to avoid discrimination or to contribute to the evolving social formula.

This is an extremely important distinction—a fact that leaps out at you if you live in a country where both these contexts prominently exist together. This is, of course, the situation in Canada, constituted partly by Québec and the aboriginal nations, on one hand, while being one of the world's foremost destinations for voluntary immigrants, on the other. The confusion between the two contexts—attempting to treat Québécois as immigrants or fearing that immigrants might demand the same things as Québécois—has greatly bedevilled the discussion in Canada, perhaps fatally. It is not altogether an accident that this book was written by a Canadian.

But important as this distinction is, Kymlicka recognizes that reality is much more complex. There are contexts, like those of African Americans, that fit neither of these slots. The classification is just a help, a way of avoiding the worst errors. It invites us to go on being careful about the fine nuances on the ground that that can make all the difference.

Kymlicka argues specifically from a liberal perspective, which makes the autonomy of all individuals a central value. He wants to show that the reluctance of many liberals to allow for any group-specific rights—their clinging to the principle that all rights must be "difference-blind"—is a terrible mistake. Not only can such thinking lead to sometimes unworkable policies, but it can also involve denials of justice. In an interesting chapter (4, "Rethinking the Liberal Tradition"), Kymlicka shows that Liberals were not always blind to the problems of minorities and that the advocacy of *benign neglect* is relatively recent, arising in part from an overgeneralization from postwar American experience, particularly the Civil Rights Movement.

The crucial argument concerning justice comes in chapter 5. Here Kymlicka takes up and reworks the basic thesis of his influential *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford, 1989). One of the things that makes autonomy such a crucial value is that it is a condition of our being able to think out what the good life for us consists in. But this thinking can only be effective to the extent that we possess a vocabulary for it. By this is meant not just the words but also a lively sense of what the different life-alternatives are which they name. This vocabulary we inherit from our culture. Cultures are not closed worlds and borrow a lot from each other. But successful borrowing requires a home culture in which new ideas are integrated, and without a functioning home culture people are incapacitated.

Now if liberalism involves treating people with equal respect, and in particular attempting to ensure equality in autonomy, then a case can be made for measures that help to protect and promote minority cultures that may be under great pressure in the larger society.

Kymlicka makes a crucial distinction here between *internal restrictions* and *external protections*. Measures give cultural groups power over their members enabling them to enforce conformity are proscribed on liberal grounds. But measures that enhance the resistance of a minority culture against majority pressure may often be demanded by justice.

There is, alas, no space to go into the interesting detailed discussions in the book of such matters as "collective rights" (chapter 3), the demands of justice in polyethnic contexts (chapter 6), the meaning and limits of toleration (chapter 8), the conditions of shared identity (chapter 9), and a host of other matters. But this is an immensely rich, informative, and above all clarifying work, written by a first-class philosophical mind, animated by a humane outlook. It ought to be compulsory reading for all those who want to carry on the debate in this area.

The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism. By Todd May. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 152p. $27.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

Brent L. Pickett, *University of Colorado at Boulder*

Although poststructuralist thinkers have been criticized on many fronts, the most frequent and powerful objections have focused on their normative commitments. It has been argued that while Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, and others are obviously critical of much in modern society, they never come clean about the moral views that underpin this stance. Foucault celebrates resistance, for instance, yet as Nancy Fraser asks, "Why fight?" Why is struggle preferable to submission? An answer to this question inevitably involves moral claims, about which poststructuralists prefer to avoid talking.

Todd May's book represents an important advance in poststructuralist thought because he seeks to make explicit the moral commitments that inform the works of Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard. By articulating the moral theory underpinning poststructuralism, May propounds a more defensible version of this position. In effect, he makes it possible to answer Fraser's question. There are three central elements to what May sees as the moral theory of poststructuralism. The first concerns the status of moral talk. He sets out to defend the sensible view that moral discourse is deeply situated in a world marked by power and contingency, but that morality still commands our obedience. The second element of the theory is what May calls the principle of antirepresentationalism. By this he means that "people ought not, other things being equal, to engage in practices whose effect . . . is the representation or commendation of certain intentional lives as either intrinsically superior or intrinsically inferior to others" (p. 48). Antirepresentationalism is similar to antiperfectionism, although the former is broader in scope. Not only should the state abstain from fostering some types of lives while trying to discourage others, but everyone else is to abstain from doing so, too. Therapists, professors, and parents should not represent one form of life as morally better or worse than others. May persuasively argues that this moral principle is important to poststructuralists. Foucault, for instance, was concerned with the growth and increasing power of psychiatry and how its use of the concept of *normality* had disciplinary effects. Where poststructuralists have erred is in thinking that antirepresentationalism entails a denial of all moral talk. In contrast, May emphasizes the distinction between telling someone what she ought to do versus telling her what she should be. Antirepresentationalism only rules out the latter, not the former. Morality can often tell one what is the proper course of action, but "it is not morality's role to answer the question of how one should live" (p. 137).

Because the principle of antirepresentationalism disallows moral judgments about what sort of person one ought to be, it rules out virtue-based ethical theories. May also argues that deontological theories cannot easily accommodate the principle, which leaves consequentialism as the only view standing. May argues that a multivalue consequentialism is both generally defensible and works well with antirepresentationalism. This argument for consequentialism, and much of the book generally, is couched in Anglo-American terms. As a result, this book is clearly argued and avoids the leaps in logic and vague abstractions that plague so much poststructuralist work. Defending French theory in Anglo-American modes of argument raises difficult issues of translation, however, and sometimes May's analytic terminology lacks sufficient explanation for readers in the Continental tradition. Nonetheless, this book will be helpful in building bridges between competing traditions.

It must be noted, however, that May raises questions that are left unanswered or answered unpersuasively. First, and most important, one cannot help but wonder what he means by poststructuralism. He largely ignores its deep epistemological skepticism and explicitly criticizes its relativism. He states that Fraser, Habermas, and others are right in demanding "a moral grounding for poststructuralist claims" (p. 10). In what ways, then, is the moral theory he propounds still *poststructuralist*? This question is pressing because some poststructuralists, Deleuze especially, strongly want to avoid giving a moral grounding to their position. Their view is that since morality is a thing of this world, riddled with the same mendaciousness and hidden biases that characterize other social practices, one cannot appeal to it in order to criticize other institutions and practices. Yet, I think May's theory does largely succeed in making explicit the covert moral assumptions these theorists have.

In addition to denying this theory a transcendental ground and giving the principle of antirepresentationalism a strong role, May also argues for evaluating lives with aesthetic rather than moral criteria. The idea of an aesthetics of living is currently fashionable in postmodernist circles. According to poststructuralists, it is unacceptable to tell a person what she ought to be; admonishments that one should be more normal, productive, or virtuous are themselves immoral. Yet, clearly Foucault, Deleuze, and May still want to talk about the respective merits of various lives. How can one evaluate people's lives without violating the antirepresentationalist principle? The answer is that one can use aesthetic rather than normative criteria. It is for this reason that Foucault wrote about people he admired as having realized "life-poems." Thus, if a person sits in a bar night after night, we should at most speak of his life as ugly, not immoral.

May is more careful with this idea than many other theorists in that he only offers an aesthetics of living as a suggestion for how to live one's life. After all, telling someone to make of herself a life-poem clearly violates the antirepresentationalist principle. Yet, is there an important difference between my telling someone that she should reflect more upon her actions and my telling her to be a more reflective, considered person? Both utterances appear to mean the same thing, yet the latter is immoral according to May, while the former is not. Aside from the question of whether poststructuralists *can* adhere to this principle, there is good reason to doubt that they *do*. May points out that the idea of an aesthetics of living comes from Nietzsche. That is certainly true, but Nietzsche clearly represented the life of the overman as intrinsically superior to that of the herd. Foucault, in his final works, also commended the life of self-creation and self-mastery as intrinsically superior. Volumes 2 and 3 of his *History of Sexuality* are much more concerned with what a person should be than with what she should do, which is probably why May never refers to these works. More generally, a recognition of how ethical goods are realized in certain morally admirable persons (and here Foucault comes to mind) has the ability to empower us. The costs of the antirepresentationalist principle would likely be very high, nor does May seem to realize how much adherence to this principle would affect the way we think and live.

With *The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism*, May has performed a valuable service, regardless of whether one is sympathetic or critical of postmodern thought. His goal of spelling out the moral intuitions of poststructuralists is worthwhile. The few criticisms I have made are not meant to detract from his achievement.

Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue. By Heinrich Meier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 136p. $19.95.

Shadia B. Drury, *University of Calgary*

This book is a useful contribution to the current controversy over the fascinating and frustrating work of Carl Schmitt. The thesis of the book is that no one understood Schmitt better than Leo Strauss and that this fact was acknowledged (in private) by Schmitt himself. To prove his thesis, Meier provides us with a detailed commentary on the three editions of Schmitt's most famous work, *The Concept of the Political*. Even though Schmitt maintained that the changes in the later editions were not of a substantial nature, Meier sets out to show that the changes are in fact significant and that they are a direct response to the comments and criticisms of Leo Strauss.

Meier's book includes the complete text of Strauss's well-known commentary on Schmitt's book (in a new translation) as well as three letters written by Strauss to Schmitt. But there are no letters from Schmitt to Strauss; Meier suggests that Schmitt never responded to Strauss's letters or acknowledged his influence because it was difficult for a member of the Nazi Party and one of its leading lights to acknowledge the influence of a young Jewish scholar in 1933.

Meier's book is not a good introduction to either Carl Schmitt or Leo Strauss; it is of value only to those who already know something about these authors. To appreciate the book, it is useful to know something about the recent efforts to rehabilitate Schmitt's work. From this viewpoint, Schmitt's membership in the Nazi Party was an opportunistic ploy that was not logically or theoretically linked to his political thought, which is a brilliant and incisive critique of liberalism. In my view, Schmitt's work is indeed often brilliant and his critique of liberalism is sometimes penetrating; nevertheless, his conception of politics seems to valorize death, war, and struggle. The main thesis of his *Concept of the Political* is that politics is an autonomous domain in which the supreme distinction is between friend and foe. The foe need not be evil, ugly, or unprofitable; it suffices that the foe is the *other* or the *alien* who threatens one's own existence and way of life. To be political is to recognize the foe and to keep him at bay. During the Weimar regime, Schmitt wrote a letter advising President Paul von Hindenburg to eliminate the two extremist parties—the Communists and the Nazis—because they threatened the very being of the regime. Needless to say, his advice was not heeded and Weimar was destroyed. In Schmitt's eyes, as in the eyes of many other German writers including Leo Strauss, Weimar became the paradigm of liberalism—weak, spineless, and stupid.

It is difficult not to assume that Schmitt embraced the Nazis with enthusiasm precisely because they, unlike the liberal Weimar, grasped the fundamental idea of the *foe*—i.e., they understood politics. Schmitt's defenders would have us understand things differently. They maintain that the idea of the foe has the effect of making politics more moderate. The idea is that when politics is given a domain of its own, when the foe is purified, when he is perceived as a purely political enemy, when he is no longer painted as evil, ugly, and satanic, then there will be no reason to exterminate or destroy him; it will suffice to keep him at bay. But Meier's book contains nothing about the debate to which it contributes and does not so much as mention any of Schmitt's defenders or detractors.

Meier's view of Schmitt is completely informed by Leo Strauss. But unlike Strauss's less insightful disciples, Meier neither assumes nor pretends that Strauss is a great champion of liberal democracy; he is fully cognizant of the fact that Strauss shares Schmitt's aversion to liberalism. He therefore acknowledges that there is a broad base of agreement between Strauss and Schmitt. For Strauss as for Schmitt, liberalism is not just weak and spineless; it is also extremely seductive and enchanting. For Schmitt, as for Heidegger and others, liberalism has the effect of homogenizing the globe into a single *bourgeois* culture of production and consumption. It has created a universal order devoted to the trivialities and mundanities of average everydayness. In its own crafty way, it has replaced politics with economics, seriousness with triviality, work with entertainment, and humanity with animality. In short, liberalism has dehumanized and depoliticized the world. In Meier's view, Strauss not only shares Schmitt's criticism of liberalism; he radicalizes it.

According to Meier, Strauss's objection to Schmitt is that the latter's critique of liberalism does not go far enough for several reasons. First, Schmitt is too great an admirer of Hobbes, who is one of the founders of liberalism. As Strauss points out, Hobbes posits the state of nature (i.e., the state of war) only to transcend it. However, it may be added that Hobbes's state of nature is never transcended at the international level, which is the level fundamental to Schmitt's understanding of politics. Second, Strauss objects to Schmitt's view of politics on the grounds that it is itself caught in the web of the liberal tradition. By insisting on the autonomy of politics, Schmitt falls prey to the liberal desire to keep the domains of human life hermetically sealed—private and public, moral and political. But if politics is to make human life serious again, if it is to rescue humanity from the triviality of liberalism, then it must be wedded to the "one thing needful," which is to say, the serious questions about right and wrong, good and evil, truth and falsehood. In short, Schmitt's insistence on the autonomy of politics prevents politics from playing a serious role in human life and, in so doing, frustrates his own purpose.

Meier believes that Strauss's critique suggests that Schmitt must wed politics to theology. Meier's painstaking analysis of the subtle changes in Schmitt's three editions of *The Concept of the Political* is intended to show that Schmitt did in fact heed Strauss's criticism and adopted a less autonomous view of the political that links it to religious faith. Contrary to Schmitt's critics, Meier believes that Schmitt did not valorize politics simply because he glorified war and struggle as ends. He believes that what Schmitt feared most is the loss of commitment and faith. He concludes that all their agreements notwithstanding, Strauss sides with political philosophy and Schmitt with political theology. The difference between them is the difference between Athens and Jerusalem, reason and faith. But Meier does not tell us what that difference amounts to or what practical political ramifications it has, if any. After all, Strauss is well known for thinking that reason and philosophy is the domain of the few, while unthinking faith belongs to the many. By linking faith and politics, Strauss makes the latter more dangerous and more bloody. But Meier does not reflect on the consequences of Strauss's radicalization of Schmitt's position.

Despite its severe limitations, Meier's book is refreshing for avoiding the proclivities of much of Straussian scholarship—purposeful obfuscations, cold-blooded lies, and fearful mediocrity.

The Fragility of Freedom: Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future. By Joshua Mitchell. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995. 288p. $34.95.

Michael P. Zuckert, *Carleton College*

That great sage Tristram Shandy once asked, "So long as a man rides his hobby-horse peaceably and quietly along the king's highway, and neither compels you or me to get up behind him,—pray, sir, what have either you or I to do with it?" Well, Joshua Mitchell has a hobbyhorse and for the most part rides it peaceably and quietly, and thus, according to the wisdom of Tristram, it does us no harm when he rides along as he will. In this case, the hobbyhorse is Mitchell's resolve to read Tocqueville in theological terms. His book, he says, "focuses ... on theoretical matters that remain indecipherable without attending to certain theological suppositions embedded in Tocqueville's thinking" (p. xii, cf. pp. 233, 254). He reads Tocqueville's political thought as a thoroughgoing effort in political theology in the tradition of, and in nearly full agreement with, the classic Christian political theology of Augustine. Thus, the ultimate destination of Mitchell's journey is a presentation of Tocqueville in terms of "the transcendent source from which [the soul] perennially strays," and of the religious faith that can "circumscribe the imagination of the one bemused by the bad infinity, the hubris, that attends errancy from God" (p. 209).

Mitchell goes well beyond the religious themes all previous students of Tocqueville have discussed—the so-called providential march of history toward equality and the great emphasis in the French thinker on the importance of religion for the political health of democracy. Whereas other readers of Tocqueville have paused to ponder what Tocqueville might mean by the first of these claims and how it might relate to the sociological, political, and historical analyses he presents of the forces impelling toward equality of condition, Mitchell considers it merely a "fundamental ... theological" point, from which "we must begin" (p. 167). As to Tocqueville's commendations of religion, most analysts of *Democracy in America* have been careful to note Tocqueville's characterization of his own argument: "Though it is very important for man as an individual that his religion should be true, that is not the case for society.... What is most important for it is not that all citizens should profess the true religion, but that they should profess religion" (*Democracy in America*, I, ii, 9). This is the announcement of a sociological, a political, or a functional approach to religion, not a theological one. Mitchell notes this passage in passing (p. 166), but by this time he is so fast a-galloping that it appears to make no impression; he proceeds to treat Tocqueville's analysis of religion in terms of "that hidden foundation which alone can answer the heart's call" (p. 166). One manifestation of Mitchell's more theological reading is his regular tendency to speak of Christianity where Tocqueville speaks more generally of religion (see, e.g., pp. 191, 249, and esp. 255–58).

Although the prophetic mode in which Mitchell writes encourages him to pursue many distracting digressions, the main line of argument is actually quite simple once one disentangles it from the debris. Tocqueville's "suppositions about the democratic soul in America originate with Augustine" (p. 42). The Augustinian soul, or "self," due to "Adam's errancy," "falls away from God ... through disobedience" (p. 43). Human beings "forget" their "subjection to God" (pp. 45–46) and pretend to self-sufficiency. Inescapably bearing the trace of the creator, however, human beings never recede into mere animality but generate profoundly spiritual engagements with the world. Two polar modes of engaging the world emerge "between which the human soul oscillates" (p. 47). On the one hand, the soul experiences a "frantic activity in, and love of, the world that masquerades as self-sufficiency and freedom," a self-sufficiency that threatens to efface the boundary between creator and created (p. 47). On the other hand, unable to find the satisfaction really available only in God, "the remorseful soul, which longs for respite and repose, looks inward in ... repudiation of the world," a "self-enclosure" and "withdrawal" (pp. 50–51). These polarities are for Augustine, as for Mitchell and his Tocqueville, universal of the human condition.

Tocqueville, Mitchell claims, built his political science on this Augustinian theory of the soul alienated from God. Tocqueville's democratic soul vacillates between the same two poles—a restless activism in this world ("restiveness") and a stance of withdrawal that Tocqueville calls individualism. Mitchell understands these Tocquevillian ideas in a quite strictly Augustinian sense; for example, here is how he explains "restiveness": "the soul, divided by the sting of God's call beyond the world, throws itself evermore ardently into the world, into activities and works, in order to evade the call" (p. 80).

The Augustinian soul is thus naturally "immoderate," unsuited to healthy communal life and to rational action. Tocqueville's political science is his attempt to articulate the means that the Americans have found to cure or ameliorate the immoderations and irrationalities of the Augustinian soul. Associational life, local politics, and related devices are ways in which the soul's disposition to withdraw "unto itself," as Mitchell so biblically likes to put it, is countered; religion is the means by which some peace is brought to the democratic soul's restiveness and accompanying envy.

Mitchell's hobbyhorse, it is clear from the above summary, certainly does no harm, but it is also of no particular value to those interested in Tocqueville's political thought. The theological vantage point that Mitchell takes imports too much into Tocqueville's text that finds no resonance there and omits too much that makes Tocqueville such a genuinely interesting and valuable thinker. There are two omissions: Central to Tocqueville's new political science is his concept of "social state," said by him to be "the prime cause of most of the laws, customs, and ideas which control the nations's behavior" (*Democracy*, I, i, 3). Tocqueville goes yet farther and shows that even the dominant personality types ("souls") derive from social state. That is, his analysis is rooted not in a (universalistic) Augustinian theology, but in a socio-political conception of a very different sort that is entirely absent from this book. Mitchell also fails to understand the way Tocqueville's analysis of associational life in America draws from Montesquieu's earlier treatment of the aristocracy as intermediate powers in the (feudal) monarchic regime. Mitchell finds Augustine everywhere in Tocqueville but seems not to understand Montesquieu at all. For example, he informs us in one place that "for Montesquieu ... Negroes were not human beings" (p. 177), apparently unable to perceive the heavy irony of an argument to that effect that Montesquieu put in the mouth of a defender of slavery, but of which Montesquieu himself entirely disapproves. In place of the Montesquieuian emphasis on intermediate powers, Mitchell's theological impulse has him discussing Tocqueville's commendation of associations as the equivalent of Catholicism's "mediation of the saints" (p. 120). Carried away by his insight into "theological patterns," Mitchell confidently concludes that for Tocqueville Protestants (more independent, lacking mediating saints) are "more likely to be drawn toward an all-powerful state" (p. 121). Of course, only passing acquaintance with Tocqueville's texts suffices to remind that it was the French, Catholic as they were, who were most in danger from democratic centralization, and the English and the Americans, Protestant as they were, who were best guarded against that danger. But if one's hobbyhorse is going fast enough, it is difficult to notice even the most obvious features of the text.

Ethics, Killing and War. By Richard Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 256p. $49.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Robert L. Holmes, *University of Rochester*

Norman begins with the nature of moral thinking; proceeds circumspectly through discussions of the wrongness of killing, killing and letting die, killing in self-defense, and the killing of the innocent; and concludes by giving concrete meaning to the notion—going back at least as far as Augustine—that there is sometimes a *necessity* about our recourse to war that morally speaking gives us no choice but to fight.

The treatment of war, it should be said, is embedded in a philosophical discussion, some of which—though it is jargon-free and accessible to the diligent nonphilosopher—will likely be of interest primarily to the philosophically inclined. Here Norman unflinchingly takes on one of the most difficult issues in recent and contemporary ethical theory, the nature and limits of moral thinking. The upshot of his argument is that subjectivism is mistaken and that, although there may be "moral tragedies" (which he thinks the analysis of war discloses) in which whatever one does is wrong, there will nonetheless still be room for rational moral thought.

The analysis of war begins in earnest in chapter 3, on killing and letting die, and continues throughout the remainder of the book. Thanks to frequent, useful summaries of what has gone before, those interested primarily in the analysis of war would not be severely disadvantaged by beginning at that point.

Noteworthy here are Norman's critiques of national sovereignty and the just war theory. In the former, he denies, contrary to Walzer and others, that there is anything in the concept of a nation that automatically justifies its defense by means of warfare. In particular, he dismantles the claim that there is a significant analogy between individual and collective self-defense, concluding that only if the evils threatening a community override what he argues to be a strong presumption (rooted in respect and sympathy) against the taking of human life is violent resistance in defense of political sovereignty justified. One cannot conclude that such a presumption is overridden simply on the grounds of political sovereignty or by analogizing collective self-defense with individual self-defense.

Unlike most writers on the topic, Norman, in his critique of the just war tradition, distinguishes between the justice of war and its more general moral permissibility (which might be based on considerations other than, or in addition to, justice). Understanding justice in terms of rights, he contends that the notion of a just defense of territorial integrity is insufficient to override the presumption against killing. The infliction of "great harms" on others as part of a just defense is warranted only if those others are culpable, which they cannot all be presumed to be in warfare. Hence, he concludes, the just war theory "does not provide a way of rebutting the initial moral presumption against war in any form" (p. 206).

Nonetheless, Norman is not a pacifist. He dusts off the word *pacificism* for his own position, one of defensive deterrence, which "aims to deter by means of a military capacity which is not only defensive in intent, but cannot be interpreted by other states as potentially aggressive" (p. 244). How does this position—since it entails a willingness to wage war under some circumstances—defeat the presumption against killing that derails the just war theory? The answer is by allowing that there may be situations in which we have no choice but to fight and to do so is the lesser of the evils confronting us.

Norman's argument that we may have no choice, however, is the least convincing of the book. It counts an alternative form of resistance (e.g., nonviolent resistance) as an option only if "it is publicly recognized as such and gets its meaning from a wide social movement, however informed" (p. 220). But why we should accept this narrow construal of resistance is unclear. Although Norman acknowledges cases of improvised nonviolent resistance, such as in Norway against the Nazis (and, he might have added, in Lithuania against the Soviets and on the part of Eastern European peoples against their own governments), he still thinks there may be cases in which such resistance does not gain the acceptance necessary to qualify it as a "challenge to oppression." Even if that should be conceded, the absence of an institutional framework for nonviolent resistance—if that absence means you have no choice but to fight when the chips are down—would simply seem to argue for creation of such a framework before the chips are put down. This, in principle, should always be possible in the case of national defense and hence always be relevant to the problem of war in any standard sense. Whether it is always possible in the case of defense against internal oppression (as Norman thinks it was not in South Africa in 1961 when the African National Congress abandoned its commitment to nonviolence) is less clear.

Nonetheless, this is a patient, fair-minded argument that blends careful moral analysis with pertinent illustrative references to recent events, such as the Falklands War and the Gulf War. Norman's is an excellent book and an important contribution to the ethical analysis of war.

Jerusalem and Athens: Reason and Revelation in the Works of Leo Strauss. By Susan Orr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. 224p. $65.50 cloth, $22.95 paper.

Michael Palmer, *University of Maine*

Susan Orr's book is one of a relatively small but rapidly increasing number of attempts to read and understand the writings of Leo Strauss as Strauss read and understood the writings of political philosophers before him. The first genuinely philosophical reading of Strauss was Alexandre Kojeve's, half a century ago in postwar Paris. The most recent commendable attempt is Laurence Lampert's (1966) *Leo Strauss and Nietzsche*.

Orr's book is a paragraph-by-paragraph, even sentence-by-sentence, commentary on Strauss's 1967 lecture "Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections." Orr says in her introductory chapter that she has limited herself to only one essay because the subject of reason and revelation in Strauss's thought is so complex that a discussion of it in all of his works "could lead us to incorrect assumptions" (p. 18). How a discussion of the theme in all of Strauss's works, as opposed to just one, might lead to incorrect assumptions is not specified. Orr nevertheless insists upon the importance and makes liberal use of five other works of Strauss: "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization" (1981) and "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy" (1979), both from lectures delivered in 1952; "On the Interpretation of Genesis" (1981), a lecture from 1957; the "Introductory Essay" Strauss wrote for the English translation of his *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* (1965); and *Natural Right and History* (1953). She refers to other writings, too. Orr's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, then, we believe that she presents what is, to the best of her ability, a comprehensive interpretation of reason and revelation in the thought of Leo Strauss. Mimicking Orr mimicking Strauss, we might suggest that this is the esoteric intention behind the fact that the cover page of her book refers to "the *Works* of Leo Strauss," while the title page within reads "the *Work* of Leo Strauss" (my emphases), which would appear to more casual readers to be an obvious mistake. (Similarly, we wonder how much we are supposed to read into the subtle revisions of the translation of God's Hebrew name, "*Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh*," which appears in four slightly different versions in five successive paragraphs of her book (pp. 93–95), sometimes quoting Strauss, sometimes not; and a startlingly new version, later, quoting Harry V. Jaffa quoting Strauss (p. 119).

Orr's central theme is to demonstrate how Strauss restores the Bible—"Jerusalem" as a serious alternative to classical political philosophy—"Athens," even, or especially, for philosophically minded contemporary readers. This is all to the good. But she situates her commentary in the context of the debate between so-called West Coat Straussians and East Coast Straussians, especially Jaffa and Thomas L. Pangle as champions of the former and the latter, respectively. This is not the place to elaborate on this debate, but it must be remarked that Orr's presentation of it is suspect. In her acknowledgments, she thanks Jaffa for his "unflagging support and inspiration" (p. ix). She also thanks Jaffa for clarifying Pangle's position for her (p. 160, n. 21) in the very note in which she provides the citation for her approving quotation from Jaffa that "Pangle's account . . . has nothing whatever in common with anything that might be attributed to Leo Strauss" (p. 10). There is, of course, no indication that she sought clarification of Jaffa's account from Pangle. Thus, her "conclusion" that Jaffa's Strauss is superior to Pangle's cannot surprise (although she quotes Strauss, elsewhere, explicitly stating what appears to be Pangle's allegedly fantastic distortion of Strauss's view [p. 27]).

Orr says that she follows "all the rules" that Strauss said were necessary for understanding difficult and important texts (p. 33). Both the strengths and some of the weaknesses of the book follow from Orr's obedience to these rules. Strauss himself warned that there could really be no such rules, that part of what makes a great book great is that it teaches its readers how to read it and that the rigid application of his own discoveries about how to read Machiavelli, for instance, could lead to fallacious results if applied to someone else. Orr makes myriad discrete observations on Strauss's text in the course of following her rules, many of which are thoughtful and insightful, many of which are not. The net result is a book that sometimes reads more like preparatory notes for an interpretation of Strauss than an actual interpretation. Orr's repeated observations about which paragraphs are at the center of sections, or which sentences are at the center of paragraphs, or the number of sentences that a paragraph contains, are sometimes apt: that the middle sentence of the first of Strauss's two paragraphs on the six-day story in Genesis is the ironic remark that only God was an eyewitness to the beginning of the universe (p. 65), or that the middle sentence of the second paragraph contains the lesson of the first creation account, that "Heaven is lower than earth" (p. 67). But they are also frequently inapt: Does it really matter that the paragraph on Hesiod, the twenty-sixth, also has twenty-six sentences (p. 100; therefore, we note, no middle sentence)?

A general problem with Orr's discussion is that she insists upon precise distinctions when they suit her case but glosses over them when they do not; for example, she warns that in reading Strauss we must recognize that there are differences between Zeus and Yahweh, not to mention Zeus and Christ (pp. 14, 41), which "East Coast" Straussians allegedly insufficiently appreciate (p. 154). But she does not hesitate to speak of "the Judeo-Christian God" (p. 13), as if Strauss might not also have something to say about any differences between Christ and Yahweh. Indeed, Orr's book homogenizes Judaism and Christianity throughout. She claims that she is careful to note exactly what Strauss writes, the order in which he considers items, and what he fails to mention (p. 18)—even notes, herself, his emphatic failure to mention Christianity (p. 28)—but she pays little more than lip service to the difficulties that follow, simply asserting whenever she wishes that Strauss includes Christianity in his defense of Jerusalem (pp. 150, 154). An important piece of evidence in support of her assertion is supposed to be that Strauss's use of the Christian term *Bible* throughout his lecture is significant, since he treats exclusively the Old Testament in the lecture without using the term *Hebrew Bible*, as he does elsewhere (p. 29). Yet Orr later quotes another writing where Strauss does use *Bible* and *Old Testament* synonymously (p. 45). She even cites one where Strauss reminds us "that there is no *biblical* word for doubt" (p. 54, my emphasis) and supplies a footnote in which she reminds us that this cannot apply to the New Testament (p. 164, n. 57). Her commentary proper ends on an especially confused note, attributing to Strauss a position that her quotation from him makes clear is not his own (p. 145). And the power of her summary conclusions is vitiated by the fact that the conclusive ones are admittedly obvious (p. 147), the intriguing ones admittedly borrowed (p. 150), and the rest admittedly inconclusive. Orr does take serious questions seriously, however, and many readers will benefit from the exercise of contending with her reading of Strauss's important essay, even if that reading is questionable. An unqualified good is that, in addition to a reprint of "Jerusalem and Athens," the book contains Strauss's "On the Interpretation of Genesis," previously difficult to obtain.

Theory and Practice: Nomos XXXVII. Edited by Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew. New York: New York University Press, 1995. 472p. $42.50.

John G. Gunnell, *State University of New York at Albany*

The thirty-seventh volume of the NOMOS series consists of sixteen chapters derived from papers presented at the 1992 Annual meeting of the American Society for Political and

Legal Philosophy. In the introduction the editors deftly, and more thoroughly than this review allows, summarize each of the diverse contributions by philosophers and political (and legal) theorists.

In Part One, "The Foundations of the Debate," Norma Thompson argues that Aristotle's attempt to vindicate the theoretical life was directed, although obliquely, against Herodotus, and Jeffrie Murphy sympathetically describes and interprets Kant's famous essay on the utility of theory.

Part Two, "The Value of Pure Theory," consists of Francis Kamm's defense of "high" and "low" ethical theories as both intrinsically worthwhile and significant for practice; David Wong's analysis of the tension between the "impersonal" and "personal" points of view in moral theory; and Jeremy Waldron's brief for reading the classic texts of political philosophy (and estimable contemporary endeavors) as fundamental explorations of the nature of "the political" rather than examples of practical advocacy and policy prescription containing a "bottom line."

Although Part Three is titled "Arguments for the Priority of Practice," the emphasis is on defending the relevance of theory. Martha Nussbaum challenges Waldron's thesis by arguing that classic political philosophy did speak to and about practical politics and that contemporary philosophers should, and are qualified to, do the same. Susan Brison further pursues the latter point and urges that philosophers be politically engaged—for the sake of both theory and practice. This section concludes with Henry Shue's extended argument that justice, as fairness, demands not only confronting the issue of global warming but entails pursuing solar technology.

Part Four, "Theory and Practice in Law," contains Cass Sustein's argument that while the practice of law is a normative enterprise and necessarily "theory-laden," there are "hazards" in applying political philosophy to legal issues; Stephen Carter's hypothetical discussion of how a "Kantian sovereign" might deal with the issue of religious resistance; and Frank Michelman's exploration, within a Rawlsian framework, of the extent to which the validity standards of a prescriptive theory might be immanent in practice.

Part Five, "The Public Implications of Theory," consists of two essays: Gerald Postema's defense of the idea of deliberative democracy, or "public practical reason," and Kent Greenawalt's consideration of the dilemma facing theorists when stating that "truths" may issue in harmful effects.

While the final part of the book is designated "Practitioners as Theorists" and is offered as a demonstration of the "wide variety of approaches that political practitioners take to theoretical claims," it would seem that it might more accurately be called "Theorists as Practitioners," since it features theorists who ventured into politics. John Kane claims that Marx's "realistic" rejection of moral idealism was a recognition of the intransigence of social structures; Steven Smith argues that there was an inherent connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his attachment to Nazism; and Jean Elshtain "displays" how Václav Havel, in thought and action, found a way to avoid the traditional theory/practice paradox as well as the excesses of both paralytic transcendental theory and quiescent antifoundationalism.

As with many redactions of conference proceedings, there is some difficulty presenting the volume as a work of one piece, but the editors have sorted and structured the contributions in a helpful manner. Even though a couple of chapters may miss the mark, the general thematic integrity is quite well sustained, and on the whole the collection is useful and stimulating. What limits many of the essays, however, is a failure to recognize that the "theory/practice problem" is less a universal with various manifestations than a category for subsuming historically situated issues that have a certain family resemblance.

Even though some of the chapters, such as Elshtain's, deal with specific cases, *theory* is often used generically to encompass everyone from Aristotle to Rawls, and *practice* often appears as an abstract and equally undifferentiated datum. There is scant attention given to the concrete situation of the academician, who, either explicity or implicitly, is the principal reference for theory, to the particularities of politics and other practices, and to the relationship between them. The relationship between theory and practice is itself a practical problem without a unilateral theoretical solution, but most of the authors seek to find either something inherently practical in theory or something theoretical in practice.

Philosophers can embrace positions such as "critical race theory" (Brison) and talk *about* such matters as the environment (Shue) and the quality of life in developing countries (Nussbaum), but this is quite different from talking *to* and *in* politics. Even Waldron, who embraces a more epic vision of political philosophy, is not unsympathetic to what seems, in many of these essays, to be the assumption that "political theory is simply conscientious civic conversation without a deadline." The very concept of theory and practice tends to be prejudicial, since it conceals what is really at issue: the relationship between two practices—and two theories.

It is conceivable that moral philosopers are in a position to "show people what the truth is" (Kamm), and it may be interesting to ponder the question of what harm a philosopher's "truth" may cause. But what deserves discussion and examination are the presumptions that university professors have some special access to either ameliorative or dangerous truths, that in contemporary American society there is and can be some significant interaction between academic and public discourse, and that in a democratic society philosophical claims about moral truth and public policy should carry some special authority.

We might begin by examining the exact context in which Kant wrote his essay and the extent to which it was an attempt to justify the authority of academic philosophy. And while we can speculate about parallels between Heidegger's philosophy and his political sympathies, the latter might be more directly connected to his aspiration for resurrecting the mandarin status of the German philosophical professoriate. Much of the contemporary talk about theory and practice, including many of these essays, seems to manifest similar anxieties and unrequited hope.

Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia. By Andrzej Walicki. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 555p. $65.00.

Paul Thomas, *University of California, Berkeley*

This book covers a lot of ground. Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Luxemburg, Leninism, Stalinism and its dismantling from within—all are examined with some thoroughness and with an eye for significant differences, as well as for a continuity Walicki is unfortunately determined to insist upon. Walicki writes in the shadow of his compatriot Lezsek Kolakowski's more ambitious (and more unwieldy) three-volume survey, *Main Currents in Marxism* (1978), but casts his net wider. He is able to analyze what he calls (rather clumsily) "detotalitarianization" and "decommunization" in the former Soviet Union and in Poland.

Walicki tries to make his argument more tightly focused than Kolakowski's. He writes not as a philosopher but as an intellectual historian, albeit one with a fervent belief in the power of ideas. This means that Leninism, for instance, is treated in the first instance not institutionally but as a "current of thought." Walicki is explicit: "I support the view that ideas *do* have consequences, that great historical movements need ideological legitimation and therefore that their historical fates depend to a certain extent on their ideology" (p. 423).

This governing belief may seem unexceptionable enough. It is when we ask to what extent and in what way fate depends on ideology that doubts begin to intrude. Walicki's central point takes the form of a paradox: "Soviet-style totalitarianism," before it unravelled, was "the most important practical result" of a "conception of freedom" that was in its origin "the organizing principle of [Marx's] entire philosophy of history" (p. 1). This is so, we are told, because "the communist idea of freedom" from its very inception "presupposed the total abolition of civil society and the market economy by subjecting social forces to conscious rational control in a totally planned economic system" (p. 4). There are two levels to Walicki's defense of this broad claim. The first is that since every important Marxist theorist or practitioner subscribed to this same conception of freedom, differences among them (to some of which Walicki is sensitive) pale into insignificance alongside this massive similarity, which is dealt up again and again, no matter what it is called upon to explain. The second level is that the conception of freedom at issue is flawed and incoherent, not just because it involves a "full suppression of the freedom to produce, exchange and consume" (p. 87)—a suppression that is hard to imagine and which, in the event, was never attained or even attempted—but because this conception is held to have been "inherently (though unconsciously) totalitarian" (p. 498) in its own right. More specifically, Marx and Engels's "entire conception of human liberation as well as their 'scientific socialism' " comes under the rubric of "the totalitarian potential of ideas"; Leninism is "the best exemplification [*sic*]" of "the totalitarian character of an organized revolutionary movement"; and Stalinism represents "the totalitarian character of a state" (p. 452).

Walicki has presumably effected this triple join to his own satisfaction; his readers may be less convinced. That Marx's thought was in some way proleptic, and was intended to be proleptic, is not at issue. What is at issue is whether "ideas"—anybody's ideas—can sensibly be said to have "totalitarian potential" if the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy is to be avoided. In Walicki's formulation the word *totalitarian* (which he distinguishes from *authoritarian* but does not really define) is a convenient—*too* convenient—bracketing device, not a term that admits of consistent application. The obvious objections to Walicki's thesis are that it makes Marx and Engels responsible for future, unsavory political developments of which they could have known nothing, and conversely, that their successors are made responsible for putting into effect doctrines with which they were perforce unacquainted. Walicki's way of dealing with these objections neither convinces nor disarms.

Instead, his response goes too far. Those for instance who fail to "recognize [Lenin's] War Communism as an attempt to realize Marx's communist utopia"—the list would include Nove, Gerschenkron, Lewin, Stites, and Pipes, all of whom see War Communism as "necessitated by circumstances"—get short shrift. Some of these (Walicki refrains from specifying which ones) are duly accused in short order of "a programmatic neglect of the role of ideas in shaping history" (p. 362).

Such statements (there are plenty of them in a book that could have used more stringent editing) evidently lack balance. Why does Walicki play so fast and loose with the notion (which few people would dispute) that ideas have consequences? He is aware, in his calmer moments, that "great historical movements are rarely able to follow the logic of their ideologies ... they have to respond to the exigencies of the changing situation and consequently change themselves, sometimes losing their original identity completely" (p. 363). Why then the need to line up expediency against ideological motivation in such a way that the latter invariably wins hands down?

The pity of it is that Walicki's book bristles with insights and aperçus about successive Marxist theorists, all of whom are then duly obliterated, tarred by the same brush of complicity. The treatment of Marx is a case in point. Walicki indicates in passing what is to my mind a real area of tension in Marx's thought: "The contradiction between the ideal of direct participatory democracy ... and the communist ideal of economic organization which is based on a settled plan and completely eliminates 'the anarchy of the market' ... might also be formulated as a contradiction between democratic self-government (presupposing decentralized decision making) and freedom as mastery over collective fate (presupposing rational planning and a highly centralized planning agency)" (p. 339). But neither this idea, nor Walicki's notion that Marx confused freedom with action, is dealt with adequately: Walicki *says* what he needs to *show*. The railing and flailing about Marx's supposed millenarianism, soteriological myth, secular gnosis, and self-deification, which is what we get in place of the needed analysis, are not an argument but an alibi. Neither Walicki's nor Kolakowski's use of such an approach is going to convince anyone who thinks the notion of a *secular religion* (or that other warmed-over standby, *totalitarian democracy*) is simply a contradiction in terms.

The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Edited by Stephen K. White. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 354p. $59.95 cloth. $17.95 paper.

Steven Best, *University of Texas at El Paso*

If one is searching for a contemporary Hegel, one need look no further than Jürgen Habermas. He continues to be one of the most prolific, encyclopedic, and influential social theorists of recent decades. His works have generated a veritable Habermas industry, with followers worldwide taking up his problems, concepts, and style. This phenomenon has had mixed results: while generating good research and setting high standards of rigor, it has also seduced many academics farther and farther away from their communities and concrete political issues into an abstruse and esoteric theory available only to the cognoscente.

The *Cambridge Companion to Habermas* aptly demonstrates the ambiguity of the Habermas phenomenon. It includes a dozen well-written essays by some leading contemporary theorists on the topics of modernity, communicative rationality, discourse ethics, democracy, justice, the contemporary relevance of Marx, the postmodern critique of modern theory, and the ever-difficult problem of identity and difference. Yet the book as a whole rarely breaks free from Habermas's cumbersome jargon to validate its relevance to various crises in our contemporary world.

In our current postmodern climate, Habermas is a mighty defender of the progressive achievements of the Enlightenment and modernity, in particular democratic norms, universal values, and the standpoint of critical rationality. First taking up arms against positivism and its reduction of reason to a domineering instrumental rationality, as opposed to a "communicative rationality," or "discourse ethics," that raises normative validity claims and seeks social consensus over democratic norms, Habermas found a new enemy in postmodernism in the 1980s. Since then, he has engaged in major polemics with postmodernists like Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault, in an attempt to counter their irrationalism and antimodernism and salvage the noble and "incomplete" heritage of the modern Enlightenment.

While Habermas's polemics have had sound motivations, they are not unproblematic. Numerous critics have countered that Habermas is too reliant on a naive rationalism, that he provides a dubious basis for a renewed foundationalism, and that his attempt to rescue universal values is overly totalizing. These and other problems are well explored in this collection.

Romand Coles compares the ethical positions of Habermas and fellow Frankfurt School theorist Theodor Adorno. Seemingly, we have an antithetical relationship here, for Adorno is the champion of "negative dialectics" and nontotalizable difference, while Habermas defends the need for discursive consensus and the universal standpoint. Yet Coles shows that Habermas does not deny the value of plurality and that Adorno, rather than renouncing the ideal of consensus, "situates it antagonistically in juxtaposition with the competing pull of dissent" (p. 34). It is through Adorno's work, Cole argues, that we can achieve a more complex, satisfactory, and realistic notion of consensus, one that appreciates, more than Habermas allows, ambiguity, oblique meanings, and ineliminable existential distances.

Similarly, while embracing Habermas's goal of discovering means for democratic consensus through rational debate and dialogue, in a process that discovers common interests and universal norms, J. Donald Moon finds that difference and conflict are deeper than Habermas allows. Against postmodernists, Moon agrees with Habermas that there might well be grounds for identifying common interests and norms, but they would be the more limited, negative grounds of what constitutes a damaged life, rather than the more complex, positive vision of the "good life." More pessimistic than Habermas on the possibility of consensus, Moon claims that there are "reasons to believe that some norms could be validated through discourse, but it is far from obvious that they would be sufficient to settle the conflicts that arise in a pluralist world" (p. 152).

Mark Warren defends Habermas from misreadings that argue he has too strong a notion of consensus. For Warren, Habermas's goal is not to force rigid consensus, but rather to provide a rational basis for an argumentative process that allows for differences and disagreements. Yet, Warren argues, Habermas's ideal of discursive democracy is too rationalistic, failing to incorporate affective dimensions of the self. This results in "an overly optimistic account of the motivational powers of reason, even under ideal circumstances" (p. 181).

Thus, one could say Habermas begs a key question: Why would individuals be rational in the first place—rather than remaining complacently and stubbornly attached to their prejudices and self-serving interests or resorting to coercion and violence to settle their differences? While Habermas realizes there may be unconscious resistances and ideological blockages, Warren argues, he does not adequately incorporate such insights into his theory of discursive democracy. Rather than abandon Habermas's theory, Warren attempts to reconstruct it by incorporating therapeutic considerations *into the deal of autonomy and democratic model.* In doing so, Warren cautions against believing that inner experience can be exhausted in clear, rational language and trying to perfectly fit the private self with public expressions.

Tracy Strong and Frank Sposito explore the weaknesses of Habermas's notion of discourse through his relation to Kant. In an original and intriguing reading of Kant, they argue that he not only anticipated Habermas's theory of communicative rationality, but had a complex appreciation for the problem of incomprehensibility and otherness (especially as posed in the aesthetic vision of the genius). Despite Habermas's heavy reliance on Kant, they argue, he did not retain the tension in Kant's thought between universality and otherness. Rather than reject postmodernists as the enemy, a move they argue is conditioned by Habermas's own German experience with National Socialism, they argue he should embrace their emphasis on difference and otherness and retain the tensions in Kant's thought. Following up on this suggestion, Axel Honneth argues for a postmodern ethics of difference that overcomes problems associated with the abstract universalism of the modern idea of "equal treatment."

Max Pensky reminds us that Habermas is not *merely* an abstract thinker. This mistaken perception is far more prevalent in the United States than in Habermas's native Germany, where, as an engaged intellectual, he has intervened in numerous political issues, such as asylum rights, German reunification, and the "historian's debate," where he repudiated attempts to normalize the nation's Nazi past. Against other critics, such as John Dryzek who argues that "Habermas himself has shown little interest in [applying] critical theory in practice, preferring to confine his discussion of critical social science to the epistemological and metatheoretical level" (pp. 99–100), Pensky claims that Habermas has struggled to bring his theoretical and political writings into closer relation with one another.

If one is wondering more specifically about Habermas's politics, Nancy Love argues in "What's Left of Marx?" that despite his sustained criticism of Marx's historical materialism, Habermas remains a socialist. Since his early work, Habermas has broken with the "productivism" in Marx that reduces interhuman dynamics to the human-nature relation and a philosophy of labor. Against this, Habermas has insisted on the autonomy of communicative interaction and has stressed the ways in which Marx's labor theory of value is obsolete in late capitalism.

Love clarifies some facets of this critique, but mutes the continued importance of Marx's economic analysis of capitalism, particularly core concepts like exploitation and commodification. Habermas's socialism, she argues, is grounded in the spirit of institutional critique, rather than in any particular ideological commitments or a defense of "actually existing socialism," both of which Love claims to be unresurrectable. Rather lamely, Love argues that what is left of Marx for Habermas is the "conviction that 'people can be more human than their society permits' " (p. 63). Of course, this belief is compatible with liberalism, or most other political ideologies for that matter, and she fails to bring out the extent to which Habermas attempts to transform key Marxian concepts, such as alienation, within a communicative framework. Nor does she explore the ways in which, in fact, Habermas's politics oscillate between liberalism and socialism.

Pensky correctly claims that "the *universalism* that lies at the heart of Habermasian theory remains an empty abstraction unless it can be reconstituted within the context of a concrete lifeworld" (p. 67). This, indeed, defines the central task for Habermas's future endeavors and those who find important insights in his theoretical labyrinth. While Dryzek fails to mention Habermas's more concrete political writings and interventions, he usefully points to numerous cases—e.g., Daniel Hallin's critique of American mass media—where Habermas's analyses can be and have been usefully applied.

Similarly, Simone Chambers shows, in the case of the Canadian constitutional debate, that while rational public opinion and will formation are extremely important ideals, they are inordinately difficult to achieve in practice. While her essay and Dryzek's do break through to practical considerations, no essay in the book takes note of *economic* institutions to analyze how capitalism fosters divisions among people and thwarts the democratic process, and thus the discussions remain overly abstract and idealized.

Although hardly a good introduction to Habermas's work, this work is an excellent tool for advanced students of Habermas, and it raises crucial questions that are relevant for anyone concerned with the theoretical and practical problems of democracy, such as relate to the problem of balancing consensus and dissent, universality and particularity, and the ability of people to attain the "communicative rationality" that Habermas rightly identifies as the basis of a healthy democracy. The book clearly shows not only the profound contributions Habermas makes to democratic theory, but also some serious problems in his work and the extent to which his massive theoretical apparatus still needs to be discussed in relation to concrete social and political issues.

American Politics

Financing the 1992 Election. By Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. 313p. $55.00 cloth, $18.50 paper.

Frank J. Sorauf, *University of Minnesota*

This is the latest volume in one of the oldest and most important continuing series in the study of American politics. Beginning with *Financing the 1960 Election* (1962), Herbert Alexander has chronicled the campaign finance of the presidential years every four years to this present volume's 1992. While all nine volumes have focused on the presidential campaigns of the year, both before and after the nominating conventions, recent ones have included more materials on the congressional campaigns. Taken together the *Financing* series constitutes a unique resource about the funding of our most visible and important electoral campaigns.

In the early years of sporadic candidate reporting to clerks in the House and Senate, these volumes were data archives and Alexander was the archivist. They bulged with lists of major contributors and party or campaign committees. After Congress greatly tightened the reporting of campaign spending in 1974 and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) began to collect and make data available in 1976, this series no longer had to be a compendium of basic data. The volumes have therefore become briefer and more evaluative. Nonetheless, they have remained the authoritative reports on presidential campaign finance that the profession and the outside world have come to rely on.

The volume on the 1992 campaigns is an example of the series at its best. It draws freely and fully on the FEC data on giving and spending in federal elections, but it does more than that. Alexander and his Citizens' Research Foundation have gathered additional data, concerning, for example, categories of spending, the use of polling, candidate fundraising strategies, and spending by labor unions. And they have brought data together from different sources into new aggregates and totals. The Alexander estimates of total spending in all national, state, and local elections are surely the most reliable and relied upon totals of quadrennial campaign money.

The strength of this volume, as of its predecessors, is in the data and the detail. It is both reference book and supplement to all of those books on the presidential races that ignore, in varying degrees, the financing of them. Alexander offers little theorizing, but there are opinions and judgments aplenty. His analytical contributions tend to be in definitions, concepts, and the ordering of data. For instance, his way of looking at the presidential campaign as three campaigns—those of the candidates themselves, the independent spenders, and the state parties fueled by soft money—clarifies the matter considerably. But these volumes are frankly narratives and chronicles, and Alexander's success in documenting what happened is what makes them so valuable.

Beginning with the 1980 book, Alexander has added coauthors who have brought special strengths to the collaboration. This year's coauthor, Anthony Corrado, contributes a splendid chapter on that most arcane of topics: soft money. Lucid, orderly, and authoritative, this chapter reflects the new data on soft money transactions that the FEC has been collecting since 1991. Nor are the policy issues slighted, for one cannot talk about soft money without talking about the vitality of grassroots politics or the increasing centralization of power within the parties. In short, the chapter ought to be read by all who must pronounce on the subject, whether they do so in the national media, in political science journals, or in Pol Sci 1.

Along with Corrado's chapter, the book's great strengths are the narrative chapters tracing the 1992 presidential race from the first stirrings of candidacy through the general election. These are chapters of rich detail, in which the raising and spending of money is always placed within the atmosphere and dynamic of the broader campaign. Here, too, the idiosyncracies of the candidates and their campaigns are fully recalled; the underfinanced eccentricity of the scramble for the Democratic nomination is evoked with special vividness. There is also a fine and detailed chapter on the media in the campaign. While the chapter on reform is a useful and very specific account of attempts at congressional legislation from the late 1980s through 1994, the authors avoid dealing at length with the major reform options.

All of these excellences will not necessarily disarm every critic, and I have a few differences of my own with the authors. I would define and conceptualize a little differently at several points. For instance, I am uncomfortable with a concept of the "costs of electing a president, 1992" (p. 20), which includes expenditures external to the candidates, such as labor spending on internal communications and voter mobilization. Once one ventures into indirect costs, where is one to draw the line? Why not include income lost by candidates or the value of volunteered labor? But the beauty of Alexander's work is that one always knows what the components of an aggregate are and is always able, therefore, to reaggregate.

I might also add that I occasionally had reservations about some of the judgments. Alexander sets a very high standard for regulatory legislation and regulatory processes, and he blows a quick whistle when it is slipshod or only partially successful. After adding up the soft money, labor, and compliance spending in 1992—none of it prohibited by the 1974 legislation that limits candidate spending if they take public financing—he concludes that the "candidates' spending limitations . . . are not effective" (p. 117). Yet it seems to me that they are, especially since it was only direct spending by the candidates that the limitations were applied to. Congress did put limits on the compliance expenditures (e.g., legal and accounting fees), but it has yet to limit the sums of soft money or the expenditures of private groups in the campaign.

None of these quibbles, however, detracts from the importance of the work, both the series and its latest volume. There is not much in the study of American politics that merits the word "indispensable," but these nine volumes do.

Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946–1992. By Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 151p. $49.95.

S. Sidney Ulmer, *University of Kentucky*

Does the Supreme Court ever overrule a precedent? Of course it does. It once overruled fifty in a single case, five of which were its own, merely in order to change a rule of statutory construction (Owen J. Roberts, *Helvering* v. *Hallock*, 309 U.S. 129–130, 1940). Are such decisions capricious? Or whimsical? Or an attempt to get rid of *bad law*? Brenner and Spaeth think they have a better answer. In *Stare Indecisis*, they present a full-length empirical study of how and why the Supreme Court has altered its precedents in the period covered by its 1948–91 terms. Their primary theoretical question is "Why do the justices in the overturning and overturned cases vote the way they do?" (p. 109).

Adopting a critical posture, the authors first survey relevant work in the area going back to 1959. Some of the judgments made in this and other sections may bruise a few egos. Are the authors diplomatic? No. Do they have sharp elbows? Yes. But they are careful to spell out why the research designs and findings of earlier scholars are unacceptable—acknowledging, at the same time, that their own research decisions are not perfect. This is a refreshing plus. The downside is that meaningful comparisons with earlier findings are somewhat limited.

Using their own decision rules, Brenner and Spaeth identify 115 overruling cases that formally altered 154 precedents. They then employ cumulative scaling and correlation analysis to derive an answer to their inquiry. Essentially, they insert an overruling case into a scale of cases representing a particular policy question. If the insertion does not destroy the scale, they infer that the attitude of the justices toward the assumed scalar variable determines the choices of the justices whose votes were scale-consistent. Nonscale votes are considered responses to some other variable dimension.

Some carping is possible here if one is so inclined. The authors provide neither the scales from which they drew their inferences nor the votes of the justices in the overruling cases. These omissions rule out any serious effort at replication. It is suggested that a justice's nonscale vote may reflect an attitude toward precedent. Why not a scaled vote? Brenner and Spaeth's logical disposition of that question may not satisfy all skeptics. In addition, we are not told whether there exists a set of overruling cases that would scale on overruling per se. I recognize that the overruling cases are distributed over more than forty terms. But the 1975 and 1976 terms combined show 12 overruling cases. Were these or other sets of cases to scale, the author's findings might be confounded.

I write as one who, while not having done any cumulative scaling in decades, had his own tarriance with such techniques in more youthful days. But cumulative scaling, like all methods of analysis, has its own characteristics or deficiencies that must be recognized. Though not stated as such by the authors, the null hypothesis for the book's Guttman-type scales is (H_0): There is no significant consistency in the responses of the justices to the values inherent in the cases chosen for scaling. (H_1) is the alternate.

The scaling techniques used by Brenner and Spaeth may produce a confident suspicion that attitudes drive behavior and may even persuade one to reject the null hypothesis. But they cannot, as the authors recognize, tell us what attitudinal variables cause the justices to vote the way they do. Furthermore, simple correlation methods, as a means to repair the deficiency, are not very robust in evaluating hypotheses. Thus, one may wonder if the authors sought out and rejected competing methods of analysis and, if so, why. Or did they consider whether some other hypothesis might have been more appropriate for the inquiry of interest.

The authors answer their theoretical inquiry with the proposition that Supreme Court justices "vote as they do" because of ideologically driven personal policy preferences. Conceding that *stare decisis* may also play some role, they find it much less satisfactory in accounting for the voting patterns examined. Indeed, they suggest in the final two sentences of their text that "it is time to stop assuming that legal variables are important in the Court's decision making . . .[and] start testing whether these variables are, in fact, important" (p. 111).

Are the author's conclusions going to trigger any cardiac arrests? No. It is common knowledge that personal policy preferences impact the justices' decisions in certain situations and that these decisions are not merely responses to constituencies. We know also that legal principles do not decide all cases. The authors would add that overruling cases are not exceptions to these general propositions.

Putting all such questions aside, however, I think this book has a good deal of merit. It has considerable value as a compendium of data dealing with the Court's use of precedent. It is also notable for the implicit questions it raises; e.g., are there exceptions to the proposition that attitudes motivate behavior? If so, what are they and how do we explain them?

The book is also important for the general question it raises about legal variables. It is quite clear that we have not been as industrious in evaluating the impact of legal principles on Supreme Court decision making as we have in validating attitudinal models. When belief in legal principle ruled the day, as it did in the discipline before Pritchett, there was a certain attraction in subverting, or at least enlarging, the status quo by developing new answers to old questions. (How else can young scholars move ahead so rapidly?) But to verify that attitude toward policy issues has explanatory value establishes little about other influences on decision making. These other influences must be studied with the same interest, alacrity, and insight as attitudinalists have exhibited if we are to attain a balanced knowledge of the factors pushing decisions one way or the other.

The authors' call for testing whether legal variables are important is quite timely. The challenge is to develop and test empirical hypotheses focused on specific legal variables. This has been done successfully for jurisdictional decisions, using *conflict in the circuits* and *conflict with Supreme Court precedent* as key variables. I can think of no probative reason why a shift to decisions on the merits should lead to lesser expectations.

To sum up, Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth are prolific and productive scholars who over the years have enriched our discipline prodigiously. In their latest work they have made imaginative forays into some nooks and crannies of Supreme Court behavior that have not received much recent attention. The result is a book that will be a necessary reference and starting point for all who would further enlarge our knowledge of a very craggy vineyard.

The Conundrum of Class: Public Discourse on the Social Order in America. By Martin J. Burke. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 303pp. $16.95.

Ira Katznelson, *Columbia University*

This valuable survey of the discursive deployment of class in American politics and society from the colonial period through the nineteenth century (initially a dissertation in American Studies) is aimed at providing scholars in the social sciences and the humanities with a better object of analysis. Starting from the premise that class is an essentially contested concept, Burke works inductively to reconstruct the ways in which America's literate elites, writing in newspapers and popular periodicals, conceptualized and disputed class and class relations.

The text's strategy seeks to leap over and ignore the long-standing debates about definitions and theoretical orientations among students of stratification. Burke deploys no orienting theoretical abstractions. Instead, he identifies a knowledge and communication elite who have the means and capacity to orient and diffuse a public conversation and who transmit cultural images that they both create and reflect. In a herculean effort (the book's extensive notes and bibliography occupy virtually as much space as the text itself), Burke traces the character of their rhetoric by extensively searching and reading systematically in eighteenth and nineteenth century periodicals, pamphlets, government hearings, speeches, and other forums. The analysis of this material is grounded in the path-breaking scholarship tracing semantic changes of key concepts pioneered by Reinhart Koselleck, which sees such meanings as both cause and effect of other historical processes. The discussion is organized to demonstrate that each epoch of American history has possessed its own distinctive dominant narrative about the character and meaning of class.

The result is an immensely useful chronicle. Burke shows both the impossibility of eliding class, an important category Americans have routinely deployed to give meaning to everyday experience, and the price paid by the imposition of experience-distant categories imposed on the rich array of historical evidence. For students of labor and working class history in particular, this book should rightly introduce a degree of unease both into the older materialist strand, which tends to treat rhetoric as a product of deeper causes and which has possessed a model of correct class consciousness, and into the postmodern linguistic turn, which has evanesced the ties that bind language to social, political, and economic structures and processes.

The appeal of Burke's effort lies in his implicit rejection of these alternatives, in his insistence on time-bound configurations, and in his agnosticism about hierarchies of causation. Nonetheless, the willful transcendence in *The Conundrum of Class* of difficult theoretical and causal issues does not come without a price. Because Burke refuses to deploy a perspective on class and class formation independent of his rich set of materials, he necessarily becomes hostage to them. Comprehensiveness, as far as I can tell, is the only guide he has used to collect his data (assisted in this quest by such aids as Hoornstra and Heath's *American Periodicals, 1741–1900* and *Poole's Index*). Yet, as this is not an encyclopedia but an interpretive text, the broad compass of his evidence cannot substitute for theory as a guide to the selection of materials and the structuring of the narrative. In the absence of theoretical choices, the character of the data set is very hard to assess, as are the principles we know must be present to inform the pruning and organization of this mass of material. But as no principles are announced or examined, there is no visible analytical structure connecting the harvesting of texts and the author's periodized account.

As a check on overly simple or linear stories, Burke's unwillingness to place causal bets is refreshing; but taken as far as he has, it is also infirming. After all, every periodization scheme either is driven by a coherent view of history and change or becomes a superficial packaging device. Each of Burke's chapters describes a dominant, even hegemonic, pattern of rhetoric about class. The focus shifts from the mutually constitutive nature of class and citizenship to productive labor, the reconcilability of class conflict or the harmony of interests, and the combat between labor and capital. In the absence of clearly stated and necessarily theoretical selection criteria, how are we to credit these claims about hierarchies of relations among divergent, conflicting tendencies at any single historical moment? I yearned to know more about how Burke views the relationship between elite and mass culture; about the connections between class and other popular bases of identity; about the relationship between language and narrative; about connections between the repertoire of possibilities at a given time and mechanisms of selection within that repertoire; about the status of periodization; and, above all, about how Burke would like us to think about the intentional and nonintentional elements that produce change from one discursive configuration to another. Burke is persuasive in letting us see how categories of class were naturalized by a wide array of actors at specific moments; but that is no reason to naturalize his analysis. In the absence of a coherent account of relations among language, experience, agency, structure, and process, however, this is where we end up. It is possible, of course, to argue that narratives themselves provide this join, but such a claim, one likely to be congenial to the author, is not deployed here.

I could carp further. How is it possible to tell the story of class in America without noting its imbrication with the language of race and ethnicity? Can we tell this tale virtually exclusively as male discourse? Is it really possible to discuss social order in the United States while being silent about regional differentiation or about the wide array of lived experiences of material, spatial, and social relations? Such caveats notwithstanding, the book's diligent research and claims about the changing and complex modal standings of class in the American experience enriches the subject and challenges scholars who do not share the author's analytical proclivities to think harder, even to think again.

Trustworthy Government: Leadership and Management Strategies for Building Trust and High Performance. By David G. Carnevale. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995. 233p. $27.50.

Frank J. Thompson, *State University of New York at Albany*

Potential readers of this book should from the start be aware of two of its characteristics. First, the volume does not focus on trustworthy government in the broadest sense. Instead, it zeroes in on trust *within* organizations as the central problem that must be solved to achieve better performance by public agencies. Second, the tone of the book is hortatory, or, as the author puts it, "passionate" (p. xii). Carnevale mingles his review of the literature on organizational trust with strong convictions that government agencies face major deficits of trust brought on by an outmoded commitment to the bureaucratic model.

These features acknowledged, the book deserves serious attention by those interested in public administration, organization theory, and, more generally, opportunities to enhance the performance of governmental institutions. At a time when many scholars have become attracted to the principal-agent model, with its emphasis on the need to control underlings who will shirk, distort information, and engage in other wayward behavior, a book that hammers home the importance of internal organizational trust is welcome indeed.

In the first part of the volume, Carnevale makes a strong case that trust is the "hidden ingredient" in high-performance agencies. He reviews various definitions of trust, summarizing it finally "as faith or confidence in the intentions and actions of a person or group to be ethical, fair, and nonthreatening concerning the rights and interests of others in social exchange relationships" (p. 20). Carnevale contends that low-trust organizations suffer from many impediments to higher performance. Above all, they fuel fear, defensive routines, and related dynamics that block employees from continuous learning.

In the second part of the book, Carnevale conducts a workmanlike review of certain keys to building trustworthy organizations. In this regard, he shines his spotlight on strategies for leadership, employee participation and involvement, effective communication, equitable performance appraisal and incentive systems, and the sensible management of power, politics, and conflict within organizations. These chapters draw from a substantial body of literature—especially that focused on organizational behavior and development—to etch a more detailed vision of a high-trust agency.

The third section of the book calls for "liberating public organizations" by "transcending the bureaucratic machine." This section opens with an excellent chapter on reinventing training in order to achieve a new learning paradigm for organizations. Carnevale goes beyond the customary call for more training to upgrade the skills base of public agencies. Instead, he emphasizes that learning must be continuous and feature critical self-reflection as its principal objective. The new training paradigm encourages employees to think critically, to learn on their own, and to use what they know. Carnevale concludes this section of the book with a call for "democratic administration"—a form of administration, which, among other things, facilitates trust by providing employees with abundant opportunities for meaningful involvement in agency decisions.

The hortatory, provocative style of *Trustworthy Government* will no doubt stiffen the backs of some who read it. Carnevale occasionally crosses the line from social scientist to preacher, ignoring the complexities and subtleties of the topic. But his fundamental thesis is sound and the volume takes the reader beyond the conventional wisdom on how to improve the performance of public agencies. Others have also recognized the importance of organizational trust, but Carnevale appropriately pushes the concept to center stage in the current debate about revitalizing public management.

Moreover, Carnevale's work points to an important agenda for additional research on issues of trust within public organizations. Critical questions beg for attention. How can we better conceptualize and measure trust? To what degree do different kinds of public sector agencies experience low levels of trust? How do these levels compare with those in the private sector? How strong is the relationship between lower scores on measures of internal organizational trust and higher rankings on indices of bureaucratization?

Even more fundamentally, the book suggests the need to wrestle with the important problem of whether high-trust public agencies can thrive in low-trust societies. In this regard, much evidence indicates that citizens' trust in government in the United States has slumped over the last three decades. Even more disturbing, this decline appears to be part of a broader social trend. People not only have less confidence in government, but also harbor more skepticism about an array of other institutions and about each other. If this depletion of social capital is in fact occurring, it poses profound problems for those seeking to create high-trust, learning agencies in government. A low-trust society will, for instance, fuel tendencies to heap more and more rules and controls on administrative agencies that will in turn erode their capacity and competence.

Ultimately, we need to learn much more about the particular circumstances under which governments can foster high-trust public agencies in a low-trust society. As part of this inquiry, we should probe which leadership and management strategies are hearty enough to be effective in such a corrosive environment. David Carnevale deserves much credit for forging a bridgehead from which to explore these and related issues.

Urban Innovation: Creative Strategies for Turbulent Times. Edited by Terry Nichols Clark. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1995. 264p. $49.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Robert M. Stein, *Rice University*

It has been ten years since Terry Clark and his colleagues from the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project began their cross-national study of local governments. In the ensuing decade an enormous amount of data has been collected that chronicles the efforts of cities throughout the world to adjust to the changing political, social, and economic environment in which these cities govern. A generous output of publications has originated from the project, including the most recent volume, *Urban Innovation: Creative Strategies for Turbulent Times.*

This edited volume is a departure from past publications that focused on narrow policy issues. The volume features six original essays and provides a broad challenge to many of the extant theories in the field of urban politics and public policy. The product is a large amount of data analysis on a wide range of topics, including race and class in urban politics, party organization in urban public policy, antigrowth movements, the growth of urban government, intergovernmental aid to cities, and service contracting. However, though provocative, the overall effect of this volume is uneven. The empirical analysis in a number of pieces is inconclusive. In other chapters we are left with a great deal of undigested information, which might, under more careful scrutiny, produce greater understanding of the issues under study.

The volume is organized around three central issues: the nature of demand in the urban setting, policy choices of urban/local government, and coping with policy choices under conditions of limited resources. Terry Clark's piece on race and class and Rowan Miranda's essay on parties and hierarchy comprise part one of the volume.

Clark finds the influence that race and class have had on the urban political landscape has declined over the past 25 years. Rivaling class and race among the forces shaping urban political discourse is a *new political culture*, where politics of the environment, growth management, gay rights, and abortion have supplanted concern with the workspace, jobs, and issues of class politics. Clark goes on to identify cities with weak political and social hierarchies as the most fertile setting for the new political culture. Political and social hierarchies spark political organizations, conflict, and ideological differences. When these rigidities are absent in urban governance, citizens are less likely to organize around class and racial lines and their leaders are less likely to respond to these interest group pressures. Not surprisingly, Clark finds that new social movements are most pronounced among cities with affluent, young, better educated, and white residents.

The empirical evidence for Clark's new political culture is, however, limited and largely confined to survey responses of urban leaders about their own policy preferences and those of their constituents. Moreover, the policy impact of less hierarchical governance and the new political culture is found to be minimal. Beyond the paucity of empirical evidence for Clark's thesis is a more troubling issue of causality. Clark is unclear as to whether the absence of hierarchical governance leads to the decline of race and class as important cleavages in urban government or whether this new political order arises in cities dominated by younger, more educated, and more affluent persons. Untangling these complex relationships would go a long way toward understanding the consequences of Clark's new political culture for urban public policy.

Rowan Miranda's piece on the strong party organization thesis is a systematic, though not altogether satisfying, test of a long-standing hypothesis in the urban policy literature. Strong party organizations are thought to impose fiscal discipline on urban governments, preventing profligate spending that cannot be avoided in cities with clientelist-oriented politics. In the absence of strong party organizations, cities cannot resist diverse interest group demands for increasing government spending. As expected, clientelist politics is positively related to a wider scope of functional responsibilities and spending. Miranda's test of this hypothesis is slightly flawed by his awkward operationalization of clientelist/machine politics. His proxy for this concept is the percentage of population of Irish stock. Yet, however strong the historical tie between Irish immigration and clientelist politics, its contemporary relevance remains theoretically unclear and empirically ambiguous. Moreover, this finding raises the possibility that the institutional legacy of clientelist politics remains long after its progenitors have left the urban scene.

Part two of the book focuses on the policy choices of urban governments. Clark and Goetz examine one of the oldest beliefs about urban government, namely that all growth is good. The authors report that more than a quarter of the cities they surveyed reported adoption of some type of growth-limiting policy. An empirical effort to explain these policy adoptions focuses on the obvious: Cities with more active organized groups opposing growth adopt more growth-limiting policies. Interspersed throughout this chapter are thumbnail case studies of cities that have adopted growth-limiting legislation. These case studies are richer and suggestive of a more nuanced explanation of antigrowth policies than is provided in the authors' own empirical analysis. The interaction between political culture, interest group activism, and political structure (i.e., hierarchy) is evident in the case studies but unexamined in the empirical analysis.

Miranda and Walzer's analysis of spending and employment practices of urban governments during the period 1970–89 is standard fare, with one interesting twist: "The most striking finding was the importance of the black sector in increasing expenditures during the 1970s, although not in the 1980s" (p. 160). Thus, preceding a period of significant fiscal retrenchment, race had a significant and positive effect on urban expenditures and public employment. After the Reagan revolution, however, race had a significantly diminished effect on the outputs of urban government. Obviously, the time period studied is itself a unique, independent force on urban policy. The aforementioned finding is consistent with Clark's new political culture and intriguing for what it suggests about the future role of race in urban government.

The third and final part of this book examines how cities have coped with fiscal stress, particularly the cutbacks in federal and state funding during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Calvin Clark and Oliver Walter's piece, "Cuts, Cultures, and City Limits in Reagan's New Federalism," is an excellent summary and update of previous research on the effects of federal aid cutbacks on urban public policy. The dreadful predictions about financial crisis did not occur in the short run because of a combination of factors, including the adoption of austerity measures, an increase in state aid, and the economic recovery of the 1980s. Clark and Walter's findings also provide an indication of what we can expect if the Republican 104th Congress succeeds in devolving more policy authority to states. The authors found that "the growing importance of state aid ultimately destroyed the progressive nature of the overall system of fiscal federalism" (p. 191).

Miranda's study of service contracting addresses an internal means that cities have employed to inoculate themselves against exogenous fiscal pressures. Miranda asks a simple, but essential, question about service contracting: "If there are expenditure and employment reductions from contracting some services, are they linked with some sectors more than others (i.e., private, nonprofit, or governmental)?" (p. 198) His findings are anything but expected. Contracting with nonprofits is found to be the most efficient sector. Miranda's explanation for this finding takes direct aim at the most cited justification for market-oriented service delivery—the profit motive. Rather than relying on the pecuniary motivations of nongovernment service vendors, Miranda suggests, nonprofits may indeed be less likely to take advantage of information asymmetries when bargaining with city officials. The importance of this finding is that it shows that the nonpecuniary motivation of nonprofit service contractors can produce significant efficiency gains for the contracting government.

Clark and his colleagues have written a rich, if not always even, volume of new research. They have placed their new work squarely before the extant literature and, where appropriate, have attempted to show and remedy deficiencies they see in contemporary urban policy research. As a teaching tool, this volume would be an excellent text for courses in urban politics and public policy. Each chapter provides a thorough review of the relevant literature. The reader is given a perspective from which to evaluate the contribution of each chapter and its implications within the larger discipline of pubic policy and urban politics.

Government Lawyers: The Federal Legal Bureaucracy and Presidential Politics. Edited by Cornell W. Clayton. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 292p. $35.00.

Herbert M. Kritzer, *University of Wisconsin—Madison*

At least from the time of Alexis de Tocqueville, commentators and observers have recognized the apparently large role played by lawyers in American politics and government. With a few noteworthy exceptions, until the last decade there has actually been surprisingly little systematic, empirical research on lawyers in government and politics (at least outside obvious areas such as the courts and criminal justice processes). This volume, edited by Cornell Clayton, brings together a series of essays on high-level executive branch lawyers and the roles they play in policymaking processes. The contributions cover the attorney general, the solicitor general, independent counsel, agency general counsel offices, independent agency legal officials, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and the White House Office of the Counsel to the President. Some chapters focus on one of these areas, while others compare relationships across two or more.

In the introductory chapter, Clayton suggests two major themes that make the question of government lawyers as lawyers interesting and important: first, the role of lawyers in navigating separation of powers issues and, second, the role of lawyers in trying to prevent partisan loyalty from becoming partisan abuse. Inherent in these themes are the traditional dilemmas of the law/politics dichotomy and the tension between professional detachment and client/patron interest. Clayton argues that understanding the processes and politics of legal policymaking involves merging the insights of the "policy science literature" and the "law journal literature." This set of themes and perspectives provides the framework for potentially interesting analyses and insights. Sadly, many of the chapters fail to live up to that potential, and Clayton does not provide the reader with a concluding chapter that tries to tie together the rather disparate discussions. Furthermore, even though the focus is on *lawyers*, Clayton and his chapter authors have failed to see the potential importance of yet a third large, diverse literature that deals specifically with the legal profession.

Several of the chapter authors have recently published books on the topic of their contributions (i.e., Nancy Baker on the attorney general, Rebecca Salokar on the solicitor general, and Katy Harriger on the federal special prosecutor), and others have book manuscripts under development (e.g., Michael Strine on the presidential counsel), and this type of detailed knowledge of the offices is clear in all of the discussions. Most chapters take what can best be described as an institutional approach to the task of description and analysis; one author describes his approach as a rational-choice perspective, although the relevance of that perspective for much of the chapter is somewhat vague. Overall, as is often the case with collections of this type, the chapters are uneven in quality and insight, although even the weaker chapters are useful introductions for someone interested in basic information on a particular entity.

The unevenness is most apparent in two of the chapters authored by persons who have published book-length treatments of their subjects. These chapters read largely as cut down versions of the longer works. They do not seem to have a strong theoretical frame, perhaps because of the authors' perception that they needed to cover a lot of different themes in a short space. Harriger's chapter on the independent counsel (special prosecutors), however, does not suffer from this problem. Rather than trying to summarize her larger work, she has chosen to focus specifically on the question of whether there is too much potential for abuse of power by independent counsel. She concludes that the issue of abuse by special prosecutors does not arise "in the independence of the office but rather in the nature of prosecutorial discretion possessed by all prosecutors, independent or not" (p. 85).

Another problem shows up in Nelson Lund's discussion of the conflict between the White House Office of the Counsel to the President (commonly called the "White House counsel") and the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. While Lund posits a rational-choice framework, much of the discussion in this chapter deals with narratives of a series of incidents. Lund follows the narratives with some discussion of differences of perspective between the two offices and some speculations on motivations underlying actions or interactions (e.g., "the fear of such embarrassment is the likeliest cause of the Justice Department's failure to change its position," p. 237). Interestingly, the conclusion to this chapter has much more to do with broad policy patterns than it has to do with the role played by lawyers in the formulation or advancement of policy positions. It is hard to see what exactly Lund gains from rational choice theory.

A similar problem appears in Neal Devins's chapter on legal policymaking at independent agencies. This chapter opens with a discussion of the issue of independent litigating authority (i.e., an agency's ability to represent itself in court rather than relying on lawyers from the Justice Department to appear on its behalf), a long-standing source of tension between the agencies (both independent and departmental) and the Justice Department. Devins then launches directly into descriptions of two case studies involving the EEOC and the FCC, without explaining exactly what the reader should be learning from those descriptions. The chapter ends with a brief comparison of the two agencies' experience and a brief conclusion that returns to the dilemma of independent litigating authority. In the end, the chapter really tells us nothing about government lawyers.

Jeremy Rabkin discusses the role of the White House counsel in dealing with ethics issues. Is the counsel's job to protect the president, a perspective that he suggests is what got Bernard Nussbaum into trouble? Or is it the responsibility of the counsel to take a broader view of the office of the presidency? Rabkin adopts the former position, but with the caveat that protecting the president is both a legal and a political task, and an effective White House counsel must know how to balance occasional conflicts between the political and the legal.

The best chapter in the book is Michael Strine's institutional analysis of the development of competing sources of legal counsel for the president—the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel and the White House Office of Counsel to the President—and the inevitable tensions that result. He links the development of these offices to the rise of the administrative state and considers efforts to deal with conflicts that exist. He concludes with a brief discussion of the difficulties in changing the institutional arrangements for providing legal support to the White House, the natural desire of the occupant of the Oval Office to exercise as much control as possible over his advisors, and the dilemmas this desire creates when the advisors serve both the political master and the professional master.

This point leads to what strikes me as the most significant shortcoming of the book: the failure of any of the authors to recognize the potential significance to this discussion of the large literature on lawyers outside of government. This shortcoming is most striking at junctures where the authors assert or imply that government lawyers are different from nongovernment lawyers. For example, in a chapter on agency general counsel, Michael Herz discusses the independent litigating authority issue and argues that one reason to centralize litigation but not counseling is that litigation is the only separate speciality "not defined by subject matter" (pp. 164–65). While there are certainly many private practice litigators who do not specialize substantively, most litigators do in fact specialize, limiting their interest, for example, to securities litigation, anti-trust litigation, civil rights litigation, tax litigation, personal injury litigation, or medical malpractice litigation. Herz also observes that corporations routinely handle nonlitigation matters in-house, while sending litigation to outside law firms, and that the divide between agencies and the Justice Department is similar. However, corporations increasingly handle routine litigation in-house, and much of the reason for using outside firms has to do with location: the corporation may be sued anywhere in the country, while its own lawyers are located (and admitted to practice) in one locality, and/or the issues to be litigated may involve specialized substantive (as opposed to procedural) knowledge that inside counsel does not possess. Interestingly, the reverse may be the situation with regard to agencies and the Justice Department. The agencies are more likely to have lawyers with specialized expertise distributed around the country than is the Justice Department, which is likely to have its substantive specialists concentrated in Washington (the litigators in the U.S. Attorneys' offices around the country seldom have strong substantive specialties).

Several authors touch on the theme of conflicting political and legal (i.e., professional) loyalties. The problem of conflicting loyalties—professional obligations (or financial incentives) versus clients—is one that has been dealt with extensively in the literature on the legal profession. For example, in *Partners with Power*, Nelson (1988) considers the failure of attorneys in elite law firms to refuse assignments from large corporate clients which the attorney believes might involve doubtful client actions or doubtful client motives. In *The Chicago Bar* (1982), Heinz and Laumann observe that elite legal practice does not seem to follow the model of the *collegiate occupation* described by Terence Johnson in *Professions and Power* (1972), where the producer has primary control over defining the client's needs and how those needs will be met; rather, elite lawyers follow the *patronage* model where it is the client who controls. This is due to the dependence of elite lawyers on a small client base and the relative ease with which those clients can change lawyers. It would seem that these types of insights would be directly relevant to the analysis of the role of lawyers at the highest reaches of government.

In summary, *Government Lawyers* is a useful collection of essays that provide an introduction to major legal actors in the executive branch of the federal government. For someone who wants a quick background in a range of actors, I would recommend this book. For someone seeking cutting-edge research on legal actors in government, however, this book will be disappointing.

The Speaker's Electoral Connection: Willie Brown and the California Assembly. By Richard A. Clucas. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1995. 173p. $12.95.

David Soherr-Hadwiger, *University of New Mexico*

In the last two decades, legislative campaign committees and leadership political action committees have gained prominence in congressional and state legislative elections. By the 1990s, these committees had become important sources of campaign contributions and other coordinated campaign expenditures, especially for endangered incumbents and challengers in legislative races.

Scholarly research has kept pace with these developments. Several excellent works are available on the strategies that legislative campaign committees employ in allocating campaign contributions. Unfortunately, many of these works have been primarily descriptive in nature, offering few or no theories to explain why legislative leaders allocate these funds among incumbents and nonincumbents in the way they do.

Richard Clucas's book, *The Speaker's Electoral Connection: Willie Brown and the California Assembly*, takes an important step toward the development of a general theory to explain legislative leaders' strategies in allocating campaign funds. Clucas draws on research on the U.S. Congress by Richard Fenno, David Mayhew, Gary Jacobson, Barbara Sinclair, and others to develop an overarching theoretical framework. Using this framework and a case study of the California Assembly, he produces novel insights into three questions: What factors affect legislative leaders' allocation of campaign funds? How do changes in the political context (especially intraparty struggles) affect leaders' campaign contribution strategies? What do legislative leaders demand and receive in exchange for their campaign contributions to other legislative candidates?

Unfortunately, the book's title and cover give the impression that this is a biography of Willie Brown. It is not; the book is dedicated to theory building. The concepts and findings in this book would be as informative to a study of Newt Gingrich as to studies of state legislative leaders outside California.

Clucas's theoretical framework begins with a purposive approach, assuming that legislators are goal-seeking actors whose foremost objective is reelection. Legislative leaders, on the other hand, tend to be elected from relatively safe districts and therefore place greater emphasis on the goal of retaining their leadership positions. Drawing on exchange theories of James McGregor Burns (*Leadership*, 1978) and others, Clucas argues that legislative leaders exchange various services, including campaign contributions, for continued support for their leadership among rank-and-file legislators.

When allocating campaign contributions from legislative committees, legislative leaders are attentive to the preferences of incumbents in their parties. They follow one of two possible strategies for distributing campaign funds. An incumbent-maximizing strategy allocates contributions to incumbents in order to build up their campaign warchests and discourage strong challengers. A party-maximizing strategy directs contributions to marginal incumbents, strong challengers and open-seat contests with the objective of improving the party's position in the legislature.

Clucas adds a new dimension to the extant literature with his examination of the factors that encourage legislative leaders to pursue a party-building strategy. He observes that in the Congress rank-and-file Democrats urge their leaders to pursue incumbent-maximizing strategies. By contrast, rank-and-file Democrats in the California Assembly support party-building strategies, due to the high degree of partisanship in the Assembly and the Assembly's prominent role in reapportionment. Because the California legislature oversees reapportionment, Assembly Democrats see a clear link between the collective success of the legislative party and their individual prospects for reelection. Change in party control could substantially affect the borders of legislative districts, thereby endangering the incumbents' electoral viability. This argument is persuasive in the California context, especially in light of the partisan reapportionment battle there in the 1980s.

The discussion of the congressional party campaign committees is less satisfying. Clucas's analysis here is based largely on research on congressional campaign contributions in the early 1980s. Authors such as Paul Herrnson (*Party Campaigning in the 1980s*, 1988) and David Magleby and Candice Nelson (*The Money Chase*, 1990) have shown that congressional parties have moved toward party-maximizing strategies in recent years. This shift calls for modification, but not abandonment, of Clucas's theoretical approach.

This book also explores the effect of changes in the political context—particularly the emergence of intraparty power struggles—on the Speaker's campaign contribution allocation strategy. When faced with an intraparty challenge to his leadership, the Speaker increased his activity in the primary elections and directed primary and general election campaign funds to candidates who supported his faction within the legislative party. This strategy was apparent in 1980 during a leadership struggle between Leo McCarthy and Howard Berman and again in 1988 when Willie Brown fought off an intraparty rebellion by five conservative Democratic assemblymen (the "Gang of Five"). Although Clucas does not label it such, this discussion suggests the existence of a third, *faction-maximizing* strategy for allocating leadership campaign funds.

Finally, the book offers valuable insights into the relationship between Speaker contributions to legislative candidates and support for the Speaker during the legislative session. Clucas finds that beneficiaries of the Speaker's campaign largesse express their appreciation not with floor support, but through low-profile activities, such as backing the Speaker's reelection in caucus or behind-the-scenes maneuvering on legislation. Gratitude is short-lived.

One of the more appealing aspects of the book is the care with which Clucas places his case study of the California Assembly in the context of other U.S. legislatures. His work exemplifies solid use of the case study method by conscientiously explaining the limits on the generalizability of these findings to other legislatures. He offers an agenda for future research by hypothesizing that different political contexts—especially size of a party's legislative majority and whether the legislature controls reapportionment—will affect the Speaker's strategy for allocating campaign contributions.

Also appealing is Clucas's integration of statistical analyses with an insider's understanding of the individuals and events in his case study. This combination of approaches gives insights into the nuances of campaign strategies as well as general patterns.

Working People of California. Edited by Daniel Cornford. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 503p. $50.00 cloth, $18.00 paper.

Meta Mendel-Reyes, *Swarthmore College*

As a labor organizer in California from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, I experienced personally some of both the highs and the lows of the history of working people that are recounted in this superb new anthology. In 1975 when the state legislature passed the first labor law in the country to cover agricultural workers, I was a full-time volunteer organizer with the United Farm Workers Union, whose ten years of strikes and boycotts had led to this historic event. Under the charismatic leadership of Cesar Chavez, the UFW then turned to the formidable task of organizing thousands of migrant workers of different nationalities, speaking several languages and dispersed throughout a large state, to take advantage of their first opportunity to vote for union representation. During this period, I witnessed the struggle to build and sustain a multiracial labor union that was also a democratic movement, in the face of continued opposition from the agriculture industry that was taking advantage of the national decline of organized labor.

Ten years later, as a field representative for the Service Employees International Union in Silicon Valley, I observed the often-appalling working conditions in California's fastest-growing manufacturing industry, microelectronics. Yet union efforts to organize the mostly female, minority, and immigrant workers failed miserably, with under 6% of the work force unionized today, far below the shrinking national figure of 14%. *Working People of California* appears at a moment when its subjects face their greatest challenges since the 1930s. By emphasizing both the successful and the failed struggles of the state's labor past, this comprehensive anthology makes a timely contribution to our understanding of the present and future of California's workers.

Working People of California is primarily designed to showcase recent scholarship. In his very fine introduction, Daniel Cornford reviews critically the state of the field, going well beyond mere synopses of the various contributions. Inspired by the *new social history* that emerged during the 1960s, the current generation of California scholars has only just begun to extend the traditional, institutional approach to labor history to investigate the full lives of workers on and off their jobs. According to Cornford, the "greatest achievement of the new social history has been to enhance our knowledge of the social and cultural world of the state's racial and ethnic minorities" (p. 11). To study these groups better, scholars have conducted community and case studies, focusing on a particular place, occupation, gender, or race or ethnic group over a limited period of time. The new social historians also pay attention to the many examples of resistance and empowerment, showing that the work force was "not simply a passive victim of teleological forces; rather, within certain limits, it played a significant role in shaping its own destiny" (p. 10).

The fifteen chapters are organized chronologically and thematically into five sections: Workers in California before 1900, Workers and Group Identity, Workers on Strike, Workers and Politics, and Workers in Post–World War II California. Each chapter is preceded by an editor's introduction and followed by suggestions for further reading. The first essay, by Douglas Monroy, shows that the internationalization of the California economy was as significant at the very beginning of the European conquest as it is today. Forced to rely on Native Americans for labor, unlike any other settlers of North America, the Spanish missionaries developed a near-totalitarian system of control. From the introduction of the clock to the incarceration of unmarried women, the California natives were "confined, restrained, disciplined, denaturalized" (p. 40), in short, converted into productive workers, at least until they nearly all succumbed to the diseases brought, along with Christianity, by their "saviors."

The chapters also lend themselves to fruitful comparison across sections; for instance, four essays focus on women workers in the fields, in the canneries, in the restaurants, and on the high-tech assembly lines. In "Dishing It Out," about the building of waitress unions in San Francisco during the first half of the twentieth century, Dorothy Sue Cobble tells the story of one of the first separate locals of women in the United States. Despite obstacles, including lack of skills, temporary jobs, hostile employers, and the lukewarm support of the male-dominated unions, the waitresses became powerful enough to win strikes and to push for protective legislation long before the New Deal. Unfortunately, their gains were nearly always limited to "white women only" (p. 92), because the female unionists were as hostile to nonwhite workers, especially Asians, as were their male counterparts.

The perspective of California's largest minority appears in Vicki Ruiz's essay on the female cannery workers of Southern California. Belying the stereotype of Mexican women in the kitchen or the field, 25% of the *Mexicanas* in the Southwest worked for wages as blue-collar, industrial workers. Ruiz shows how a "cannery culture," blending a women's approach to work with the Mexican emphasis on family, nurtured a particularly democratic, participatory kind of unionism. Unlike the separate waitress locals, the cannery unions included men as well as women, and Russian Jews in addition to Mexicans.

Several especially strong chapters locate the beliefs and ideologies of California's working people in the context of national politics and political culture. Cornford's contribution to the volume argues that the workers' understanding of themselves as guardians of a "democratic-republican tradition" inspired labor organizing and the formation of the California Workingman's Party in the 1860s. According to Michael Kazin, the Union Labor Party that dominated San Francisco at the turn of the twentieth century relied on a kind of "labor nationalism" that united white workers in opposition to Chinese and Japanese immigrants. James Gregory shows that a similarly narrow definition of the nation led the Dust Bowl migrants of the 1930s to reject unionization or other forms of collective action. Instead, "Plain-folk Americanism," a combination of nineteenth-century agrarian populism and early twentieth-century religious fundamentalism, stressed the values of patriotism, racial superiority, and individual toughness. The resurgence of the Religious Right in the 1990s suggests the ongoing appeal of national identity that is inclusive toward whites sharing the same values, but exclusive toward everyone else.

Karen Hossfield's study of high-tech assemblers in Silicon Valley suggests that the future of labor organizing in California is dark, due in large part to the companies' effective union-busting tactics and their willingness to relocate overseas. To have a chance in the global economy, working people and their unions must organize across the divisions of race, ethnicity, nationality, and gender that have held them back, as detailed in the chapters by Sucheng Chan on the Chinese in rural California and Charles Wollenberg on African American shipyard workers in Oakland.

However, several chapters tell of multiracial movements that did achieve success, albeit briefly, including Tomas Almaguer's account of the alliance of 1,200 Japanese and Mexican sugar beet workers who won one of California's first agricultural strikes; Marilynn Johnson's study of the little-known coalition of labor, minorities, and working people outside unions that successfully challenged the business-dominated city government in Oakland during World War II; and Bruce Nelson's retelling of the Big Strike of 1934. Led by Harry Bridges and the longshoremen, over 100,000 workers conducted a general strike that immobilized the San Francisco Bay Area and that still stands as one of the most dramatic moments in twentieth-century American history. Multiracialism also contributed to the success of Cesar Chavez's farmworkers movement, a factor that is barely noted in Cletus Daniel's relatively weak chapter.

Working People of California is an excellent introduction to California labor history for advanced undergraduates and graduate students, and a valuable resource for political scientists and scholars in a wide range of disciplines. It will be of less interest to specialists already working in this field, because nearly all of the contributions have appeared elsewhere as articles or as chapters in books. As in many anthologies, the parts here are greater than the whole; as strong as Cornford's introduction is, he synthesizes the literature not California labor history itself. A more theoretical approach would have illuminated such critical questions as the relationship between unionization and the empowerment of workers; the essays suggest that organized labor has often thwarted the working people of California, a paradox hinted at in the very title of the book.

The significance of *Working People of California* to scholars of national politics depends on whether or not California is, echoing Carey McWilliam's (1949) famous title, "the Great Exception." Although Cornford claims that a definitive answer awaits further research, it seems clear that California has often been a political as well as a cultural trend setter. The way in which the most populous state responds, or fails to respond, to the challenges of the global economy—the new wave of immigration, race relations in a multicultural society, and the overall decline in the quality of life of working people, not to mention the unemployed—is bound to affect, if not prefigure, the future of the rest of the country. *Working People of California* reminds us that contemporary debates over public policy affect most directly the working people, whose voices are rarely heard in politics and whose stories remain to be fully told.

The New Social Contract: America's Journey from Welfare State to Police State. By Joseph Dillon Davey. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 208p. $59.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Christopher Howard, *College of William & Mary*

Compared to our understanding of why certain people are poor or what policies are most effective in fighting poverty, our understanding of the politics of poverty has changed little in recent years. Many analysts still subscribe to the dictum that "programs for the poor are poor programs" that are politically vulnerable, socially stigmatizing, and marginally effective. The chief virtue of *The New Social Contract* is its ability to provoke the reader into viewing the politics of poverty in a new light, primarily by emphasizing the connection between it and the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the book's power to provoke exceeds its power to persuade.

The author's main argument is that rather than provide a marginally adequate safety net for the poor, the United States increasingly incarcerates them and restricts their civil liberties. Thus, one reason the poor have failed to protest dramatic cuts in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and low-income housing over the past 20 years—as well as the steady erosion of wages and greater income inequality—is that many of them are in jail, on probation, or living in fear of prosecution. Davey cites, for example, rapid increases in spending for police and corrections, the parallel growth in the prison population, the so-called War on Drugs, and several federal court cases limiting the rights of the accused as signs of an emerging police state. Moreover, these developments have reduced the ability of marginal workers to sustain themselves through illicit activity, thus forcing more of them into traditional low-wage jobs.

This argument is intended to build on Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward's pathbreaking and controversial book, *Regulating the Poor* (1971), which highlighted the connections among AFDC, labor markets, protest, and social control. Compared to AFDC and other forms of public assistance, however, the criminal justice system strikes this reader as an expensive, inflexible, and inefficient tool of social control. Using Davey's own calculations, one sees that building and operating prisons costs far more per "beneficiary" than the most generous package of means-tested benefits one could assemble. It is more difficult to crack down and ease up on criminals than to expand and contract AFDC benefits, if for no other reason than the huge costs of prison construction. And it seems reasonable to infer that this emerging police state is adversely affecting the civil liberties of many middle-class citizens as well as the poor. Davey himself points out how wasteful the criminal justice approach to social control appears without then explaining its appeal or persistence.

In general, this book contains little of the detailed empirical research that helped make *Regulating the Poor* a classic. Davey paints with a broad brush, trying to capture the past quarter century of antipoverty policy and criminal justice policy at the national and state levels in approximately 170 pages of text. As a result, he summarizes the findings of other researchers and presents aggregate government statistics without explaining in much depth why we should believe these findings or what interesting variations these statistics conceal. It would help, for instance, to show more precisely how the police state is replacing the welfare state by comparing state-level variations in spending priorities, employment patterns, and incarceration rates at any one point and over time.

In addition, the author unintentionally gives the reader reason to question the wisdom of building on Piven and Cloward's protest model. Early in the book, as he describes recent trends in antipoverty policy, he mentions growth in Food Stamps and especially Medicaid. Absent protest, how did such programs expand? And what about the equally impressive growth of the Earned Income Tax Credit (not acknowledged)? Combined, these programs dwarf AFDC, so their expansion matters. Davey might have restricted his argument to cash programs for the non-working poor, but then he would have been hard put to declare a transformation of the entire American welfare state.

As with many studies of social control, causality is a problem here. Davey refers early and late in the book to the central role of business elites in creating this police state, but offers only one quotation from David Rockefeller (circa 1971) as evidence—and that quotation makes no mention of crime and punishment whatsoever. At other times he alleges that the media and police are deliberately exaggerating the threat of crime to further their own organizational goals, while demographics, conservative federal judges, and public opinion also receive a share of the blame. Although one could imagine business elites manipulating the media, the police, the Supreme Court, and public opinion, the author trusts readers to establish that causal path on their own. Why business elites might favor such a costly solution in the first place is not entirely clear.

Finally, the book is fairly silent about questions of race and gender. It seems plausible that many of the developments cited by the author affect poor black and Latino men in particular. Consequently, the police state could be less a replacement for the welfare state than an emerging third tier, below the social insurance tier for (disproportionately white and male) wage earners and their families and the public assistance tier for (disproportionately minority) single mothers and their children. While such a claim is less sweeping than that offered in *The New Social Contract*, it would still provoke readers into seeing disturbing connections between seemingly separate domains of public policy.

Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood. Edited by Martha Albertson Fineman and Isabel Karpin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 398p. $65.00 cloth, $16.50 paper.

Sue Davis, *University of Delaware*

The editors of this volume have compiled a series of revised papers that were originally presented at conferences in 1990 and 1992 on motherhood sponsored by the Feminism and Legal Theory Project, now located at Columbia University Law School. The collection is distinguished for its interdisciplinary approach and for the sensitivity the editors have brought to their project. The inclusion of the racial, class, and sexual-orientation dimensions of motherhood is one of the major strengths of this work. The essays also span a variety of approaches, ranging from systematic analyses of caselaw (Kate Harrison's "Fresh or Frozen: Lesbian Mothers, Sperm Donors, and Limited Fathers") to explorations of motherhood in literature (Carol Sanger's "Mother from Child: Perspectives on Separation and Abandonment").

The organization of the essays under four headings, "Resisting Mother," "Nonconforming Mother," "Regulating Mother," and "Mother in Practice," while perhaps not the clearest method for sorting the essays, has provided the editors with an effective device for integrating the diversity of disciplines and approaches. While virtually all of these essays will prove to be of value to scholars of feminist jurisprudence, many political scientists are likely to prefer the essays that focus on legal developments and those with the most precise implications for policy. One of those, Reva B. Siegal's "Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory," discusses abortion rights as an issue of equality for women by comparing the contemporary debate to the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize abortion. She points out that restrictions on abortion rights now, as in the nineteenth century, reflect and enforce judgments about women's roles—they force women to assume the status and perform the work of motherhood, a role that has long been used to subordinate women as a class. In another essay that focuses on legal rules, "Mother: The Legal Domestication of Lesbian Existence," Ruthann Robson explores the rules of law that interfere with lesbian relationships with children and argues for a legal theory that addresses lesbian choice. In an essay that most clearly focuses on policy, "A 'Tangle of Pathology': Racial Myth and the New Jersey Family Development Act," Nina Perales examines the impact that one state's attempt at welfare reform has had on African American and Latina mothers.

Although this volume is composed of a seemingly diverse collection of essays, it is permeated by a crucial theoretical perspective that renders the whole much greater than the sum of its parts. That perspective is that motherhood and the family are socially constructed by the dominant ideology of patriarchy. *Mothers in Law* advances the arguments that Martha Fineman proffered earlier in her controversial, original, and important *The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies* (1995). In one of the strongest essays in *Mothers in Law*, "Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse," Fineman outlines her argument that the discourse about mothers in our society is shaped by the ideology of patriarchy with its premise that the primary affiliation or connection in society is the sexual bond. That discourse, she points out, categorizes mothers according to their relationship or connection to men. Thus, in the discourse of poverty single motherhood status is defined as one of the primary predictors of poverty and single mothers are defined as the problem. The solution is perceived to be a legal tie with the child's father that will require him to fulfill his financial obligations. Fineman understands ideology as a complex system of symbols and beliefs, a shared cultural construct that obscures the economic problems that render it so difficult for single women to raise their children. As a consequence of the pervasiveness of the ideology of patriarchy, she notes, reforms take the form of pushing women into a model of family life rather than addressing their needs as single mothers. Motherhood, Fineman contends, is "a colonized [concept]—an event physically practiced and experienced by women but occupied, defined, and given content and value by the core concepts of patriarchal ideology" (p. 217). In short, ideology for Fineman is a central force in our gendered lives, and a feminism that continues to focus on formal equality invariably fails to confront the gendered differences that women experience as mothers.

Although that argument provides the basis for all of the essays in *Mothers in Law,* it is reflected more clearly in some of the essays than it is in others. For example, in "The Legal Construction of Mother," M. M. Slaughter describes the disadvantages that women who are forced to be mothers (i.e., childrearers) experience in the labor market and underlines the ways in which the workplace continues to be structured around an "ideal worker" who has no childcare obligations. In "Reproductive Technologies, Surrogacy Arrangements, and the Politics of Motherhood," Laura Woliver reviews the debates on surrogacy and reproductive technologies, underlining the ways in which women are marginalized by the new reproductive arrangements. In a particularly powerful essay, "Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood," Dorothy E. Roberts examines the connection between racism and patriarchy, claiming that understanding the relationship between them is essential to understanding the subordination of all women. She notes that while all women are socially defined as mothers or potential mothers, contemporary society views childbearing by white women as desirable but devalues and discourages procreation by black mothers. Roberts points out that expanding women's access to day care, low-income housing, nontraditional job markets, and health care will be more viable short-term remedies for black female poverty than reforms that attempt to restore the patriarchal family structure. While those three essays present the overarching theme of the book most effectively, the essays that discuss works of literature (e.g., Nancy K. Miller's "Mothers, Daughters, and Autobiography: Maternal Legacies and Cultural Criticism" and Joanna K. Weinberg's "Older Mothers and Adult Children: Toward an Alternative Construction of Care") do not contribute much to the argument. Generally, however, Fineman and Karpin have done a fine job of weaving together these essays to present a cohesive and convincing argument that represents an important perspective in feminist theory.

Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent. Edited by Theodore L. Glasser and Charles T. Salmon. New York: Guilford, 1995. 475p. $49.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

George E. Marcus, *Williams College*

This well-titled volume containing 18 essays, together with an introductory essay by Elihu Katz, provides succinct and lucid accounts of the work in the field of communications on the specific topic of public opinion in the modern liberal state. As the editors acknowledge in their prefatory remarks, *public opinion* has long been an elusive target. To this day little consensus has emerged on the character and etiology of this term. As a group, the essays provide clear and coherent insight into the state of the art in communications as it addresses public opinion and governance.

The essays in this volume can be grouped into four categories. One group of essays describes the historical evolution of research in this field, the history of theoretical terms and issues, and the institutionalization of public opinion. Some of these essays, especially those by Peters, Herbst, and Boyte cogently span ancient and recent attention to public opinion, the concern over the emergent influence of popular sovereignty, and the quality of public judgment. A second group of essays recounts theoretical approaches in philosophy, social psychology, journalism, and cognitive psychology, in addition to communications. This group of essays covers, in a broad sweep, the familiar issues of levels of analysis, the impact of the work of Asch and Sherif, among many others, and the rise of the polling industry. These essays provide adequate, though not fully detailed, accounts of the major strands of research and their principal findings. The third group of essays provides sharper focus on particular approaches, such as those advanced by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Murray Edelman, and Jacques Ellul. This latter group is particularly useful in providing concise arguments meant to bear directly on the quality of contemporary politics. Finally, there are some essays, such as one recounting how the press seemed to consistently overstate former President Reagan's popularity, that, while interesting, do not fit into the larger scheme.

The value of this collection is that it provides in a single collection a recounting of the principal ideas that have guided the work of communications scholars in recent years. Those who work in this field will find much that is familiar. They will discover, as in the essays of Noelle-Neumann and Edelman, for example, condensed and precisely written essays that deftly synthesize longer expositions published previously. In the synthetic essays, the contributions from the cognate fields of psychology and sociology are recounted, and an effort is made to identify the main lines of research, such as the agenda-setting approach or how the structure and impact of journalism shapes the mediated responses of the public.

In this young field, a number of issues continue unresolved. Public opinion, as distinct from the aggregation of individual opinions, remains only partially understood. We currently have few methodologies and still fewer theoretical tools to enable us accurately to disentangle either individual from collective opinion or public opinion as the expression of unified moral sensibilities from the collection of private belief in surveys that have little public consequence. Part of this difficulty is the restricted research tools available to communications scholars. The industry of polling as currently practiced by academic scholars, journalists, and political campaigns is too expensive to adopt panel design studies. Thus, although time series can be constructed from the repeated national surveys, in the absence of more detailed studies with repeated interviews we will have a difficult time understanding how and when moral sensibilities are made salient by current events and by the appeals of leaders, and if and when public understandings, however formed and shaped, impel private accommodation. Recent work, not discussed in this collection, incorporating experimental methodologies, holds some promise for mitigating some of these weaknesses.

Concern with consent and public opinion becomes principally important in the realm of politics. Here the conception and import of public opinion derive from ancient arguments about the nature of opinion and knowledge, the possibilities for virtue and the likelihood of corruption in the body politic, the capability for mediated representations to convey and educate a diverse and extended public largely unable to observe public affairs directly, and the susceptibility of mass publics to demagoguery and simplistic accounts. Because so much of our interest arises from the consistent doubt that modern democratic institutions and contemporary political practices enable the modern polis to manage public affairs, these essays, in the main, give a full account of the history and evolution of these arguments. However, as is often the case with precisely these topics, the essays that deal with them reflect a presumption that public affairs are more managed and manipulated than given thoughtful public expression and direction. Partially, this inability to conceive of contemporary politics as other than degraded arises from the inability of much of contemporary democratic theory to leave behind the destructive nostalgic impulse to anchor democratic realization in intimate, equalitarian, and stable communities. Thus, most of the synthetic accounts here, as elsewhere, view progress as largely destructive of the public's capacity to direct public affairs. The possibility that new forms of communication have led to new forms and possibilities of politics is left largely ignored. For example, the strategy of Greenpeace or Act-Up to use confrontation to marshal public opinion dependent on the ubiquity of international video coverage and distribution beyond the control of national elites suggests that at least some modern developments have given activists tools that increase their influence and reduce that of established authority. The development of fax, e-mail, the Internet, and the World Wide Web has also diminished the ability of governments and other conservative institutions of centralized authority to restrict and shape the public's understanding of public events and mores.

There are some issues of special interest to political psychologists and political scientists alike that are given relatively little attention in this collection. Very little is said about the various strategies and means by which individuals, groups, and parties go about the process of modifying or securing public attention and public opinion. Very little is said about the actual strategies or means by which public consent is manufactured in times of crises and of tranquility, or when elites agree or when they disagree. Nor do we learn anything about how leaders contend with competing elites either in or between elections, or competition between elected and unelected elites, or how elites contend with publics that are ill-inclined to follow as compared to when—as in Orwell's essay "Shooting an Elephant"—leaders are looking warily over their shoulders. Thus, the politics of the construction of and competition over consent is only partially addressed by these essays. Setting aside these caveats, Glasser and Salmon have given us a collection that is consistently rich in thoughtful reflections about the status of the field, replete with vivid and well-written reviews of the dominant agreements and disagreements in an area of central importance to modern politics.

Poor People's Social Movement Organizations: The Goal Is to Win. By Melvin F. Hall. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 151p. $47.95.

Douglas R. Imig, *University of Nevada, Las Vegas*

In this work Hall introduces an "organizational empowerment model" (p. xi), in which "organizational maintenance, internal polity, goals, and inter-organizational relations" (p. 20) give shape to social movement organizations (SMOs) and, consequently, to their strategic action and likelihood of success. This focus on organizations adds a worthwhile perspective to the study of collective political action through social movements and public interest groups.

Organizations occupy an uneasy position in the literature on social mobilization. Hastily thrown up in the course of mobilizing, Piven and Cloward tell us, most movement organizations quickly fade when the wave of concern that led to their formation begins to recede. Organizations endure when they prove more useful to their elite supporters than to the groups they claim to serve. On the other hand, some observers suggest that organizations may be necessary to translate transient waves of mobilization into lasting vehicles for political change. Failure to form lasting organizations able to make inroads to institutional political venues may contribute to the political marginalization and rapid decline of many social movements.

To this debate Hall brings evidence from a large sample of locally based organizations concerned with social justice. His data are drawn from Campaign for Human Development (CHD) records on more than 150 community-based poor people's organizations (all of which received CHD grants during the 1980s) as well as surveys and interviews with representatives of these groups. The result is a wide-reaching database on social justice advocates operating during the 1980s that Hall uses to assess and expand insights into collective action drawn from the literatures on social movements, interest group politics, and organization theory.

Hall's basic thesis is that organizational structure matters. He demonstrates this by examining the relationship between how groups are arranged (e.g., the size of their membership, degree of dependence on external funding, levels of internal democracy, active networks with other organizations, and dues requirements), and the types of activity they undertake. He finds that certain structural features (in particular, high levels of internal democracy and high levels of interaction with other social justice groups) correlate strongly with the propensity of a group to engage in contentious action.

In addition to organizational structure, Hall tells us, context also matters. Group representatives reported intense competition through the 1980s, for example, as organizations found their access to money, members, issues, and access constricting (p. 54). Similarly, activity of poor people's SMOs is circumscribed by accessibility to municipal governments and the uneasy relationship between challengers and elites. Hall proposes a useful corollary to the argument that a visible antagonist provides a lightning rod for mobilization. At times even "the perception of an ally in high places may induce quiescence among the members of an organization," regardless of the actual support provided by that ally (p. 81).

A number of aspects of this argument deserve elaboration. First, we need to begin to talk about the relative importance of political opportunity structures, organizational constructs, and strategic action in consistent and analytically distinguishable ways. At certain points, for example, this work argues that the Reagan-Bush initiatives undermined poor people's groups by cutting both social services and operating grants to some SMOs (p. 93). At other points, this same set of challenges is said to have provided an important mobilization tool for this group sector (p. 86). To some extent both tendencies are undoubtedly true, but are they true for the same groups? Is the difference a function of group structure, entrepreneurial acumen, strategic action, or some other factor?

Second, while arguing that context matters, the work largely paints a static picture of one issue sector of SMOs with similar resource streams (e.g., CHD grants). As such, it is difficult to evaluate how fluctuations in political context affect group maneuvering or to demonstrate the superiority of particular organizational forms. Furthermore, the patterns of group competition that Hall describes are likely to be functions of the turbulence and constrained resources confronting social justice groups in the 1980s. Conversely, during periods of expanding public and foundation concern when resources are flush, we would expect to see an explosion in the number of groups formed as well as more coalition-building. In this respect, SMOs are likely to play different roles during waves of mobilization than they do during periods of movement abeyance.

In passing (p. 50, n. 2), Hall introduces a tantalizing counterpoint to the argument that political context is critical to organizational activity and movement success. He tells us that SMOs in the sample (i.e., comparatively successful groups) tend to pursue similar tactics regardless of when they were formed. This finding may support his contention that SMO survival and political vigor largely result from organizational design and strategic choices, rather than being artifacts of social and political context. But in order to know if this is the case we would have to know more about these groups. Have their goals and strategies shifted over time? If so, are these changes products of a learning process, do they represent "mission creep" as groups stalk funders, are they responses to shifting political opportunities, or are they artifacts of sampling only from relatively successful groups? Unfortunately, the evolution of strategic choice by these groups is not examined.

A final point needing clarification is the conceptualization of collective action. Rhetorically, Hall asks, "Is collective action not how a social movement presses its demands?" (p. 13). It depends. Contentious collective action is difficult to generate and provokes uneven responses. Once able to get to the policymaking table, groups not surprisingly often prefer to take their activities "indoors"; and may win policy concessions in the process. Yet SMOs are often treated dichotomously in *Poor People's Social Movement Organizations* as either contentious or quiescent. Consequently, we learn how certain organizational forms are linked with contentious action and how SMOs launch protests under a range of seemingly limiting circumstances (for example, when reliant on patrons for survival). But equating contentious action with collective action is limiting. While it is certainly useful to understand the organizational propensity of poor people's SMOs to embrace contention, it is also critically important to understand the conditions under which groups are likely to win by protesting or, conversely, when they would do better by seeking other means to amplify the voice of the poor in politics.

Overall, the focus of this volume on organizational empowerment represents a valuable contribution to the study of social movements and public interest representation.

Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation. By Jennifer L. Hochschild. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 412p. $29.95.

Joe R. Feagin, *University of Florida*

The American dream has been at the center of the nation's culture for centuries, yet until the 1960s it was reserved for whites only. Since then, in theory at least, all Americans have had a chance to secure the success promised by that hoary dream. Yet Hochschild's book is one of several recent research efforts to demonstrate that the achievement of the American dream is still problematical for African Americans. Well-researched and perceptively written, this is another major work from the pen of one of the nation's most original thinkers on racial matters.

Hochschild views the American dream in more or less traditional terms—as the achievement of success, particularly material success, by individual Americans competing with other Americans. She begins with perhaps the most insightful analysis of the history, development, and dimensions of the American dream that can found in the extant literature. After this philosophical and analytical introduction, Hochschild draws heavily on opinion surveys from the last several decades to show that both blacks and whites believe in the American dream as a prescription for society. However, these surveys indicate that, as whites have become convinced that there is little serious discrimination left and that blacks are included now in the American dream, blacks have pointed to the continuance of racism and become less hopeful that the American dream applies to them.

Hochschild confirms that the black group that most whites consider to have achieved great success in U.S. society, the black middle class, is the group most concerned about persisting racial barriers and the group least convinced that the American dream is for black Americans. In contrast, poorer African Americans, who have seen their social and economic conditions decline significantly, have been more likely to persist in their belief in the American dream than have more affluent black Americans. These important findings on the black middle class parallel those in recent qualitative studies (see Ellis Cose, *The Rage of the Privileged Class*, 1993; Joe Feagin and Melvin Sikes, *Living with Racism*, 1994). Hochschild spends some time explaining these paradoxes in the book's middle chapters. She examines several explanations, including the propensity to make excuses, racial discrimination, the sense of collective despair, and ideological alternatives to the traditional dream of success.

One weakness of Hochschild's analysis is that it is, like much research by white scholars, sometimes too oriented to a white audience. For example, in comments like this, "I introduced experiments to persuade skeptics that racial subordination is pervasive" (p. 117), she speaks to a white audience, for there are virtually no black skeptics needing persuasion. This sensitivity to conservative white opinion on racial matters can also be seen in a section on making excuses ("whining") as a possible reason for the black middle-class sense of relative deprivation. There Hochschild briefly seems sympathetic to the analyses of two conservative analysts who argue that black Americans mistakenly believe their failures are the result of racism. However, she concludes this section by suggesting that the whining explanation is not very important in explaining the sense of deprivation.

The discussion of persisting discrimination as a reason for the black sense of relative deprivation is much more thorough, and Hochschild cites surveys and experimental studies to demonstrate persisting discrimination. Nonetheless, in this generally insightful section there is too little awareness of the realities of racism as daily experienced by African Americans. Hochschild develops an interesting analysis of "elusive racial bias," subtle discrimination by whites that hurts its black targets, often without intention. The explicit suggestion is that most whites have moved from outright racism to elusive racial bias, a suggestion common in recent social science analyses of discrimination. This "elusive racism" explains why affluent African Americans still feel deprived and angry over racism.

This is an interesting argument, but it misses much of the reality of black middle-class life, a reality seen in the books noted above and in recent research by Philomena Essed (*Everyday Racism*, 1990) and Lois Benjamin (*The Black Elite*, 1991). The more likely reason why middle-class African Americans are angry and less enchanted with the American dream is that they are the ones who are mostly likely to face racist whites in the numerous societal arenas where there have been, until relatively recently, no (or very few) African Americans. Poorer African Americans as a group have not pioneered in multiple arenas that were, or still are, entirely white. In corporate and small business settings, historically white suburbs, traditionally white universities, middle-class restaurants and stores, and major political circles, middle-class African Americans frequently face *blatant* discrimination by prejudiced members of the white middle and upper classes—those whites who get little attention in social science analyses of racism. Today, middle-class African Americans face both the elusive bias suggested by Hochschild and the overt barriers created by whites with the power to enforce prejudices. Recent surveys show that at least 40% of *affluent* white Americans are racist in their thinking and propensities. Thus, the probability of a black person encountering racist whites in historically white social settings is high.

From the black middle-class (or black) vantage point, judging from the various studies mentioned above, the analysis of the American dream should start from the fundamental proposition that the dominant institutions and value systems in U.S. society are founded on, and are still pervaded by, white racist prejudices and practices. White racism is fundamental to the society's culture and institutions, not temporary or tacked on. From this perspective one can make much sense of the continuing rage within the black middle class. As the ones who have done everything the system told them to do (work hard, sacrifice, and so forth) in order to be successful, their experiences teach them daily that the promise of the American dream is still a "white lie." Their everyday experiences with subtle and overt racism are the reality lying behind pessimistic judgments.

Hochschild has crafted a valuable and important book forcing readers to rethink the meaning and future of the American dream. This is the first research study to take a close look at the attitudes around that dream along racial lines. The conclusions are not encouraging for the future of U.S. society. In assessing the beliefs and situations of poor African Americans, Hochschild comes up with a chilling conclusion: The fluidity of the commitment of the black poor to the American dream means that allegiance could easily change, though at present their relatively substantial commitment means there is time for whites to eliminate the racist barriers still standing in the way of black access to the dream.

In Washington but Not of It: The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists. By Daniel J. B. Hofrenning. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. 246 p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Allen D. Hertzke, *University of Oklahoma*

The influence of the Christian Right in the 104th Congress has heightened interest in national religious lobbies. Yet religious advocacy is broader than the visible efforts of Ralph Reed or Gary Bauer. Indeed, religious lobbies span the political spectrum, and, as Hofrenning observes, liberal groups outnumber conservative ones. This new book provides useful information on the growing religious presence in Washington.

Anchoring his analysis in a critique of pluralist theory, Hofrenning argues that religious lobbies represent a distinctive *prophetic* approach to politics. In contrast to the host of narrow self-interested lobbies, religious groups, he argues, seek a fundamental reordering of societal values and structures. To be sure, religious leaders disagree profoundly about the nature of our problems and their remedies. Yet, they are similar in their prophetic tendency to pursue more radical ends than the "K Street crowd."

Hofrenning develops this thesis in chapters that examine the outlook, scope, and tactics of religious lobbies. He provides a fine description of the prophetic biblical tradition that blends acute critique of society with a vision of its transformation. Hofrenning then shows how prophetic rhetoric flows through the religious lobbies. From the religious right rolls a stringent jeremiad against moral collapse; from the religious left streams a critique of societal injustice toward the poor and powerless. Though poles apart ideologically, religious lobbyists share a prophetic disillusionment with the state of society. Moreover, they struggle with a poignant dilemma: Should they aim at faithfulness or success, at winning or witnessing to the faith?

Unfortunately, Hofrenning's attempt to sustain the prophetic theme leads him to unsubstantiated conclusions. Taking their rhetoric at face value, he argues that religious lobbyists are fundamentally radical, even extreme. But if we look at the actual agenda, we find religious groups battling over such issues as single-payer health care or a $500 child tax credit. Perhaps they are more *of Washington* than they would like to admit.

Failure to appreciate this possibility leads Hofrenning to conclude that "because of their unwillingness to compromise, religious lobbyists favor outsider strategies" (p. 58). If that is so, then why all the congressional testimony and inside-the-Beltway meetings? Hofrenning apparently operates with this formulation: insider = compromise/outsider = radical. Yet the most astute groups—Jewish organizations—see insider and outsider tactics as complementary. Hofrenning has also equated largely symbolic gestures with mobilization tactics. Such symbolism may reflect desperation more than principle, with prophetic rhetoric covering for inadequate clout.

Hofrenning does not quite know how to handle the discrepancy between prophetic claims and action. He concedes that there are "profound differences between religious lobbyists and the long tradition of prophets" (p. 93). Yet his analysis generally does not take into account those differences. Part of his reticence flows from an acknowledgment that judging the truth or falsity of a prophet is beyond our competence as political scientists. But Hofrenning's own analysis seems to suggest that some lobbyists attempt to buy their prophetic credentials on the cheap, with a news release or a coalition letter. But do they really live like prophets in the biblical tradition? Are they immune to the blandishments of power, such as an invitation to the White House or a citation in the *Washington Post*? These are questions left unanswered.

Hofrenning has embraced a worthy subject. But nettlesome lapses suggest a rush to publication when more field research, analysis, and theoretical refinement would have helped immensely. The book is not quite ripe.

Sweeping assertions, for example, litter the manuscript. Hofrenning claims that religious lobbies "significantly transform politics" (p. 5), "shake the foundations of the entire political structure" (p. 48), "reject" insider tactics (p. 137), and shun a "mainstream style of political compromise and incremental change" (p. 53). None of these assertions can stand without hefty qualification. Moreover, Hofrenning's thesis papers over key differences among evangelical, "mainline," Catholic, and Jewish groups.

Another problem is that Hofrenning includes extensive treatment of such defunct groups as the Moral Majority, but slights the Christian Coalition and the Southern Baptist Convention. He is apparently unaware that both maintain Washington offices.

Hofrenning's categories are sometimes strained. One table lists "Nontraditional Evangelicals" (p. 81) as including the Episcopal Church and the U.S. Catholic Conference, a placement that would be likely to surprise leaders of both bodies. This questionable categorization leads Hofrenning to infer that grounds for unity exist between people of vastly different worldviews.

Awkwardly operationalized concepts are a problem, too. In addressing the connection between lobby leaders and members, Hofrenning employs a measure of *salience* to determine if "prophetic" leaders avoid lobbying against member opinion on salient issues. He finds they generally do. He determines salience, however, by visibility in press coverage, not actual member sentiment. This leads to questionable leaps of inference. With respect to "mainline" Protestants, he concludes that "the picture of a church lobbyist as a crusading oligarch, a 'general without an army,' is refuted" (p. 159). "Refute" is a strong word in our discipline, and Hofrenning's analysis cannot approach that certainty.

The book is also time-bound in a curious way, considering its recent publication. In two separate places Hofrenning suggests that religious conservatives have "withdrawn" from Washington, an assertion that was not fully accurate when some scholars made it in the late 1980s and is surely not true in the 1990s. Religious conservatives are more robust, sophisticated, and hooked into Congress than ever.

Ultimately, Hofrenning's attempt to chart new territory—both when it succeeds and when it falters—points to a larger problem in the field of faith and politics. We have growing research on religious groups and movements; what we lack is a decent understanding of actual impact. Like many analysts of religion and politics, Hofrenning can only point to isolated examples of influence. We simply need more research on effectiveness, especially from the perspective of those on the receiving end of religious advocacy. Thus, while this analysis provides a window into the clashing perspectives of the religiously inspired, it does so "through a glass darkly." We await further clarity.

Perspectives on the Politics of Abortion. Edited by Ted G. Jelen. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. 216p. $49.95.

MaryAnne Borrelli, *Connecticut College*

This book is well titled: Its four substantive chapters present highly contrasting perspectives on the politics of abortion, each employing the methodologies of a different subfield within political science. What is most distinctive about this collection, however, is its commitment to reaching across the boundaries imposed by profession and by discipline. To achieve this end, the introductory chapter is authored by a community activist who details the personal and corporate costs of abortion politics as they are currently practiced. The four political scientists submit strongly, though not polemically, argued analyses. The conclusion, written by five professors from Illinois Benedictine College, then offers an unsparing and distinctively interdisciplinary critique of the complete work. In its structure as much as its topics, then, this is a book about confrontations and conflicts—and about how they may be constructively managed and mediated.

The political scientists, whose chapters set the standard for the text's contribution to the "public conversation regarding abortion," have submitted research that is of uniformly high quality with distinctive queries. Still, because the chapters are so independent of one another, the reader is sometimes left with an inventory of interpretations rather than a single and tightly integrated theoretical framework.

For example, Mary Segers's assessment of the U.S. Roman Catholic Church as a quasi-federal interest group and as a prophetic community follows immediately upon Clyde Wilcox's examination of public opinion and political parties in the post-*Roe* years. Singly, these chapters contribute distinctive insights into the practice and dynamics of abortion politics. Having considered the structural characteristics that facilitated the church's political success, Segers considers the consequences of that success for the church's practice of its "Gospel norms" of justice and equality. Here the differences that inevitably emerge between interest group leaders and members are viewed as destructive of canons and creeds, some religious and others secular. Wilcox, in turn, notes that public opinion concerning abortion has been remarkably constant for more than thirty years, though political parties and electoral contests have become increasingly polarized about this issue. His testing of various hypotheses is painstaking, disproving theories that attribute such apparent contradictions to partisan extremism among primary voters or convention delegates, campaign contributors or party elites. Rather, he describes a gradual realignment in party affiliations among those who are essentially single-issue voters, such that the national party platforms are able to hold the firmly pro-choice or pro-life voters without alienating moderates. Having studied both chapters, however, the reader is left wondering whether Segers has identified a particularly telling instance of the citizen–institution divergence investigated by Wilcox. If so, does the church position alienate a significant proportion of its membership? And how is this religious alienation to be conceptualized, given its apparent similarities to an electoral realignment? These questions, which seek to determine more about a church's political identity in a supposedly non-churched political system, are premised upon the themes of moral decision making and political calculation present in every chapter.

If the chapters are topically distinct even in the conclusion, the final chapter does draw upon their divergent methodologies in evaluating their contributions. Eileen McDonagh's insistence that the abortion case law be reconsidered, its conceptions of pregnancy critiqued and reformulated, receives its own jurisprudential critique. Writing in tones that echo the precision of the constitutional law commentary of Kent Sezer's chapter, the conclusion authors consider the extent to which a medical definition of pregnancy alters the status of the fetus as an "innocent" and thereby justifies the use of force to protect the woman's bodily integrity. The commentators ultimately express reservations about McDonagh's conception of "feminine subjectivity" while acknowledging that her work proves the limitations of rights-based abortion debates. In an even more striking reinterpretation, the Illinois Benedictine College professors apply McDonagh's cultural-cognitive models to the Wilcox findings and proceed to explore abortion as an "American cultural construct" whose meanings are multiple, ambiguous, and paradoxical. The political parties then emerge as boundary-setting institutions that provide struggling individuals with coherent policy alternatives. Too often, such a mixture of standards would serve merely to indict the researchers or to confuse the reader. Here, the ability to demonstrate the fragility of all interpretations further explains why, when public opinion is so enduring, political decision makers have become so volatile.

The commitment to reinterpretation and to moving past established barriers, however, is compromised by the lack of a pro-life author among the political scientists. While McDonagh and Segers are unabashedly pro-choice and Wilcox and Sezer are carefully objective, the remaining position on this spectrum is unrepresented. In light of the introduction's concerns regarding the shift away from nonviolence within the pro-life movement and its changing political ideology and membership, the absence of a respondent is particularly unfortunate. Alternatively, a pro-life writer as constructively critical of pro-choice institutions as Mary Segers is of the U.S. Roman Catholic Church could stimulate further reflection, research, and political change. The challenges issued by the conclusion do provide a measure of ideological balance, however, if not an independently assertive voice for the pro-life perspective.

Perspectives on the Politics of Abortion is an intriguing collection, rigorously presenting new patterns of conceptualization and aggressively pursuing new forums for political debate. If its dialogue is occasionally limited, it is nonetheless carried farther than has previously been observed. This is, therefore, a text of interest to those who are as diverse in their concerns as the authors are in their own.

Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy. By Bryan D. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. $15.95.

Barry Rundquist, *University of Illinois at Chicago*

This book includes a theory of attention shifting, a critique of rational choice theory, explanations of various empirical patterns in American politics, a discussion of governments as adaptive systems, and spatial modeling of attention dynamics, among other things. Given the range of subjects, most political scientists should find something of interest in this book.

The book's central concern is with change: changing individual decisions, changing policy agendas, changing public policies, and changing politics. The theoretical problem it addresses is how change, even abrupt change, can occur while both decision makers' policy preferences and the structure of policymaking institutions tend to be relatively stable (p. 133). Jones's answer is that policy change occurs because over time individuals and collectivities shift their attention from one problem or dimension of a problem to another problem or dimension of a problem. When attention shifts, choices change, despite the stability of policy preferences and policymaking institutions. For example, when President Bush announced his War on Drugs in a televised speech in 1989, the number of people responding to Gallup polls that drugs were the most important problem in the country increased from less than one-third to almost two-thirds. The author concludes that "changes in attentiveness toward the drug problem, then, shifted dramatically during the early Bush years, a change that was far more abrupt than changes either in policy preferences or in the severity of the problem" (p. 108).

Why does attention shift? Attention shifts, Jones argues, because decision makers view an environmental change as a problem that cannot be solved by simply applying or modifying decisions regarding similar problems that they have made in the past. So they begin a new search for possible solutions and, by paying attention to new environmental cues, they may make decisions that are quite different from the ones they made earlier. The cues on which decision makers focus may have always been in the complex environment, but previously they paid attention to different cues and therefore made different decisions.

Policy change occurs, according to Jones, because "decision-makers become attentive to aspects of the decisional situation that were previously ignored. They don't change their minds, in the sense of changing preferences, but they change their focus by attending to preferences that they had previously eliminated from being relevant to the choice situation" (p. 10). "Changes in choice are caused not so much by changes in preferences as by [decision makers'] exquisite sensitivity to contextual cues" (p. 13). "They are not just preference maximizers; they are also problem solvers, and problem solving [requires] perceiving changes in the relevant task environment" (p. 13). Jones derives this argument from the work of Herbert Simon, William Riker, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Howard Margolis, Shanto Iyengar, Michael Cohen and Robert Axelrod, and others.

In making his argument, Jones takes on several of the alternative approaches that political scientists have used to think about policymaking. These include the preference-satisfaction model that assumes that "democracy has to do fundamentally with the communication of citizen preferences to policymaking elites and the subsequent matching of public policies to those preferences" (p. 1). He argues that the emphasis on preference satisfaction has resulted in the underdevelopment of the alternative notion that "democracies respond to openness and their openness allows the expression of problems more efficiently than do closed systems of governance" (p. 21). He also criticizes the economic arguments that small decisions add up to socially optimal policy and that people acquire information in increments until the added benefits of new information just balance the added costs of acquiring more information (p. 3). As Jones puts it, although "I have by no means rejected the preference maximization model. . . . I fully reject the marginalist model as a complete model of how people acquire and act on information on politics" (p. 4). In his view, attention shifting requires much more information gathering than the marginalist model allows.

The main limitation of Jones's model is its unpredictability. Although he provides examples of how shifting attentiveness may alter choices and outcomes, the explanation of when decision makers will change their attentiveness from one issue dimension to another reduces to "whenever they perceive that environmental change requires it." But when that is and which dimensions will frame choices appear to be identifiable only in retrospect.

Readers may also have trouble, as I did, with the many assertions that particular empirical patterns in American politics are examples of and/or can be explained by shifts in attention. Whether the logic of attention shifts can explain better than other political science and/or decision theoretic explanations such phenomena as the 1968 presidential election, public opinion on defense policy, and the authorization and cancellation of the supercollider, and whether "in the end, one cannot understand democratic government without understanding the serial shift," remains to be established.

In sum, this is an interesting book that asks students of American politics to think about whether political change can be better comprehended by modeling political decision makers as problem solvers rather than as preference maximizers.

Theories of Urban Politics. Edited by David Judge, Gerry Stoker, and Harold Wolman. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1995. 310p. $69.95 cloth, $25.95 paper.

Barbara Ferman, *Temple University*

This volume is an ambitious and successful attempt to survey the major theoretical landscape that underlies the field of urban studies. The contributors to this volume are leading scholars from North America and Europe who were asked to present, critique, and assess the myriad theories that structure many of the debates in urban politics. Their contributions fall into four broad categories: theories of urban power; analyses of specific attributes of urban politics, such as structure, institutions, and leadership; the relationship between government and its citizenry; and the larger economic and social environments within which urban politics unfolds.

As the editors point out, although this is clearly an eclectic mix of topics, there are numerous common themes that run through many of the chapters. The most salient theme, although only implicit in many of the chapters, is the difficulty of theory-building. The reader is immediately struck by this in the first section on urban power. David Judge's effort to rescue pluralist theory from its many critics rests in part on the assertion that the elements of pluralism do not constitute a theory at all, but rather, an "anti-theory." Pluralism is more important for what it has rejected than for what it has established. Two chapters later, Gerry Stoker, while agreeing with some of Judge's assertions, undermines pluralism's defense when he argues the superiority of regime theory in promulgating a concept of power that centers around social production. By implication, pluralism and its archenemy, elite theory, have both failed to grapple with how power is really exercised.

Regime theory's advantage is short-lived, however, for it too comes up wanting. According to Stoker, regime theory's neglect of context results in a narrow parochialism, which cannot be readily exported to the other side of the Atlantic, while its preoccupation with regime continuity limits its ability to explain political change. Attacking theory-building efforts from an entirely different direction, Susan Clarke, *Lynn Staeheli, and Laura Brunell argue for a gendered* approach to the study of local politics, claiming that most current and prior theories are only partial theories since their underlying assumptions and concepts exclude entire systems of stratification.

The chapters addressing specific attributes of urban political systems are no less harsh in their criticisms of current theoretical thinking. Clarence Stone asserts that the absence of any viable definition of political leadership has resulted in largely ad hoc treatments of the topic in the literature. In an equally critical vein, Bryan Jones argues that numerous debates have been aired on bureaucracy that rest on inaccurate models of bureaucratic functioning. Consequently, scholars have been asking the wrong questions.

Beyond this theme of the difficulties of theory-building, other more specific criticisms are articulated throughout the book. The limited cross-national utility of some theories is noted by several contributors. Not surprisingly, many of the theories developed in the United States seem inadequate when placed in the context of the different structural, political, and cultural realities of European cities. The application issue speaks to a bigger problem cited: many of the theories lack a viable methodology. According to Harding, growth machine theory, when transported to the United Kingdom, is reduced to description; Stone contends that leadership studies essentially become ad hoc; and Painter suggests that regulation theory and post-Fordism are much better at post hoc explanations than they are at explaining the development of new forms of regulation.

Related to the methodological problem is the issue of grounding theory in empirical analysis. Marxist writings, according to Pickvance, offer one example of this shortcoming. The "critical and selective stance towards evidence" (p. 272) found in much Marxist analysis, may fortify the ironclad categories related to class, but it simultaneously opens the door to external theoretical criticism. Another common criticism is the value-laden nature of many of the concepts that form the building blocks of the theories under investigation. According to Clarke et al., most of the concepts employed in urban analyses originate from a male perspective, thereby compromising their ability to fully comprehend urban change.

After considering these criticisms and the many others that space prevents me from listing, the reader is faced with this question: Do these criticisms reflect especially flawed theories in urban politics or are they an indication of the difficulties endemic to theory-building efforts in general? The answer can be found in critically examining some of the authors' critiques. Taken as a whole, these critiques provide a series of contradictory messages and guideposts. Let us consider some of them.

Two of the criticisms that Stoker levels against regime theory are that key insights are often buried in case study details and that regime theory tends to be very localist. The first charge suggests a need to liberate theory from excessive detail. The second requires more empirical work, but of a cross-national nature, in order to liberate regime theory from nation-specific political, economic, structural, social, and cultural arrangements. Although these are good suggestions, following such paths may not yield better theory; rather, it may result in theories that are insufficiently empirically grounded and that omit key variables. Criticisms of early pluralist theory are very instructive here. In using the group as its unit of analysis, pluralists could posit a theory of how democracy works and how policies are formulated within cities. The theory was elegant and parsimonious and the conceptual categories were crisp. These attributes came at the expense of distinguishing among groups and of considering the role of the economy and the federalist structure in local politics. Moreover, pluralism was decidedly American in character. If regime analysis truly liberates itself from details, it may wind up in the pluralist trap of categories begging for distinction. If, on the other hand, it seeks to go fully cross-national, encompassing all European cities and non-European ones as well, it may end up trading one set of details for another.

The criticism that the concepts used in urban theory-building are heavily value-laden is reminiscent of Louis Hartz's discourse on the role of "unexamined biases" (*The Liberal Tradition in America*, 1955). However, where Hartz argued for a broader knowledge base (i.e., more comparative analysis), many current critics are deriding the use of concepts based on "socially constructed differences" (p. 222). There are at least two potential problems with the latter argument. First, one can easily counter that the concept of socially constructed differences is also value-laden. Second, if all differences and categories are socially constructed, can we have concepts and theory-building at all? This question is beyond the scope of the volume under review and of this review as well. Nevertheless, it is a question that is increasingly surfacing as postmodernism gains support.

Because many of the criticisms raised in this book are endemic to theory-building in general, not simply urban politics, a more accurate title for this volume would be *The Difficulties of Theory-Building: Urban Politics as a Case Study*. As such a case study, this book is quite useful, especially to scholars engaged in or contemplating theory-building efforts. But the real contribution of the book lies in its bringing together various major theories in urban politics and subjecting them to the critical analysis of some of the leading scholars in the field. Those interested in theoretical developments in urban politics should not miss this book.

Presidential Campaign Discourse: Strategic Communication Problems. Edited by Kathleen E. Kendall. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1995. 319 p. $59.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Darrell M. West, *Brown University*

Political communications are at the heart of contemporary election campaigns. Two-thirds of the overall budgets in presidential general elections goes toward television advertising. Candidates spend a substantial amount of time seeking to attract news attention, speaking at public rallies, or appearing in debates. It is no understatement in this situation to consider presidential contests as mass media elections.

This book examines the strategic aspects of presidential communications, focusing specifically on the 1992 race. The volume opens with a well-written and clearly argued chapter on the New Hampshire primary by Kathleen Kendall. She looks at how reporters and candidates struggle over "the script of the electoral drama." In her study of campaign literature, travel schedules, speeches, and news coverage, she finds that candidates and journalists "sometimes co-constructed the script and sometimes wrote different scripts." Interestingly, candidates presented themselves as possessing many different qualities, while the media focused mainly on electability and winning.

The remainder of the book presents case studies of communications problems at various points during the campaign. Joshua Meyrowitz has a study of Larry Agran's unsuccessful effort to attract media coverage. Jimmie and Judith Trent examine communications strategies based on incumbent versus challenger status, looking at Bush, Clinton, and Perot as their cases.

Ronald Wendt and Gail Fairhurst study the "rhetoric of leadership" in the 1992 presidential election. Bush's lack of vision made it possible for Clinton to run a successful "vision-style" campaign. Mary Stuckey and Frederick Antczak investigate how candidates redefine political discourse to "create the appearance of identification with, and thus representation of, the electorate." Diana Owen presents an insightful analysis of debate strategies in the new media age. Candidates face new strategic decisions now that the format, timing, and public participation aspects of debates have been changed.

Two excellent chapters address the role of political advertising in the 1992 campaign. Montague Kern shows how Perot incorporated fundamental American values, such as civic-minded self-sacrifice, in his infomercials, while Marilyn Roberts uses a postelection survey in Franklin County, Ohio, to examine how voters incorporated advertising messages in their thinking about the candidates.

Richard Gregg looks at rhetorical strategies for dealing with abortion in the 1992 campaign, while Suzanne Daughton studies the discussion of gender-related issues in the presidential contest. Sandra Bauman and Susan Herbst study perceptions of public opinion in their interesting chapter on poll coverage. Opinion surveys have become an integral part of national campaigns, as evidenced by the fact that over 130 national polls were published by print media from early June 1992 through election day. The way in which candidates and journalists react to polls is now a part of communications strategies.

Paul Corcoran studies the rhetoric of "presidential endings," meaning the language of victory and defeat on election day. Elections are not really over until the victory and concession speeches have placed the candidate's personal stamp on the event. These speeches provide important clues to the meaning of the election and the interpretation of the results.

In the book's conclusion, Craig Allen Smith summarizes the book by emphasizing the struggle for "interpretive dominance." Campaign actors fight to define the story of the election. Bush lost the communications advantage of incumbency; Clinton combined effective communications strategy with vision and style; Perot exceeded the odds against independent candidates by broadcasting effective ads and infomercials grounded in fundamental values.

Smith makes the important point at a normative level that the struggle over access to media agenda-setting now is one of our country's most pressing communications problems. Many interests are marginalized and not able to play the interpretive game. In a policymaking system placing great emphasis on interpretation and negotiation among leading actors, the fact that many segments are not well organized or well represented creates a structural bias in the newsmaking system. The recent wave of media mergers makes such imbalance even more of a problem today.

This book is well written and filled with accessible case studies of communications problems in the 1992 presidential campaign. It makes the important point that communications is an interactive fight among candidates, journalists, and the public. I recommend it to everyone interested in better understanding mass communications and election campaigns.

Ideology and Educational Reform: Themes and Theories in Public Education. By David C. Paris. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. 220p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Stephen G. Salkever, *Bryn Mawr College*

David Paris has written a remarkable and eminently readable book that will interest a wide variety of political scientists. In it he manages in the space of a little over 200 pages to address with striking depth and accessibility two questions: the contemporary controversy over public education in the United States and the question of how political theory or philosophy should be related to political practice. This is thus simultaneously a book about public schooling in America and about how best to think about such schooling; its point of departure is Paris's claim that the two questions are linked.

One hidden reason educational reform has been so difficult to achieve, he argues, is that as citizens and as policy analysts we do not sufficiently recognize that we want a number of different and often incompatible things from schools. As a result of this plurality of views, solving the problem of schools cannot be simply a matter of finding the right means to an end we all share, as most nonphilosophical policy analysts imagine. But neither is it possible or desirable, as professional philosophers of a Rawlsian bent generally assume, to transcend this plurality by articulating a basis for consensus on a substantive principle or an idealized decision-making procedure as a prelude to formulating policy. The fact that different citizens understand the goals of education differently is not a perplexity peculiar to education policy; it is a difficulty, but not a pathological one, since it is an inevitable condition of genuinely liberal democratic politics. As Paris understands it, political philosophy and political science generally should resist in such situations the temptation to oversimplify practical choices by seeking a single cause or small set of principles that is the source or solution: "Instead of attempting to avoid the plurality and conflict of goals, the suggestion here is to expect them, clearly display them, and examine the ways institutions deal with them" (p. 13).

Paris's clarification involves a careful review of many kinds of recent American discourse about the aims of education. His novel and promising approach to this task is to identify several distinct and sometimes conflicting *themes*, ways of imagining and talking about the role of schools in American society: "A theme might be thought of as a perspective, a way of viewing and thinking about the schools. It provides a more or less coherent way of organizing or knitting together the various values and goals relevant to a policy area" (p. 49). According to Paris, since the mid-1980s three such educational themes have been prominent: the "new common school theme," which concentrates on the appropriate intellectual and moral traits American public schools should form; the "human capital" theme, which emphasizes the way schools prepare students for economic roles; and what Paris names the "clientelism" theme, embracing a variety of new ways of proposing that public schools should serve the needs of their various clients. These themes are analytically separable but are often merged in practice, with the result that very different goals are grouped together under a single heading (like "quality education") as if they were the same. Paris believes that by identifying these differences and by suggesting a general strategy for dealing with them he can help people develop strategies that can work best in particular local contexts. His third theme, "clientelism," is a particularly interesting result of his analysis, since it brings together such ideological antagonists as the conservative "choice" movement and liberal programs that redefine the mission of public schools to include provision of a broad range of welfare services to children and families in poor communities. Each theme, in fact, has liberal and conservative variants, underscoring Paris's contention that *thematic* analysis shows how the unreflective use of ideological categories conceals the significance of various public policy proposals.

The book is divided into six chapters, the first introducing the dilemma of contemporary school reform and Paris's thematic approach to that dilemma, and the sixth making some proposals about the future of educational reform. Chapters 3 to 5 delineate the three themes, while chapter 2 sets the stage by criticizing the "theoretical mystique," the view that the task of theory is to attempt "to subordinate policy to principle and provide principles that can guide and serve as a basis for evaluating policy" (p. 40). His main targets here are John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Amy Gutmann. Thematic analysis rests on a fundamentally different notion of political philosophy, one that maintains a strong evaluative and philosophical cast while drawing much closer to empirical political analysis: "It assumes that we must deal with an irreducible plurality of primary values, takes a different view of the nature of consensus and justification in a liberal democratic society, and places greater emphasis on political or institutional resolutions of conflicts between and among principles" (p. 43).

The central chapters on the three themes in educational policy combine examination of the empirical claims explicitly made by different proposals with philosophical analysis of what such proposals presuppose and imply about the tasks we think schools should carry out. Paris is particularly hard on the human capital theme, arguing that in terms of both macro- and microeconomic performance "the economic significance of the schools is often overstated . . . and what is valuable within it, both in theory and practice, is probably best understood in terms of other themes" (pp. 107–8). This is so because any effective policy to link public education more closely with job performance would interfere with equal opportunity and the "second chance" aspect of American society. With respect to clientelism, he is concerned that both "welfare and choice proposals for the schools represent a further extension of the logic of individualism in defining educational aims" (p. 149). A pragmatist as well as a pluralist, Paris is suspicious of quick fixes (and especially sensitive to institutional and professional resistance to change in liberal democracies) but recognizes that contemporary schools provide many examples of successful coping with great difficulties.

Paris concludes by asking what we are to make of the current situation in which we see a number of local successes but no clear way of generalizing these to a national policy. His answer is deceptively low-key: Solutions must always be local in character if we are to respect the plurality of liberal democratic politics, but should all be guided by recognition of the presumptive priority of the new common school theme, given his arguments that "it is hard to make sense of the other aims of the schools ... without putting them in this moral and civic context" (p. 195). Paris's theoretical proposal here yields no specific policy programs but can be very fruitful, as he shows in detail, in helping citizens and educators decide which parts of current school practice to keep and enhance and where new directions are called for.

What makes *Ideology and Educational Reform* uniquely valuable is that Paris brings to his subject detailed knowledge of both educational policy and political philosophy. The result is a work of unusual depth and texture that is more attentive to the problems and possibilities of schooling in America than more abstract theoretical works, and more reflective and wide-ranging than one-dimensional empirical studies. Much learning informs this work; Paris wears that learning lightly, perhaps too lightly. His approaches both to education and to the relation of theory and practice are thoroughly Aristotelian, but the only hints of this are an epigraph to the chapter on the "theoretical mystique" and a footnote indicating that the intellectual excellence schools should teach is a virtue intertwined with virtues of character and thus is "*phronesis*, or practical wisdom" (p. 102, n. 41). Given the tendency among social scientists and policy-oriented theorists to assume that all usable philosophy was written in the twentieth century, Paris could have been more forthcoming about the theoretical background of his inquiry. I should also note that in general Paris's writing is clear, if not elegant, but sometimes overly schematic. Even with these minor reservations, this is a fine book. In addition to shedding important light on American schools and on contemporary practical philosophy, *Ideology and Educational Reform* deserves attention as a model for a discipline of political science aspiring to theoretically informed and practically relevant social inquiry.

Health Care Politics and Policy in America. By Kant Patel and Mark E. Rushefsky. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995. 290p. $59.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

Robert P. Rhodes, *Edinboro University of Pennsylvania*

Patel and Rushefsky's book is a comprehensive analysis of health care politics and policy in the United States. It is organized as a textbook, and that is meant as praise, rather than qualification. The ingredients of health care policy are exceedingly complex, and Patel and Rushefsky here examine a number of difficult issues in health care politics and policy. They begin by describing the health policy environment: policy actors, economic resources, political ideology, institutional settings, and legal parameters. Placing each policy topic in historical context, the authors discuss issues in Medicaid/Medicare and other policy affecting the poor and disadvantaged, cost containment, technology, and potential reforms for the system. Issues of ethics and social justice are briefly addressed.

The authors lean on the insights of other scholars regarding the problem of health care policy rather than developing their own. Their major contribution is in organizing a text that provides a chronology of health policy in a historic, political, and economic setting and that lays out the arguments for and against various proposals. Given the complexities of health care economics and politics, this is no simple exercise. Both undergraduate and policy sophisticates looking for a quick review may benefit from reading commentary on health maintenance organizations (HMOs), health care insurance, or diagnostic-related groupings, for instance. They will find the basic arguments on both sides of particular policy initiatives. (One important policy topic not discussed is medical liability.) Each argument is well referenced.

The authors place health care politics in the context of budget politics. There is extensive discussion of how various Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts have affected access and costs. They also provide the ideological background for various policy options. Much of what is called American conservatism today is, of course, classical liberalism. Understanding that the critique from the right—the Heritage Foundation, for example—is grounded in classical liberal economics is essential to understanding the debate in health care. Patel and Rushefsky recognize this background and their discussion of the Heritage Foundation's proposals for substituting tax credits for tax deductible health premiums becomes all the more clear.

Health Care Politics and Policy in America is well documented, the authors having effectively mined journals and research reports. It is also comprehensive in its treatment of health care policy. But one does not find a consistent theme or a clear point of view running through the book, although the authors do seem to have more fondness for regulatory schemes than for free market solutions. Instead, the reader is briefed on the pros and cons of various policy issues. I particularly liked the discussion of HMOs and how they are being transformed by insurance company and hospital ownership, two institutions that have little interest in the cost-containment ability that supposedly characterizes HMOs. Intricate health care proposals are also explained with a clarity lacking in other volumes.

But when the authors turn to ethical issues in chapter 5, their attempts to conceptualize equality, equity, and social justice beg for more distinction than they provide. Moreover, readers will not find global proposals for health care reform in this volume. In chapter 8, "Reforming the System," the authors examine the history of health care reform, starting in the late 1970s. Their survey of the politics and eventual demise of individual proposals for health care reform is excellent. The authors are cautious, examining policy proposals piece by piece, without reaching conclusions regarding either cost containment or social equity. They reach sensible and familiar conclusions regarding the relationship between the American constitutional system and the difficulty of comprehensive health care reform. Whenever serious health care reform is proposed, health care interest groups mobilize to protect their interest. Insurance companies, hospitals, physician groups, small and large business, most of the relevant players are discussed. But the authors do not support either a particular theoretical framework, whether regulatory, market, or single payer, or a particular policy.

The authors twice quoted Lawrence Brown's observation: "Politics is how society manages conflicts about values and interests. . . . And no issues trigger battles over values and interests more quickly and acutely than do the source and use of money in health reform proposals" (p. 118). But if issues of social justice are to be addressed, political analysis needs to have a value framework to choose between contending values that are consonant with a scheme of justice, rather than remain merely descriptive. Nonetheless, Patel and Rushefsky do a fine job of delineating value conflicts and describing the probable consequences of proposed policies. There was a need for a book that synthesizes the American political structures and variables that produce health care politics, and this book provides such a synthesis.

The Price of Federalism. By Paul E. Peterson. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995. 239p. $36.95 cloth, $15.95 paper.

John E. Chubb, *The Brookings Institution*

The world of federalism is not heavily populated with big ideas or ambitious theories. The federal system is complicated territory with thousands of governments, organized in various ways and interrelated vertically and horizontally. Studies of federalism have more often captured this complexity in metaphors—most famously, Grodzin's "marble cake"—than in theories of any scope, power, or influence. It is therefore fairly remarkable that *The Price of Federalism* is distinguished by its attention to important ideas.

In this comprehensive work, Paul Peterson aims to paint a big picture—to describe the federal system in bold relief, to trace its significant changes, to account for this evolution, and to evaluate it. Appropriately, Peterson chooses to focus on the bottom line—the funds that the several levels of government expend to build infrastructure, educate children, ensure public safety, guarantee income, provide adequate food, housing, and health care, and to supply other goods and services. (The focus on funding does not do justice to regulation, the influence of which cannot be adequately measured by government expenditures. But Peterson's picture is big enough already.)

To analyze these expenditures, Peterson collapses all domestic spending for the last 40 years into the standard economic categories of distribution and redistribution, the former supporting goods and services that are provided without regard to individual or geographic need and the latter intended for recipients with need. By employing these categories, Peterson connects his work to the powerful positive and normative frameworks of public finance, which are one source of this book's big ideas.

As Peterson tries to understand and evaluate the changing roles and responsibilities of the governments that make up the federal system, he pits the dominant ideas of public finance economics against the dominant ideas of institutional political science. The ideas of economics comprise a "functional" theory, and the ideas of political science comprise a "legislative" theory. (The legislative label is a nod to the origins of the new institutionalism in the formal study of legislatures.) Peterson hesitates to call these sets of ideas theories, and in the conclusion chooses to call them perspectives: nowhere in the book are they specified in the kind of detail that theory formally requires.

Critics will surely pounce on Peterson for failing to explicate his perspectives further. Proponents of the legislative perspective will argue that the functional perspective lacks sufficient detail to yield the predictions with which it is credited. They will say that the legislative perspective, fully explicated, can do a better job. My own view is that Peterson's level of specification is about right. By painting his theories in somewhat broad strokes, Peterson is able to bring together the important ideas that scholars and practitioners ought to be debating. Had he opted for more detail and formality, his focus would have narrowed and the potential significance of this work might have been lost.

Armed with important ideas, Peterson takes the reader on a provocative and panoramic tour of modern federalism. His first observation is probably his most important. He shows how the several levels of government have been decidedly sorting out their responsibilities—redistribution shifting upward to the national government and distribution shifting downward to the locals. These are troubling developments from a legislative perspective. They occurred during a time that disadvantaged groups, traditionally in favor of redistribution, gained substantial control over local governments and individual members of Congress, traditionally bent on distribution, gained influence in the national government. The functional perspective, however, has no problem with these developments: the sorting out reflects the disparate competitive pressures that the different levels of government face. What is more, the sorting out is appropriate; each level is increasingly doing what it does best.

Of course, this is not the whole picture. As Peterson thoughtfully shows, the functional view is incomplete. Changes in Congress had much to do with the sorting out of the 1980s. Congressional committee membership clearly influenced the extent to which the national government decided to aid the different governments that depend on it for redistribution. Political parties at the state level and political machines (or their remnants) in rust-belt cities made a difference in local spending priorities. But these political effects may be on the margin. As Peterson also demonstrates, politics has not prevented the "race to the bottom" in which states competitively cut welfare benefits to avoid becoming "welfare magnets." This phenomenon is better explained by the functional or economic perspective.

Peterson concludes his work by asking how the major trends he has examined serve the public interest. Are we paying too high a price for the political and economic benefits of federalism, or are the costs plainly worth bearing? Generally, Peterson approves of the direction in which federalism has been going. He agrees with the standard view of public finance that distribution is most efficiently pursued by local governments competing to meet the demands of diverse people with different needs. And he argues that the variation in services from one locale to the next is declining—and growing more acceptable. Peterson also agrees that the national government has the greatest capacity to redistribute. For this reason, he denounces the proposal before, the current Congress to delegate welfare responsibility (with grant money) from the national government to the states. This, he argues, will serve mostly to erode welfare benefits.

Critics will surely dislike pieces of the big picture Peterson has put together. They may argue that his evaluation of the states underestimates their economic and political strength or their capacity for innovation in the field of welfare. They may disagree with the specifications of his many statistical analyses, which sometimes have weaker results than his interpretations suggest. (See the state spending analysis, for example.) But this book is likely to generate debate about issues of far more consequence: how best to understand America's most distinctive political institution and how best to judge where it is going.

Presidential Leadership and Civil Rights Policy. Edited by James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. and Donald W. Jackson. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. 191p. $55.00.

Hugh Davis Graham, *Vanderbilt University*

With the exception of Ronald E. Brown's survey of presidential action in the civil rights domain from 1892 to 1968—an essay summarizing a vast literature in too small a space to add significantly to our knowledge—the contributors to this collection concentrate on the post-*Brown* presidency. Generalizing about presidential civil rights policy from Eisenhower to Bush is problematical for two reasons. First, the era is marked by sharp changes in policy and political context. Major disjunctions are associated with the *Brown* decision, the breakthrough legislation of 1964–65, the urban rioting of 1965–68, the Reagan victory of 1980, and the Supreme Court's conservative shift of 1989. Moreover, civil rights policy, centering on the black freedom movement until the mid-1960s, thereafter fragmented in a "rights revolution," featuring mobilization by a widening array of organized clientele groups—women, Hispanics, the aged, the disabled, Native Americans, gays and lesbians, and others. Such rapid changes weaken generalizations about the presidency over extended periods and maximize the importance of contextual factors in specific presidencies.

Not surprising under these conditions, the book's least satisfactory essays are quantitative analyses spanning seven or eight presidencies. Jeffrey E. Cohen measures "presidential policy problem emphasis" (p. 7) by counting the number of sentences that "refer to civil rights" in State of the Union addresses from 1953 to 1989. The result: 5.9% of Eisenhower's sentences referred to civil rights, compared to 2% for Kennedy, 9% for Johnson, 6.2% for Nixon, 9.4% for Ford, 1.6% for Carter, 5.4% for Reagan, and 18.25% for Bush. When data cry so loudly for contextual explanation, we may question the utility of quantitative methods that either require elaborate explications or, too often, confirm rather obvious hypotheses.

In a similar but somewhat more successful effort, Steven A. Shull and Albert C. Ringelstein examine the public rhetoric of presidents Eisenhower through Bush as found in statements published in the *Public Papers of the Presidents*. More attentive to context than Cohen, they note, for example, that Bush led all presidents in attention to civil rights not only because he opposed quota laws but also because he championed new civil rights protections to protect the disabled. James D. King and James W. Riddlesperger, comparing the leadership of Eisenhower and Johnson by least-squares regression using House voting data in the voting-rights legislation of 1957 and 1965, conclude that each president's distinctive style served him well under the different contexts he faced.

In a fourth quantitative analysis, Shull and Dennis W. Gleiber model four stages of the policy process to assess presidential influence from 1953 to 1985. Their analysis is careful, their conclusions are cautious, and their language is flattened by the abstractions of social science. On the other hand, the study of Charles M. Lamb and Jim Twombly of fair housing enforcement during the Reagan presidency, based on quantitative analysis of HUD complaint records, produced surprising results. Deregulation under Reagan's New Federalism led state and local housing agencies to surpass HUD in policing housing discrimination.

Although few political scientists attempt archival research, two of the essays are grounded in presidential libraries. Mark Stern perceptively compares presidential responses to defiance by southern governors in the crises at Little Rock (1957) and the University of Mississippi (1962). Riddelsperger and Donald W. Jackson test the secondary literature on President Kennedy's civil rights record against the documents in the Kennedy Library. Their research supports the moderate revisionist view, argued, for example, by Michael Belknap in *Federal Law and Southern Order* (1987), Irving Bernstein in *Promises Kept* (1991), and Richard Reeves in *President Kennedy* (1993), that Kennedy was a pragmatist who shifted toward more aggressive civil rights policies in 1963 as a matter of political expediency and necessity.

Robert R. Detlefsen offers one of the volume's most provocative claims, but bases it largely on secondary literature and journalists' reports. In exploring Reagan's failure to revise the affirmative-action executive order (No. 11246), Detlefsen argues that normally Republican big business interests resisted the conservative attack on affirmative-action programs because minority employment quotas protected them from *Bakke*-type reverse discrimination lawsuits while at the same time conferring a competitive advantage over smaller rivals less able to support the compliance costs of equal employment regulation. This explanation, offered by contemporary journalists whom Detlefsen cites (in the *New York Times* and *Fortune*) and also by subsequent writers he fails to cite (for example, by Gary L. McDowell and Jeremy Rabkin), is important and deserves fuller documentation than it receives either here or in his 1991 book, *Civil Rights under Reagan*.

Finally, Stephen L. Wasby provides a deft analysis of fundamental shifts between *Brown* (1954) and *Ward's Cove* (1989) in the triangular relationship between the presidency, Congress, and the federal courts, when the White House and the judiciary shifted to the right and Congress shifted to the left. Wasby's full analysis is now available in *Race Relations Litigation in an Age of Complexity* (1995). Since the Bush administration, the three branches of national government have done a bit more shifting. In such volatile circumstances, social-science generalizations about the presidency and civil rights policy since *Brown* remain perilous.

The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modern American Politics. By Byron E. Shafer and William J. M. Claggett. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 227p. $45.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Eric R. A. N. Smith, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

In *The Two Majorities*, Byron Shafer and William Claggett set out to describe what they call the "issue context" of contemporary American elections and to analyze the potential political strategies that the issue context creates. By *issue context*, they mean the set of enduring issues and policy concerns around which political conflicts are waged. In short, they want to describe public opinion and to discuss political strategy.

To accomplish this task, Shafer and Claggett use a 1987 Times Mirror survey conducted by the Gallup Organization. The survey allowed an unusually detailed study of public opinion, both because of its large size (n = 4, 224) and because of its thirty issue questions. The limitation, of course, is that this survey only yielded information about 1987. Generalizing beyond the data to describe the issue context of the postwar era is a tall order.

Shafer and Claggett begin by performing a factor analysis of the issue items. Their analysis yields six factors—opinions on cultural values, social welfare, foreign relations, social insurance, civil rights, and civil liberties. They label these the "surface dimensions." The authors then proceed to conduct a second-order factor analysis on the six surface factors and present us with two "deeper factors"—a cultural/national factor that explains attitudes toward cultural values, civil liberties, and foreign relations, and an economic/welfare factor that explains attitudes toward social welfare, civil rights, and social insurance. In the rest of the book, Shafer and Claggett examine how the factor scores derived from their analysis vary with party identification, with social groups, with combinations of partisan and social groups, and finally, with level of political activity (activist vs. rank-and-file party member).

In broad outline, many of their findings will probably not surprise readers. The major differences between the parties are on economic/welfare issues. Both parties are much more mixed on cultural/national issues than on economic/welfare issues. Party identification is the best predictor of most economic/welfare issues, but social group membership seems to explain cultural/national issues better. Activists are more polarized on most issues than rank-and-file party members, but not on all issues. Both Democratic and Republican activists are more liberal than either party's rank and file on civil liberties, for instance. Of course, when one considers the two deep factors plus the six surface dimensions, there are many twists and turns in the description and some surprises as well.

One noteworthy finding is which social groups emerge from the study. Shafer and Claggett chose social groups by beginning with a list of possible social group categories and using a stepwise algorithm to select the group that was most different from the national average on the two deep factors. That group was removed from the sample, the differences were recalculated, a second group was identified and removed, and so on. The result consisted of seven groups: blacks, nonchristians, "low" Protestants (defined as Protestants who described themselves as "born-again or evangelical Christians" [p. 207]), and four groups of "high" Protestants (those who are not born-again or evangelical) and Catholics. These groups were then broken down by education—college graduates, those who had some college, high school graduates, and high school dropouts. The prominence of religion in this set of groups should remind us that, although our parties have differed primarily on economic grounds since the New Deal, religious differences continue to have a substantial influence on public opinion.

Shafer and Claggett also examine the political implications of their findings. Their principal argument is that because Democrats are the majority party and because Democratic voters support the party on economic/welfare issues, Democratic candidates should focus their appeals on those economic and welfare issues. The flip side is that because Republicans are the minority party and because cultural/national issues cut across party lines, the Republicans should focus their appeals on those issues. Of course, with six surface dimensions and with additional differences between party activists and the rank and file, Shafer and Claggett offer a good deal more advice about fighting over the political agenda than this. Yet the political agenda is their focus for strategy.

The weaknesses of this investigation are the weaknesses of any secondary research. One might like to have seen more social groups examined, for instance. A more important gap is the lack of any voting or candidate preference data. Shafer and Claggett's strategic advice seems strong, but they have no way of putting it to the test. How much of a difference does control over the political agenda make? Without voting data, we don't know.

Overall, *The Two Majorities* is an interesting and useful study of public opinion. It provides readers with a good picture of public opinion and it connects that picture with sound strategic advice for each party about what sorts of issues to emphasize and to ignore.

Nativism Reborn? The Official English Language Movement and the American States. By Raymond Tatalovich. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995. 319p. $29.95.

Ronald Schmidt, Sr., *California State University, Long Beach*

Language policy is perhaps the least studied arena of the contemporary "culture wars" in the United States. Raymond Tatalovich's ambitious work offers one of the first book-length efforts by a political scientist to describe and explain the political conflict over the most visible of the language policy issues: the fight to declare English the sole official language of the United States and its subgovernments.

As Tatalovich describes it, this conflict pits two "single-issue" political movements against each other: the English Only Movement versus the English Plus Movement. The aim of the former is to protect the English language's political function of promoting social harmony through providing a communicative bond for the American people, who are constituted out of diverse ethnolinguistic communities. This goal is to be achieved by declaring English to be the sole official language of the United States, thereby discouraging the creation of separate ethnolinguistic enclaves through such misguided public policies as maintenance of bilingual education and the use of non-English ballots and election materials.

Arrayed against them is the English Plus Movement, which, while acknowledging English as the common language of the United States, seeks to expand public recognition and improve the status of the nation's other languages and language minority groups, particularly the Spanish language and Latinos. Favoring bilingualism, it opposes making English the sole official language of the nation and sees the latter as needlessly divisive and detrimental to the social mobility and equal rights of non-English-speaking groups.

Tatalovich traces the roots of official English language policy in post-World War I anti-immigration nativist movements that achieved enactment of the country's first English-only policies in Nebraska and Illinois. He then describes in rich detail the contemporary English-only campaigns in the U.S. Congress and in fifteen states. Four states with high percentages of Spanish-speaking residents (Florida, California, Arizona, and Colorado) adopted official English policies in the 1980s through voter initiative campaigns. Ten other states (Virginia, Indiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, North Dakota, and Georgia) with very small percentages of non-English speakers adopted official English policies in their state legislatures. Texas is the only state in Tatalovich's account in which an English-only campaign was mounted but failed to achieve its aim.

As noted, Tatalovich's historical description of these movements and the countermovements of opposition is richly detailed and contains a wealth of information based upon his laborious research. Tatalovich collected campaign documents, legislative records, and press accounts and interviewed protagonists in each of the states listed above, as well as gathering valuable data from the national single-issue organizations leading the movements. Thanks to this book, we now have a coherent and concise description of state-level political campaigns on this relatively neglected but important issue.

Unfortunately, however, achievement of the book's second aim—that of explanation—remains unfulfilled by Tatalovich's analysis. Is the contemporary English-only movement a rebirth of the anti-immigrant nativist campaigns of the early part of this century? If not, what is the best explanation for this contemporary political movement? These are the questions Tatalovich seeks to answer in his book.

Tatalovich begins his explanatory efforts in a promising way, situating his analysis in the public policy literature spawned by Theodore Lowi's (1964, 1972) well-known typological efforts. Citing previous writings on *way of life* public policy issues (as opposed to economic issues), Tatalovich describes language policy as a form of "symbolic" and "moral" political conflict. Reviewing sociological and historical accounts, he elaborates on noneconomic *status politics* motivated by nativist reactions to intrusion by immigrant foreigners as a likely source of the contemporary English-only campaign.

Casting a broad net in his chapter on "Scope, Methods, and Approach," Tatalovich outlines five possible hypotheses to account for the rise of the English-only movement: *racism* (Anglo hostility to Latinos), *ethnic rivalry* (Black hostility to Latinos), *economic class* (working class hostility to immigrant newcomers), *political* (partisan and ideological opposition to Spanish speakers), and *cultural* (a nativistic "generalized antiforeign sentiment" [p. 30]). Each of these hypothetical explanations for the rising tide of the English-only movement has some intuitive plausibility, and it is Tatalovich's aim to test operational measures of each potential explanatory factor through a sophisticated use of multiple and logistical regression analyses.

Unfortunately, there are serious conceptual and operational flaws in Tatalovich's attempt to implement this plan. Conceptually, for example, he does not examine or explain the basis for some of his distinctions. What are the important differences between racism as an explanatory hypothesis and that of the cultural hypothesis of nativism? How are we to distinguish between them? And why would opposition to public use of Spanish be thought of as racism when expressed by Polish or Italian Americans, but as ethnic rivalry when expressed by African Americans? Furthermore, how are these hypothetical explanations related to his earlier discussion of *symbolic* versus *economic* public policy conflicts? These important conceptual questions receive little attention as Tatalovich races ahead to test his operational measures.

When he does this, however, even more serious problems arise. There is not space here for an in-depth critique, so I will focus only on the hypothesis of racism. This allegation has been the subject of heated debate among partisans in the language policy conflict, with some English Plus activists charging that the campaign for official English policy reflects a racist effort to remove all traces of the Latino (and sometimes Asian/Pacific) presence from the nation's public spaces. How does Tatalovich attempt to measure the degree of "racist" influence in the English-only campaign? He uses a measure of the percentage of Spanish speakers in jurisdictions under scrutiny, on the theory that if racism is a factor, then "political elites and the electorate should be more supportive of official English laws in areas populated by larger concentrations of Spanish speakers" (p. 28). In short, familiarity breeds contempt. When his statistical analyses fail to show that jurisdictions with higher percentages of Spanish speakers are more likely to favor English-only laws, Tatalovich concludes that the racist hypothesis fails and moves on to other possible hypotheses. But this is not even remotely a fair test of the racist hypothesis. A similar problem exists with his operationalization of the cultural hypothesis (wherein he uses support for English-only in rural jurisdictions as his test, on the theory that nativism is a rural phenomenon).

In the end, what Tatalovich does show is that most Americans see little threat to the English language (i.e., the issue has low saliency), but that when asked, they will support an *official* designation of the country's dominant language. He also shows that U.S. English has been successful in mounting campaigns in some high-immigration states that have voter initiative procedures by mobilizing ideologically conservative and strongly Republican (outside Florida, a special case) voters as a core constituency, often with the help of outlier elected officials seeking a *wedge* issue. In the (mostly southern) states that have adopted official English through their legislatures, he finds that the key cause in most cases is a legislator-political entrepreneur who is more concerned with the growth of bilingualism on a national scale than in his/her own jurisdiction. Tatalovich clearly believes that the English-only movement has nativist root very similar to the early twentieth-century anti-immigration movement, but his weak conceptualization and data analyses prevent him from looking for other ways to validate his hypothesis. In short, Tatalovich's book should be read for its wealth of information on the recent drive to make English our official language, but those seeking a compelling explanation of this phenomenon will have to look elsewhere.

Energy Possibilities: Rethinking Alternatives and the Choice-Making Process. By Jesse S. Tatum. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 159p. $29.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.

Robert M. Lawrence, *Colorado State University*

Although Tatum has a chapter on the home power movement near the end of his book, in which he describes home power in generally favorable terms, he states that his work will not provide *the solution* to energy problems. Rather, he claims with some justification to be engaged in stimulating the reader to perceive an alternative definition of the problem. He uses the home power movement to illustrate what is clearly irrational in the context of traditional definitions of the energy problem as being one of economic competition, but reasonable if one views the energy situation from a broadened perspective. While urging a departure from the norm in assessing energy matters, Tatum is careful to state for the record that he does not mean "to suggest encouragement for every harebrained idea" (p. 11). Nor does he argue abandonment of the current best understanding of what is and is not physically and materially possible. It is Tatum's expressed hope that looking at energy in a nontraditional fashion will help focus attention on what he sees as the real issue of energy usage—"How do we wish to live in the world?" (p. 12).

As he takes a path less traveled to analyze the energy situation, Tatum acknowledges that the currently preferred means of thinking about energy is the commodity or economic perspective, where the focus is upon the comparison of standard costs, not including externalities, for various forms of energy. He notes three other perspectives. First is the ecological view, where different energy sources are assessed in terms of renewable or nonrenewable characteristics and in regard to the impacts their use would have upon the environment. Second is the belief that energy should be viewed as a matter of equity, that is, as a right for all human beings in terms of their access to heat, light, etc. The third is the strategic context in which energy supplies are evaluated in terms of whether they are indigenous to nation *x* or have to be imported from nation *y*.

Tatum explains the general preference for the "hard, cold, facts" of economic perspective in terms of what one would expect given contemporary centers of power located in the corporate, government, and scientific worlds. He wants to ask questions beyond those generated by that trilogy.

A basic question for Tatum concerns how the choice of energy futures influences human lives, particularly in regard to population, economic growth, and the shaping of human relationships. This view is not new. Garrett Hardin, William Ophuls, and Robert Heilbroner, among others, have worried about these matters for a long time, and there is the classic team-written exploration of growth, energy, and the environment, Meadows et al.'s *The Limits to Growth* (1972). Of considerable influence upon Tatum's thinking have been the works of Amory Lovins and his associates at the Rocky Mountain Institute, Old Snowmass, Colorado (see, for example, Lovins's "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken," *Foreign Affairs* (1976).

Tatum worries about the long-range impacts of technological fixes and about those who place too much faith in technology expanding energy growth without adequate inquiry into the consequences. Leaving matters in the hands of those he calls "fixers" means to Tatum that "we cease to function as free and autonomous beings and we invite the atrophy of our own capacities for observation, reaction, decision, and renewed action" (p. 30).

The author urges going beyond the traditional expert responses to energy matters, what he defines as the engineering response and the economic response. Both of these perspectives in his view are overly narrow because of their refusal to incorporate the broader issues of human values and relationships. He is particularly perturbed that both of these traditional responses tend to leave ordinary people out of the energy decision-making process and thus out of participatory democracy.

Tatum notes that there is a lack of uniformity among experts. He devotes an entire chapter to expounding the views of three groups of dissenters. These are, first, physical and natural scientists who suggest that economic analysis fails to properly consider the physical role of energy in the production process, what can be described as a kind of energy theory of value. Second are those who argue that economic analysis should be deemphasized in favor of efforts to achieve a more sustainable lifestyle. And a third group of dissenters are the historians, anthropologists, and others who directly challenge the engineering and economic responses as being unrealistic.

How society develops its responses to energy questions is, according to Tatum, unduly shaped by institutional momentum and popular nonparticipation. Thus, part of the purpose of this book is to challenge institutional momentum and "wisdom" and stimulate popular inquiry into and consideration of energy options.

An example of moving beyond traditional assumptions while involving citizens is explored in chapter 6, which focuses on the home power movement. Tatum introduces this response not as his *solution*, but as an example of what happens when citizens and dissenters engage the energy question in innovative ways. The home power movement is described as an effort to incorporate extreme conservation of energy use with renewable electricity production in one's home. Generally, such activity takes place at some distance from the established electric grid and is engaged in by environmentally concerned citizens who have a gift for tinkering with lead acid batteries, photovoltaic cells, and electricity-producing windmills. Such people are also skilled in insulating their homes and in passive solar collection.

In exploring the home power movement in some depth Tatum stresses that it is possible to depart from traditional analyses of energy matters in ways that are congruent with both democratic values and environmental ideals. While his point may not sit well with big government, big science, and big business, in a democracy it should be heard.

Governing the White House: From Hoover through LBJ. By Charles E. Walcott and Karen M. Hult. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 372p. $40.00 cloth, $22.50 paper.

Phillip G. Henderson, *Catholic University*

Governing the White House provides an insightful analysis of the evolution of key components of the White House staff. Specifically, Walcott and Hult assess the structure and functions of the White House staff in six areas: congressional liaison, press relations and publicity, White House–Executive Branch relations, domestic and economic policy, national security policy, and writing and scheduling. In addition, the authors devote one chapter to specialized policy structures that have arisen in the White House in such areas as foreign economic policy, science advising, and liaison with constituent groups.

Though similar to Bradley Patterson's (1988) *Ring of Power* in scope, the Walcott and Hult study, which relies on rich historical perspective and a heavy dose of archival research, adds much to our knowledge of the development of White House staffing arrangements. The authors start from the premise that environmental factors, organizational precedents, and presidential choice all influence White House structuring over time. Institutional innovations that are viewed by one president as indispensable may not find as receptive an audience in succeeding administrations. The White House chief of staff and cabinet secretariat positions, for example, were created by Eisenhower and abolished by Kennedy, only to be revived in the Nixon/Ford years.

Walcott and Hult agree with Richard Neustadt that a structural innovation is more likely to become institutionalized when it is retained by a president from the opposing party. Judged by this standard, one could argue that the White House chief of staff position, which remained dormant during the Kennedy and Johnson years and through nearly half of Carter's presidency, did not become fully institutionalized until Bill Clinton became the first Democrat to formally designate a staff chief prior to taking office.

Unlike the chief of staff position, Eisenhower's creation of the Office of Congressional Relations gained ready acceptance as an institutionalized component within the White House when John F. Kennedy chose to retain and refine rather than abolish the office. But as Walcott and Hult note, formal acknowledgement of the legitimacy of a White House-centered staff structure for lobbying Congress was preceded by years of covert activity.

Hoover was the first president to establish a professional staff to lobby Congress, but he was careful to avoid the appearance of attempting "to exercise too much influence over Congress, whose members stubbornly insisted on the institution's independence" (p. 31). Roosevelt "brought legislative lobbying out into the open," but "aides who became too visible in their dealings with Congress did so at their own risk" (p. 33). Even during the Truman years, Charles Murphy, the staffer in charge of legislative liaison, "saw his role as being quite circumscribed, restricted to behind-the-scenes reporting and advising. Murphy himself did no lobbying. Rather, the president did considerable personal lobbying for particular bills" (p. 36).

In their meticulous chronicle of the rise of congressional liaison operations in the White House, the authors draw on a vast array of primary sources from the presidential libraries. These sources include, among others, the diary of Herbert Hoover's second congressional liaison officer, James MacCafferty; the papers of Rexford Tugwell, Samuel Rosenman, and James Roosevelt from the Roosevelt Library; and the papers of several other prominent White House aides involved in liaison activities, such as John Steelman, Charles Murphy, James Haggerty, Bryce Harlow, Lawrence O'Brien, and Joseph Califano from the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson libraries.

Primary sources abound in most of the other chapters of the Walcott and Hult study as well and are used effectively to make this study a valuable contribution to our understanding of the institutional presidency. Some political scientists may have reservations about the decision of the authors to delimit the study to the period from Hoover through LBJ. In essence, however, the prodigious use of archival materials justifies confining the scope of the study to well-documented developments that were instrumental in shaping the modern White House.

Unlike Richard Tanner Johnson (1974), who confined his study *Managing the Presidency* to three basic styles of presidential management—formalistic, competitive, and collegial—Walcott and Hult offer more categories to account for greater variation in governance structures. They suggest, for example, that collegial structures can be competitive, mediative, or consensual.

Taking into account the variation in governance structures is useful in explaining how a highly centralized variant of a hierarchical system, such as that utilized by Richard Nixon, differs from what the authors describe as a collegial/competitive form of hierarchy, as exemplified in many of the structural innovations utilized by Dwight Eisenhower. Applying these more precise categories also helps to explain structural variance within the same administration. Ronald Reagan's presidency, for example, seemed to drift from a collegial/competitive environment under James Baker's tenure as chief of staff to a more centralized/hierarchial environment under Donald Regan's stint as chief of staff.

Although Walcott and Hult develop a greater appreciation for nuance in White House operations, their analytical framework becomes a bit cumbersome. The authors present a total of seven types of governance structures. They then associate each governance structure with distinct forms of participation, distinct types of expertise, and distinct decision rules. Fortunately, the rich historical narrative of the book speaks for itself, relatively unencumbered by the overly ambitious analytical framework set forth by the authors in chapter 1.

As in any study involving the organization of the White House, some of the book's findings are open to interpretation. The observation that the National Security Council "remained a primary locus of policy deliberation" under John F. Kennedy (p. 160) is a case in point. In his book, *President Kennedy*, Richard Reeves (1993) notes that the youthful president could not sit still for fifteen-minute briefings by his national security advisor, much less attend full meetings of the NSC. When asked during an NBC News interview why there had been no formal NSC meetings during his first months in office, Kennedy responded: "These general meetings are a waste of time."

Overall, the Walcott and Hult book represents a nice blend of solid research, skillful assessment, and good writing. It adds an important dimension to the literature on the institutional presidency.

Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement. By Nancy Whittier. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995. 309p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

Nancy E. McGlen, *Niagara University*

Whittier's main concern in *Feminist Generations* is to dispel the *postfeminist myth* that the radical feminist movement died in the 1980s. This myth, she believes, rests on two misinterpretations. The first is that the activists from the 1960s and 1970s shifted their interest away from radical feminism in the 1980s, preferring to focus on more traditional priorities and goals. The other error is to assume that all women in succeeding generations avoided participating in the radical feminist cause, wrongly assuming that the movement goals had been achieved. While recognizing that the myth may have some limited validity, Whittier sets out to prove that the founding mothers did not abandon their feminist ideals and that younger generations have persisted in doing the work of the movement.

Whittier's argument relies on a conceptualization of social movements that rejects traditional understandings. Rather, she defines the women's movement (and by extension similar social movements) as follows:

> We see the movement, then, not just through the organizations it establishes, but also through its informal networks and communities and in the diaspora of feminist individuals who carry the concerns of the movement into other settings. What makes these organizations, networks, and individuals part of a social movement is their shared allegiance to a set of beliefs, practices, and ways of identifying oneself that constitute collective feminist identity. (pp. 23–24)

By replacing the need for organizations or, as she later notes, even the goal of challenging existing political institutions, and substituting collective identity in defining a social movement, the task of debunking the postfeminist myth becomes more manageable. As long as there is a collective feminist identity the movement persists, even if successive generations of movement participants shape this identity to fit their own experiences and the limitations of the external environment they confront.

To look for this collective feminist identity, Whittier conducted personal interviews with 34 of the founders of radical feminist movement organizations in Columbus, Ohio, and with an unspecified number of women from successive political generations who later joined the original organizations or started new ones there. Because she narrowed the locus to radical feminists in one city, of course, no conclusions about the survival of a broader collective feminist identity can be made.

One of the strengths of Whittier's work is her reporting and interpretation of these interviews. She looks initially at the first generation who came of political age during the era from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Whittier identified these women through an examination of the documents from the radical feminist organizations in Columbus. She then tracked down as many of them as she could using the local phone directory and a modified snowball technique, gathering phone numbers and addresses from other interviewees. What she found was a political generation composed of four micro-cohorts who came of political age at different stages during the movement's high tide, 1969–84. Relying on the interviews, Whittier reports that each micro-cohort had its own definition of what it meant to be a feminist and that conflicts among cohorts over these definitions and the best strategies to pursue were frequent in the 1970s, often resulting in exits from movement organizations. In support of her thesis, Whittier found that regardless of their micro-cohort, the women she interviewed still largely identified themselves as radical feminists and were committed to the cause of radical feminism, even though they generally acted out this support in their professional or personal lives or in other social movements and not through membership in radical feminist groups.

These early cohorts of feminists view the women who entered the movement from the mid-1980s on, with their emphasis on lesbian women culture and their seeming lack of interest in confronting the dominant political and economic institutions, as apolitical or retreatists. Indeed, Whittier argues that disagreements over style, strategy, and feminism serve to draw a dividing line between the cohorts of the earlier era and the new generation such that the four earlier micro-cohorts now form a common political generation.

Despite the deep disagreements between the two resulting generations, Whittier claims that the radical feminist movement is not dead. The older generation persists in its collective feminist identity; and the younger generation is not apolitical, rather it continues the feminist struggle with its cultural activities and the maintenance of a collective feminist identity of its own creation.

If we accept Whittier's argument, we need to ask if a movement can ever die? Whittier appears to say no. Rather, she argues, movements go through cycles, reinventing themselves as new generations enter and the political environment changes. But because a collective identity continues in the beliefs of both the departed and the incoming generations, the movement does not expire. One might wonder, however, if for Whittier there is ever a point where various conceptions of the collective identity of feminism diverge so much as to prove that a new movement has entered the scene and that the old one is no more.

Even if we accept the notion of persistent, if changing, movements as more useful than the conception of movements ceasing to exist only to be reborn decades later with new goals, we are still left with an important question. Why do movements have epochs when they confront the political system and others when they do not? While some of the answer may lie in the changing cohorts of a movement, even Whittier is not content with this as the sole explanatory variable. Throughout the text, and in often disconcerting conflict, she gives a series of factors from the external environment that she identifies as conducive to confrontational political tactics. She is particularly persistent in seeing the Reagan era as critical in causing the radical feminist movement to decline in numbers and to move away from an overt political strategy. However, her discussion of the gay/lesbian, antinuclear, and animal rights movements in the 1980s and the role of feminists in them indicates that not all movements were de-energized by the Reagan era. Indeed, research on movement growth suggests that membership in some social movements increases as the environment turns hostile, especially if hard-won gains are threatened. Thus, while Whittier's redefinition of social movements may be useful and insightful, she does not offer an explanation for what interests political scientists most: Why do social movements, feminist or other, sometimes become active in the political arena and at other times turn away from politics or, if your prefer, die politically?

Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy. By Robert H. Wiebe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 321p. $25.95.

Erwin C. Hargrove, *Vanderbilt University*

Robert Wiebe is an historian who thinks and writes like a social scientist and who comfortably uses social science research. But as an historian he can fashion a larger tapestry than most social scientists, who follow particular strands. This is a distinct advantage in a book that asks about the nature of democracy in America and how it has changed over time.

Wiebe defines democracy as self-government by citizens, albeit through elected representatives, but with a high premium on popular participation in politics, governmental responsiveness, and government accountability to citizens. He rejects the effort to define democracy in ideal, abstract terms and insists that all democracies are anchored in history and culture. Thus, European democracies developed in order to curb state power and American democracy developed in an almost stateless condition. One must work with the materials given by history and democracy is never a finished form.

Wiebe analyzes three periods in American history in order to see continuity and change in the ideals and practice of democracy. The United States became a democracy in a period (1820–90) in which a broad middle class emerged, which was skilled in the practices of grassroots politics. Legislative caucuses gave way to political conventions, ascriptive privileges were cut down, politicians with a common touch replaced the Jeffersons and Madisons, and the open frontier beckoned. Public education and the ideal of literacy enhanced the capacities of citizens. Politics was "leveling, fusing, uniting." There was not so much a sense of the public good as a belief that continuing public fights, in a context of wide participation, would permit agreed ideas of a public good to emerge. However, this was a democracy for white men only. Women, African Americans, and, to a great extent, wage earners, were left out.

The period from 1890 to 1920, in which the United States became an urban, industrial nation, brought forth a three-class system: a national class of highly educated elites, a local middle class, and a lower class with skilled workers and independent farmers at the top, trying to get into the middle class, and many wage earners at the bottom. This last group included not only African Americans but many "unwashed" from southern and eastern Europe. The new national class created centralized hierarchies, especially in industry, but also in the professions, transportation, and government. The economy and the institutions that dominated it became a national economy. Agrarian populists attacked the new hierarchies unsuccessfully. The Progressive movement did the same with ironic results in that the Progressive ideal of nonpartisan government by experts, with a corresponding reduction in party politics, contributed to a decline in popular participation in politics, and especially in voting.

Women, African Americans, and organized labor eschewed radicalism and temporized their claims on society in order to cater to middle-class values. But most important, the *people*, or perhaps the ideal of the people, disappeared. New ideals of citizenship as passive consumership emerged.

The period from 1920 to the present saw the state replace the people as the pillar of democracy. The New Deal compromise between national and local elites permitted a division of labor in government in which national standards were overlaid on local particularism, especially in the South. The democratic ideal shifted emphasis from process to results. The civic trends of the earlier period continued as voting rates stayed low, the well organized prevailed in government and the weakest citizens had little representation. Pluralist theories of democracy were unduly sanguine about the fairness and equity of representative government. The consequences in the post–New Deal period have been political polarization, a disappearing electorate, and an atomized citizenry. Wiebe is at pains to point out that these trends cannot be charged to events in recent history like presidential primaries, PACS, or television. The trends are older and stronger and reflect the secular changes in society in earlier years of this century. This is an historian who is saying, implicitly to political scientists, look more deeply into history to understand current reality.

Wiebe is skeptical of remedies for these problems that run against the grain of our political culture. Proposals to change the culture in communitarian directions, for example, deny what he believes to be the irreducible fact about American politics, that it serves the ideal of *individualism*. American democracy is not possible without a strong individualism. People must have choices and receive what they regard as rights. He draws the logical conclusion that the only way to restore democracy to America is to pull down the large bureaucratic structures that defeat the democratic impulse. Both participation and accountability must be restored. His touchstone is the nineteenth-century model of a "collective self-governing process," which was John Dewey's view of American democracy. Wiebe voices Dewey's hope that community breeds politics, which breeds community. The problem is not polarization or individualism, but the weakness of grassroots politics.

Unfortunately, Wiebe does not tell us how to get from here to there. He does say that such changes will not come incrementally. Some kind of giant shock will be necessary. He gives no analogue, but perhaps the depression of the 1930s would suffice. But even then the New Deal response was new forms of hierarchy and centralization. The author rejects the vision of responsible national party government expounded by Elmer Schattschneider, because it just adds more hierarchy. The ideal and the reality are very different for Wiebe, as the South becomes Republican, PAC money is distributed by national party organizations to candidates, presidential primaries are increasingly front-loaded, and television dominates political campaigning.

Our current politics reveal how ragged our appreciation of our problems is. The Republicans would tear down governmental hierarchies but promote hierarchies of private government. The Democrats are liberal statists who have not fully awakened to the arrogance of central bureaucracy. What is there to choose between? The very popular alienation from politics that Wiebe diagnoses reflects our collective inability to find new circuits of responsiveness and accountability between citizens and government. An American republic of ten states (like the Canadian provinces) in relation to a federal government with foreign and macroeconomic responsibilities might work very well. Perhaps we need some really radical thinking.

But Is It True? A Citizen's Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues. By Aaron Wildavsky. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 574p. $35.00.

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, *University of New Mexico*

The literature on the politics of environmental risk has made much of the fact that the lay public tends to perceive the threats to human health from chemicals, radiation, and other man-made sources to be much greater than do most scientific experts (Rothman and Lichter, *APSR*, 1985; Slovic, *Science*, 1987). Not surprisingly, public policy has tended to follow the concerns of the public more closely than it has the views of the scientists (U.S. EPA, *Reducing Risk*, 1987). Critics of this state of affairs, including Aaron Wildavsky, have charged that the result is policies that seek to eradicate minuscule risks at enormous public expense and that the politics themselves may result in even greater risks than those posed by the conditions they seek to correct. More fundamentally, according to Wildavsky, a significant fraction of the wealth of society is drained into activities that produce no health benefits, whereas societal wealth itself may be the single most potent ingredient in increasing public health and safety (Wildavsky, *Searching for Safety*, 1988).

In Wildavsky's view, the crux of the problem lies in the citizenry's poor understanding of the scientific debate about environmental health threats. Rather, the public responds to claims (often false or misleading) made by interest groups and amplified in the news media. These forces will continue to distort public policy preferences unless the public can find a way to reach more informed judgments through deliberation on environmental policy issues.

In *But Is It True?* Wildavsky and his collaborators seek to demonstrate a method by which ordinary citizens can become informed about and evaluate the scientific debates underlying controversial environmental policy issues. The requirements for these citizens will be approximately 200 hours of difficult reading of original research articles from the scientific literature, identifying the main concepts used and the differences in scientific opinion, and contacting and interviewing scientists involved in the debate. An entire chapter lays out some of the most critical research design issues (including such considerations as the adequacy of controls, attention to natural background variations, appropriate measurements, and quantification of exposures). His main concern is to show that his students—and therefore presumably citizens of average intelligence—can master the main components of the scientific debates ranging from the human health threat posed by dioxin to the complex matter of global climate change.

This book, which was written collaboratively by Wildavsky and his students, seeks to demonstrate that even those without extensive physical science backgrounds can make sense of complex environmental issues and evaluate the resulting policies. Eleven chapters focus on specific environmental science debates, with Wildavsky and his students evaluating (1) the initial claims about environmental health risks that stimulated the call for policy intervention, (2) the initial policy response, and (3) the subsequent trajectory of the scientific debate and findings on the issue.

The book covers a wide range of specific environmental controversies, including the cranberry scare (due to residues of the weed killer aminotriazole) of 1959, the debate over the pesticide DDT, and controversies over the effects of dioxin, asbestos, Alar, and nitrites. The largest and most complex controversy described in the book concerns global climate change. Other chapters evaluate more localized (though widely known) environmental actions by the federal government, such as Love Canal and Times Beach. Each chapter provides a readable overview and chronology of the scientific findings, from the initial work that triggered the policy response to the (often ongoing) follow-up research. These chapters provide a very clear and useful delineation of the mechanisms that have been hypothesized to cause the environmental or human health effects, the global climate change and ozone depletion chapters being particularly well written in this regard.

For those who have followed Wildavsky's work on environmental risk, it will come as no surprise that most of the potential environmental hazards evaluated are found either to be less threatening than was generally believed or to pose no demonstrable threat at all. The lone exception is ozone depletion from CFCs, where the evidence points strongly to their role in ozone destruction, without, however, clearly demonstrating global ozone depletion. The discussion of positive and negative feedback mechanisms regarding ozone creation and destruction is fascinating.

A major theme running through the book is the desirability of abandoning the "precautionary principle," which holds that (1) possible (rather than probable) harms should be regulated, (2) we should err on the side of caution by requiring science to disprove possible harms before a chemical use is permitted, and (3) regulators should consider health hazards but not the potential benefits of a substance or process. The precautionary principle underlies much environmental regulation, perhaps most notably the Delaney clause that bans any food additive shown to cause cancer in laboratory animals. Wildavsky would replace the precautionary principle with opposite prescriptions: Regulations should be based on probable harms, safety should be presumed until strong evidence shows otherwise, emphasis should be placed on the regulation of strong health effects rather than weak ones and benefits—as well as harms—should be considered in regulatory decisions.

In sum, the book tries to show that citizens can (and ought to) attain a sufficient working understanding of scientific controversies to take informed positions on environmental issues, and it persuasively demonstrates serious flaws in current approaches to regulation. The book is quite persuasive when it argues that it is possible for well-educated and motivated lay citizens (like Wildavsky's students) to understand the complexities of environmental policy debates. I am not persuaded, however, that many citizens are likely to make the necessary investment of time and effort to attain that understanding. It is much more likely that citizens who already live full lives will continue to utilize simplifying heuristics to reach decisions and take positions on complex policy issues (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice*, 1991). For better or worse, such simplifying heuristics as credibility, competence, and public interestedness will continue to play a large role in determining which claims about environmental risk the public will believe.

This book shows how laypersons can arrive at informed conclusions about environmental controversies, but it is not likely to become the basis for widespread civic literacy programs on these controversies. It will probably not fulfill its ambition of becoming the "citizen's handbook," as declared in its subtitle. Nonetheless, the book does offer a wealth of clearly written information on past and current environmental science controversies, and it is a godsend to those who teach environmental policy classes. The book also makes a clear and compelling case for challenging conventional wisdom about the environmental perils that appear to surround us.

Democracy, Dialogue, and Environmental Disputes: The Contested Languages of Social Regulation. By Bruce A. Williams and Albert R. Matheny. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. 256p. $32.50.

Daniel Press, *University of California at Santa Cruz*

Political scientists in the field of policy studies have not been very receptive to the fashionable perspectives of postmodernism, sometimes with good reason. Postmodern philosophers and their adherents often write impenetrable and ponderous prose. Worse yet, as Bruce Williams and Albert Matheny point out in this excellent book," postmodernism's focus on concepts like discourse, texts, vocabularies, and so forth is sometimes taken to deny the existence of political, economic, and social structure" (p. 9). It takes a book like this one to see what we have been missing. In their engaging prose, Williams and Matheny show how studying the language of political conflict over social regulation can have concrete, commonsense, useful applications to students of the policy process—particularly to studies of highly contentious policy conflicts, where the very meaning of debate is always open to question. Such is generally the case with many environmental disputes and especially so with hazardous waste management, the case study of this book.

In Part I of their book Williams and Matheny argue that gridlock in hazardous waste management is inevitable, because organized interests, agencies, and grassroots activists talk past each other in languages that are incomprehensible or unacceptable to their opponents. Thus, industry and agencies use a managerial discourse founded upon a progressive, technocratic legacy to argue that hazardous waste management is a technical problem, best left to experts and scientists. Politicians and national organizations, on the other hand, rely on a pluralist discourse to "discover" the best waste management solutions by virtue of interests aggregated through fair processes. Grassroots activists reject both these languages for their inability to challenge the fairness of social regulation that imposes potentially dangerous facilities on those communities least equipped to object. In response to the inadequacy of any one language, Williams and Matheny develop a *dialogic* model of social regulation that would permit these discourses to occur simultaneously, by permitting equally informed opponents to participate meaningfully in policy disputes.

Part II draws upon extensive interviews and case studies to illustrate the book's analytical framework and to make a normative case for the dialogic model of social regulation as it would apply to hazardous waste management disputes. Williams and Matheny use excerpted quotes from a decade of case study interviews in three states (New Jersey, Ohio, and Florida) to demonstrate, over and over, how the managerial, pluralist, and communitarian discourses have collided in hazardous waste facility siting conflicts. The authors illustrate their points by using the language of the disputants, thus bringing the reader the full force and promise of their discursive analysis.

But as the authors demonstrate convincingly in chapter 4, the obstacles to coordinating (and ultimately reconciling) these discourses in a dialogic model are structural (rooted in federalism) as much as they are political. Much of the book is devoted to demonstrating how federalism disadvantages local communities and their residents, who are often asked to shoulder the concentrated costs of hazardous waste management.

Williams and Matheny challenge the Reagan administration's assumption that the states would be better equipped to handle hazardous waste management. To make their case, they construct an empirical study of state hazardous waste policy, asking how many states had the capacity to impose effective regulation on industry in 1980 (the latest year for which the Reagan administration would have had useful data when it embarked on its program of decentralization). The book's only weakness is the brief treatment it affords this quantitative, empirical analysis. The discussion is mostly left to a short appendix, and the results are hardly discussed in the text at all, making the whole study appear as something of an afterthought.

In addition to contributing their postmodern, discursive framework for understanding hazardous waste conflicts, Williams and Matheny also demonstrate convincingly the utility of focusing on policy debates at the local level, or, as they put it, in "geographically defined communities." For example, aggregate studies show without a doubt that political participation, mobilization, and civic engagement have all declined precipitously in the United States since World War II. But local political cultures and institutional performance vary tremendously in the United States, suggesting that we may learn a great deal about participatory democracy if we change our scale, units of analysis, and resolution to a subnational, substate level.

Until the last decade or so, political scientists have downplayed the relevance of local politics; however, this trend is being reversed, especially in policy studies whose object of attention is services and outputs in general and policy variation in particular. Studying local outputs permits a wealth of comparisons unavailable to national or area studies. And comparative studies of *environmental* policy outputs are becoming more common and sophisticated.

But William and Matheny avoid uncritical fascination with local actors. The communitarian discourse may be more participatory than the managerial or pluralist; however, it too is severely constrained in its ability to manage the coordination between community-level input and higher levels of policymaking. Communitarian discourse "fails to consider the broader national context within which social regulation takes place," fails "to consider the ways in which scientific and technical issues constrain the decisions of local communities," and "fails to specify adequately the institutional mechanisms for mobilizing and maintaining a citizenry capable of continuous participation in democratic decision making" (p. 51).

Many studies have raised these criticisms; few have proposed ways that they may be addressed. And like many writing in the field of environmental policy, Williams and Matheny have a normative goal of improving environmental policymaking—especially by breaking political gridlock—while also encouraging meaningful democratic participation. The authors make progress toward this goal by showing how grassroots organizers have begun to transcend the limitations of the communitarian discourse. Successful efforts at coordination began in the 1970s with labor activists confronting workplace hazards. Environmental activists followed, using community right-to-know laws to engage technical issues on both the local and national levels and to unify grassroots efforts around the country (the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste being the most notable example). Drawing on these cases and on theorists like Benjamin Barber, the authors propose useful reforms for improving the quality of participation at the local level while managing the ambiguity of scientific uncertainty and competing public goals.

Overall, *Democracy, Dialogue, and Environmental Disputes* is an impressive contribution to the study of social regulation, democratic theory, and hazardous waste politics and policy. It delivers one of the few sophisticated treatments of the conundrum involving the relationship between environment and democracy. Williams and Matheny have achieved this by focusing on the language of participation, the coordination mechanisms of actors operating on vastly different political and geographic scales, and the determinants of effective environmental policy capacity.

Comparative Politics

The Labor Wars in Córdoba, 1955–1976: Ideology, Work, and Labor Politics in an Argentine Industrial City. By James P. Brennan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. 440p. $59.95.

Peter Ranis, *York College and the Graduate Center, CUNY*

James Brennan has written an ambitious and important book attempting to recapture and reevaluate the labor militancy before, during, and after the historic worker rebellion in Córdoba, Argentina, in May 1969. We owe him a sizeable debt for bringing these dramatic events back into focus at a time in which we are seemingly far removed from such deeds.

Brennan depicts the thinking, policies, and activities of the automobile, metallurgical, and light and power union leadership as they strive to create a scaffolding for both significant economic justice in the key provincial industries and relative labor autonomy against a triumvirate of paternalistic employers, authoritarian governments, and Buenos Aires union bureaucrats. The book is a well-defended paean to the exemplary leadership of Agustín Tosco of the Cordoban Light and Power Union Local who unflaggingly led various labor coalitions both before and after the 1969 insurrection. He depicts the political and union martyrs of the right-wing repression begun under military President Juan Carlos Onganía but whose murderous phase begins during Juan Perón's "second coming" of 1973–74. Brennan brings alive the Cordoban suspicion and distrust of the *porteños*' (Buenos Aires) patronizing and pragmatically self-serving labor leadership culture. The intellectual and personal accounts of Tosco, as well as those of Atilio López, head of the Córdoba bus drivers, and Raimundo Ongaro, leader of the short-lived CGTA, are often riveting. Another strength of the book is in the use of Renault and Fiat archives as well as union documents and other publications to help unearth corporate strategies and labor responses in Córdoba. In the process, Brennan describes the automobile assembly process in exquisite detail that brings home the daily routines and rigors of industrial work.

Brennan's underlying point is the importance of factory level organization and conditions on union and political militancy. In this pursuit he seems to give us every piece of information he has uncovered. There are historians who present all their research and those who distill their research; Brennan falls into the former category. As a result, the reader can become a bit punch-drunk, losing the ability to distinguish important issues from less important ones. One is jabbed while wishing the author would throw a haymaker. When he does argue strongly for a thesis, it can be lost in the midst of description and not exhaustively defended.

For example, Brennan's stated intent is to "[throw] aside broad sociological explanations and obfuscating theories of labor aristocracies or dependent industrialization and [analyze] the bare facts" (p. 159). But, though he challenges various theoretical postulates concerning the working class, he tends not to mount a definitive thesis of his own. Instead he skirmishes around these alternative hypotheses and, in the end, opts for a litany of class and cultural approaches concerning the origins and consequences of the 1969 *Cordobazo* and its aftermath. In the process he often embraces the very propositions he scuttles at the outset.

Brennan wants to forward the primacy of shop-floor struggles (understandable labor reactions to new forms of industrial technological rationalization, specialization and discipline) in defining working class political culture (pp. 316 ff.). He relies not so much on working class oral histories but rather on the more available and supposedly more reliable testimony of their labor leaders (p. 368). Thus we have an emphasis on systematic, self-conscious working class politics without sufficient attention paid to the subjects themselves, their lives, their work, and their Peronist values. This is a decision that forces Brennan at the end of his study to speculate about cultural and sociological factors that gave rise and continuous sustenance to working class commitments to Peronism, with all its inherent contradictions and which, nevertheless, culminated in Córdoba's heroic struggles. Certainly the rank-and-file workers who participated in the Córdoba labor wars of the late 1960s through the mid-1970s were usually very young, basically in their 20s at the onset of the struggles (p. 326), and would have been only in their late 30s to early 40s when Brennan undertook his field work.

Brennan also analyzes the role of the new industrial worker, mostly of rural origins, without engaging the venerable debates between Gino Germani and Juan Carlos Portantiero and Miguel Murmis. The author tilts against E. P. Thompson and others concerning working-class cultures, in favor of his thesis regarding the prime importance of industrial labor reactions to corporate rationalization policies. But again the reader senses ambivalence and lack of closure (see pp. 85 ff.). Instead Brennan shuttles back and forth between shop-floor struggles and the political cultural context, arguing the former but modifying it by the latter (e.g., p. 356, where he cites Juan Carlos Torre and Elizabeth Jelin). He argues against the conservative "aristocracy of labor" thesis (first propounded by Lenin) and contends that privileged workers can demonstrate class consciousness, but he does so without citing the seminal work of Eric Hobsbawm and others, who have written convincingly that skilled workers are often most radical precisely when defending their historical trade union gains. Though there is one passing reference to John William Cooke's writings, his undoubted impact on Perón's revolutionary posturing in exile (e.g., *La Hora de los Pueblos*, 1968) go unplumbed. This is a crucial omission because Perón's writings in the late 1960s help explain the overlapping of rank-and-file Peronist attitudes with the *clasista* radical labor leadership.

In the conclusion, Brennan argues that "broad sociological explanations for Córdoba's militancy seem facile and misleading" (p. 351). However, I think his multifaceted approach, with shop-floor militancy as the leading variable deemphasizes a major structural reality. For example he has cited only in passing Córdoba's generally high socioeconomic level and low unemployment. But that is precisely the point. It is in such periods of moderate prosperity that dissent and rebellion, born of a sense of reach and optimism, can stir the relatively privileged labor sectors to press for reforms that improve the lot of the whole working class. Furthermore, I believe he does not sufficiently distinguish between the Cordobazo of 1969 when workers with students involved in the coordination and participation rebelled and nearly achieved a revolutionary outcome and the subsequent *clasista* working class militancy of the early 1970s born of the self-confidence earned with the Cordobazo.

In the end we are left with the hope that the epochal and heroic struggles described so thoroughly and so movingly by James Brennan still resonate in the hearts of Argentine workers. But it is the character of two successive Carlos Menem presidencies, not the constrained earlier Peronist governments, that will altogether alter the working class's historic responsiveness to Peronism. Menem has ruptured that vital historical link of Peronism with social justice and income redistribution. Previous phases of Peronism always represented the underdog, and thus its basic empathy kept people rooting for it. President Menem has emptied Peronism of that orientation and metamorphosed it into something representing the haves, people who hardly need a political party or anything else for that matter.

British Politics and European Elections 1994. By David Butler and Martin Westlake. New York: St. Martin's, 1995. 349p. $59.95.

Michael Keating, *University of Western Ontario*

European elections are, as Butler and Westlake remind us, second order elections, with low turnout and low voter interest. The ostensible aim, to elect members of the European Parliament and decide on Europewide issues of policy, is subordinated to domestic political preoccupations as the elections become a mid-term poll on the parties' standings. Britain is not unique in this respect, but the domestic implications of the 1994 European elections were of particular importance there. Labour established itself as a credible challenger for government, but the old two-party dominance did not reestablish itself, as the Liberal Democrats confirmed their presence in the south, and nationalists in Scotland and Wales strengthened their position. John Major survived once again as leader of his party, helped perhaps by the death of Labour leader John Smith at the outset of the campaign.

Butler and Westlake's book, in the tradition of the Nuffield election studies, is essentially a descriptive account of the parties, the issues, the campaign, and the results. We are given a brief history of Britain's ambivalent attitude to European integration, an account of the events of 1989–94, covering the fall of Margaret Thatcher, the Maastricht Treaty, and the efforts of John Major's beleaguered government to bridge the divisions between Europhiles and Euroskeptics. Chapters follow on the parties, the national campaign, the campaign in the regions, and the outcome. There are chronologies of the major events and the book is enlivened by cartoons and photographs. The authors do not have an easy task. The principal fault lines in Europe are within the major parties and not between them, so that elections do not serve well to focus issues and choices. Nonetheless, there could have been more analysis, exploring the differing attitudes to Europe and relating these to questions of ideology and strategy. What, for example, is the nature of the British national identity that Euroskeptics so zealously defend? Do either the Europhiles or the Euroskeptics have a coherent notion of the state? Why does Britain have such a tortured and permanent debate on whether they are part of Europe or not?

The book is stronger on analysis of immediate political preoccupations and events, such as the effects of the death of John Smith and the rise of Tony Blair, or the success of John Major in keeping his job as party leader and Prime Minister. The coverage of events and issues is a little uneven. The chapter on the minor parties gives as much space to the obscure UK Independence Party as to the Scottish National Party (which won two seats). The sections on the regions are done by different authors, but they have been given far too little space to delve into local issues, personalities, and party strategies. This is a pity, since there does appear to have been considerable regional variation in the result. The authors appear to have done a survey of candidates, but we are given no details on the sample, questionnaire, or method, and the results are not reported systematically. Consequently, it is not clear whether information, especially in the final chapter, is merely anecdotal or survey based. The appendix by Michael Steed and John Curtice is more systematic. They examine the effects of the electoral system, showing that under the regional system of proportional representation proposed by the Labour Government in 1978 the Liberal Democrats would have gained twelve seats instead of two, all at the expense of Labour. They unearth convincing evidence of tactical voting and put Labour's success in context by breaking it down geographically and showing that in the "deep south" the Liberal Democrats remain an immovable obstacle to a Labour breakthrough.

This book will be useful as a record of events but contributes little to our understanding of British and European politics. The proofreading leaves quite a lot to be desired as well. "Principle" is used in place of "principal" at least three times, "comprised of" is used instead of "comprised," and the nationalist and green parties are transposed in Table 9.2. We are also told that the "554 candidates spent £4, 960,00. an average of £9 [*sic*] each" (p. 218).

Economic Reform and Democracy. Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 252p. $38.50 cloth, $13.95 paper.

The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. By Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 391p. $59.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Anne E. Henderson, *College of William and Mary*

Scholars familiar with the burgeoning literature on democratic transitions may perhaps be forgiven for a certain skepticism about the value added by each successive treatment of the topic. It is hardly surprising that the recent global trend toward democratization has given rise to its own scholarly growth industry; and yet it sometimes seems that this industry is producing a surfeit of explanations for a finite number of cases. Nevertheless, the two volumes currently under review are welcome additions to an increasingly crowded field, since they analyze democratic transitions from a distinctive political economy perspective. The two volumes differ in their specific arguments; but they share a well-justified presumption that the politics of authoritarian breakdown and democratic consolidation cannot be understood in isolation from the economic choices and constraints that accompany the transition.

Economic Reform and Democracy, edited by the indefatigable Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, is a collection of informal thought pieces by well-known scholars and policy practitioners. Using methodology no more rigorous than anecdotal evidence, the various authors debate the relationship between democratization and economic reform. Some of them, unfortunately, miscast the debate in terms of the relative economic effectiveness of democratic and authoritarian regimes. This is an unavoidably inconclusive approach, since regime type is too crude an indicator to capture the determinants of economic performance. Yet several authors (including Jose Maravall and Barbara Geddes) cannot resist the temptation to challenge the convenient bogeyman of "conventional wisdom," which postulates that democracies are less capable of imposing economic reforms than authoritarian governments. Maravall and Geddes argue that while the need to build social consensus may complicate reforms under democratic auspices, democratization and economic reform need not be incompatible.

Building on this unstartling proposition, many of the contributions to this volume theorize about the conditions under which democratic regimes can successfully reform their economies. Given the ongoing debate over the optimal design of economic reforms in democratizing societies, it is at first surprising that the contributors find so much to agree about. Yet it turns out that many of the points of agreement are based on conclusions so obvious as to be virtually unchallengeable. For instance, the authors discover that it is easier for democracies to legitimate economic reforms if the policy process is transparent and accountable than if decision making is secretive and corrupt. Similarly, the authors manage to concur that successful economic reform depends not only on policy design but also on state implementational capacity. Few scholars will be taken aback by these findings. Surely the shopworn "paradox" that market-oriented reforms require a capable state is no longer particularly controversial.

More interesting than such widely acknowledged truisms are the authors' arguments on the proper political strategies for operationalizing economic reforms. The volume includes renowned exponents of the shock-therapy school, such as Anders Aslund and Leszek Balcerowicz, who contend that rapid, radical reforms are necessary to forestall countermobilization by former elites and to build popular confidence that economic changes are lasting. Also represented are the views of gradualists such as Padma Desai, who argues that shock therapy is untenable in many democratizing societies where the executive lacks the political insulation and predominance to impose economic policy simply by decree.

Perhaps the most intriguing angle on this debate is the argument that different political strategies are most effective for various stages of economic reform. For example, Joan Nelson postulates that the first phase of reform, involving relatively straightforward and administratively simple liberalization and stabilization measures, is best accomplished through executive fiat. However, the second phase of reform, entailing complex and drawn-out structural and institutional transformations, requires a different political strategy based on creating broad social support constituencies.

Yet how is social support for economic reforms to be mobilized in fragile new democracies? After all, the short-term winners from economic reform are generally few and difficult to organize politically, while the losers often include the most powerful beneficiaries of the old regime. The contributors grapple with this conundrum with limited success. One proposal is to co-opt critical segments of the electorate by providing government benefits to compensate for the effects of economic austerity. But it is difficult to see how the exigencies of economic reform (which typically include reductions in government revenues along with cuts in spending) can be reconciled with compensatory measures to placate all politically relevant "losers." For example, few governments will have the resources to buy off both middle-income voters and the poor, making it difficult to construct broad-based coalitions behind the reform project. Neo-corporatist solutions are no more promising than all-encompassing social coalitions. In most new democracies, corporatism (which depends on the state-mediated cooperation of organized business and labor interests) is rendered infeasible by fragmentation and differences of interest within the labor movement and employers' groups. Given the difficulties of mobilizing new social coalitions, many democratizing states may be tempted to seek support among the beneficiaries of the old regime—with negative consequences for democratic consolidation and economic reform.

Aside from a few predictable swipes at the IMF by exponents of "indigenous" development strategies, the volume includes no systematic treatment of the role of international factors in shaping the reform trajectories of democratizing regimes. Nor does it attempt to compare the democratization and reform experiences of Latin American, East European, Asian, and African countries in a rigorous fashion. Although the country studies included in the volume document a rich variety of strategies for simultaneous economic and political reform, there is no evidence of strategic transferability from one situation to another. Upon finishing Diamond and Platter's book, the reader is left with an impression of multiple paths but few general rules or sustainable theories.

Haggard and Kaufman's book produces quite a different impression. The authors aspire to construct a comprehensive theory explaining the political economy of democratic transition. Their contribution to the literature lies in their effort to identify the critical factors that determine the propensity of authoritarian regimes to collapse, and the ability of newly elected governments to consolidate democracy and carry out economic reforms. Haggard and Kaufman argue convincingly that scholars such as Philippe Schmitter and Adam Przezorski, who confine their analysis of democratic transitions mainly to the strategies of key actors, overlook the socioeconomic and institutional factors that shape those actors' preferences. But Haggard and Kaufman's argument becomes somewhat less convincing when it lays out which socioeconomic and institutional factors should be included in a general theory of democratic transition.

Haggard and Kaufman propose a simple, elegant model of authoritarian breakdown based on economic performance and elite cohesion. Authoritarian regimes are most vulnerable to collapse when poor economic performance undermines their ability to purchase social compliance and when elite fragmentation weakens their capacity to manage economic and political problems. By contrast, cohesive elites can better prevent economic crises and withstand political pressures. And even when cohesive elites operating under noncrisis economic conditions come under pressure to democratize, they are in a better position to impose a political settlement that protects their future access to power and limits the options of their successors. Haggard and Kaufman thus attach great importance to the circumstances surrounding authoritarian withdrawal. Although to a lesser extent than many transitologists, they tend to overemphasize the role of transitional "pacts" in structuring subsequent political and economic developments. In fact, bargains worked out during the transition tend to be revised later as the balance of power in society shifts, and predictions based on the terms of pacts become less reliable over time.

Haggard and Kaufmann also propose a simple, elegant explanation for variations in economic performance and prospects for political consolidation in new democracies. They argue that two institutional arrangements—the organization of executive authority and the structure of the party system—are most important in determining the success of economic reform and political transition. Echoing the theories of Joan Nelson, Haggard and Kaufman postulate that centralized executive authority is necessary to initiate economic reforms, but that the consolidation of economic reform and political democracy requires the assembling of a coalition of supporters and beneficiaries. The most effective mechanism for mobilizing this support base, according to the authors, is a cohesive, nonpolarized political party system.

For an analysis that places such primacy on the characteristics of party systems, Haggard and Kaufman's work provides surprisingly little discussion of the sources of party polarization and fragmentation. The authors contend that the factors shaping party systems "far exceed the bounds of this study" (p. 168). Yet an analysis of how party systems structure political outcomes is not entirely satisfying if it provides no explanation of the factors shaping parties themselves. The reader is left wondering whether the ultimate causes of political outcomes lie not in the characteristics of particular party systems but in the social and economic forces which gave rise to them.

Perhaps the most obvious basis on which Haggard and Kaufman's argument can be critiqued is that of case selection. The authors exclude Eastern Europe on the grounds that the region's economic difficulties were too "profound" (p. 18) to be comparable to the Latin American and Asian countries chosen as cases. Since the relative intensity of economic crisis is an important variable in the authors' model, this dismissal of Eastern European cases as economically extreme seems inexplicable. Haggard and Kaufman also ignore Eastern Europe because they concede that its inclusion would force them to incorporate international influences into their analysis. In other words, the authors were unwilling to complicate their minimalist explanatory framework by including a factor that is central to the study of East European transitions—but also quite important to the cases the authors do select. In fact, several of the detailed case studies acknowledge international incentives and constraints as critical determinants of policy outcomes.

Yet, no systematic effort to integrate external factors into the theoretical analysis is made.

This problem reflects the main weakness of explanatory frameworks, such as Haggard and Kaufman's, that accord primacy to parsimony and therefore ignore many factors without which outcomes cannot be explained. The authors try to circumvent this weakness through constant references in their case studies to "other" determinative factors that lie outside their theoretical model. Yet, at some point the repeated disclaimers acknowledging situation-specific causes begins to undermine the general plausibility of their pared-down explanatory framework.

If the two volumes under review yield an important insight into the transition process, it is that after the initiation of economic and political reforms the consolidation of democracy requires a strategic and institutional shift. Democratizing states must move from reliance on wide discretionary powers wielded by reformist executives to construction of institutionalized mechanisms for governmental consultation with societal interests. Unfortunately, none of the authors provides compelling generalizations about the nature of those mechanisms. No broad conclusions emerge about the relative efficacy of presidential versus parliamentary structures, of two- versus multiparty systems, or of various types of electoral systems and mechanisms of interest representation. This does not augur well either for abstract theorizing about the political economy of democratic consolidation or for actual tinkering with institutional arrangements in efforts to create the "perfect" reformist state.

Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945. By Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 280p. $54.95.

Timothy P. Mitchell, *New York University*

Between 1930 and 1945 a significant change occurred in the way many Egyptians imagined their national community. Before the 1930s, a highly westernized intellectual elite, adopting the model of European racial nationalism, claimed for Egyptians a unique ethnic identity determined by the history and geography of the Nile Valley. This idea was displaced in the 1930s and 1940s by a broader, less-exclusive self-definition, which emphasized the Arab, Muslim, and "Eastern" aspects of Egyptian identity and defined the nation as part of a wider, anti-imperialist community.

This change is the subject of Gershoni and Jankowski's careful study, which traces the transformation in political identity through a close reading of the periodicals, books, and political debates of the period. The authors attribute the change in Egyptian self-identity to three underlying processes. The first was the world economic crisis of the 1930s, which caused a collapse of the Egyptian economy and a sharp decline in living standards. The accompanying crisis in the new parliamentary system and increase in political repression weakened the pro-Western ruling class and facilitated the growth of more radical, anti-imperialist political movements and ideologies. The second process was the rapid growth of cities and schooling and of an educated petite bourgeoisie, whose outlook was more anti-imperialist and who formed and joined new mass-based political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the ultranationalist Young Egypt. Through such organizations, the authors argue, this expanding social class became the audience for the new nationalism and, by a feedback process, to some extent its shapers. The third source of the transformation was Egypt's gradual involvement during this period in a new regional rivalry among the recently independent Arab states and in the fight for the independence of Palestine. The 1936–39 Palestinian armed struggle to end the British occupation and halt Zionist immigration was especially significant in galvanizing a more Arab and anti-imperialist political outlook among almost all classes of Egyptians.

The authors label the new, broader forms of Egyptian identity "supra-Egyptian" nationalism and distinguish three political ideologies in which it was expressed: Islamic nationalism, which identified Islam as the determining element in the formation of Egyptian identity and pictured Egypt as a segment of the transnational Muslim community; Egyptian Arab nationalism, which emphasized the role of Arabic language and culture and rejected the idea that Egyptians were a distinct race; and "integral" Egyptian nationalism, the militaristic chauvinism of groups such as Young Egypt that claimed an expansionist, even imperialist mission for Egypt as a superior nation destined to dominate the Arab world and beyond.

Redefining the Egyptian Nation is the first full-length study of this change in how the nation's identity was imagined. The book demonstrates how the development of nationalism is not a simple process of coming to self-awareness, but the outcome of a political interaction among emerging social classes and between domestic, regional, and international political forces. Moreover, the study illuminates the origins of an important political phenomenon: the rejection of the European model of nationalism, rooted in nineteenth-century racism and Orientalism, and the attempt to elaborate a more layered and multiple sense of political identity, an identity not exclusively determined by the geographical boundaries of the nation state.

The book's analysis of this phenomenon is limited, however, by its understanding of the nature of nationalism, which is derived from modernization theory. The authors claim that modernization dissolved traditional family, village, and tribal conceptions of community, creating an "urgent need to redefine the collective image of Egypt" (p. 212). The "largely mental bonds" of national culture created by modern schooling and literacy stepped in to fill this need, it is said, and became "the primary determinant of collective identity" (p. 216). Yet there is no evidence that family, community, or other preexisting identities in fact dissolved or failed to adapt themselves to new circumstances.

Rather than a collective response to the vacuum of dissolved traditions, nationalism emerges from the evidence of this and other studies as the particular project of a dominant intellectual and social class, working to construct a new political and social hegemony. The shift to supra-Egyptian nationalism was partly a response to popular challenges to this hegemony, as the book explains. But the response was organized in a manner that maintained the hegemony. This is unclear from the authors' modernization approach, which portrays a Westernized elite forced to adopt the more "traditional" categories of Islamic and Arab identity. There is no evidence that Arabness is any more traditional an identity than Egyptianness, and even Islamic nationalism represented an entirely modern, individualistic, and disciplinary construction of Islam. The shift in Egyptian nationalism cannot be understood as a return to tradition, just as nationalism itself cannot be explained as a response to the alleged collapse of that tradition.

Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China (1978–1989). By Shiping Hua. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 206p. $17.95 paper.

Lucian W. Pye, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

The center stage of Deng Xiaoping's China has been captured by the drama of economic growth, leaving the world with the impression that beyond pragmatism the Chinese are devoid of ideological thoughts, except for the slogan "To Get Rich Is Glorious." Shiping Hua has sought to rectify this impression by reporting that there are still Chinese intellectuals engaged in the century-old search for a formula for transforming China into a modernized, world-class society. Hua's report reveals remarkable diversity among the intellectuals, but it also points out that people who were once deeply immersed in Marxism find that, try as they will, it is hard to shed all traces of the ideology.

Hua's approach is very Chinese in that he is strong on labeling, pigeonholing, and classifying, but weaker on analysis, explanation, and answering the "So what?" question. Hua classifies China's main intellectuals according to two main schools of thought, scientism and humanism, and then identifies three variations of each, which in turn he illustrates by the writings of a leading thinker. Thus, the book as a whole revolves around the works of six authors.

The first version of scientism is that of "Marxist Scientism," which is essentially traditional Marxism as a dialectical *science* of history. The category is exemplified by the works of Mao Zedong's old secretary and ideologue, Hu Qiaomu. The second version is "Technological Determinism" as revealed in the thoughts of Su Shaozhi, the former director of the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and an early champion of Deng Xiaoping's reforms. This version of scientism makes economic progress the dynamo of history and more particularly holds that rapid economic growth will produce not a revival of capitalism but rather the shortest and safest route to socialism. The third version of scientism is that of the younger philosopher Jin Guantao, who was strongly influenced by Western social science theories of systems analysis and cybernetics. Hua labels this school "Empirical Scientism" and includes in it Yan Jiaqi, China's leading political scientist until he fled the country.

The three versions of humanism begin with "Marxist Humanism," which focuses on the "young Marx" and questions of alienation, very much in line with the themes developed by some Eastern European intellectuals in the 1970s who were seeking to stay within the fold of Marxism while breaking with Leninist principles. Hua's example is Wang Roushui, who was the former deputy editor of the *People's Daily* and also a leading theoretician for Deng's faction in the Party. The second version is "Confucian Humanism," the focus of which consists of identifying appropriate modern elements in classical Chinese thought; for example, the Chinese tradition of stressing practical rationalism, the orderly weighing of pros and cons, and a concern for action, which Hua sees as a Chinese version of the dialectic. Hua's examplar is Li Zehou, a member of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who revived many of the themes of earlier, pre-Communist reformers, but with novel twists. Li reverses, for example, the earlier formula for combining Western science and Chinese traditional values. In the past the *ti-yong* formula held that the *ti*, or essential values, should be Chinese cultural values, while the *yong*, or utilitarian and practical values, could be Western knowledge. Li suggests that China needs instead to take modern Western knowledge as the fundamentals for a new culture and leave Chinese cultural values for any practical adjustments.

The third version of humanism is "Critical Humanism," which in the writings of Gan Yang become a variant of postmodernism and critical theory. The depths of desperation of some Chinese intellectuals in their search for China's salvation can be seen in Gan Yang's melange of snippets from the writings of Heidegger, Nietzsche, Kirkegaard, Habermas, Althusser, Cassirer, Marcuse, Fromm, Foucault, Daniel Bell, Derrida, and other critics of science, rationality, and modernization. If these be China's beacon lights, pity China!

It should be noted that many Chinese have long thought it possible to summarize the thoughts of philosophers in single sentences. The problem of superficiality has, however, become more troublesome in the post-Mao era because even a limited lifting of the heavy hand of state censorship has released a tidal wave of publishing. Unfortunately, there are now no mechanisms or procedures to ensure quality control, and consequently just about anything written gets published to satisfy the cravings of a long-denied but undiscriminating reading public. Consequently, academic authors are routinely but hurriedly turning out a book a year. And as for journals, there seems to be more available space than supply of quality manuscripts. This is a situation that encourages not careful research, but rather a lot of helter-skelter and superficial writing, consisting largely of quick generalizations, copious but meaningless citations—a form of name dropping—and criticism by unargued pronouncements.

Shiping Hua's review of the six Chinese writers leads to a paradoxical conclusion: Although Chinese traditional thought was firmly rooted in the humanistic outlook, contemporary Chinese thinkers are far more inclined to scientism. This near-worship of science goes back, of course, to the May Fourth Movement of the early 1920s. Today, however, Chinese intellectuals find themselves in a somewhat awkward situation because they are now learning from the West that it is no longer de rigueur to be enthusiastic about science and technology. In the spirit of postmodernism one is supposed to pontificate on science's limitations and be cynical about its promises. Hua, however, makes the interesting point that in spite of such scorn scientism is winning out because China has a fragmented political culture for which scientism provides a useful basis for working toward unity, since it combines the promise of truth with objective neutrality and has a lingering touch of utopianism.

It is not clear what Shiping Hua's book tells us about China's prospects because of his six key authors: one, Hu Qiaomu, is dead, and the other five are all refugees, one in Hong Kong and the other four in America, and thus their writings are largely banned in China. No doubt there will be another generation of Chinese intellectuals who may more or less follow in their footsteps. The evidence of the last century, however, is that China cannot hope to find salvation in the efforts of her philosopher-intellectuals. The country needs a much broader based debate about the kind of nation China should try to become. Unfortunately, the regime of the day will not permit such a public debate, even though it does allow its scribbling classes to turn out their books just so long as they do not inspire popular political action. Shiping Hua has effectively shown that China has had some very capable individual thinkers and philosophers; what he has not demonstrated is how they might influence history. A final paradox is that the very process that has made Chinese intellectuals cosmopolitan thinkers has also changed Chinese society so that intellectuals now find it harder, if not impossible, to perform their once great historic role as advisors and critics of rulers.

Divided Waters: Bridging the U.S.-Mexico Border. By Helen Ingram, Nancy Laney, and David Gilliam. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995. 260p. $35.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Stephen P. Mumme, *Colorado State University*

This gem of a book analyzes the politics of water management on the United States-Mexico border using the twin cities of Nogales as a window on the possibilities for binational cooperation in water management in a border community. Based on a five-year Ford-funded study undertaken by the University of Arizona's Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy and assisted by staff at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana, the book is distinctive for its in-depth, diachronic, multimethodological assessment strategy focused on a single binational metropolitan area, Nogales. The authors draw on neighborhood-based water use surveys, GIS (geographic information systems) analysis of community development and change, participant observation of community decision making on both sides of the border, and market economy and institutional analysis to give us what is without doubt the most complete picture to date of the dynamics of local water management along the United States-Mexico border.

In brief, the authors' thesis is that contemporary institutional practices for managing water resources on the U.S.-Mexican border are both archaic and unresponsive to the new realities of economic integration, urbanization, and political mobilization on both sides of the border. Old institutions, based on the model of national management—the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) is a case in point—are structurally inadequate to the emergent new realities of municipal integration at the border level and certainly ill-equipped to respond to the demands of newly mobilized constituencies in the border community. What is more, the normative framework for assessing the effectiveness of water management institutions has markedly changed, shifting from distributive to qualitative concerns and from economic development to sustainable development. New institutions and new approaches are needed, they argue, if water resources are to be better managed for multiple uses in this arid region.

Reinventing the border, as they put it, requires, at minimum, that new institutions be truly binational, exercise jurisdiction over a broader range of environmental issues—not just water resources—anticipate and deal proactively with problems rather than reacting to successive crises, contribute to building the capacity of locally based environmental management institutions, provide credible information on the environmental and sustainable development dimensions of project development, and be ready to work in an enabling fashion with other institutions in a multitiered and binational institutional environment. By this measure, various recent institutional innovations affecting transboundary water management, notably the new Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), still fall short.

While one may find exception with certain aspects of the authors' conclusions, their sophisticated and detailed treatment of the problem is presently unmatched in the literature, making this book essential reading for those who would better understand the problems of environmental management on the United States-Mexico border. Highly readable, the book should find a wide crossover audience among those interested in transboundary water management, environmental policy, regional development and policymaking in border areas, and the design of effective international environmental institutions. It is also an exceptional source for those interested in understanding the reach and scope of the new environmental institutions brought into being by the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The European Union and the Regions. Edited by Barry Jones and Michael Keating. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. $59.00.

Jeffrey Anderson, *Brown University*

"Is Europe witnessing the death of the once mighty nation-state?" This dramatic question, which greets the reader on the inside flap of the book jacket, is the starting point for *The European Union and the Regions*. Specifically, does the modern European state form, which in this century alone has survived two global economic crises and world wars both hot and cold, face imminent extinction, its natural habitat squeezed inexorably from above by an ever-closer European union and from below by an eruption of regionalist sentiment? The collective answer offered up by contributors to this volume is, in a word, "no." And yet this is a nuanced and insightful "no," one that in no way points to the perpetuation of the status quo. All of which makes the volume essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary state-society relations in Europe.

In fact, one quickly concludes that Jones and Keating are not at all well served by the query adorning the book jacket, which smacks of naive sensationalism and reads as if it were written not by the editors but by a publishing executive. Keating's introduction dismisses the more extreme scenarios that depict the withering away of the European state (e.g., the so-called Europe of Regions) and establishes a sober tone for the remainder of the book. Readers will find nothing but clear, hard-headed empirical analysis in the ensuing thirteen chapters, which comprise a survey of European regional policies written by Harvey Armstrong, eleven country studies (one for each EU member, circa 1994, save Luxembourg, which one could argue is a region masquerading as a nation-state!), and a conclusion. The editors have done a truly admirable job of imparting a common organizational framework to the country chapters, each of which discusses change and continuity in the relationship between center and periphery during the postwar period and then moves to an evaluation of the impact of European integration on both the formal and informal position of the regions.

The results are intriguing. In no member of the European Union are center-periphery relations uncontested, even in highly centralized and unitary regimes like Greece and Ireland. Indeed, regionalist demands have grown louder over the past decade in all member countries. In part, this has resulted from purely domestic political processes, involving a transfer of central government responsibilities to subnational authorities, or what Yves Mény has so eloquently characterized as the decentralization of penury.

Europe too has played a part in this regional awakening. The various country chapters in *The European Union and the Regions* document numerous instances in which the

Community's cohesion policies, which grew in prominence during the late 1980s, generated regional mobilization and in some cases regional empowerment vis-à-vis central governments. Quite frequently, subnational actors have found in EU cohesion policy not only a source of material policy benefits, but also a sympathetic and influential partner—namely, the European Commission, which has sought to link up with subnational groups to further its own agenda in Brussels. Paradoxically, in some countries European integration has presented regions with real and actual costs as well as benefits. Francesc Morata (Spain) and Hans-Georg Gerstenlauer (Germany) uncover deep-seated regional defensiveness toward Brussels in their respective countries, and Morata goes so far as to argue that integration has led to the weakening of the Spanish provinces.

Whatever the case, the content and ultimate impact of regionalism vary from member country to member country, shaped by unique national constitutions and political arrangements. But as Jones stresses in the concluding chapter, a "regional dynamic," nurtured and in some cases created by supranational integration, is present in all member countries, and this dynamic is challenging the traditional configuration of the European nation-state, again in myriad ways.

As to the shortcomings in this volume, I would have to mention first its density. In packing an introduction, twelve substantive chapters, and a conclusion into 300 pages of text, the editors have accomplished a herculean task; but in the end they are left with precious little space to identify, let alone elaborate upon, the many interesting parallels and contrasts that emerge from the country studies. Some readers, particularly those who come to this book from the Community studies literature, might also find the volume undertheorized; although occasional references to horizontal and vertical policy networks crop up here and there in the text, the authors have declined to construct and employ an overarching analytical framework within which the twelve national variations on a single regional dynamic can be situated.

Yet, what to some might appear as a flaw will strike many others as a virtue. Surveying the results of these rich empirical analyses, carefully edited to generate comparability across cases, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that only now are we beginning to accumulate sufficient empirical knowledge to support a productive journey into the realm of theory. Jones and Keating have produced a volume that not only stands on its own as the definitive study of intergovernmental relations among European regions, national governments, and supranational institutions in the mid-1990s, but also provides an excellent springboard for empirical comparisons with regional initiatives elsewhere in Europe (the three new EU members come immediately to mind, as do prospective members in Eastern Europe), as well as for general theorizing about the politics of regionalism in advanced industrial democracies.

Democracy from Below: New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany. By Ruud Koopmans. Boulder: Westview, 1995. 282p. $60.00.

Russell J. Dalton, *University of California, Irvine*

New social movements have become important and contentious new actors in advanced industrial societies. Koopmans presents a valuable study of the growth of these movements, and their use of political protest as a political tactic. In many ways, this book is more than the title implies. The empirical analyses are based on a content-coding of newspaper reports about protest activities in West Germany, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. The cross-national comparisons in chapter 2 make for stimulating reading. These data document the high levels of unconventional action in all four societies (1975–89), and important variations in the action repertoires of these movements. Although much of the cross-national data have already been published by members of the project, the systematic presentation and discussion of national patterns will make this a useful resource for those studying contemporary social movements.

Koopmans also makes the important theoretical argument that social movement behavior reflects a combination of institutional constraints (the political process model) and the identity/goals of the movement. By merging both factors, he moves beyond a number of recent social movement studies that have examined only one theoretical framework. The book also adds to the theoretical literature by specifying the conditions through which opportunity structures actually function.

Chapter 4 presents a more extensive time-series analysis of protest in West Germany (1965–89). Koopmans presents evidence that protest by one movement tends to stimulate protest by other movements, rather than having the negative impact theorized by others. The longitudinal analyses also provide an opportunity to test several rival theories of how the repertoire of protest movements changes over time. In addition, chapter 4 presents detailed studies of the evolution of specific movements in West Germany: antinuclear, squatters, peace, environmentalists, and the *Autonomen*. Even specialists in German politics will find interesting material in the vignettes and the tracking of these movements through the events data series. For instance, Koopmans documents the institutionalization of the environmental movement, from the actions of individual *Bürgerinitiativen* to the organized events of large associations.

Koopmans concludes that these data provide convincing support for the political process model of social movements. However, this reader was unconvinced. Despite the theoretical emphasis on both process and movement identity, there is relatively little attention given to evaluating the latter theory. At many times one suspects that political differences in the identity of movements (or specific movement organizations) underlie the patterns of protest events, but seldom are the data disaggregated to test this hypothesis and there are no multivariate analyses that combine potential predictors. Moreover, the author's pessimism about German democracy seems inconsistent with the wider literature on Germany postwar development.

We should applaud Koopmans's efforts to develop empirical measures of social movement activity and to use these data to evaluate existing social movement theory. Too much of the social movement literature remains based on descriptive or even anecdotal evidence. Yet even a sympathetic reader might have questions about the validity and reliability of such newspaper reports. For instance, the limited number of newspaper sources in each nation inevitably introduces some bias—this is clearly a sampling of events, not a complete census, and we do not know if this is an unbiased sample. For instance, cross-national levels of protest do not match the results from mass survey reports. Other readers will note that some forms of action seem dramatically underrepresented; for example, Koopmans reports only 40 protest events for the entire German women's movement between 1975 and 1989. Even though coding such events is becoming a common methodology in social movement research, more attention to these validity questions is deserved.

Finally, there were a few frustrating stylistic points. The book is most successful when the theoretical framework from chapter 2 guides the empirical analyses, but often this linkage is less than clear. Descriptive statistics, chronological histories, and hypothesis testing tend to be intermixed in puzzling ways. Finally, the book lacks an index, which will be a frustration to all readers.

Koopmans has made a valuable addition to the literature on social movements. Other writers on the subject should follow his model in merging theory and empirical evidence on how these movements are changing the politics of advanced industrial democracies.

Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. Edited by Charles A. Kupchan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 224 pp. $39.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Donald Rothchild, *University of California, Davis*

The study of nationalism has again become fashionable. Whereas liberal and Marxist scholars in the 1970s and 1980s were inclined to dismiss nationalism and ethnicity as anachronistic and impediments to the processes of modernization—even as evidences of "false consciousness" according to some writers in the Marxist tradition—today's social scientists are more prepared to recognize the strength of national and ethnic appeals at a time of extraordinary social change. With the simultaneous collapse of communism, the emergence of weak successor states, the troubled search for belief systems and identities, heightened material expectations, and intense conflict and competition for state-controlled resources, it is no wonder that ethnonationalism has again come into prominence. Regardless of whether these identities are recent or have a long history and whether group memories of exploitation and persecution are accurate or not, the sense of inclusion in the group becomes the fact of overriding importance. Inclusion is central because it provides group members with the security and purpose they need to live in a world of strangers—even foes. The resulting desire for inclusion becomes so strong that many members will willingly subordinate their material interests and their safety for the well-being of the collectivity. At times, members will go farther and even sacrifice their essential moral values, to the point of massacring innocent "enemies," to advance the cause of their ethnonational community. Rather than easing the diffuse dangers around them, however, such savagery creates spirals of violence that engulf all.

In an effort to focus on this ambiguous and complex process of change and discontinuity, Charles Kupchan and his colleagues offer a broad picture of contemporary Europe that considers most of the major elements in question: the concept of nationalism, its intellectual and social roots, its relationship to supranationalism, its appearance in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and its implications for United States and Western European policy. Rather refreshingly, the authors make little attempt to conceal their disagreements on several of these issues. For example, Kupchan defines nationalism in terms of a "common political identity" (p. 2), Ivo Banac as an ideology (p. 107), and Stephen Van Evera as a political movement characterized by the primary loyalty of its members and their desire for an independent state. Moreover, whereas Aleksa Djilas contends that Western writers place too much blame on the Serbian role in the Bosnian civil war, Kupchan distinguishes between the civil war (in which all parties share responsibility) and the war of aggression against Bosnia (in which the Serbs, and to a lesser extent the Croatians, have a primary responsibility) (p. 224).

Although there is little effort to disguise their differences on particular issues, the authors nonetheless agree substantially on Europe's sometimes creative, sometimes turbulent experience with a resurgent nationalism. Kupchan's comment in the introductory chapter that Europe's new nationalism has varied consequences, being a source of fragmentation and ethnic violence or of state stability and interstate cooperation, receives extensive support. An emphasis is placed on cultivating nationalism's positive potential for consolidating a society, providing symbols of common experience and common fate that will unite peoples at a time of anomie, confusion, lost faith, and a pervasive sense of uncertainty and vulnerability. Charles Schöpflin concludes that "modern nations benefit enormously from an ethnic base" (p. 40), and David Calleo asserts that "states that rested on a national community were, on the whole, more successful" (p. 27) than others in dealing with issues of internal and external security and the integration and expansion of their economies.

Nationalism, then, plays an important integrating and legitimating role; nevertheless, there is no denying that its aggressive face complicates the democratic process and results in ethnic domination and spirals of conflict that lead to brutal reprisals and war. As the state weakens and ethnicity replaces common citizenship as the primary focus, violence may become routine, as Paul Goble shows with respect to the conflicts over Karabagk and Chechnya and the struggle between the Abkhaz and Ossetin in Georgia (p. 134). The opportunistic role of elites is often a critical factor in these confrontations, employing the mass media in a provocative way to mobilize members for destructive purposes. Writing about the former Yugoslavia, Aleksa Djilas describes the various communal leaders as having "irresponsibly and deliberately manipulated nationalist sentiments" to whip up support among their constituents for a vicious and highly damaging war (p. 85).

In an effort to cultivate the benign aspects of nationalism, various authors urge such measures as the strengthening of state capabilities; invigorating civil society; encouraging a mass media independent of the state; making economic assistance contingent on acceptable human rights practices; utilizing international tribunals; expressing greater caution in extending state recognition; engaging in border rectification; conceding cultural autonomy, federalism, and confederalism; setting up available peacekeeping contingents; and providing for a more active European Union role.

Although this examination of the aggressive face of European nationalism and how officials may respond to it is hardly new to American political scientists, what seems most innovative in this volume is Henry Bienen's forthright and challenging analysis of the implications of nationalism for U.S. foreign policy. Bienen maintains that the new Europe's ethnically based nationalism and civil unrest does not pose a threat to U.S. national security. Hence, while the United States should not favor secessionist movements and should work with its European allies to encourage the viability and capabilities of multiethnic states, American leaders must take great care in selecting which confrontations threaten U.S. interests and therefore justify deploying American power abroad. The failure of the other authors to respond to Bienen's "narrow view" of U.S. security interests represents a serious omission.

Moreover, the authors point to such important issues as demand-bearing groups, regimes, information flows, and magnifiers without examining the process at hand in a systematic way. What variables in the political environment are at work and interacting with each other that can explain why information is (or is not) being diffused across intranational or international borders? In making these observations, I do not wish to raise doubts about the value of this wide-ranging analysis of nationalism in the new Europe; rather, I want to point to other, related areas that might be developed in order to give the reader a fuller picture of the various dynamic elements at play.

The Rebel's Dilemma. By Mark Irving Lichbach. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 514p. $45.00.

Anthony J. Gill, *University of Washington*

In *The Rebel's Dilemma*, Mark Irving Lichbach presents a tour de force of the collective action research agenda with regards to the study of dissent, rebellion, and revolution. His book is monumental and pivotal, but not because it reveals any new theoretical insights or explains a particularly vexing empirical anomaly. Rather, it consolidates over three decades of research on collective action problems and sets the agenda for future studies of collective dissent and rebellion.

Lichbach starts by segmenting the study of collective dissent into two broadly defined research programs: deprived actor (DA) theories and collective action (CA) theories. The former paradigm holds that rebellion results from psychological factors (e.g., frustration) caused by shared deprivations. In essence, the DA program is a demand-based theory of collective dissent. But Lichbach argues that demand is not enough; collective rebellion needs to be supplied. CA theorists, Lichbach included, posit that dissent is a public good (PG) and that for rebellion to be successful, dissenters must overcome the ever-present prisoners' dilemma (PD). The PG-PD nature of rebellion forms the core of the rebel's dilemma: While psychological frustration may create a constituency of potential rebels who could best address their grievances through mutual cooperation, no individual dissenter has an incentive to participate in group protest. Not surprisingly, Lichbach's analysis relies heavily on Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965).

Since Olson, CA theorists have "discovered" numerous solutions to the rebel's dilemma. Lichbach classifies these solutions into four broad categories—Market, Community, Contract, and Hierarchy. Market solutions (e.g., lower the costs of participation) serve as the baseline for collective dissent as these solutions require no preexisting structures or community. Community, Contract, and Hierarchy supplement solutions to the rebel's dilemma where Market solutions are insufficient.

One of the book's principal shortcomings is that the divisions between these four groups lack analytical precision. For example, Lichbach discusses ideology and symbols as Market solutions, whereas they also could qualify as Community solutions (e.g., overcoming mutual ignorance). Likewise, Hierarchy-based solutions appear under the Contract heading and vice versa. However, this apparent flaw in Lichbach's analysis actually bolsters one of his central arguments: Each categorical solution (e.g., Contract) to the rebel's dilemma is incomplete in explaining any and all incidents of collective dissent. Specific solutions in each category necessarily complement solutions in other categories. Furthermore, no one specific solution (e.g., locate patrons) is inherently necessary for rebellion to occur. In other words, of the two dozen solutions proposed by CA theorists for overcoming the rebel's dilemma, none is either necessary or sufficient.

With so many potential solutions to the rebel's dilemma available, Lichbach wonders why collective dissent is not more prevalent. This is where he introduces the state into the analysis. Whereas rebel entrepreneurs work to solve their collective action problem, state leaders attempt to aggravate the rebel's dilemma. In doing so, however, states have their own PG-PD problem to manage. State elites need to maintain cooperation among themselves lest rebels divide and conquer them. Generally, state leaders have the advantage over rebels in that they have already solved their collective action problem; hence, successful rebellion is comparatively rare. Unfortunately, Lichbach does not develop this fascinating subtheme further, but rather leaves it for a forthcoming volume.

The multiplicity of solutions to the rebel's dilemma that are neither necessary nor sufficient has a further implication for the scope of theory in studies of collective dissent. Lichbach argues convincingly that there cannot be a grand theory of rebellion. Context matters. Dissident entrepreneurs will pick and choose among all potential solutions according to specific environmental constraints. Thus, one of the major tasks for CA theorists studying rebellion is to specify what particular circumstances lead to a given mix of solutions to the rebel's dilemma.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Lichbach evaluates the analytical and empirical strength of the CA program as it currently stands. First, he begins by arguing that each categorical solution to the rebel's dilemma is logically incomplete: "Contract requires Market.... Market requires Community" and so on (pp. 279–80). As a result, CA theories fail in terms of scientific predictability. With no single solution to the rebel's dilemma being either necessary or sufficient and given the enormous number of permutations that logical incompleteness implies, successful rebellion will invariably surprise scholars. However, one could debate Lichbach as to whether future predictability is either a central or even a desired goal of social science.

Lichbach also compares the CA theories to the DA research program according to Lakatosian and Popperian criteria. The former criterion evaluates one theory against an alternative on the basis of whether it provides additional and true information about empirical observations, while the latter requires different and better information for a given theory to be more valuable than another. On average, CA theories of collective dissent outperform the DA perspective on both criteria. Interestingly, Lichbach gives the DA agenda more credit than is perhaps due. At several points in his comparative evaluation he attributes the explanatory power of DA theories to CA solutions and gives the DA perspective high marks for this. While, this should demonstrate the explanatory advantage CA theories have over DA theories, Lichbach never acknowledges this.

Undoubtedly, many scholars will disagree with Lichbach over the specifics of the various solutions to the rebel's dilemma he proposes. Some may even disagree with the CA approach altogether, although they do so in the face of strong evidence and argumentation to the contrary. But for those sympathetic to the CA program, *The Rebel's Dilemma* is an invaluable work. Lichbach brings together various strands of CA research in a comprehensive effort to show what has been accomplished in the field and then defines a convincing research agenda for the future. He suggests that future CA-based studies of dissent should focus on the psychological microfoundations of rationality (including the role of culture and norms), as well as considering more explicitly macrostructures (e.g., the state) that constrain rational action. Despite not providing any new theoretical insights into collective dissent per se, this book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution.

Ultimately, the truest measure of value of a scholarly work is the degree to which it stimulates the reader's own intellectual development. *The Rebel's Dilemma* has provided me with more food for thought than any book I have encountered in recent years. I anxiously await Lichbach's companion volume, *The Cooperator's Dilemma*.

Remaking the Italian Economy. By Richard M. Locke. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 232p. $29.95.

Stephen Hellman, *York University*

The ability of the Italian economy to flourish despite all the obstacles thrown in its way by the political system has long been noted and occasionally even studied in systematic fashion. Unsuccessful efforts in the 1980s to provide a more predictable framework of industrial relations by imitating arrangements in place elsewhere (especially Northern Europe) have also received considerable scholarly attention. And at least since the path-breaking work of Bagnasco's *Tre Italie* (1977) and Trigilia's *Grandi partiti, piccole imprese* (1986), Italian and other specialists have underscored the importance of local territorial and institutional arrangements in explaining not only political success but also patterns of social stability and economic adaptation.

Richard Locke's *Remaking the Italian Economy* is thus informed by a rich literature and, even without broader ambitions, its original research (a fieldwork- and document-based analysis of transformation in the auto and textile-apparel industries in contrasting milieux) would represent a solid contribution and merit our attention. But Locke also takes off from this research to suggest alternative ways of viewing both Italian and more general processes of industrial transformation, and these efforts are persuasive and provocative enough to make this a first-rate study.

The first two chapters provide an admirably synthetic summary of Italy's structural strengths and weaknesses, as well as of efforts to revive and restructure the economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Lack of political will, bureaucratic foot-dragging, and outright sabotage marked efforts at large-scale change in that period. But Locke reminds us that reformist designs were shot through with contradictory assumptions or practices as well. He then analyzes (chapter 3) profound modifications to the industrial relations system during the same period. And here he shows how extensive reforms put in place in the 1970s and 1980s not only lacked internal coherence, but often backfired: "Initiatives aimed at abating the peculiarities of the Italian system instead accentuated them" (p. 75). This was the result not so much of muddle-headedness as of unintended consequences, with policies designed for one set of conditions producing dramatically different results as circumstances changed. Such processes worked in especially poignant ways among the unions: altering its strategic focus to adapt to one set of conditions, the Catholic CISL found itself disoriented and weakened when those conditions were no longer operative.

Locke then addresses the auto and textile industries (chapters 4 and 5, respectively), comparing Fiat in Turin and Alfa-Romeo in Milan in the first instance and the range of experiences in the country's premier textile district, Biella, in the other. These cases are well chosen for the purposes of Locke's study and also for the contribution they make to the broader discussion of Italian territorial and sectoral differentiation.

The author's major argument follows from much of the literature, namely, local differences really matter in explaining why firms in some areas are much more able to adapt than others. Particularly important is the sociopolitical network that evolves in a given locality. Arguing from this framework, Locke goes beyond much received wisdom in demonstrating that local differences exist and are significant *within* one area, the North, often portrayed as homogeneous. Polarization and frontal class conflict have long been accepted as characteristic of Turin, but Milan, despite intense conflict during the period of peak mobilization, provides a setting in which labor and management worked out a far more conciliatory style of conflict resolution to the mutual benefit of each. In contrast to Fiat's zero-sum game, restructuring was actually negotiated and was less disruptive and painful at Alfa Romeo.

The inclusion of textiles and apparel as well as automobiles is important methodologically: by choosing industries that differ radically along so many dimensions and showing their adjustment strategies during the same period, Locke is able to argue convincingly that local context—and not some technology-specific variable—plays an important role in shaping strategic choices. And nowhere was there more successful adaptation than in the Biella district. Chapter 5 provides a brief and fascinating history of textiles as well as of class relations in Biella. Here we find a rich and complex network of relations between labor and capital and, equally important, among capitalists—not always noted for their cooperative behavior. The restructuring of the 1980s was thus marked by a decentralization of production that seemingly paralleled wider trends, but in Biella the decentralization process was exceptional: it occurred amidst considerable consultation among owners, with labor's cooperation, and without the weakened unions and declining wages that were a by-product of similar changes elsewhere. Moreover, no single pattern of restructuring occurred; myriad options were tried and several met with success. Skeptics might wish to withhold judgment until other cases are subjected to similar scrutiny, for there is much that makes Biella exceptional (above all a catastrophic flood in the 1960s, discussed by Locke, that forced areawide cooperation). Still, the overwhelming weight of all the evidence presented does support the author's findings.

These findings are presented to demonstrate the importance of local variations in explaining Italy's economic successes (and failures). But they also form part of a broader argument, namely, that under present conditions it is more useful to view the Italian economy—or any advanced capitalist economy for that matter—not as a single "national system," but rather as a much less coherent *composite* of diverse subnational patterns that often coexist uneasily within a country's boundaries (Locke identifies polycentric, polarized, and hierarchical local orders). The particular mix between types of local economies characterizes each national economy far more accurately than any presumedly hegemonic pattern. Nor is it necessary for there to be a single dominant form. Some countries may have a prevalence of one pattern, e.g., Germany has more polycentric locales. Other countries, including Italy, have a more balanced distribution. This framework makes it much easier to pinpoint why and in which sectors (geographical and industrial) economic adaptation does or does not take place and has the advantage of accounting for complexity from the start. This may not represent a radically new perspective, but it does suggest a refreshing way to rethink old categories.

The Making of Portuguese Democracy. By Kenneth Maxwell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 250p. $49.95.

Democratization and Social Settlements: The Politics of Change in Contemporary Portugal. By Daniel Nataf. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 289p. $21.95 paper.

Walter C. Opello, Jr., *State University of New York, Oswego*

These books are about the transition to democracy in Portugal, which began on April 25, 1974, when a group of military officers calling themselves the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) overthrew the authoritarian dictatorship established by António de Oliveira Salazar in 1932. This coup was one of the three most important political events to have taken place in Portugal in this century, the other two being the coup of October 5, 1910, that overthrew the monarchy and established a republican regime in Portugal and the coup that brought down that republic on May 28, 1926, and established Salazar's nearly fifty-year-long New State dictatorship. Both of these books, although radically different in their approaches, seek to demonstrate that the 1974 transition to democracy was not only an event of major significance for Portugal but also an epochal event for the global system of states.

For Kenneth Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the founder of the Camões Center for the Study of the Portuguese-Speaking World, and a longtime observer of Portuguese politics, analyses of the Portuguese transition to date have "homogenized" Portugal's transition within a comparative framework that has obscured the true nature of the transition. According to Maxwell, unlike the other transitions to democracy in southern Europe at about the same time in Greece and Spain, Portugal's transition "acquired many of the characteristics of a revolution" (p. 4), which the others did not. His book is a vivid, richly detailed account of this attempted, but eventually unsuccessful, revolution.

After an overview of Portuguese history, Maxwell begins his study with the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime. This is followed by a discussion of both the struggle among the rival leaders and political forces that contended for control of Portugal's future during the two-year period of exception that followed the 1974 coup, and the reactions and actions of political leaders in the United States and other European states to events taking place in Lisbon during that period. Maxwell brilliantly weaves together a discussion of events in Lisbon with critical moments in Portugal's erstwhile colonial empire in Africa, Europe's last, where the bulk of the Portuguese armed forces had been stationed since the early 1960s, engaged in a three-front war against independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Maxwell's book also contains a useful bibliographic essay about the scholarly literature covering the old regime, Portuguese colonialism in Africa, the 1974 revolution, and the consolidation of the democratic regime.

The connection between events in Lisbon and happenings in the African colonies that Maxwell focuses on is the central contribution of his book and, in his view, the heretofore overlooked aspect of the Portuguese transition that reveals its significance for the broader world. For Maxwell the coup in Portugal was much more than a big event in a small, poor, minor European state, with little impact on the world system of states. Despite having failed as a domestic revolution, the Portuguese transition was nothing less than a major world historical turning point that eventually brought about the end of the Cold War in Europe and sparked the "third wave" (Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 1991) of democratization that has since swept over the planet. In his conclusion he writes: The chain of events set in motion by the April 1974 coup ... had widespread and long-lasting international ramifications.... The civil war in Angola, sparked by the helter-skelter withdrawal of the Portuguese and by outside intervention, helped undermine *détente*, threatened the credibility of the Carter administration when the Cubans with Soviet support extended their activities to Ethiopia and the Ogaden, and later on provided justification for the huge military buildups which contributed to the burdens of military expenditures that, in the end, broke the back of the Soviet Union" (pp. 180–81).

Daniel Nataf, professor of political science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, agrees with Maxwell that the Portuguese transition had the characteristics of a revolution but is more precise about its nature. For Nataf, the Portuguese transition was a revolution because it "expanded democracy" into social and political realms, while the transitions in Greece and Spain only changed political institutions. According to Nataf, the Portuguese transition was the first transition of the third wave in which the class struggle was unambiguously open and visible.

Nataf provides, therefore, a class analysis of the Portuguese transition, an effort that has not been made before by an American political scientist. Following Jessop's "Accumulation, State and Hegemonic Projects" (*Kapitalistate*, 1983), Nataf analyzes the Portuguese transition using the following concepts: *hegemonic project*, the mobilization of support behind a popular program of action that advances the interests of the dominant class; *social settlements*, the agreements made by the dominant and subordinate classes regarding the type of political institutions that can be put in place within which they can coexist; and *dishegemony*, Nataf's own concept, by which he means a situation where neither the class that has dominated historically nor the subordinate classes can agree on a hegemonic project.

Nataf's book outlines the Salazarist hegemonic project and discusses the dishegemony that followed in the wake of the 1974 coup, during which time subordinate classes were radicalized and the political parties of the left, owing to differences among them, were unable to put together a coherent national popular program to end capitalist hegemony or establish a new social settlement based on a counterhegemony by subordinate classes. Nataf's book also measures the degree to which the evolving democratic capitalist hegemonic project received popular support in elections and opinion polls, and analyzes the relationship between party competition and trade union strategies that produced a new social settlement. His book concludes with a typology of democratization that compares the Portuguese transition to other examples of recent transitions, especially those of the former communist states of Eastern Europe.

Nataf summarizes the Portuguese transition as follows: "The fall of the dictatorship was an instance of relative state autonomy during a complete collapse of [the traditional dominant class]. This enabled the dictatorship's historic political opposition to play a paramount role in articulating a new hegemonic project. The quasi-revolutionary transition to democracy featured particularly intense competition among political forces as leftist elements sought to expand democratic change to fundamental social and economic reforms. Unable to implement a counter-hegemonic leftist model the transition resulted in a dishegemonic impasse. As the transition ended and consolidation started, political parties played a key role in expressing hegemonic alternatives, with elections taking the form of referenda on models of society.... The consolidation proceeded through four phases of evolution, culminating in the Social Democratic Party's (PSD) victory in 1987. The party's success gave it a relatively strong mandate for pursuing democratic capitalism" (p. 16).

Both books are significant contributions to the study of the Portuguese transition because they seek to show how important and unique this event was for the Portuguese as well as for the global state system. Maxwell tells the story with a vividness and richness of detail that makes his a "rattling good yarn," and Nataf contextualizes the events described by Maxwell in terms of the domestic economic class struggle that was unleashed by the coup, thus rectifying a major lacuna in the literature of the transition. Nataf does a superb job exploring the social forces underlying the overt political events and personal conflicts that Maxwell so vividly describes. In Nataf's work the political actors of the transition are more than rival political leaders with certain personalities who extend their models for the new regime to the Portuguese citizenry. Rather, they are individuals who possess economic interests that derive from their class location in the social structure and wish to impose these class hegemonic projects on the situation.

I am hard-pressed to find any major flaws or shortcomings in these two fine works, although I find Maxwell's conclusion about the Portuguese coup's connection to the collapse of the former Soviet Union strained. Surely, the collapse of the USSR was a more complicated affair than Maxwell would have it. Mainstream political scientists will find Nataf's book wanting because it *is* class analysis not because it is flawed *as* class analysis. In my view, Nataf has produced a first-rate study of the Portuguese transition using a political economy framework that can be profitably read by all who are interested in democratization in the late twentieth century.

Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. By María José Moyano. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. 226p. $24.00.

Deborah L. Norden, *Colby College*

For Argentina—perhaps even more than for its neighbors—the 1970s were a decade of debilitating and nearly incomprehensible violence. The military regime initiated in 1976 (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional) holds responsibility for much of that violence, with thousands of disappearances to its credit. In painstaking detail, María José Moyano describes the other major players in the Argentine drama—guerrilla movements, collective protest, and paramilitary organizations. The majority of the analysis centers around the numerous guerrilla organizations, drawing on a wealth of sources (most notably, interviews with participants) for a subject intrinsically difficult to research. Moyano's critical and thorough study of Argentina's guerrillas provides a broader panorama than earlier works, such as Gillespie's *Soldiers of Perón* (1982), as well as helping to balance the post-Proceso tendency to portray guerrillas as alternately heroes or victims.

Moyano centers her study around a tantalizing question—why did the guerrillas engage in violence that often appeared to contradict their political goals? The greatest theorists of guerrilla warfare, Clausewitz (*On War*, 1949), Mao Tse-Tung (*On Guerrilla Warfare*, 1961), and even Argentina's own revered Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, author of *Guerrilla Warfare* (1985), have emphasized that military means must respond to political ends. Because guerrillas depend heavily on the support of the people for everything from supplies and shelter to recruits, both Mao and Guevara taught that guerrillas need to befriend the people they encounter and avoid inflicting unnecessary costs on them. According to these practitioner-theorists, every action of the guerrilla should be infused with political meaning designed to display the virtues of the revolutionaries and their aims.

Despite this ideal, guerrilla movements in Argentina and elsewhere (Peru's Shining Path has been the region's most notoriously savage guerrilla organization) have used violence against civilians through kidnappings, bombs, and other means that do not appear to be very closely tied to political aims. Moyano notes that in the early stages of Argentina's guerrilla movements, the guerrillas did follow Guevara's teachings, avoiding any resemblence to the armed forces whom they opposed (pp. 61–62). However, toward 1973 and 1974, Moyano documents a trend toward increasing militarization throughout the guerrilla movements. As she explains, larger numbers of combatants were involved in operations, more of these operations were directed against military sites, and, perhaps most significant, there was "a shift from an initial emphasis on violence against property to an emphasis on violence against persons" (p. 50). Following Mao's and Guevara's theories of guerrilla warfare, as guerrillas approach the culmination of their struggle, their forces must adopt more traditional military forms of organization and warfare. Yet Argentina's guerrillas do not appear to have come anywhere near that stage. According to Moyano, the guerrillas' changed approach indicated declining attention to public opinion, which turned against the increasingly brutal would-be revolutionaries. The guerrillas sacrificed the public support they required for the illusion of military prowess.

From 1969 to 1979 Argentine politics varied dramatically, from military rule to civilian in 1973, then back to military (although much more repressive this time) in 1976. These abrupt contextual changes would appear to be obvious explanations for transformations within the guerrilla movements. Yet, while Moyano does take regime changes into consideration, her explanation focuses on dynamics *within* the guerrilla organizations. Moyano looks at such factors as bonding between guerrillas ("resocialization") and the risky nature of guerrilla life as causes of guerrilla militarization. However, as causal factors, these undeniably important aspects of the guerrilla experience appear somewhat less convincing and less significant than the third factor she mentions—the "bureaucratic imperative" (p. 7). According to Moyano, beginning around 1973 the guerrillas experienced a massive expansion of their membership (pp. 102–5). This growth helped generate increasing organizational complexity, exemplified by the adoption of military-style ranks and hierarchies. At the same time, the prolonged life of the guerrilla organizations meant that those members with considerable time invested in the movement became increasingly concerned with the welfare of the organization itself and their own careers within it, even above the original motivations of the movement. The growing complexity of the organizations and the distance between leaders and followers, flavored by the socializing experiences mentioned above, helped drive the guerrillas toward increasingly militaristic actions.

By looking toward internal causes of militarization, Moyano reveals dynamics of guerrilla movements with considerable parallels elsewhere in politics. Most notably, Moyano's analysis reveals that neither external context nor original motivations suffice to explain the trajectory of political movements; rather, organizational imperatives exert increasing influence on leaders' decisions. A very similar dynamic occurred in the military movement that lasted from 1987 to 1990 in Argentina. Like the guerrillas Moyano describes, the military rebels gradually moved from reacting to external conditions and allowing their goals to define their actions to making choices based on organizationally defined motivations. In both movements, guerrilla and military rebel, leaders became more and more concerned with protecting the organizations they had founded than with pursuing the goals that had motivated those organizations. Thus, for the guerrillas, military objectives overtook political objectives; with the military rebels, political goals began to surpass military ones.

Despite presenting an interesting argument, *The Lost Patrol* is not without its weaknesses. Much of the substantial information presented has not been sufficiently integrated with the argument. Furthermore, the author includes data in tables that the text explains as biased (for example, relying on the military's reports of violent incidents during the Proceso); the result are therefore somewhat confusing and misleading. Tighter categorization would also strengthen the work, especially when the author discusses groups responsible for right-wing violence. Nevertheless, these drawbacks—some of which are practically unavoidable given the paucity of available data—do not negate the overall quality of the work. The book gives a very thorough overview of the history, organization, and development of guerrilla movements, as well as providing significant insights into the guerrillas' behavior. These achievements alone suffice to make this a valuable contribution to literature on guerrilla movements, political violence, and Argentine history.

From Leningrad to St. Petersburg: Democratization in a Russian City. By Robert W. Orttung. New York: St. Martin's, 1995. 332p. $49.95.

Jeffrey W. Hahn, *Villanova University*

The book under review is a study of the democratization process in a single Russian city, St. Petersburg (until 1991, Leningrad), from 1987 to 1994. Writing in a narrative style, Orttung chronicles the actions of the city's major players during this period of political transition. Following a section describing the groups initially in place when the reform process got under way, he discusses how the competitive local elections of 1990 elevated reformists to power and undermined the power of the CPSU. The book's third section traces the struggle for power that followed in 1990–91 between the hard-line remnants of the CPSU and the reformers, as well as the growing conflict between Mayor Anatolii Sobchak and the reformist majority in the city soviet. The final section covers the postsoviet period and the return to virtual unlimited executive rule in St. Petersburg, which ensued due to the abolition of the soviets by Yeltsin in October 1993 and to the election of an eviscerated City Assembly in 1994. The author's basic conclusion is hardly surprising: As far as democratization in St. Petersburg is concerned, the "breakdown" phase of the transition from authoritarianism is complete, but the democratic consolidation process has a long way to go.

If the author's general conclusion is not especially remarkable, the contribution that the book makes to existing scholarship is noteworthy, both theoretically and substantively. With respect to theory, the author has chosen to use the tools of neo-institutional analysis to assess the problems and possibilities of democratization in St. Petersburg. According to the neo-institutional paradigm, political institutions develop as a result of strategies adopted by self-interested actors; at the same time, rules embedded in the new institutions constrain and shape the strategies of actors. In applying this perspective to Russian politics, Orttung focuses on the sources and consequences of the electoral law of 1990, on the semi-presidential structure of the city's political system, and on the institutional legacy of the communist era, especially as it influenced the development of parties. In his concluding chapter, he shows how decisions in each of these areas promoted or impeded democratic outcomes in St. Petersburg. Despite the fact that the book originated as a doctoral dissertation, the author's use of theory is judicious, competent, and clear. The narrative is informed and grounded by theory throughout.

The book also makes an important substantive contribution to our knowledge of what is happening in Russia. More than in any other metropolitan area except Moscow, events in St. Petersburg from 1987 to 1994 have been central to the Russian transitional experience. Along with Moscow, it was the only Russian city to elect a reformist majority in 1990. At the same time it was home to the most hard-line elements of Communist Party leadership, leadership that would eventually create the first Russian Communist Party in the same year. Had Mayor Sobchak not dramatically persuaded the leader of the military district in Leningrad to disobey orders from Defense Minister Yazov on August 19, 1991, the coup attempt might have succeeded. Orttung's careful analysis of the politics of St. Petersburg tells us much about how democratic institutions get built locally; equally important, it explains much about why the Russian experience has been so difficult. The author has provided a detailed and balanced picture of St. Petersburg politics based on an exemplary use of primary source material. Indeed, at times there is more detail about persons and movements that failed than the reader may ever want to know about. Yet because the writing is lucid and free of jargon, it is a highly readable, occasionally fascinating, account.

Even good books are not without faults; this one is no exception. There are two that merit attention here. At the very beginning and at the very end of the book, Orttung makes laudatory reference to the importance of local government in the transition to democracy. He further makes the point that few studies of the transitional process pay much attention to local politics. While the case study of one Russian city presented here constitutes a major contribution to overcoming this deficiency, the exclusive focus on St. Petersburg cannot help but produce a distorted view of democratization at the local level in Russia, because the city's politics are so atypical. Other than Moscow, it was the only Russian city in 1990 to elect a "democratic" majority. The election of Sobchak as mayor in 1991 and his subsequent struggles with the "democrat"-dominated soviet had no parallel elsewhere. The 1994 elections in St. Petersburg were distinctive not only because they were won by reformists, but because identifiable parties were on the ballot and because the two largest groups of candidates came from the sciences and from business. In other locales public officials and managers dominated. The point here is not to deny what we can learn from a close look at St. Petersburg, but to argue that what happened there needs to be seen in a larger context. To generalize about the democratization of local government in Russia we need to know how similar findings from one city are to what is going on elsewhere.

The second criticism to be made concerns the presentation of results from the 1994 elections to the new city assembly. Chapter 15 provides a detailed description of all the electoral blocs that competed in the first (spring) round of the these elections. It also includes a methodologically sophisticated analysis of how the votes were distributed. As it turned out, however, low turnout in the spring meant that too few deputies were chosen to constitute a quorum (25 of a possible 50), and the first meeting of the assembly had to await a second round of elections in November. Curiously, the overall composition (by electoral bloc) of the assembly (49 deputies) following the fall elections *is* presented in the previous chapter (table 14.1). Unfortunately, the analysis of the composition of the assembly by bloc presented in chapter 15 does not match up well with this overall picture, leading to confusion on the part of this reader about which blocs controlled the new legislature and the degree to which they were "democratic." This confusion is compounded by what appears to be the use of different names for the same party (e.g., "Beloved City" on p. 217 becomes "Favorite City" on p. 244). In short, the chapters dealing with St. Petersburg after 1993 are not well integrated. In a book which is otherwise so well written and organized, this is unfortunate.

Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. By William Reno. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 229p. $54.95.

Barry Riddell, *Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario*

Things Fall Apart was Achebe's novel written about the devastating effects of colonialism in Africa. Here, Will Reno recounts how patron-client relations taken to their extreme in Sierra Leone led to similar consequences yet again; this second round results in the collapse of colonialism's enduring legacy, the nation-state, always conceived as the institution that bound society together. Reno's work on Sierra Leone indicates how foreign firms and personalities, linked with state rulers in a mutually beneficial relationship to pillage the peasants and resources of Kono District, amassed great wealth and a delicate power base in national political life. He shows how the postcolonial state was eroded and the political-economy was controlled by private armies in resource-rich enclaves. If the reader feels confined because of the detailed study of the Sierra Leone situation, it must be recalled that such collapse of the nation-state has occurred in several other parts of the continent and is likely imminent elsewhere as well; this book rises far above being yet another country case study. The familiar map of the world now has several blank spots; warlords have replaced formerly secure countries, whose former authenticity was confirmed by cartographic color (Reno effectively employs the map as model to assist in the advancement of his thesis). Besides, the development of the book's thesis requires detailed and particular investigation; however, as the focus is always on evidence and the work is temporally organized, the reader never has the feeling of being off on a tangent.

Just as the formal economy has withered and been replaced by an informal or gray sector, the "Shadow State" has assumed control of political life in Sierra Leone. Using the events of postcolonial Kono District, Reno empirically indicates how politics and economics have been intertwined in this diamond-rich area, and how politics shifted from a national to a personal enterprise. His investigation is novel and leads to a deeper understanding of local political life in Sierra Leone. His investigation has included the illegal and the clandestine, and this is where much of political life in the country resides; in this sense, events such as elections, coups, and one-party states are surface expressions. The footnotes, which extend to 24 pages, include not only the basic literature on African political economy, but also news reports, interviews, national and district archival data, theses, and many *fugitive* sources. This is indeed an impressive study, supported by a wealth of information; the result is that the book often takes on the flavor of a detective novel because of its detailed and dangerous investigation, but unlike such a novel it is informed and guided by a thoughtful addressing of the extant literature on the collapse of the state.

Reno traces the historical evolution of the Sierra Leone state from the rise of personalized rule under Stevens (Pa Shakki) to the pressures exerted on Momoh by Stevens's associates, international finance, Lebanese businessmen, popular expectations, resource distribution, and local and national elites; the reader is led to eventual collapse. This is the story of "the juncture of economic accumulation and political authority which forms the basis of the Shadow State" (p. 8). It tells of the privatization of the public and how state-society relations led to decay and "the struggle to exercise authority in realms outside institutional state boundaries" (p. 13).

The work is contextualized in the external pressures within which Sierra Leone operates (falling commodity prices, expensive oil, debt, drought, and dependent development) in order to explain internal issues (government incapacity, capricious leaders, and entrepreneurs from abroad). It is refreshing in the senses that the work is nuanced and is a marked departure from the many dependency or Creole-Freetown centered analyses that dominate the country's academic work. Diamonds are at the heart of the matter and the areal focus is up-country in Kono as it interacts with the politicians at the center. The past is ever present in the state and the mining enterprise, history remains alive in the legacies of colonial administration and capitalism, and Reno carefully traces the roots. At middle stage is the district-nation struggle, expressed as center-periphery interaction in the attempt to control diamond rents. This is theory-informed, empirical investigation at its best! The journey through the recent history of the local-national political economy is well worth the trip.

Russia in Search of Its Future. Edited by Amin Saikal and William Maley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 239p. $49.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

Stephen White, *University of Glasgow*

The USSR, when it still existed, prided itself on knowing where it was going: forward and toward a radiant future. That faith has not survived the transition to postcommunist rule. Instead, there is the trauma of loss of empire and of a coequal place in the world order; the shock of adjustment to unemployment, rising prices, and the other attributes of capitalism; and the emergence of social problems like organised crime on a scale that now exceeds that in the West.

This book derives from a conference that was held in December 1993, and the 1993 elections are a central point of reference for many chapters. As Saikal and Maley point out in their introduction, the rise of Zhirinovsky and his party was "hauntingly reminiscent of various steps on Hitler's rise to power"; but a prolonged phase of political struggle is "not atypical in transitions from autocracy to democracy," and the cost in terms of loss of life has been relatively low (p. 1).

The chapters that follow consider the Russian transition from a variety of points of view. Alexander Obolonsky and Archie Brown focus on political change. Not everyone will share Obolonsky's view that October 1993 saw the "victory of democratic forces (p. 25); Yeltsin's decree of 21 September was an acknowledged violation of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court when it ruled accordingly was simply suppressed, and the destruction of Russia's elected parliament in early October led to elections in which a number of parties were banned and others unable to gather the signatures they needed to compete. Obolonsky is more persuasive in a thoughtful exploration of the psychological resistance to reform, or what he describes as a "conservative syndrome in Russian mass consciousness" (p. 17).

Archie Brown deals with the political leadership in a typically thoughtful chapter. The task of leadership, he points out, has been "conspicuously difficult" in early postcommunist Russia (p. 28), with challenges to the state itself and concerns about Russians in other republics to add to economic and political transformation. He takes a different position than Obolonsky on the shelling of parliament, noting the comparisons that were made with the Tsar's dissolution of the Duma and the Bolsheviks' dispersal of the Constituent Assembly. The consequence, as he also demonstrates, was a deepening of popular mistrust in politicians and in government institutions of all kinds.

There is less for political scientists in the other chapters of this symposium, although it contains very capable overviews of economic change by William Maley, of agriculture by Robert Miller, and of privatisation by Stephen Fortescue. But students of international relations are well served in a series of contributions of Russia's external relations, with the *near abroad* as well as foreign states, and in another group of chapters on culture and society.

Saikal and Maley, in a theme-setting contribution, look for elements of continuity and change in Russian foreign policy, with particular reference to official debates, policy formulation, and foreign relations themselves. As before, different perspectives are articulated not only within the leadership but also by institutional interests, including the foreign ministry and the military. One of the most important divisions, they suggest, is on the *near abroad*, but public opinion has also emerged as a factor of some importance, particularly in shifting Yeltsin away from the Atlanticist views of foreign minister Kozyrev (who has himself adapted to changing circumstances).

Relations with the former Warsaw Treaty allies are considered in more detail by Leslie Holmes. A key concern is the possible enlargement of NATO, from the Lithuanian request for membership in January 1994 onwards. The West, as Holmes points out, "remained apprehensive about admitting the formerly communist states" (p. 131); less widely remarked was the development of a network of treaties between Russia and the former allies, including even military cooperation agreements. Saikal, in a related chapter, deals with Russia and Central Asia.

The book concludes with another group of contributions, this time on culture. It is here that the question of identity reemerges, in the form of the ideological and spiritual vacuum that has followed the end of Soviet rule. The writers and intellectuals cited by Sergei Serebriany have all kinds of responses: for some Russia should constitute a new empire, a strong state within Soviet borders, or an approximation to Eurasia, while others (like the Democratic Party leader, Nikolai Travkin) refuse to consider a "mythological" question of this kind, and still others admit they have no answer of any kind (p. 167).

This, a discussion of some penetration, is followed by chapters by Peter Sawczak on the restoration of a Russian literature and by John Miller on alternative visions of the Russian future. The likeliest, it emerges, is statism: a "strong, authoritarian, bureaucratic, centralised state, presiding over society and social change" (p. 193), a sort of communism without communists. There is strong public support for the state ownership of heavy industry and resistance to private ownership of land, and there is anxiety in the face of crime and unemployment. No wonder that, as Miller argues, the statist model "has things going for it" (p. 198), including the support of those who used to administer the old system.

Some of these essays are rather slight, all of them are fairly brief, and few of them draw very substantially upon Russian-language or other primary sources. The virtues of this volume are of a different kind: it is accessible, it reflects a variety of viewpoints, and it points up many of the key issues in a Russia that is indeed in search of its future. If the chapters in this volume are any guide, the search is likely to be a rather extended one.

Designer Politics: How Elections Are Won. By Margaret Scammell. New York: St. Martin's, 1995. 342p. $59.95.

Anthony King, *University of Essex*

Any analysis of political marketing can go down either or both of two roads. Either it can focus on marketing's influence on politicians (whether or not, for example, it causes them to change their policies or even modify their political outlook); or alternatively it can focus on marketing's electoral impact (does marketing succeed in its own terms?).

Of the two approaches, the former is probably the more straightforward methodologically. All the would-be researcher has to do is gain access to enough of the key players—the marketing men and women, the politicians, possibly some well-placed journalists—and then form judgments, based on a careful exploration of events, about marketing's impact on the behavior of the politicians during the course of an election campaign or a series of campaigns.

The other approach, the one that seeks to assess marketing's impact on the electorate, is altogether more complicated. For example, hard data are needed on different segments of the population's exposure to different electoral messages (did the exposed group respond to the campaign differently from the nonexposed group?). In the end the researcher probably has no choice but to run quite elaborate thought-experiments, trying (in his or her mind) to hold the parties' leaders, ideologies, past performances, and current policies constant, while imagining variations in the quality and content of their media and other propagandistic output (did an outstandingly good marketing campaign enable a party to win that might otherwise have lost?).

Whichever approach the researcher adopts, he or she may also want to raise further philosophical questions about the role of the political marketer. What is to be regarded as honest and dishonest in campaigning? What should politicians do if they find that their conscientious convictions are at odds with what the market researchers' numbers are telling them? What is, and ought to be, the effect of marketing on the exercise of political leadership?

Although a photograph of President Clinton adorns the cover of Margaret Scammell's monograph, the bulk of the book deals exclusively with marketing as a feature of modern electoral politics in Britain. One chapter deals with the changing face of British election campaigns since the nineteenth century. Three more deal with the "marketing of Maggie," the transformation of a rather shrill middle-class housewife into Margaret Thatcher, Warrior Queen, the Iron Lady. Two chapters deal with official government propaganda—as distinct from Conservative Party propaganda—during the recent Tory-dominated era. The book concludes with an account of post-Thatcher political marketing and an assessment of marketing's effects on British politics overall.

Almost inevitably, *Designer Politics* is full of information of interest to British politics specialists. Some of it is trivial, for example, of Gordon Reece, one of Margaret Thatcher's early media advisers, the author writes: "Slight, dapper, kitted out in well-cut suits, always adorned with a watch-chain and matching ties and handkerchief, he was rarely seen without a cigar and had a well-reported taste for drinking only expensive champagne" (p. 64). But some of it is more substantial. In particular, Scammell documents the extent to which the Thatcher administration between 1979 and 1990 used the government's own propaganda machine—and vast quantities of taxpayers' money—to promote often highly controversial government policies (rather as though Ronald Reagan had used American taxpayers' money to promote the Star Wars program).

The problem with *Designer Politics*, however, is that it lacks any kind of analytic cutting edge. It is not so much social science as journalism with footnotes (though putting it like that is hard on some journalists). More or less all facts, not just the details about Gordon Reece's cigars and champagne, are treated as free and equal. In addition, the author is not sufficiently familiar with the political and governmental setting of the marketing activities she describes to be able to weigh in any detail their impact on the British parties' recent campaigns. In addition, her treatment of marketing's effects on the actual election outcomes is highly impressionistic—and frequently self-contradictory. For example, the relationship between her subtitle (*How Elections Are Won*) and her title (*Designer Politics*) suggests that she is making a strong claim for the electoral power of political marketing; but at a considerable number of points (see, e.g., pp. xiv–xv and 287–88) she goes out of her way to refute that claim. The reader is left unclear about exactly what, if anything, the author *is* claiming. As for the philosophical questions, they are given very short shrift (chiefly on pp. 17–19) and are not integrated into the book's overall argument.

In short, while Scammell has assembled a good deal of useful material that British politics specialists will want to refer to from time to time, she has not really advanced the study of the relationships between political marketing, on the one hand, and either politicians' behavior or the behavior of voters, on the other. In her defense, it should be said that the analytic and methodological problems in the field are, beyond any doubt, formidable. No one else has gone very far down either of the two roads mentioned at the beginning of this review.

Between Reform and Revolution: Political Struggles in the Peruvian Andes, 1969–1991. By Linda J. Seligmann. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 268p. $39.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Cynthia McClintock, *George Washington University*

The core argument of this book is that Peru's agrarian reform initiated political changes in Peru's highlands that culminated in the advance of the *Sendero Luminoso* guerrilla movement in the 1980s and early 1990s. To make this argument, anthropologist Linda Seligmann seeks to bring to bear evidence from her field research in Huanoquite, a rural district in the department of Cusco. Her research spanned a year in 1984 and several months in 1989 and 1991—years when field work in the Peruvian highlands was a challenge that only a brave and committed scholar would assume. The author's discussion of various questions—especially the role of the schoolteachers in Huanoquite and the conflicting perceptions and needs that the teachers and peasants had of each other—reflects close knowledge of the district and sensitivity to its residents.

However, in my view Seligmann does not successfully demonstrate her thesis. Given that she is arguing that "the unmet promises of the state and the often paradoxical efforts of rural inhabitants to combine their moral principles, their conceptualizations of their ethnic and class identities, and their interpretations of the legal tenets of the reform law directly and indirectly contributed to the emergence of Sendero in the district" (p. 21), the reader would assume that there was considerable support for Sendero in Huanoquite. In fact, there apparently was not. In her introduction to the book, Seligmann reports that "few peasants in Huanoquite have chosen the option of armed struggle so far as I know" (p. 10). Later she states that some younger, more educated peasants were militants (a peasant group that would be less likely to be concerned about the effects of the agrarian reform), but her emphasis is upon the peasants' resistance to the guerrilla movement.

Accordingly, Huanoquite was different from numerous other communities in Peru's southern highlands where peasant support for the guerrilla movement was considerable. For example, in a volume edited by David Scott Palmer (1994), anthropologist Ronald H. Berg describes widespread support in the southern highlands province of Andahuaylas and Billie Jean Isbell reports initial support in the community of Chuschi, eroding after 1982. Whereas the one major Sendero action in Huanoquite (the blowing up of a cooperative's tractor), did not appear to be endorsed by the district's peasants, in these other southern highland communities violent actions were enthusiastically approved.

Not only should Seligmann's dependent variable apparently be the scantiness of peasant support for Sendero in Huanoquite, but also her account of events in the district since the 1969 agrarian reform suggests more reasons for political satisfaction than dissatisfaction among Huanoquite peasants. The amount of land that was expropriated from large landowners in the district and transferred to peasant households—62% of the total estimated land base in the district, or 81% of the land that the Peruvian government sought to transfer—was considerable by any standard and exceeded that expropriated in most other areas of Peru. As

Seligmann comments, "community and cooperative members were mostly delighted that the hacendados no longer ruled the roost" (p. 131).

Although agrarian-reform officials are judged harshly by Seligmann, their actual conduct in Huanoquite does not appear to have been reprehensible. For example, Seligmann devotes one of her longest chapters to a land dispute between two moieties in Huanoquite called the Inkakuna and the Maska. Conflict between the two groups dated from the seventeenth century and any objective determination of legal rights to the land was impossible. The land judge recommended that the disputed property be divided between the two groups—a recommendation that appeared reasonable.

Another chapter in the book tells the life stories of two Huanoquite peasants who became community leaders in the wake of the reform. Both men were dedicated to the improvement of the quality of life in Huanoquite, and both had earned the respect of other community members through their success as farmers and their hard work on behalf of the district. Seligmann indicates that neither peasant would have been able to ascend politically in the pre-reform era; a peasant was not elected to the office of district council mayor in Huanoquite until 1980. Nor did either peasant confront obstacles to his leadership from the state.

A further chapter describes the demand-making and political organizing by Huanoquite peasants during the 1970s and early 1980s. Huanoquite peasants were especially angry about the tendency toward abusive behavior among many of the teachers in the district. Although the problem continued, the Huanoquite peasants did achieve recognition of their concerns and a temporary suspension of the teachers. Seligmann reports that in general the peasants had "fond memories" of their intense politicking during this era (p. 190).

Accordingly, it seems to me that, in the case of Huanoquite, Seligmann has shown not how Peru's agrarian reform provoked problems that facilitated the expansion of Sendero, but rather how the reform provided sufficient economic and political gains that the peasants were not persuaded by the guerrillas' appeals. There is evidence that a similar effect occurred in the majority of communities in the Cusco department and also in most coastal departments.

In other Peruvian departments, however, where the quantity and quality of transferred land was much less or where grassroots political organization was much weaker, the pattern that Seligmann claims for Huanoquite was in fact evident. Tensions between well-capitalized agrarian cooperatives that included relatively few members among their ranks and impoverished peasant communities that benefited barely if at all from the land reform were often very severe. The intensity of the conflict between cooperative members and these peasant-community members is cogently described for Junín by Nelson Manrique (1989) in "La década de la violencia" and for Puno by José Luis Rénique (1994) in "Political Violence, the State, and the Peasant Struggle for Land (Puno)."

In short, in this book anthropologist Seligmann tackles important questions of great interest not only to anthropologists but also to political scientists and makers of agrarian policy in developing countries. She brings to her description of the agrarian reform and its aftermath in Peru the overtime, up-close knowledge of a locality that is the hallmark of the excellent anthropologist. However, to the extent that her goal is the analysis of the origins of the Sendero Luminoso revolutionary movement, her account of the political attitudes of the teachers in Huanoquite—not of the peasants—is most telling.

The Transformation of Italian Communism. By Leonard Weinberg. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995. 147p. $29.95.

Donald L. M. Blackmer, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

The author of *The Transformation of Italian Communism* had a fascinating tale to tell. In the post-Stalin years, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was in a class of its own among the communist parties, seeking openly to reconcile its Leninist identity with the demands of its participation in a Western parliamentary system. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe the PCI moved decisively, changing its name and abandoning what was left of its old ideology and organizational structure in a desperate struggle to survive. Now reborn as the Democratic Party of the Left in a totally new political context, the former communists have not only survived but are plausible contenders for a share of power in a center-left coalition.

The book has two purposes. Its descriptive goal is to show how the PCI became the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and what that might mean for Italy's party system. The more ambitious analytical goal is "to call readers' attention to the impact of international developments on domestic party politics not only in Italy but among the industrialized democracies in general.... a truly widespread, though often neglected, phenomenon" (p. ix). It opens with two short chapters that explore the interplay between international events and domestic politics and offer an overview of the Italian party system. The heart of the book lies in the next three chapters, the longest of which describes the radical changes pushed by its new leader, Achille Occhetto, under the spur of Gorbachev's perestroika and the East European events of 1989. There follow two briefer chapters on party organization and the personal reactions of leftist intellectuals, and an eight-page conclusion.

Weinberg's analytical theme is introduced with an anecdote about a visit to Rome by Secretary of State Kissinger which allows the author to conclude that "the working assumption was that international events and domestic party politics bore little relationship to one another." He then asks, "But is this true? Aren't their [*sic*] occasions when developments outside a country's borders have consequences so far as its political party system is concerned?" (p. 1). It would be hard not to agree with such an uncontroversial proposition, or with the claim that comparative analyses of party systems have focused largely on domestic rather than international variables. Neither comparative politics nor international relations has been notably successful at integrating the insights of the other field into its conceptual frameworks. Weinberg's own effort to do so, by employing the concept of linkage, is laudable, but falls rather flat for want of adequate elaboration and clarification of terms.

What is more than a little puzzling here is that if there were any Western country for which this argument hardly needed to be made, it would be Italy (along with Germany). No sensible analysis of Italian politics since the end of World War II has failed to recognize the remarkable extent to which its party system, and its political and cultural life more generally, has been conditioned by the Cold War—and now again by the Cold War's end. Analyses of Italian communism in particular have stressed the issue of balance between the PCI's international commitments and its domestic needs. So in the Italian context, the author's theoretical framework has something of a straw-man flavor.

The book's primary value lies in the empirical account of the PCI's reaction to the crisis resulting from the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe. As the first book-length treatment in English it provides a reasonably thorough and reliable guide to the traumatic period from the end of 1989 to the party's final congress in January 1991. [For those who read Italian, Piero Ignazi's *Dal Pci al Pds* (1992) offers a more sophisticated account, especially rich on organizational and attitudinal questions.] But even here there are problems.

Perhaps inevitably in such a brief book, the story told is primarily one of communist and other left-wing leaders staking out competing positions, with little attention given to the reactions of party cadres and their mass base. A top-down version of the story is well worth telling if a thoughtful effort is made to explain the strategies of the players, especially those of Occhetto, the party secretary. We are told more than once that "Occhetto began a campaign to radically change the party," but his motivations and intentions are not sensitively examined. We know that the party is in trouble from a three-page summary of its decline, but we are not helped to understand why the central actor made the choices he did. His speeches are not analyzed for clues; strategic options are not discussed; possible political motivations are not explored. For example, Occhetto had a plausible need to stake out his personal claim to authority as a reformer while at the same time replacing older leaders with a loyal group of younger ones like himself who were relatively free of the old sectarian, internationalist, and visceral anti-fascist attitudes. In sum, we are told what happened but not much about why. There are still enough unreformed Italian communists around, and French ones too for that matter, to remind us that Occhetto's choice was not inevitable.

Furthermore, the author's evaluation of the new party as of 1993 is ambiguous. Comparing documents of the two parties, he notes that the PDS statute "contains strong elements of continuity with the old PCI," notably with respect to organization and party structure (p. 87). This may be a correct comparative reading of the statutes, but the judgment about continuity seems at odds with the thrust of the chapter on party organization, which centers on "the end of the PCI as a mass party" (p. 99). This uncertainty of interpretation is deepened by a brief comparative discussion of party transformations intended to answer the intriguing (but in this form probably unanswerable) question of whether the PCI should be considered "extinct" or "reborn." (Would the concept of an "afterlife" be more apropos?) Weinberg acknowledges that by 1989 the PCI "was widely perceived as a relatively open, non-dogmatic party with reformist aspirations," but nevertheless concludes that "the PCI, however, changed over the years, could not escape its own origins" (p. 99).

This last sentence may have been intended without the comma following "however," which blurs its meaning (a slip all too typical of the book's careless editing). All the same, the judgment rendered is clearly tilted toward the side of continuity. This verdict could prove true, but since the case is asserted, not argued, it seems arbitrary. To this reader, it is also not quite plausible. To be sure, behavioral evidence about the new party was not yet in when Weinberg wrote. What we already knew, however, about the internal workings of the PCI in the 1980s suggests that the party's organizational behavior had already changed greatly. Moreover, the logic of the new party's situation would seem to indicate a continuing need to move toward a more fully democratic and decentralized organizational style. Among the central factors inhibiting the old party from moving more decisively in this direction were the fear of a split within the party and the loss of a still valued international connection with a great power. Life has removed those inhibitions: the split has already occurred and the Soviet Union is no more. In the new political context, even a modified form of democratic centralism has little to recommend it, either to party members or the public at large.

Leonard Weinberg could not have imagined today's context, since his book was completed before the Italian political revolution had revealed its full scope. He might, however, have given his story greater accuracy and richness had he managed to communicate more of the complexity and relevance of its long history.

States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis. By Linda Weiss and John M. Hobson. Cambridge, England: Polity Press (Blackwells), 1995. 295p. $49.95.

Peter Evans, *University of California, Berkeley*

The rise of the East Asian NICs (newly industrializing countries) during the 1970s and 1980s helped spur a revival of interest in the economic role of the state. The resulting literature not only analyzed the East Asian NICs themselves but also used these cases to gain new comparative perspective on the state's economic role. Linda Weiss and John Hobson have added a very useful and provocative book to this literature.

Their special contribution is to join the analysis of East Asian cases with the extensive body of work that analyzes the role of the state in the original burst of capitalist industrialization in northwest Europe. The chapter on how the eighteenth century British state fostered the growth of capitalist industrialization is one of the most interesting in the book, in part because it espouses the provocative thesis that the eighteenth-century British state behaved in a more "Gerschenkronian" manner than the late-nineteenth-century Tsarist state, which was one of Gerschenkron's exemplars of "state-led industrialization."

Weiss and Hobson gain additional comparative leverage by following their analysis of contemporary East Asia with a revisit to the British state in the contemporary era, where it is analyzed together with the United States under the rubric of the "decline of Anglo-American capitalism." Even more important, they deploy a common conceptual and theoretical perspective across a diverse range of cases.

The book's rich variety of conceptual schema is no less central to its contribution than its empirical scope. Particularly useful is the way in which the authors spell out the connections between Michael Mann's concept of "infrastructural power," developed in looking at the emergence of the modern state in Europe, and contemporary perspectives on East Asia states, which see them combining autonomy with embeddedness to create what Weiss and Hobson call "governed interdependence" (pp. 6, 161–62). This is not to say that all of the book's conceptual offerings are equally felicitous. For example, the weakness of dominant elites is conflated with a "weak class structure" (p. 242) and eventually with a "weak society" (p. 245), all without acknowledging that many societies that are "weak" by this definition (e.g., most African cases) are considered by other theorists of state-society relations (e.g., Joel Migdal) to be examples of "strong societies." Such criticisms aside, the fact remains that Weiss and Hobson have done a generally admirable job of making concepts work across cases.

The return to contemporary Britain aptly raises an additional set of questions about how state-society relations evolve over time. Weiss and Hobson's portrayal of the extent of British decline may be slightly exaggerated—for example, they uncritically pass along the erroneous assessment that the level of Britain's GNP per capita now lies midway between that of Africa and that of Germany (p. 203)—but this does not detract from their overall argument. Their basic thesis is that, having successfully stimulated industrial growth by allying itself with financial and commercial interests in the eighteenth century, the most powerful parts of the British state (most obviously the Treasury) became locked into this set of linkages in a way that eventually gave the state a decidedly anti-industrial bias. In short, a pattern of "embedded autonomy" that produced success in one historical context later became an entrenched institutional obstacle to development.

Curiously, Weiss and Hobson go to some lengths to deny that the same outcome might happen in today's "economic miracles," appearing to believe that "governed interdependence" is sufficiently robust and adaptable to provide economic advantage indefinitely into the future (pp. 191–94). Reconsidering their own analysis of the British case in the light of recent changes in the global economy suggests a less sanguine vision of the future of governed interdependence.

In their analysis of the role of the state in the initial rise of capitalism, the authors argue persuasively that the "consolidated territorial base" provided by the nation state was much more attractive to industrial capital than the fragmented jurisdictions of feudalism (p. 56). In their analysis of Britain, they suggest that a crucial reason for the British state's eventual inability to promote industrial growth was the fact that the core of the capitalist class to which the state was linked (the financial groups of the City of London) defined its territorial base as the globe rather than the nation. As Korea's Samsung, Hyundai, and Goldstar increasingly redefine their territorial base as the globe rather than the small peninsula that incubated them, shouldn't this have implications for governed interdependence? More generally, how can governed interdependence be an effective model of state-society relations in a world where the dominant firms in most countries are headquartered elsewhere and where, even if they are headquartered locally (as in the U.S. case), corporate definitions of the appropriate territorial base are relentlessly transnational? Weiss and Hobson are certainly right in saying that "the impact of the international economy is strongly mediated by state capacity" (p. 249), but this is not an excuse to ignore the consequences of the growing predominance of transnational capital. Governed interdependence may still be possible, but sustaining it is likely to require substantial institutional innovation, even in East Asia.

The growing difficulty of discovering a shared set of "national interests" that can unite states and private economic elites also increases the salience of another problem that Weiss and Hobson share with most others who work on the state's economic role, including myself. Almost all of us are guilty of conflating "development" with the growth of GNP and the expansion of industrial production. This may be legitimate when examining the rise of capitalism or the success of the East Asian NICs, but it becomes a more dubious assumption when the analysis turns to already-industrialized societies like the United States. Weiss and Hobson admit that U.S. "industrial decline" is less serious than Britain's, but if we look at the U.S. political economy in the 1990s, "industrial decline" does not really capture the problem at all. The profits of U.S. industrial corporations are growing quite nicely. Even the overall growth of GNP is respectable, though admittedly lower than during the golden age of capitalism. What is declining is the quality of life experienced by the average citizen. The ever greater ease with which corporate prosperity can be decoupled from national well-being must change the way we evaluate how states combine autonomy and embeddedness. Just as Weiss and Hobson's book does an excellent job of synthesizing the conceptual gains of the literature on which they build, it also points to the necessity of new departures.

Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition. By Yael Zerubavel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 340p. $22.95.

Myron J. Aronoff, *Rutgers University*

There have been several important books published on collective memory, myth, and commemoration in Israel which are thus far only available in Hebrew (Maoz Azaryahu, *State Cults; Celebrating Independence and Commemorating the Fallen in Israel 1948–1956,* 1995; Nurit Gertz, *Captive of a Dream: National Myths in Israeli Culture*, 1988; and Immanuel Sivan, *The 1948 Generation: Myth, Image, and Memory*, 1991). Another book in English, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel*, was not yet available at the time this review was written. The non-Hebrew-reader is therefore extremely fortunate to have Yael Zerubavel's original and excellent study available in lucid, jargon-free English. The book is well conceived, well organized, and well written.

Professor Zerubavel, an anthropologist and folklorist, has written a sophisticated interdisciplinary analysis of the "interplay among history, literature, folklore, and politics in the process of constructing a memory" (p. xvii). Drawing from a wide range of primary and secondary sources, she skillfully traces the process of what Eric Hobsbawm calls "the invention of tradition" in Israel. Building upon the pioneering theoretical work of Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora, her analysis is in the spirit of contemporary "cultural studies" without resorting to the frequently obtuse discourse of postmodernist deconstruction. She shows how commemoration produces narratives that collectively contribute to the formation of a *master commemorative narrative* that structures collective memory. In essence, she analyzes the formation and ongoing reformulation of the dominant themes of political culture (without ever using the term).

Zerubavel analyzes how three historical events became major political myths and how their commemoration contributed to the emergence of a hegemonic master narrative. She also discusses the importance of *countermemory*, which challenges and subverts the dominant version of collective memory, creating the tensions that produce the dynamics of change in political culture. Her choice of cases and her analysis of them as national myths, expressed through literature and national rites from the turn of the century through contemporary times, is extremely well developed. She successfully combines conclusions from her own original research with the findings of a wide range of scholars whose work she artfully synthesizes.

Professor Zerubavel explains the Zionist periodization of

Jewish history, in which the two-thousand-year period of exile from the Land of Israel was suppressed and denigrated, and the national revival in modern times was linked with periods of political sovereignty in antiquity. National revival centered on the Hebrew man, the Land of Israel, and the Hebrew language. "Zionist commemorative narrative constructs a *symbolic bridge* between Antiquity and the modern period, emphasizing their affinity and distancing both from Exile" (p. 32).

She persuasively argues that each of the three cases analyzed constitute historical turning points (or liminal transitions), which are constructed through the Zionist master commemorative narrative to symbolize national rebirth. These cases are the death of Yosef Trumpeldor, a one-armed hero, in a battle at Tel Hai against a large group of Arabs in 1920; the second Jewish revolt against the Romans (A.D. 132–35) led by Shimon Bar Kokhba; and the fall of Masada (a fortress in the Judaean desert) to the Romans in A.D. 73.

Zerubavel's nuanced analysis of the dynamics of collective memory provides extremely valuable and important insights for political scientists. It is the best extended case study of which I am aware on the topic of collective memory and commemoration. However, given Zerubavel's disciplinary training, the absence of any mention of the shift from what Duverger called a dominant party system to a competitive party system after the 1977 election is an understandable, although unfortunate, oversight. This important systemic transformation, which was not even clearly understood by the main political actors at the time (especially Prime Minister Menachem Begin), helps explain the renewal of political polarization, which is an important component of Zerubavel's analysis of countermemory and challenges to dominant interpretations of the master commemorative narratives (political myths).

My major criticism of this very impressive study concerns Zerubavel's failure to develop more fully some important implications of her findings, as exemplified by her incomplete sketch of the pattern of changes in the political culture that have characterized the more recent period. She says "the tension between the linear and cyclical perceptions of history often underlies the construction of collective memory" (p. 7). Her substantive analysis discusses the struggle between different interpretations of the myths in the transformation of historical time into commemorative time. Yet Zerubavel fails to clarify the association between these competing political interpretations and the fact that the competing parties have ideologies that respectively reflect linear versus cyclical perceptions of history.

Supporters of the Labor-led government and their policies of territorial compromise tend to view history as linear. The more nationalistic opponents of the government—particularly those inspired by religious messianism—tend to view history as cyclical. (See Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions*, for a more nuanced explanation). Zerubavel titles one of the sections of her concluding chapter "The Frailty of Invented Tradition." Political culture is like a fragile web of symbolic themes that is constantly stretched in opposite directions by conflicting interpretations. Political culture is an illusion, but an illusion that is necessary for the survival of society and civilization. Israel's political culture is particularly vulnerable because so many challenge its claim to be a natural community rooted in antiquity.

In her final section, "From Collective Memory to Multiple Memories," Zerubavel perceptively analyzes the dynamic character of collective memory and its continuous dialogue with history. She concludes, "The emergence of competing versions of the past and the moral claims regarding its use are central issues that continue to occupy contemporary Israelis as they negotiate the meaning of the present within the framework of their understanding of the past" (p. 237).

These conclusions raise important questions. Given the contradictory interpretations articulated by secular and by religious Israelis, by doves and by hawks, is what unites them still more significant than what divides them? Whereas previous ideological disputes established the hegemony of Zionism as the dominant cultural paradigm in Israel, do the present divisions continue to change and strengthen it, or do they undermine its salience for greater numbers of Israelis? Zerubavel mentions the challenges to the dominant Zionist discourse by those previously marginalized by it—for example, Israeli Arabs and the ultraorthodox Jews—but pays less attention to important challenges by privileged insiders, such as leading young Labor politicians and so-called post-Zionist scholars and intellectuals. Although Zerubavel does not answer these questions, this seminal work is essential reading for anyone who would attempt to answer them.

International Relations

Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade and the Environment. By Fen Osler Hampson with Michael Hart. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 421p. $49.95.

I. William Zartman, *The Johns Hopkins University*

Although there are more instances and many case studies of multilateral negotiations, there are almost no conceptual—let alone theoretical—studies of the subject. Some of the excellent case studies, such as Winham's *Tokyo Round Negotiations* (1986) and Bunn's *Arms Control by Committee* (1992), test hypotheses but use them to explain a specific process. But beside Zartman's *International Multilateral Negotiations* (1994) and perhaps Kaufmann's *Effective Negotiation* (1989), nothing addresses the generalized process, and even N-person game theory is not much help in explaining nonvoting decision making. Practically all that is known conceptually about negotiation refers to its bilateral exercise. Fen Hampson has rendered a great service in helping to fill this gap by testing and deriving insights about multilateral decision making from a number of empirical exercises. The work is a major contribution to understanding an important diplomatic activity and to opening up a new field of analysis.

The empirical basis of the study rests on eight case studies: negotiations producing the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1983 agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the 1990 treaty and 1992 applications on Conventional Forces in

Europe, the nonagreement on an international trade organization in 1947–48, the GATT Uruguay Round agreement in 1993, the Vienna, Montreal, and Helsinki agreements of 1985, 1987, and 1990 on the ozone layer, the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes of 1989, and the 1992 Climate Change Convention. (The two economic cases were written by Michael Hart.) The essays in themselves are good tight analyses of the event, generally organized into sections on prenegotiations, negotiations, and factors that explain the outcomes and showing a broad grasp of the subject matter and the process of coming to agreement on it.

Hampson approaches his analysis from two different angles. Conceptually, he treats multilateral negotiation as a process of managing complexity through the construction of party and issue coalitions. By decomposing, sequencing, and incrementally building agreements, negotiators break down and reaggregate groups of issues and parties to build a single agreement. They build party and issue coalitions under overarching formulas and around notions of fairness. They use crosscutting and bridging coalitions to break up polarities. Multilateral negotiation then becomes a contest of competing leaderships, in which leadership is defined as the construction of ties bringing parties and issues into a winning coalition. Sometimes these are opposing attempts, as different leadership-created coalitions try to obtain different agreements (as in the environmental and GATT cases); at other times they are alternative attempts, as different leaders try their hand at overcoming differences to bring about an agreement that is broadly desired (as in the arms control negotiations). Realistically, the ties that hold the coalitions together are presented as being of varying natures and thus are hard to reduce to a single dimension.

Inductively, Hampson's study focuses on ways in which obstacles to agreement—that is, the initial disagreement—were overcome. In the negotiation phase, the analysis returns to the notion of coalition-building leadership; in the prenegotiation phase, he singles out two factors: the galvanizing effect of crises and the unifying effect of consensual knowledge on the subject, the two being somewhat related. These elements are quite independent on the multilateralness of the process and refer rather to the nature of the subjects under negotiation, but they set up the process as one of building a technical or problem-solving agreement on the basis of public consensus when confronted with a crisis.

Interestingly, the study brings out the important linkage between public awareness and the success of multilateral negotiations, a connection that was present in the Cold War as well as in the post–Cold War era. Indeed, it shows that multilateral negotiations differed less between the two periods than might be imagined; while multilateral negotiations have increased in frequency and in party and issue complexity, they are no more intractable as a result.

Hampson's analysis helps make multilateral negotiations more understandable. By focusing on coalition as a central concept, he provides a central theme that has practical meaning and theoretical content, heading further analytical writing in a promising direction. By underscoring ways of overcoming obstacles to agreement, he identifies a very practical understanding of the negotiator's (or specifically the leader's) challenge. This book is a major step in putting multilateral negotiation on the map and in the curriculum as a subject to be taught and analyzed.

The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy. Edited by Sanford Jacoby. New York: Oxford University Press. 231p. $39.95.

Jonas Pontusson, *Cornell University*

In the words of the editor, the title of this collection of essays "reflects a basic tension inherent in the process of economic globalization: capital . . . is becoming more international, while labor remains rooted in particular places called nations" (p. ix). Focusing on advanced industrial nations, the volume is organized around two broad issues, which Sanford Jacoby articulates in his introductory essay: first, the impact of globalization on industrial relations and especially "labor's bargaining power and political influence" (p. 8), and secondly, union strategies in response to "the changes wrought by globalization" (p. 12). These issues represent a new research agenda for students of labor politics and industrial relations, and Jacoby deserves praise for bringing them to the fore. However, his volume does not quite deliver on the promises of its title and its introductory essay.

Most of the substantive chapters somehow deal with labor and international economic competition, but none attend to the impact of globalization on labor and industrial relations in a systematic fashion and, except for Jeffry Frieden's chapter, none discuss union responses to changes in the international economy. Indeed, the term *globalization* rarely appears in the 180-odd pages that follow the introduction. In view of the fact that at least one author of each chapter teaches at UCLA, a more appropriate subtitle might have been "What People at UCLA Have to Say about Labor." Even this subtitle would fail to encompass Kenneth Sokoloff's chapter, which examines the impact of industrial policy on labor productivity in South Korea and Mexico but does not concern itself with labor as a (potential) collective actor.

All the chapters provide interesting descriptive materials, and several chapters challenge received wisdoms. For instance, the chapter by Peter Lange, Michael Wallerstein, and Miriam Golden marshals newly collected data on union organization and wage-bargaining arrangements in Germany, Austria, and the Nordic countries to challenge the idea of a general trend toward decay or collapse of corporatist institutions. While wage bargaining has become more decentralized and fragmented in Sweden and Denmark, no such trend can be discerned in Germany and Austria by Lange, Wallerstein, and Golden's measures. Similarly, Ruth Milkman challenges the conventional image of Japanese transplants in the United States. According to Milkman, "most Japanese firms which have established factories in the United States have resolutely opposed unionism, and have adopted human resource practices that more closely resemble those of traditional nonunion American plants than those of their companies' plants in Japan" (p. 128).

In both instances, the authors fail to pursue the analytical puzzles that their descriptive analyses raise. It is perhaps not so puzzling why Japanese firms in the United States prefer to operate without unions, but why do they prefer non-Japanese human resource strategies? Milkman does not begin to address this question until the second-to-last paragraph of her essay. As for Lange, Wallerstein, and Golden, they never even pose the question of why decentralization has occurred in Sweden and Denmark but not in Germany or Austria. The lack of explanatory ambition is also a striking feature of the chapters by Christopher Erickson and Sarosh Kuruvilla (on labor cost and productivity differentials among member states of the European

Union) and by Daniel Mitchell (on employee benefits in Western Europe and the United States).

The chapter of Jeffry Frieden sets out a useful framework to think about the impact of financial integration on labor's policy options and preferences. Observing that "national monetary authorities can only stimulate a financially open economy by allowing the currency to depreciate" (p. 202), Frieden argues that financial integration renders exchange-rate issues increasingly salient and that these issues pit different segments of labor against each other. While labor in sheltered sectors prefers a flexible exchange-rate regime and a high exchange rate, labor in export-oriented sectors prefers fixed/low exchange rates, labor in sectors reliant on global production prefers fixed/high exchange rates, and labor in import-competing sectors producing for the domestic market prefers flexible/low exchange rates.

This schema sheds light on how different unions and labor-affiliated parties lined up in debates over European monetary cooperation in France and Italy in the early 1980s, but I am not sure whether (or how) it provides an answer to an empirical question that Frieden poses for himself: Why did France and Italy, having opted out of the European "snake" in the 1970s, join a fixed exchange-rate regime in the 1980s? As he points out, the EMS option entailed currency appreciation for both France and Italy. While Frieden's conceptualization of labor preferences suggests that the decision to adopt the austerity measures necessary to stay in the EMS might be attributed to the influence of sectors reliant on global production, he does not address the problem of conceptualizing and measuring the exercise of political power by sectorally defined segments of labor (or capital). Nor does he tackle the problem of how and why workers and the organizations that represent them choose between conflicting policy preferences. After all, major segments of labor had (or should have had) ambivalent preferences with respect to the EMS option. Did labor in export-oriented sectors choose to prioritize its preference for fixed rates over its preference for low rates, and/or did labor in sheltered sectors choose to prioritize its preference for high rates over its preference for flexible rates? If so, why? One way to pursue these questions would be to compare the French and Italian cases to other cases—most obviously Germany—in which the EMS option did not entail currency appreciation.

To complete the picture, it should be noted that this volume also includes a very interesting theoretical account of cross-national variations in strike activity by George Tsebelis and Peter Lange, and a chapter on industrial districts in France and Italy by Michael Storper. All in all, this is a wide-ranging, rich and stimulating volume. Considered as a whole, its most important contribution is to show how the study of labor and industrial relations intersects with other concerns of comparative and international political economy.

On Security. Edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 233p. $17.50 paper.

Nicholas Onuf, *American University*

Events of the last decade have forced many scholars to reconsider the meaning of the term *security* in the context of relations between states. If security means physical safety for whole populations, the diminishing threat of nuclear annihilation and the increased threat posed by modernity's assorted ills—environmental degradation, uneven development, and social turmoil—are hard to ignore. Any such reconsideration runs into trouble from realists, however, because it shifts attention from states. Not only does this move encourage loose talk about global transformation, as if states no longer mattered, but it also denies security a meaningful referent.

Ronnie Lipschutz, *On Security*'s editor, recognizes that broadening the meaning of security can make the term meaningless. He would direct attention back to the state and its relations with other states, but not simply in realist terms. The volume's six other contributors accept the premise that something more than a broadened definition of security is required. Their contributions range from postmodern to mature realist. While the editor's constructivist inclinations occupy the middle ground, he offers little that might serve as common ground.

James Der Derian issues a genealogical challenge to "The Value of Security" (the title of his contribution) in order to promote a Nietzschean celebration of insecurity. Far more substantial is Ole Wæver's discussion of security as a practice constituted chiefly by the speech acts of states' agents. Misleadingly he claims that the word *security* is a speech act by itself. More properly, security and its lack are the subject of innumerable speech acts. When agents assert that some development is a security problem, these assertions can have a constitutive effect in defining both the problem and the agents' relation to it, just as Wæver asserts. This is, however, an incomplete analysis of the situation.

When agents assert that some development constitutes a threat to the state, they also begin to issue directives to the state's population or to subordinate agents. These directives are speech acts that have responses to the asserted threat as their subject. Wæver notes the importance of these responses but seems to think of them as consequences of agents' assertions, not their directives. The agents in question also make promises—again, speech acts—to asserted threateners about the consequences of continued threats. If these promises are accepted at face value, deterrence results. Wæver fails even to identify speech acts of this sort, much less to acknowledge their place in the process of "securitization."

When agents' speech acts fail to have desired results, Wæver calls this "desecuritization." With the ending of the Cold War in mind, he evidently assumes that this process takes place on both sides, more or less in parallel, with respect to assertions about threatening developments. Directives may be also be disregarded; oppositional agents may issue counterdirectives to greater effect; states' agents may even find their authority to issue directives under challenge. As the Cold War ended, these failures also took place on both sides, though hardly symmetrically.

Finally, it should be noted, those whose actions are asserted to be threatening may not believe promises of untoward consequences; they are undeterred. Here speech act failure would lead to rapid desecuritization and, in all likelihood, war. Wæver fails to consider this possibility or, more generally, the constitutive effects of speech-dominated interaction among the agents of different states. Deterrence and its failure are prime subjects of the old way of thinking about security. They are also prime examples of performative language at work, and security revisionists are wrong to ignore them.

Unlike the other contributions to this volume, Daniel Deudney's makes a good deal of deterrence. Deudney finds threat, control over violence, and deterrence in the very logic of the Hobbesian state. He argues that the state's legitimacy depends on its ability to provide security, that nuclear weapons have impaired the state's ability to do so, and that this situation deforms state-civil society relations. The nuclear state imposes "conditional suicide" on civil society to achieve security and then must trick the civil population into accepting this state of affairs, thereby preserving the state's autonomy. The state does so chiefly by keeping nuclear weapons from public view. Deudney intimates that nuclear capabilities create a "legitimacy deficit" for the state, when indeed such a deficit arises from every state's need to make deterrence plausible under all possible conditions. There is no doubt, however, that nuclear weapons accentuate the problem, as Deudney shows by examining antinuclearism in the United States during the 1980s.

Using James Rosenau's recent work as a framework, Pearl-Alice Marsh looks at the same era, though more broadly. She concludes that grassroots activists successfully challenged the official rendition of what constitutes a security problem. Despite an interest in discursive strategies, she fails to elaborate on what oppositional agents actually said to change the national security agenda.

Beverly Crawford assumes that changing conditions in the world economy, not challenges arising from within civil society, are largely responsible for the changing security agenda. Globalization of production and exchange increase interdependence. Liberals welcome this development because it inhibits threatening behavior, but realists fear that it makes states more vulnerable. Inability to exercise control over markets for militarily relevant advanced technology is a particular problem that Crawford explores for different countries. She might have given more attention to the general problem. Vulnerability is threatening only, to use Wæver's language, when agents focus their speech acts on making it so—and succeed.

Barry Buzan's contribution returns to Deudney's concern with the state and its legitimacy in relation to security. He differs from Deudney in thinking that advanced states are more legitimate than ever. He also thinks that "strong" states have developed in tandem with the international system, which has thus become ever more threatening to weaker states. Sketching consequences for diverse states as anarchy matures, Buzan shares Crawford's concern with the impact of technological change. More than any other contributor, Buzan remembers that security depends on states' relations with other states.

In the context of international relations, insecurity is a systemic condition which this volume tends to neglect. Lipschutz's conclusion might at least have acknowledged this neglect. Instead, it recapitulates what the contributors have said. In passing, Lipschutz suggests that the construction of "others" as threats contributes to the construction of "selves." If he had linked the construction of collective identity to the relations of agents within and among such constructions, perhaps in a separate contribution, the conceptual payoff might have made this volume even better than it is.

United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge. Edited by John D. Martz. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. 407p. $55.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

William M. LeoGrande, *American University*

In the aftermath of the Cold War, does the United States still care about Latin America? That is the recurrent theme in this collection of essays, a follow-on volume to Martz's (1988) well-known book *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961–1986.*

Like its predecessor, this collection is organized into three parts. Part I focuses on the policy process in Washington (Robert Pastor and Howard Wiarda writing on the Reagan and Bush administrations, Michael Kryzanek and Steve Ropp on the Grenada and Panama interventions). Part II examines bilateral relations with several key countries (George Grayson on Mexico, Eul-Soo Pang on Brazil, John Booth on Central America, and Enrique Baloyra on Cuba). Part III examines policy areas that have emerged as central to inter-American relations in recent years (Riordan Roett on debt, Christopher Mitchell on immigration and human rights, William O. Walker on drugs, Martz on democracy, and Joseph Tulchin on the global context of hemispheric relations). With some of the best-known scholars in the field of Latin American studies as contributors, the quality of the chapters is high.

Pastor argues that Ronald Reagan's anti-Communist crusade in Central America led him to ignore the rest of the hemisphere. Wiarda regards George Bush as a pragmatist who managed to disentangle the United States from Central America, while largely achieving Reagan's goals there, and broadened Washington's field of view to encompass other critical issues like debt and drugs. But, Wiarda notes, during the Bush presidency one could already see the waning of American interest in the region.

John Booth chronicles in detail Washington's obsession with Central America during the 1980s, until the fever began to subside during the Bush presidency. He concludes by asking whether the end of the obsession "presages a new era of inattention" (p. 208). In the past two years since these essays were written, Booth's question has been answered with a resounding yes, judging from the foreign aid budget. For fiscal year 1996, President Clinton requested just $167 million in economic assistance for all of Central America—down 71% from his first budget request in 1993, and down 86% from the peak level of U.S. aid, $1.2 billion, in 1985.

Washington's primary interest in Latin America in the 1990s has clearly been economic. Roett provides an excellent account of the Latin American debt crisis and its eventual amelioration through structural adjustment. He regards recent economic reforms and the promise of free trade as offering real hope for Latin American economic development. At the same time, he correctly identifies social investment—i.e., the need for the state to direct resources toward raising the standard of living of the poor—as a crucial challenge for the future. Structural adjustment in the 1980s was achieved at the cost of deeper poverty; sustainable growth in a democratic policy requires that issues of social justice be addressed.

Roett echoes many analysts who fear that inattention to social issues will produce mass protest, instability, and the decay of democratic government. Surprisingly, Latin America's democracies have thus far been able to impose structural adjustment with little backlash. The legitimacy of democracy, especially in states recently ruled by authoritarians, has inoculated the polity against discontent—at least temporarily.

Two bilateral relationships continue to be especially important for the United States: our ties with Mexico and Cuba. Grayson's discussion of U.S.-Mexican relations focuses primarily on the adoption of NAFTA—why the Mexican political elite decided they wanted it and how President Clinton managed to get it through the U.S. Congress. In the wake of the Chiapas rebellion and two dramatic political assassinations, Grayson rightly identifies political reform as the major challenge now facing Mexico. His account also demonstrates how thoroughly U.S. domestic politics has invaded the policymaking process in inter-American affairs.

Baloyra does a fine job of tracing Cuban relations with the rest of Latin America during the past decade. But his decision to focus on Cuba's Latin ties leaves the book without an account of how the end of the Cold War has affected the relationship between Cuba and the United States. That is unfortunate, because no U.S. bilateral relationship was more directly derivative of the East-West conflict. The interests at stake for Washington in its relations with Havana have been utterly transformed since the demise of the Soviet Union. Security, once paramount, has all but disappeared as an issue. Yet, surprisingly, U.S. policy has shifted hardly at all—an anomaly that raises interesting questions about the inertia of the policy process, the influence of domestic lobbies, and the deeper hegemonic continuities in U.S. policy toward the hemisphere that predate the Cold War and may perhaps outlive it.

In the first of two concluding chapters, Tulchin looks at the *discontinuity* in U.S. policy caused by the end of the Cold War. As national security has evaporated as an overriding U.S. interest, a plethora of other interests have come to the fore, competing for primacy: trade, environment, population, human rights, drugs, democracy, immigration, and nuclear proliferation. Given its domestic importance, he sees trade as primus inter pares.

We can extend that logic. The inter-American issues still capable of grabbing Washington's attention are precisely those that have significant effect on the quality of domestic life in the United States: free trade, not only with Mexico, but with the whole hemisphere; drug smuggling from the Andes via various Mexican and Caribbean routes; and immigration from Mexico, Haiti, and Cuba. Both George Bush and Bill Clinton have emphasized the promotion of democracy, but unless its linkage to domestic well-being in the United States is clearly made, one wonders how permanent the commitment will prove to be.

In the second conclusion, Martz is also skeptical about the promotion of democracy. He examines the continuities underlying this impulse, noting that such missionary zeal extends back at least to Woodrow Wilson and has often been an excuse for intervention in the service of less-noble motives. Democracy, he concludes, will have to come from Latin America itself if it is going to be durable.

Overall, these essays leave the reader with the clear sense that U.S. policy toward the hemisphere is unsettled. Embracing free trade and free markets, Latin America may be on the verge of explosive economic growth, but with uncertain social consequences. Democracy (more or less) is installed everywhere except Cuba, but its durability remains unproven. Despite these momentous hemispheric changes, Washington's policy agenda is uncertain, its attention flagging. Yet one thing is certain, events in our near neighborhood will continue to impinge on the United States, even if Washington retreats into a haze of indifference.

East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order. Edited by Robert S. Ross. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, and Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995. 368p. $59.95 cloth, $22.50 paper.

Donald Crone, *Scripps College*

This book joins the burgeoning literature on political and economic changes in the Asia-Pacific region following the end of the Cold war period. As a region plagued by serious security problems for almost all of the past century and impacted by the Cold War and its "hot" proxy wars for most of the past five decades, East Asia is now enjoying something almost unprecedented in its modern history: relative peace. Along with peace, albeit importantly without a security community, the region has enjoyed stunning economic growth. These two transformations are the central subject matter of this edited volume.

The editor's introduction lays out the common concern underlying the twelve substantive chapters: despite considerable stability, the authors "also recognize various trends that suggest the potential for significant regional instability that could affect the vital interests of countries throughout the region" (p. xi). This tone of skeptical analysis distinguishes much of this volume from the more upbeat approach generally pervading the current literature on the region. The authors are concerned that there are sufficient remaining security issues, newly created tensions from economic growth and uneven interdependence, and ambitious foreign policy goals—all only weakly constrained by an embryonic regional security structure—that could in combination return the region to a zone of international conflict.

One example of this concern is that expressed by Robert Gilpin in one of the few essays to concentrate on economic affairs. His central point is that the distinctive features of East Asian development—the importance of the "Japanese model," the internationalization of Japanese industrial policy to encompass the region, and the focus on export-oriented growth—have resulted in a dependent and vulnerable position (because of the high degree of outside market dependence) in a global political economy that is poorly endowed with institutions capable of handling the sorts of pressures created between the region and its outside partners. (Although the institutions are growing impressively, as Harry Harding shows.) East Asia may be a driving economic force, but there is still a political gap.

Richard Betts takes the analysis of the gap between economic and political power another step, noting that because of the undesirability, in the eyes of most states in the region, of China and Japan becoming "normal" powers with corresponding economic and security roles, only the United States can balance the region. The presumption of this "necessary" role for the United States in the region, while a frequent theme in the volume may well underestimate both the emerging sense of independence of regional states and the willingness (or even ability) of Washington to play the role of "balancer" with the subtlety and skill required.

The volume's analysis of the great powers of China (Ross), Japan (Mochizuki), the United States (Zagoria), and Russia (Ziegler) is its strength. (Although one wonders whether Russia is really justified now or is covered here because history ends only slowly.) There is a great deal of astute thinking about how recently shifting alignments and likely future developments might effect a new balance of power in the region. Much of this area seems worrisome to U.S.-based analysts who accept that the U.S. role will continue to attenuate. But some of the most interesting changes in the region are obscured because of the lesser emphasis on what the volume terms the "local powers"; here Korea (Scalapino), Indonesia (Vatikiotis), Thailand (Unger), and Vietnam (Leifer) are covered. What is missed is the degree to which the roles of these countries, and some of the actors not included (e.g., Taiwan or Singapore), have grown to the point that they moderate the dominance and independence of greater powers, both in and outside of the region. Here the relative emphasis placed on political affairs slights the degree to which East Asia has really become a post–Cold War region, one in which economic security and continuity now play a greater role in shaping political affairs, rather than the other way around.

Still, the authors are well qualified to pass judgment, as they are almost all senior established names in U.S. regional studies circles. Each chapter is well crafted; most include varying levels of historical depth, detailed coverage of central contemporary issues, and some form of near-term future speculation. Given the extensive publishing delays so frequently encountered, the volume is quite up to date, taking account of events into 1994 in many cases. It is quite admirably suited to use in courses and, I think, is a good representation of the present state of American thinking on the region.

The contributions of this volume to the area of political and security relations are significant, the analysis of economic affairs less so. It is a good balance to the literature, which has focused mainly on the transforming growth and its attendant effects, sometimes forgetting that economic transactions take place only in politically bounded spaces. The texture of those political bonds and boundaries is well explored here.

Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpretations. Edited by Ralph Summy and Michael E. Salla. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995. 278p. $59.95.

George H. Quester, *University of Maryland*

This is an interesting and valuable, albeit somewhat vexing, book. The title claims to put forward "a range of interpretations" of the end of the Cold War. But this collection of conference papers might disappoint a reader looking for a balanced juxtaposition of the entire range of such arguments, for it consists entirely of varieties of the "peace movement" or left-of-center views of what has happened since 1989.

The book professes to correct for what one of the editors, Ralph Summy, refers to as the "unassailable orthodoxy" of rightist and centrist interpretations of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union. This orthodoxy is defined as coming in two "slightly different forms" (p. 3). The first is that endorsed by the Reagan-Thatcher camp and the second is that of the U.S. Democratic Party and the social democrats of Western Europe, stressing "the relentless application of the West's military superiority and the dynamism of its ideas and economic system."

One might respond that the *orthodoxy* to which these authors are so opposed thus surely already encompasses a wide variety of interpretations. But from the Marxist viewpoint openly espoused by several authors in this collection or from the viewpoint of the Cold War peace movement, many other questions need to be addressed, including whether the West actually won the Cold War, what the Cold War was all about and whether it was worth "winning," and when the Cold War began and whether it is really over.

Most of the authors in this volume are relatively junior scholars, many of them connected with the University of Queensland (where the conference was held) or with other Australian universities, but there are contributions also by Johan Galtung, David Cortright, Kevin Clements, and John Burton.

The chapters are well written and well researched; even though the authors basically all write from a similar political perspective, they do indeed cite most of the literature on the end of the Cold War question and all the many arguments that are criticized in the book as an orthodoxy. The papers are tied well to each other by the editors' introductory and concluding chapters, which lay out the general argument clearly and schematically.

Some of the chapters, in particular those by April Carter, Jennifer Turpin, and Ulf Sundhaussen, are less ideological and more straightforwardly descriptive of events as they unfolded. Here we get more of an acknowledgement that there may have been many different factors contributing to the defeat of communism, including the personality of Gorbachev, Reagan's military expenditures, the role of "people power" in the streets of Dresden, the outright tactical and strategic mistakes of the East German leaders, and the strength of Western economic and political ideas.

But other participants, in particular Robert Elias, Johan Galtung, and John Burton, would insist that almost all of the credit for the end of the Cold War would have to be given to the peace movement and to tactics of civil disobedience. And some of the authors, for example Geoff Dow and Rick Kuhn, would instead question whether there is much of a victory here to celebrate at all.

The book does indeed present views that have not been so widely heard since 1989, with the implication that this is because we are all being "unitary" and "rigid" in celebrating the reunification of Germany, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and everything that went on in between. Yet what these authors reject as an orthodoxy might still strike much of the world as elementary common sense.

The arguments presented in this collection are very interesting, but this is not the same as saying that they are so tightly argued as to be convincing. While the individual authors do somewhat disagree with each other, one senses that they were not really confronted at the Queensland University conference at which these chapters were presented and refined with the strongest responses and counterarguments from what is labeled the orthodox view.

The book would have been richer and more valuable, albeit with a very different personality, if some rightist and centrist contributors had been included at the conference to impose a greater intellectual challenge and test for what this group of authors wanted to present.

Much is made in the book of the fact that none of the "winners" in the Cold War predicted how it would happen. But the analytical perspectives represented in this book would hardly in the mid-1980s have forecast how resoundingly the East Europeans and Russians would reject Marxism and what it stood for. As Dr. Summy admits, the Australian peace movement has had trouble figuring out how to celebrate the collapse of the Berlin Wall as its own "victory" (p. 9). Much of this collection comes across as an interesting, but also strained, attempt to do so.

Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post–Cold War Era. Edited by John A. Vasquez, James Turner Johnson, Stanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 239p. $39.50.

Marc Howard Ross, *Bryn Mawr College*

A paradox worth considering is how little attention the development of the field of conflict resolution has attracted from scholars of international war and peace. To be sure there are some significant exceptions, such as recent interest in the specific phenomenon of war termination, but a central reason for the absence of a broader discussion is that the core assumptions of theories of conflict resolution make little sense to the dominant theoretical approaches in international relations.

John Vasquez and his colleagues set out to directly challenge international relations' resistance to ideas about conflict resolution on several grounds through a series of essays presenting the central ideas and approaches of conflict resolution, and suggesting how ideas and practices primarily developed in domestic settings (often in the United States) might be relevant for understanding and settling global conflict. The ten essays offer a good balance between an interdisciplinary group of authors from the field of conflict resolution and international relations scholars who consider how conflict resolution might be relevant to their work.

The main hypothesis motivating the volume is that there are sufficiently important similarities between different levels of conflict so that conflict resolution lessons learned at the interpersonal and domestic levels ought to be highly relevant to global conflict. Each essay has something to say about this question and the editors do a careful job in cross-referencing connections among the essays. In addition, John Vasquez's concluding essay underlines common themes and reasons to articulate a cross-level theory of conflict and conflict resolution.

Baruch Bush and Ron Fisher's essays in Part 1 provide brief but effective introductions to domestic and international conflict resolution which ought to be particularly useful for those who know little about the field. Bush comprehensively traces the rise of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement and its relationship to the legal system, discusses the use of mediation, arbitration, and negotiation, considers criticisms of ADR, and analyzes structural incentives and constraints to its use relevant in both the domestic and global arenas. He distinguishes between directive and connective institutions, pointing out that the former are more prominent in the domestic arena and the latter at the global level. This difference is one of degree, and not kind, he argues, and this means that in the global arena "there are fewer constraints on the creativity of conflict resolution, but also less direction toward using it" (p. 22). Fisher provides less of a survey and focuses on a contingency model connecting the stages of a conflict to the choice of intervention techniques that include settling interest differences, improving the parties' relationship, controlling hostility, analyzing the conflict, and reducing inequality.

The four essays in Part 2 explore interconnections between domestic and global conflict resolution. Deborah Kolb and Eileen Babbitt provide a fine discussion of mediation practice and its global relevance, offering a very useful discussion of such issues as mediator neutrality, authority, techniques and tactics of effective practice, and the mediator's crucial role in framing conflicts to make them amenable to constructive settlement. They also consider the important issue of how cultural frameworks and disputants' expectations affect the course of conflict resolution. Louis Kreisberg, while arguing that there are important continuities between domestic and international conflict, warns against too easily assuming that the two are identical. International conflict is more likely to involve bounded entities, to occur in a system without overarching political-legal authority, and to involve different issues. If these distinctions are understood, Kreisberg argues that many of the conflict resolution techniques relevant in domestic settings can be used in international ones as well.

Dean Pruitt's essay on the relevance of the psychology of social conflict to international conflict summarizes a great deal of substantive material in a short space. I found it comprehensive and insightful. For example, I particularly like his ideas about the conflict resolution implications of key psychological features of interpersonal relationships. However, I am not sure how effectively newcomers to the field will digest the wide range of material he introduces or understand its relevance for international conflict resolution. John Burton's essay on "conflict provention" (his term) is the weakest in the volume; much of his case (which is available elsewhere) is made through assertion and simplification, while hard issues such as the psychocultural status of basic needs are glossed over.

The three essays in Part 3 shift their attention to the global arena; inquiring into how international politics is often understood presents both opportunities for and obstacles to conflict resolution. John Vasquez's strong essay challenges core assumptions of the realist paradigm, most particularly the assumption that the absence of centralized authority in the international system means that it is fundamentally different from domestic politics. He offers a general approach to international conflict, with a particular emphasis on territorial issues that can be integrated with questions about conflict resolution. James Turner Johnson explores how conflict resolution concerns are compatible with both realist and idealist views of international law. Charles Doran's analysis of international power cycles leads to hypotheses about the relationship between system structure and the propitiousness of conflict resolution strategies. While these authors suggest important weaknesses in realist assumptions, each can also be seen as calling for a better appreciation of the contingent nature of realist formulations and a need to more clearly specify the contexts in which they are more or less likely to be useful.

The volume's wide-ranging essays propose a number of useful cross-context propositions about conflict resolution and suggest important ways in which the isolation of international politics as a separate field of study has not been beneficial. Importantly, they do not stop at stating that there is no difference between the domains, but stress continuities, which are explored through a thoughtful consideration of important questions that closer integration of the fields of conflict resolution and global politics would address. It is not difficult to see the value of their approach because it links domestic and global insights to such important phenomena as contemporary ethnic conflict, which frequently has both domestic and international dimensions that are well understood and manipulated by key actors. A single collection of essays rarely alters a field by itself. One can hope, however, that this book can advance a discussion and exchange which has taken place only at the margins of political science.

Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy: By David Vogel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 322p. $39.95.

Lynton K. Caldwell, *Indiana University at Bloomington*

The author, Professor of Business and Public Policy at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, states his argument in his initial paragraph:

> This book describes how the making of trade policy and the making of regulatory policy are influencing one another. It examines how international and regional trade negotiations, agreements, and disputes are affecting and being affected by national consumer and environmental regulations. It analyzes the growing political linkages between the formerly distinctive policy areas of trade and protective regulation within the European Union, in North America, and around the world. The main theoretical contribution of this work is to link the comparative study of regulatory policy to that of international political economy. It makes this contribution by demonstrating the connection among the domestic roots of national regulatory policies and preferences, national political and economic power, and regulatory outcomes.

The expansion of domestic health and consumer safety regulations during the last three decades has raised the question of domestic nontariff barriers to recent free trade initiatives. For example, the U.S. effort to ban the importation of Mexican tuna under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (the tuna-dolphin controversy) was reversed by a adjudicating panel under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This decision led to opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by most of the U.S. environmental-advocacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The conflict was vigorously pursued in the press. For example, 25 environmental and public interest NGOs took out a full-page message in the *New York Times* of 15 November 1993 headlined "Environmental Catastrophe: 8 Fatal Flaws of NAFTA."

The theoretical contribution of this book is more extensive than the author claims. The author's main concern is with the interactive connection between "the domestic roots of national regulatory policies and preferences, national political and economic power, and regulatory outcomes." The domestic roots of national policies are, of course, embedded in a soil of social movements and organized interests. The relationships between these movements and interests are subject matter for political analysts. The larger theater in which these relationships are played out, often with a klaidoscopic dynamic, is now global—a context implicit in the book's subtitle "in a global economy."

Within the global economy Dr. Vogel has focused primarily on international trade and on domestic health, safety, and environmental regulations that might obstruct or distort it. There ought to be no criticism for his selective treatment of the global economy. But the global economy may also be understood to include more than trade and economic interests. Obviously all of these aspects of the emergent global economy would not be treated adequately in a single volume. Yet political scientists using this book might link it to other aspects of a globalizing world. Some of these linkages are implicit in the author's thesis and illustrative cases among others.

There are two linkages in particular that some political scientists might find it profitable to explore further. One is the rise, role, and political influence of nongovernmental civic organizations. NGOs are not indexed per se in the book although their presence is implicit in many of the illustrative cases. The other linkage is the influence of international agreements on domestic policy outcomes. The NGOs are increasingly transnational in interests and actions and have played major roles in influencing and initiating national domestic legislation through treaties and other binding agreements.

Although NGOs are commonly identified as voluntary citizen initiatives covering a wide range of causes, notably with environmental, health, safety, and professional concerns (e.g., planning, education, and standards), multinational corporations are also nongovernmental organizations, many exceeding the economic power of particular governments. How the linkages between transnational nongovernmental policy-shaping influences and their outcomes in domestic policy and law are effected is a fertile field for political science cultivation. Vogel's book is a contribution to this line of inquiry.

Vogel's thesis is that international trade may either trade up (raise) or trade down (depress) national standards for health, safety, and the environment. But he believes that trading up is the more probable. His argument and illustrative cases are persuasive. A reinforcing factor for this thesis is the important influence of civic NGOs in those countries having higher quality of life standards that they have played major roles in establishing. Their influence has been evident in numerous domestic and international conflicts in which the outcomes in effect shape domestic policies.

Legislation by treaty is not new to the United States. Article VI of the Constitution declares that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Congress was believed to have no authority to regulate the taking of migratory birds until the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916. The constitutionality of congressional protective legislation was confirmed in the case of *Missouri* v. *Holland*, 252 US 416 (1920). Trade in the plumage of birds was a significant factor in inducing environmental legislation.

This early example of trade-induced environmental protective legislation has been paralleled and augmented manyfold by "the internationalization of regulation." The author points out that neither the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade nor the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Community, mentions the word *environment*. By contrast, the 1987 Single European Act addresses the relationship between the creation of the single market and European environmental standards, as does the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (p. 12). The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement includes a Supplemental Agreement on the Environment—a price exacted by NGOs for congressional approval of the NAFTA.

Trading Up is not the only book on trade and environment (see also Zaelke, Orbuck, and Hausman, *Trade and The Environment: Law, Economics and Policy*, 1993; Patrick Low, ed., *International Trade and the Environment*, 1992; and OECD, *Environmental Effects of Trade*, 1992). But it is the one of the most probable interest to most political scientists. It opens the way to many research inquiries on the outcomes of the various linkages and of their possible global extension (e.g., the southward expansion of the NAFTA concept to Central and South America and the eastward expansion of the European Union). The outcomes of these linkages and their successes or failures may provide many dissertations, articles, and books in coming decades.

The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International Adjustment since 1945. By Michael C. Webb. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 269p. $37.50.

Helen Milner, *Columbia University*

This book is one of a number of recent efforts to assess the impact of increased international capital mobility. Webb's argument is different from the others in at least three major respects. First, his claims are based solidly on open economy macroeconomic models. Second, his argument is about the nature and extent of international monetary cooperation. Third, he sees the compromise of embedded liberalism as still intact but under attack.

Webb maintains that, contrary to conventional wisdom, international economic cooperation has not decreased since the 1970s. Cooperation since 1970 has been tried more often than before, has become much more intrusive into domestic politics, and may have failed more than previously. These changes in cooperation are due to changes in the structure of the international economy, namely, to increased capital mobility. Thus, he disagrees fundamentally with hegemonic stability theory.

Webb bases his argument on open economy macroeconomic models. In the 1950s and 1960s cooperation on external policies of adjustment (trade and capital controls) and symptom management (financing of balance of payments imbalances) occurred regularly. With increasing integration of capital markets, however, such coordination became neither possible nor useful. Instead, countries had to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies to achieve domestic objectives, a much harder task since it intruded directly on their policy autonomy. Hence, changes in the nature of cooperation were dictated by changes in the structure of the international economy, while the specific terms of the agreement were determined by political variables that shaped a country's bargaining power.

This argument has at least three shortcomings. First, whether capital mobility has increased dramatically and why it did so are only passingly addressed. In economics a vigorous debate exists as to whether capital mobility has increased much and whether it is very extensive. Hence, was there a change in Webb's independent variable? Why capital mobility increased, if it did, is also important since it bears on whether it is reversible or not. Webb casually suggests that both exogenous forces and government policies created this new international economy. But if government policies created it, can one rule out that changes in those policies can make capital less mobile? The question becomes why did government choose policies that enhanced capital mobility and why might they alter those policies? Second, the economic model used is most appropriate for economies, like those in the EU, with fixed exchange rates. When exchange rates are flexible, governments theoretically retain the ability to pursue autonomous monetary and fiscal policies even when capital is mobile. Webb argues that empirically they do not follow such a course, and this failure is a major point of contention in economics. Why countries desire fixed exchange rates then is also puzzling. Third, he cannot explain why cooperation succeeds sometimes and fails at others. Without a theory of states' preferences, his economic and bargaining models cannot answer the question. A better developed theory of domestic politics would serve him well in this regard.

Webb's conclusion is that capital mobility is unlikely to be reversed but that this may create greater economic turbulence since increased cooperation is not inevitable. Although the rest of his argument is fairly novel, this conclusion echoes other writing on the topic. Webb's major contributions are to challenge the empirical record on the extent of cooperation since 1945, to ground arguments about the effect of capital mobility in sound economic reasoning, and to devise a theory to predict the nature of economic cooperation. These contributions make the book a very worthwhile read.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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